Turkish identity politics are commonly explained as a clash between two forces, the modernizing state and the traditional society. According to this model, Turkish modernization has taken place because of efforts of the state against the resistance of societal forces. It is true that a limited modernization, primarily understood and practiced as material Westernization, was largely a state-imposed project during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire and the first decades of the Turkish Republic. The West was perceived as the only source of civilization to which Turkey tried to belong. Turkish foreign policy has been put into the service of this national goal of becoming a part of Europe. In accordance with this policy line, Turkey became a member of NATO and eventually applied to become a member of the European Union (EU). Turkish participation in NATO was welcomed due to Western security needs – no questions asked about its internal political system. The EU application, however, has not been as smooth.
The EU demands that its prospective members meet a number of conditions. In the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, it was decided that the fitness of candidates for membership would be judged by a number of criteria concerning economic and political reforms including minority rights. More important, as an evolving supranational political entity, the EU requires its members to relinquish a substantial portion of their national sovereignty to its centralized decision-making body. What started as a loose economic cooperation among European nation-states is steadily evolving into a supranational political entity with a common economic, defense and foreign policy. It is this reality that upsets the sensitive balance between nationalism and Westernization within Turkish political and intellectual elites.
This paper argues that the case of Turkey’s EU membership process indicates that the nationalist sensitivities of the Kemalist Turkish political establishment outweigh its Occidentalist outlook. Despite 75 years of Westernization policies, the Turkish state ideology has not achieved a process of common identification with the West that would diminish its sensitivities to issues of national independence. Westernization was largely a material process, aiming to curb the influence of the Islamic sociopolitical cultural legacy of the former political establishment. On the subconscious level, the founding elites, who fought a bitter war of independence against the invading European powers, experienced Westernization as a process that took place against and in spite of the West rather than in partnership with it. Now this lack of common identification puts pressure on the nationalist nerves of the political establishment while the country is making progress towards EU membership. The irony, however, is that they cannot make a sharp U-turn. EU membership has been effectively framed as a culmination of the process of Turkish Westernization and modernization. Similarly, the opposition to the EU has been framed as being mounted by traditional forces within the society. The membership was presented as the last nail in the coffin of Turkish political Islam. Interestingly, the Islamic political movement willingly accepted this role, blasting the EU as a “Christian club.”
For all sides, the membership was useful political capital while the persistent European rejection of Turkish candidacy provided a comfortable playing ground. However, the EU’s surprising decision to grant Turkey official candidacy status at the Helsinki summit of 1999 changed things dramatically. Turkey was presented with a clear road map of political and cultural reform. The Kemalist political establishment, including the politically strong Turkish military, was caught strategically and psychologically unprepared. From their nationalistic perspectives, the membership conditions such as the recognition of Kurdish cultural rights posed real threats to national security and integrity. Hence these elites joined the EU opposition camp with the Turkish nationalists, while Islamists started to advocate membership. This was a complete turnabout.
The opposition to the EU within the Turkish political and intellectual establishment is cognitive rather than material, rooted in the way Kemalism perceives the country’s security environment and constructs threats to its national security. These perceptions are shaped by historical experiences with some of the European powers who, following the Treaty of Sèvres, occupied Turkey after World War I. The perpetual fear that this scenario would be repeated operates strongly in the Turkish nationalist subconscious. A close analysis of the writings of leading Kemalist intellectuals as well as statements of high-ranking generals suggests that this image of a conspiratorial West bent on the destruction of Turkish national integrity with the collaboration of “internal enemies” continues to exert a strong influence on their foreign-policy mentality. The opposition is also based on fears that Turkish national sovereignty would be rendered meaningless by EU membership.
The liberalized elites in Turkey, who do not share this fear-based security identity, perceive membership differently. For them, it would bring additional protection for Turkish boundaries and, more important, protection of human rights. They accuse the nationalists of interpreting the concept of national security as meaning “state supremacy” and claim that their panic results from fears that state supremacy rather than national sovereignty will fade away if Turkey becomes a part of the European integration process. Thus the EU membership debate in Turkey is a battle of security cultures.
