Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of democratic trends in previously non-democratic states, the attention of scholars and government officials has focused on prospects for democratization in the Third World.1
Analysts looking at the Arab world have differing views about prospects for democracy. A number of them have pointed out that there has been widespread popular dissatisfaction in the Arab world recently with authoritarian regimes.2 Some argue that democratization in that region is being accelerated by pressures from outside.3 Others look primarily to internal factors within each state to determine whether democratization will occur.4 Some argue that it would be impossible for democracy to emerge in the Arab world today.5 Most analysts agree, however, that the major competitor against democratic trends in the Arab world is political Islam, whose success in Iran and more recently in Sudan and Algeria seems to indicate that authoritarian systems more readily give way to Islamic fundamentalist regimes than to democratic ones.
In the Arab world today, as the perceptive Gulf scholar Jamal al Suwaidi has pointed out, the predominant form of government is authoritarian, either in the form of a traditional monarchy or in the form of a quasi-military dictatorship.6 No full-fledged democracy has emerged in any Arab state since World War II. Yet Americans, and others who live in democratic systems, tend to assume that the "natural" course of events in the history of a polity is in the direction of democracy, whether by evolution or revolution. Some Americans, including President Clinton's former National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, add to that thesis a strong connection between democracy and a free market economy.7
This paper will examine these and other questions related to the internal political system of one developing country, the United Arab Emirates, a small federation governed in a traditional way by tribal leaders who exercise broad powers based on hereditary rights. The internal situation in the UAE has largely been ignored in recent years by the world's press and by foreign governments, because (unlike Algeria) there is no crisis in the country and (unlike Iraq) it is not causing trouble for its neighbors. But because a number of apparent contradictions and potential stress points exist within the political and social fabric of this country, it is worth examining what makes its political system function, and what its future prospects are.8
STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES?
To the casual outside observer, the political system in the UAE appears beset by actual and potential problems:
•The economy is extraordinarily dependent on foreigners, who make up at least 80 percent of the resident population, the highest percentage of any country in the world.
•The foreign population is highly heterogeneous;
•The political system is traditional and authoritarian, governed by an oligarchy of the seven ruling tribal sheikhs;9
•Natural resources are unevenly distributed among its seven constituent emirates;
•Between the two wealthiest emirates, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, there are significant differences in life-style and in attitudes toward economic and social issues;
•The government has engaged in a public and vitriolic dispute with Iran, a vastly larger and much more powerful neighbor sitting just fifty miles away across the Persian Gulf.
Looking only at these objective factors, one might assume that the UAE was on the verge of a breakdown caused by the convergence of a series of major problems. Does the disintegration of other federal states (the USSR, Yugoslavia) serve as an example for the UAE? Does the worldwide trend toward democratization mean the UAE's political system will change? Will the cohabitation of so many disparate ethnic groups and the absence of an assimilation policy lead to violence (as in Lebanon)? Is the confrontation with powerful Iran dangerous, since the UAE is so vulnerable? ·
The UAE political system is however not as fragile as it might appear. Despite the factors cited above, it has, in fact, sources of strength and resilience which will probably protect it in the short run and can be mobilized by its UAE leadership to maintain the essentials of the current system even in the longer term.
DEMOGRAPHICS
Crucial to the longevity of the UAE political system are two economic facts: (1) the country produces more than two million barrels of petroleum per day, generating sufficient revenue to sustain a population of two million people at a high standard of living; and (2) it has nearly 100 billion barrels of recoverable reserves (more than four times that of the United States), enough to allow current production to continue for over 100 years. This good fortune has permitted the UAE, over the past quarter century, to bring in hundreds of thousands of foreign workers to supplement the national labor force in the petroleum industry, in other industries and in all of the services required for a modem economy.
The presence of a very large number of foreigners in the UAE,10 however, has not created serious social or political problems, for several reasons. First, as a result of petroleum wealth, the government provides everyone - nationals and foreigners alike - very inexpensive social services (medical care, education, etc.) and levies no taxes. In addition, foreigners working in the country, whether they are Asians or westerners, make more money than they would back home. Foreign workers know that they are not to become involved in politics, criticize the government or otherwise disturb the peace, or they will be sent home.
The UAE is not a "melting pot." Many separate and distinct social and ethnic groups reside in the UAE side by side, each maintaining its own cultural identity and tolerating the others, in a live-and-let-live environment. The largest groups - Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Filipinos - as well as smaller ones which have been in the country for a long time such as the British, have their own schools, their own clubs, and their own places of worship, and they tend to spend their leisure time with their own people. The foreigners learn just enough Arabic to get by. Many spend a minimal amount of their earnings, sending most of the money home to relatives.
The frictions that have arisen have been minor. One British businessman in Dubai, for example, learned from experience that it was prudent to hire only Pakistani workers or only Indians but not both for the same work place, to minimize tension.11 And the government usually leaves private clubs alone, although in one celebrated case in 1992, members of a theater troupe playing in an Indian club in Dubai were tried, convicted and jailed for blasphemy because they had acted in a drama that reportedly ridiculed Islam, Christianity and Hinduism. In December 1992, when a mob of Hindus in the Indian city of Ayodhya destroyed the Babri Masjid mosque, and Muslims rioted in protest in many places, Muslims living in the UAE (mostly Pakistanis in Dubai and al Ain) also took to the streets and carried out violent acts against Hindus. These demonstrations lasted only about two days, however; the government promptly rounded up several hundred suspects and deported them. The protests suddenly stopped; jobs were more important.
In 1994-95 the government showed concern about the demographic imbalance when it set up a ministerial-level commission to recommend ways to reduce dependence on foreign workers; it subsequently issued regulations limiting the number of domestic servants per household and prohibiting the lowest-paid workers from bringing their families with them.12 But by the middle of 1997, the 80:20 foreigner-national ratio had not changed substantially.
Virtually all foreigners are required to leave the UAE when they finish their work. The very few exceptions include a group of Yemenis who were granted citizenship by Sheikh Zayid in the 1980s and a handful of expatriate Arabs who have worked for the government for more than 20 years were allowed to retire and stay - although not all of them have been naturalized. Some outside observers have wondered why the UAE does not adopt a policy of naturalizing selected foreign professionals who contribute significantly to the national economy and welfare, to reward them for service and give them more of a stake in the country's future. Americans tend to believe this would be beneficial to the UAE, as it has been to the United States. But the UAE leadership believes naturalized citizens cannot be trusted fully especially in a crisis.13 This attitude is rooted in the essential tribal nature of UAE society, where family is primary and foreigners, although treated quite hospitably, are not made part of the family. It also indicates a desire to maintain control of the system and keep its wealth in the hands of those who currently have power. As long as skilled foreign workers are willing to work without citizenship, there is little incentive for the government to give them more than monetary benefits.
In fact, throughout the 25-year history of the UAE there have been no substantial frictions caused by the presence of such large numbers of foreigners. The prevailing social climate has always been one of tolerance. UAE nationals, virtually all of whom are devout Muslims, follow conservative social habits in their dress code, male-female relations and public behavior. But they do not force non-nationals to follow these rules. Thus for example many UAE women are veiled and segregated from men, while Western women living in the country dress and follow social behavior essentially as they would in their home countries. Extensive dependence on foreign labor has however caused problems of a more subtle and less visible sort. Since there are not enough UAE nationals in education or in the judiciary, the UAE government must hire judges and teachers from other countries to staff the courts and the schools, and occasionally the recruits bring with them views and attitudes which are alien to those held by UAE nationals. Some teachers and judges with radical Islamic ideas have been inadvertently brought to the UAE, and they have had an influence, although how much is difficult to know. For example, in 1993, a judge in Fujairah handed down amputation sentences for two convicted smugglers. Although amputations are permitted by Islamic law under certain circumstances for some crimes, UAE judges have in recent memory never ordered any, so the Fujairah case caused alarm among UAE nationals. It turned out that the judge was an Egyptian who had just recently arrived and had brought radical Islamic views with him to the UAE. He apparently assumed, incorrectly, that he could and should apply Islamic law strictly. His sentence was overturned by an appeals tribunal made up of UAE nationals, and his subsequent judgments were more in conformity with UAE custom.14
There has also been some tension at the UAE university between the more than 100 young UAE nationals on the teaching staff, who have PhDs, and the older, more experienced faculty members, brought in from countries such as Egypt, who hold positions as department heads and deans. The younger staff members believe that as nationals they ought to have more say in the management of the university because it is their country. The outsiders, on the other hand, tend to believe they know best what students need, and that the nationals are not yet ready to assume more responsibility. The appointment of five nationals to top university positions in 1995 helped to reduce the complaints from that group, but foreign teachers still constitute a majority. A question remains whether the ideas they impart to nine thousand UAE undergraduates at the university are the most appropriate in educating them for future leadership. The same question must be asked about lower stages in the education system, where thousands of non-nationals teach, using approaches and ideas from their home countries. In many cases, these ideas are different from the philosophy of tolerance and cooperation which prevails in the UAE. When government officials each year hire thousands of foreign school teachers for the UAE schools, they cannot possibly screen them adequately for a suitable fit with the environment.