THE KEMALIST CULTURE OF INSECURITY
The Turkish Republic was founded on the statist-nationalist ideology of Kemalism, a zealous process of Westernization and secularization. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding father of the republic, tried to base the state ideology on six principles: republicanism, secularism, populism, étatism, nationalism and revolutionism. The distinguishing characteristics of Kemalism were nationalism and secularism, as the Turkish Republic needed to emphasize its difference from the former political establishment. In line with the ethnically “homogenous” nations of the West at the time, the republican elites wanted to construct an entirely new and homogenous Turkish nation from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, officially recognizing all the Muslim ethnic minorities (including Kurds) as descendants of Turkish tribes. Islamic cultural expressions representing continuities with the past were liquidated by means of reforms that aimed to create a clean cultural slate on which a new definition of nationhood was to be drawn.
Despite its zealous attempt to break from the past, however, the Kemalist mindset itself had roots in the intellectual debates on modernity during the last 100 years of the Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Kemal was a central figure in the Ottoman bureaucracy, having studied in the elite military schools and having served in key military positions. He followed the lively debates of modernization and Westernization in the intellectual circles of Istanbul. Many of the reforms he initiated were earnestly discussed and debated during this period. The Republican reforms and state ideology thus reflect a strong relationship with the political evolution of the Ottoman Empire.
As Dietrich Jung observes, basic ideas of Turkish nationalism – Anatolia as the Motherland, Turkish historical consciousness and the Turkish language as the cultural foundation – were the result of intellectual discourses on the political future of the Ottomans. As he notes, there is a strong similarity between the Kemalist principle of secularism and the French political thought that influenced the intellectual discourses in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire.1 Distinct from the Anglo-American view of secularism as the neutral separation of state and church, this view emphasized a militant surveillance of religion and religious institutions by the state. The new Turkish nation was to be Westernized in the sense that religion would be reduced to symbols and rituals rather than continue in its central place in daily life. Religious institutions would be held under close scrutiny by the state, which alone could define the boundaries of religiosity. Religion and religious institutions were believed to constitute the most formidable barriers to secularization. The vacuum left by the eradication of Islam from the moral world of the people would be filled by an alternative ideology: Turkish nationalism, based on an imagined ethnic and cultural homogeneity. This was to be an alternative source of legitimacy to bind people emotionally to each other and to the state.
As Kevin Robins argues, “The nation was imagined as the embodiment of civilized values. Defined in opposition to the Islamic past, it would be a secular and rational nation. Defined in opposition to the cosmopolitanism of the Ottoman Empire, it would have a strictly national identity.”2 Unlike multiethnic and multicultural Ottoman society, Turkey’s Muslim population was assumed to be ethnically homogeneous. “Turkey belongs to Turks,” reminded the nationalist rhetoric; Atatürk praised Turkishness, declaring “Happy is he who calls himself a Turk.” The image of ethnic homogeneity was enforced by allowing only Turkish to be used as the language of instruction.
While the cultural and religious rights of non-Muslim citizens were protected as minority rights by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, Muslim ethnic and sectarian differences were denied distinct cultural representation. “Turkish ethnic identity” was thought of as an exact replacement for the Muslim millet under the Ottoman administrative system, defined in terms of religion rather than ethnicity. Accordingly, Turkish ethnicity would embrace other Muslim ethnic groups. Ironically, by denying them a separate ethnic identity and perceiving them as “ins” rather than “outs” of Turkish ethnicity, the system opened to them paths toward upward social and political mobility. Kurds and other Muslim ethnic groups were not excluded from this project of nation building; hence, Muslims could not be given minority status. This image of homogeneity was defended against attempts to reveal its artificiality, and such attempts were perceived as directed against national integrity and security.
The Kemalist project of secularization reflected a desire to purge the influence of Islamic institutions from the daily lives of Turks rather than to establish a system in which the political and the religious were separated from each other. As historian Emmet Kennedy points out, the secularist model borrowed from the West was “a secularism at war with the spiritual heritage of the West,” influenced by the French Jacobin mentality.3 While the authoritarian interpretation of state-church separation has evolved over time to a more democratic and procedural one, Kemalist ideology has remained stagnant. The state still perceives outward expressions of Islamic religiosity in hostile terms, tending to view Islamic cultural and politicalassertions as a security threat. Mustafa Erdogan maintains that the Turkish practice of secularism shows the characteristics of a political religion rather than a neutral separation of the state and religion.4 Accordingly, Kemalism’s alertness to Islamic cultural assertiveness (such as student headscarves) is deeply entrenched in its view of national security. Increased Islamic and Kurdish cultural awareness constitute a major source of the Kemalist culture of insecurity.