Similarly, the presence of thousands of foreign nannies taking care of children in UAE nationals' homes is likely to have a long-term cultural and social impact on the next generations. Most of the nannies are Filipinas or other non-Arabs, who speak little or no Arabic and know nothing about the local culture. As with judges and teachers, the resulting long-term impact is unknown, but it potentially significant.
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
The political system functioning today in the UAE is essentially tribal and authoritarian. Each of the rulers of the seven emirates holds his position because he is the senior personality in the leading tribe of that emirate, and he is likely to be succeeded by his eldest son or brother. In the UAE, there are none of the classic attributes of democracy, such as regular elections between candidates for public office, strong non-governmental "civil society" institutions, or a middle class wholly independent of the government. Although a recent opinion survey indicated that a large percentage of UAE nationals at the university favored democratization,15 the issue is not a prominent subject of discussion either in public or private, inside the country or outside it. In 1991, after Desert Storm, there was some informal discussion among a small group of educated nationals about the possibility of increased democratic participation in governance, and this was reported in the press at the time. It did not however result in a significant movement in the UAE working for democratic reform, although students and intellectuals occasionally discuss the subject privately.
Several factors account for this. First, Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan al Nahyan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi emirate since 1966 and the president of the UAE since its establishment in 1971, is universally respected and admired throughout the country. He is an authentic father figure, who is looked up to with enormous respect by essentially all nationals. This paternalist aura has been acquired over time. His proven leadership skills convinced the senior members of his Nahyan tribe (with support from the British) to install him in 1966 as ruler in place of his older brother Shakhbut. In the three decades following that bloodless palace coup, Zayid's decisions on countless major and minor questions, and his handling of all domestic and foreign crises have demonstrated his skill and solidified his position as leader of Abu Dhabi and the UAE. He maintained his strong ties with the key tribes in the country, and at the same time he worked well with the growing modern sector, bridging the two. He was decisive and tough when he needed to be, but a dominant characteristic was his ability to reconcile domestic and non-UAE adversaries. The only other leader to acquire national prestige and status equivalent to Zayid's was Dubai's ruler Sheikh Rashid, who held the post of vice president of the UAE from the country's establishment until his death in October 1990.
Zayid acquired and maintained his leading position because of his personality and leadership skills, and because he headed the wealthiest emirate. The establishment of the United Arab Emirates as a nation coincided with the dramatic growth of petroleum wealth in Abu Dhabi emirate, where 90 percent of the country's oil and gas are produced. This naturally enhanced Sheikh Zayid's prestige, since the arrangement in the federation is that the five poorer emirates are massively subsidized by Abu Dhabi and to a lesser extent Dubai. These two emirates pay for roads, hospitals, schools and other benefits throughout the nation.
Zayid's authority, however, is also based on an emotional attachment of his people that goes beyond rational factors. His skills were evident long before Abu Dhabi became wealthy. Although he spent the first four decades of his life in an impoverished pre-oil economy, he was able to use sudden oil wealth wisely (on education, social services and dramatic improvements to the environment) during the next four decades. Despite his lack of formal education, he was known as a person who could articulate the aspirations of his people and could find the right word to say in any situation, whether speaking with a group or an individual. The tribal system is characterized by direct access of ordinary people to their ruler to express grievances, and for years Sheikh Zayid and other senior leaders were quite accessible. This kind of direct access has almost disappeared, yet Sheikh Zayid's views are transmitted regularly to the people through the mass media and he remains universally respected.
Power in effect rests in the hands of the ruling sheikhs of the seven constituent emirates, who make all of the important decisions in the country, collectively or individually. There are no elections, no parliaments, and no formal mechanisms through which the people can participate in public-policy decisions. There is a Federal National Council, whose members are appointed, according to a regional quota system, by the ruling sheikhs of the seven emirates. The FNC does summon federal ministers to defend their respective policies, and these discussions - which are open to the public and fully reported in the press and on television - sometimes evoke complaints from representatives of the poorer emirates about the inadequacy of the ministry's services. This public FNC debate has brought some policy issues out into the open where the UAE public can hear some of the grievances being aired, although sensitive political issues (such as policy towards Iran) are not debated in open FNC sessions, and generally the basic decisions of government are still taken behind closed doors.
The council of ministers has from the beginning included representatives of all seven emirates, apportioned according to an informal quota system. The first cabinet formed in December 1971 had only twelve members, but when it became clear that nearly all twelve of the slots would be filled by members of the ruling families (i.e. sheikhs), the cabinet was expanded to nineteen members in order to include some non-sheikhs. It had to be expanded to twenty-two in 1972 when Ras al Khaimah joined the federation. It was expanded to twenty-nine the following year, when Abu Dhabi abolished its own independent cabinet in return for more seats in the UAE cabinet. An unwritten rule seems to be that since the president of the UAE has been from Abu Dhabi, the prime minister is from Dubai. Also, the deputy prime minister has been from Abu Dhabi. The quota has remained essentially in place, reflecting not only the strong federal character of the system but also the uneven power and influence of the seven emirates. Even the 1997 cabinet change did not essentially alter the basic proportions of cabinet seats allocated to the emirates.16
Local affiliations of the UAE cabinet ministers
|
1972 |
1995 |
1997 |
Abu Dhabi |
6 |
6 |
8 |
Dubai |
5 |
6 |
7 |
Sharjah |
3 |
4 |
2 |
Ras al Khaimah |
3 |
3 |
2 |
Ajman |
2 |
1 |
2 |
Um al Qaiwain |
2 |
1 |
1 |
Fujairah |
2 |
1 |
1 |
In the UAE, there is also no active "civil society" - usually considered a requirement for a true democracy - though a few intermediary organizations which are not strictly governmental do exist, such as the Abu Dhabi and Dubai chambers of commerce, some private literary groups, and the Sociological Society. A few informal discussion groups meet in private homes to explore issues of the day, but there are no major professional, employee or guild interest groups which act as collective bargaining units to strengthen the hands of individuals in dealing with government officials or rulers. The chambers of commerce theoretically represent UAE businessmen to the authorities, for example, but their members are appointed by emirate rulers, so they do not have independent bases of power from which to challenge the government.
There is also no independent middle class, usually considered one of the prerequisites of democracy. It is true that there is a growing group of UAE business leaders and professionals who are well educated, have modem skills and are active in the economy. Virtually all of them, however, enjoy incomes dependent on the government in one form or another, whether they are salaried - bureaucrats, petroleum sector employees, university professors, medical personnel, etc. - or on lucrative government contracts for the many construction and other projects throughout the country. Government salaries are not extravagant and have not risen substantially in recent years. In fact, in 1994 and 1995, government employees in the poorer emirates demonstrated briefly for higher pay. But, generally speaking, there has been little serious agitation of this sort, because the total benefits enjoyed by UAE citizens - including almost free medical care and education plus subsidized housing - are enough to keep them basically satisfied.
In addition, a very important factor behind the political stability of the UAE is the prevailing perception among nationals that the gap between rulers and ruled is not too great. Although members of the ruling families clearly enjoy special privileges and have a higher standard of living than average citizens, they are not perceived to Jive in extravagant fashion. Sheikh Zayid himself sets a tone of relative austerity, given the circumstances of his position as ruler. Although he has access to resources in the billions of dollars, he does not spend a great deal on himself. He prefers to live in fairly small and modest palaces, eschewing air conditioning, and he enjoys spending a fair amount of time in the desert. At the age of about 80, he still maintains the appearance of a physically fit and austere bedouin. He shuns an entourage and enjoys driving his own car. He has been seen driving the streets of Abu Dhabi at dawn, making sure that the street sweepers and municipal park workers are keeping the city pristine.
The UAE federal system functions well because a balance has been achieved between centralization and local control that satisfies the constituent elements. Each of the seven emirates controls its own economy and finances. This allows the ruling families of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the two wealthy emirates, to ensure that most of the wealth generated locally goes to their respective citizens and that each can maintain control with little outside interference. Thus Abu Dhabi, which has most of the UAE's gas and oil but little else to sell, devotes its attention to developing that industry and to using resulting profits for investment and the welfare of its citizens.
Dubai, by contrast, which will run out of petroleum reserves in a decade, gives priority to international trade, building on the commercial skills and long-standing international business connections of its merchants. With the support of the Dubai government, this emirate has become the most active trading, transport and re-export center in the region. Dubai has the world's largest man-made seaport in addition to modern communication links, world class hotels and other facilities such as golf courses, which have induced hundreds of foreign companies to relocate their regional headquarters there. As a result, Dubai has now replaced Bahrain (earlier Beirut) as the preferred business and trading center in the Middle East. Dubai's attention to international trade has brought with it a more open and inter-national atmosphere than Abu Dhabi's, and the two emirates occasionally diverge in regulations affecting trade and business.17 Also, there is a certain friendly rivalry between the two emirates which manifests itself in the sponsoring of separate international trade fairs, motor boat competitions and the like.
In May 1996, the Supreme Council decided to make the provisional · constitution of 1971 permanent, and to confirm that Abu Dhabi would continue to be the capital of the UAE. This did not however mean any significant political change but rather was a further step toward institutionalizing the prevailing system, with Abu Dhabi and Sheikh Zayid clearly at the head of it.18
Finally, in the UAE today there is no significant radical Islamist movement, although small groups of nationals and foreigners do meet and discuss religious issues. The absence of organized political Islam in the UAE is due to the factors mentioned above, especially the general level of prosperity and satisfaction with the economic situation, the absence of a serious perception of corruption or unfairness in the distribution of wealth, and the absence of a Shia/Sunni cleavage (there are a few UAE Shia families but the distinction is not an issue.)
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
The UAE's authoritarian political system appears to be very stable, showing no major signs of internal tension. No identifiable opposition groups have formed inside or outside the country, and close observers have found no indications that there are grievances causing significant discontent below the surface. Yet, in view of the turbulent political history of the region, it would be unwise to predict with certainty that this system will remain unchanged indefinitely. The fact that Sheikh Zayid has held the post of president for the entire quarter century since the country's founding in 1971 has given the UAE stability, but by the same token, his passing will inevitably create uncertainties, no matter how well his successors govern. Because of the current strengths of the system, the most likely scenario for substantial change would be a combination of simultaneous external and internal stresses, coming at the same time. The most serious external source of stress would be a precipitous economic downturn, caused by a sharp decline in the price of oil and gas. If the government were no longer be able to provide social services without charging fees or imposing income or other taxes, demands might arise for public participation in decision-making concerning the use of these funds. If taxes were imposed on foreigners as well, they might feel unfairly disadvantaged without the right to vote.
A second possible external source of stress might be the dramatic escalation of a conflict with a neighbor, and the most likely protagonist under present circumstances would be Iran. An ongoing verbal feud has taken place between the UAE and Iran since early 1992 over the disputed islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs, and the mutual mistrust is deep. Such a conflict could have domestic political consequences if the UAE leadership were seen to be weak or ineffectual in confronting the crisis.
A third possible external source of stress might be a substantial political change, such as an Islamic revolution, in one of the neighboring Gulf Cooperation Council states. This would have a psychological impact in the UAE since the GCC states share a similar (although by no means identical) social and political structure.
Finally, pressure by Western governments to democratize could theoretically develop as an additional external source of stress, but this has not yet happened, despite some general rhetorical promotion of democracy by U.S. policy makers.19
As for internal sources of stress, one might be the demise of Sheikh Zayid, simply because he has dominated the UAE political scene for a quarter century. This eventuality is never discussed publicly, but it comes to people's minds when they think of possible future crises. Crown Prince Khalifah, Zayid's oldest son, would take over as ruler of Abu Dhabi emirate and very likely also as UAE president.
Although Sheikh Khalifah has in recent years exercised day-to-day executive authority in Abu Dhabi for his father and has a reputation for doing that well, he has not yet been fully tested at the national level. Local custom and precedent indicate that he will have to prove himself by dealing wisely with challenges as they arise. If he does not, the ruling family will find a way to remove and replace him. Everyone remembers that in the 1960s, when Abu Dhabi suddenly began to receive oil income, the ruler, Sheikh Shakhbut, was not seen as able to use the oil revenues to modernize the emirate and bring benefits to his people. In 1966 he was eased out and replaced by Sheikh Zayid, who demonstrated that he did know how to spend the new money developing a modem state. If such a change in leadership were to occur again, it is likely that it would be similarly non-violent and amicable, because of recent tradition and an understanding within the Nahyan family.20 Also, there is little reason to think that outside intervention would be necessary.21
This is not to predict that Sheikh Khalifah will fail the test of leadership. His style will be different from Sheikh Zayid's because his personality is different. But the mere existence of the possibility of peacefully installing a more capable leader serves as an escape valve for the system whenever pressures build.
The five poorer emirates lack the means to act independently, but Zayid's departure from the scene could produce some competition for national leadership between his sons and the senior members of the Maktum family which rules Dubai, if the latter are tempted to play a more prominent role than heretofore in national politics. Since the death in 1990 of the scion of the family, Sheikh Rashid bin Said al Maktum, his three sons, who jointly inherited his mantle, have concentrated most of their attention on developing the emirate, leaving major national decisions including those concerned with foreign policy primarily in the hands of Sheikh Zayid. It is likely that the felicitous cooperative arrangement set up between Zayid and Rashid will be continued by their sons in the future. It benefits both families and both emirates. But uncertainty could be another stress point in the system.
Finally, an important internal factor that will affect perpetuation of the political system is how well the leadership will be able to maintain its current image of relative austerity, and avoid the emergence of a visible gap in lifestyle and in accessibility between rulers and ruled. Extravagant spending by future leaders could undermine public confidence in them.
The celebrated fourteenth-century Arab historian Ibn Khaldoun described the stages which authoritarian regimes go through. He said the leader of a pastoral society, who had natural goodness but no organized means of coercion, would be replaced by a dynastic family leadership with exclusive authority based on a popular corporate spirit (asabiyya), and a common ancestry and religion. This dynasty would build towns and cities and bring greater prosperity but would eventually become weakened, usually because of tyranny, extravagance or a loss of the ability to command, and would be replaced by another authoritarian leader from within the family or another dynasty.22
Ibn Khaldoun could not have foreseen today's circumstances, but his belief in the staying power of the authoritarian tribal systems should not be discounted. Indeed, it is likely that the UAE system will remain fairly resistant to change unless more than one of the potential stress factors kick in simultaneously and weaken it. The government might then decide to begin to modify the system, even perhaps by introducing of democratic participation. Allowing critics to express their grievances in legitimate channels - such as converting the Federal National Council into an elected body with some powers - might be an effective way to spread the responsibility for policy decisions beyond the narrow confines of the ruling elite, thus defusing the criticism. Islamists might enjoy some protection if they claimed to be merely a religious group, but if the government encouraged moderate and secular critics to have their say, this might help counter-balance the fundamentalists and channel the debate away from the government. On the other hand, if the government prevented all criticism from taking legitimate forms, it would probably be driven underground or into the mosque, where it would, in the long run, become more dangerous.
The UAE's political system is remarkably stable today. If its leaders handle their challenges well, it could survive with only modest change for some time to come.
1 I. William Zartman, "A Search for Security and Governance Regimes," chapter 3 in David Gernham and Mark Tessler, eds., Democracy, War and Peace in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 48.
2 Mark Tessler and David Gernham, "Introduction", in Gernham and Tessler, Democracy, War and Peace, p. ix. See also Rami G. Khouri, "Democracy East and West," in American-Arab Relations: A New Beginning? (Washington, DC: Foundation on Democratization and Political Change in the Middle East, Summer 1995), pp. 68-76.
3 Michael C. Hudson, "After the Gulf War: Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World," Middle East Journal 45:3 (Summer 1991) pp. 407-26.
4 Jamal al Suwaidi, "Arab and Western Conceptions of Democracy," chapter 5 in Gernham and Tessler, Democracy, War and Peace, pp.82-115, especially pp. 84-85.
5 Hilal Khashan, "The Quagmire of Arab Democracy," Arab Studies Quarterly 14, no. I (Winter 1992): 30, quoted by A.M. Lesch in Gernham and Tessler, Democracy, War and Peace, p. 224. See also Khouri, "Democracy East and West", passim. Shatiq Ghabra, in "Democratization in a Middle Eastern State: Kuwait 1993", Middle East Policy, vol. Ill no. 1, 1994, p. 119, says it is uncertain whether Kuwait's democratic experiment will work.
6 Suwaidi, op.cit., p. 91.
7 Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," in Foreign Affairs, March/April 1994.
8 Studies of groups of states, such as F. Gregory Gause, III, Oil Monarchies (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), provide some insights into the way they work, but generalizations also distort because each country is unique, and this book does not give an entirely accurate picture of the UAE, for example.
9 Unlike in some other Arab countries, the term "sheikh" is used in the UAE exclusively to refer to male members of a ruling family of one of the seven emirates. In Saudi Arabia, by contrast, it is also an honorific title, and elsewhere it designates a religious official. A tribal system is based on ties of kinship; and leadership tends to be hereditary.
10 For a useful discussion of foreign workers in the UAE and elsewhere in the Gulf, see Frauke Heard-Bey, "Kulturelle Aspekte der Zuwanderung in die Golfstaaten," Vortrag, Zentralinstitut der Universitaet Erlangen, 3 December 1994.
11 Persona l interview, Abu Dhabi 1993.
1 2 During the discussion, regulations on household servants were narrowed to exclude UAE nationals, who tend to have the highest number of servants.
13 Persona l information, Abu Dhabi, 1994.
14 UAE press, 1993, and private interview in the UAE, 1993.
15 Suwaidi, "Arab and Western Conceptions," pp. 99-100.
16 1972 information from A.O. Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, 1950-85 (London: Croom Helm, 1987) pp. 208-09, 214-15. The 1995 and 1997 information is from official UAE sources. The 1997 cabinet is listed in Emirates News, March 26, 1997. Numbers include the prime minister and deputy prime minister.
17 Dubai agents for foreign businessmen cannot represent their clients in Abu Dhabi or vice versa.
18 Al Khalij, May 21, 1996, p. 1, and Khalij Times, May 21, 1996, p. 1.
19 Anthony Lake has spoken about democracy as a worldwide goal, but it has not been an issue in the U.S.-UAE relationship; for a discussion of the U.S. government's view of democracy in the UAE, see Suwaidi, "Arab and Western Conceptions," p. 103.
20 In the 1920s, Sheikha Salama, mother of the current UAE president and widow of Sheikh Sultan, who had been murdered by a relative in a palace coup, extracted a commitment from her sons not to kill each other, a rule they have respected to this day. See Frauke Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates (London: Longmans, 1982), p. 150.
21 A recent example of a palace coup - in June 1995 in Qatar, next door to the UAE - was nonviolent, and no outside elements intervened.
22 Abdul Rahman ibn Khaldoun (1332-1406), Al Muqaddima, trans. by F. Rosenthal (3 volumes, London, 1958), vol. I, pp. 65, 163, 330; cited by Albert Hourani in his A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 2-3.
Middle East Policy is fully accessible through the Wiley Online Library
Click below to subscribe to the online or print edition of Middle East Policy and gain access to all journal content.