These attempts to limit Islam’s sociocultural influence and to break from the past, however, were not caused by Kemalism’s Westernism but by its unique blend of radical secularism and nationalism. Kemalism’s seemingly anti-Islamic outlook did not lead it to internalize Western values as part of its identity. The perception of the West in the Kemalist mindset was influenced by nationalism and national-security concerns influenced by historical experiences like the Sèvres treaty, Western support for the PKK and, recently, recognition by some European parliaments of an alleged Turkish massacre of Armenians during World War I. Therefore it would be justified to argue that despite the political rhetoric of Westernization, the image of the West in the Kemalist mentality continues to represent the Other. Kemalist intellectuals and the media frame the West in general and Europe in particular as a potential source of danger, reflecting a lack of common identification with it.
Coverage of sports in the Kemalist leaning media is a useful source for analysis of this mentality. The framing of international sporting events involving Turkish athletes and teams with nationalistic rhetoric is widespread in the Turkish media.5 In one particularly illustrative case, Milliyet, one of the leading secularist newspapers in Turkey, reported the victory by Galatasaray, a leading Turkish football team, over Real Madrid in the European Cup final with the following first-page headline: “Europe Kneeled.”6 Its highly nationalistic tone apart, this description indicates the lack of common identification with Europe. Turkey is not perceived to share a common European identity. On the contrary, the Spanish team is regarded as representing a larger European group; its defeat in the soccer field is regarded as Europe’s defeat.
In another case where French and Turkish spectators clashed during a St. Germain versus Galatasaray soccer game held in March 2000, the Turkish secularist media framed the action of French supporters as reflecting deep historical enmity towards the Turks. According to Milliyet’s coverage of the events, “The French who attacked the Turkish spectators with the advantage of their overwhelming majority [in the stadium] and with a Crusader mentality began to hit everyone haphazardly.”7 Oktay Eksi, a veteran Kemalist columnist in Hürriyet, apparently disturbed by these events and their low profile in the French media, arrived at far-reaching conclusions: “We cannot stop asking after experiencing this hypocritical behavior of the Western societies that, in the name of becoming a part of modern civilization, would it be worthwhile to place ourselves in the same camp as these depraved people?”8
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AS A CONTESTED AREA
Throughout much of its modern history, Turkey followed a pro-Western foreign policy that is institutionalized in its NATO membership. However, the Ottoman relationship with the West was also strong, as the Ottomans developed close economic and political ties with France and were allies of Germany and Austria during World War I.9 Turkey supported France during the Algerian war of independence and was one of the first to recognize Israel. This could also be explained as a strong reflection of the Kemalist lack of identification with the Islamic, and particularly the Arab, world. On the other hand, Turkey’s most fundamental decisions to engage with Western institutions such as NATO and eventually the EU were taken during the tenure of non-Kemalist premiers, Adnan Menderes and Turgut Özal, respectively. These politicians challenged the Kemalist isolationist foreign-policy line based on the principle officially attributed to Atatürk: “Peace at home, peace abroad.”
With the end of the Cold War, the past that Kemalism tried to bury started to haunt the present. The demise of the Soviet Union, which led to the emergence of several independent Turkic/Muslim nations as well as the subsequent events in the Balkans, forced many Turks to come to terms with their historical, cultural and religious legacy.10 Contributing to this was the aftermath of the Gulf War: several thousand Iraqi Kurds crossed Turkish borders escaping from Saddam Hussein’s ethnocide. Prime Minister Turgut Özal embraced the Northern Iraqi Kurds as “relatives of our citizens,” referring to their linguistic links with Turkey’s own Kurdish population. Furthermore, events in Bosnia, Kosovo and Chechnya revived feelings of ethnic solidarity among the Turkish Bosnians, Albanians and Chechens, destroying the myth of Muslim ethnic homogeneity.
Many would attribute changes in Turkey’s foreign-policy orientation to the changes in the Turkish security environment in the post-Cold War era. According to this logic, Turkey started to question its place in the Western alliance system and embark on a more activist role in regions that were previously closed to Turkish influence. As a result, Turkey was able to expand its sphere of influence, i.e., the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. This interpretation does not explain why it was only during the tenure of non-Kemalist premiers (Özal and briefly Erbakan) that Turkey moved to a more assertive and multi-directional foreign policy, and returned to an isolationist and inward-looking one during periods of the military’s increased role in politics such as the period since February 28, 1997.
This difference is attributable to Kemalism’s sense of insecurity. As argued above, the Kemalist security culture is constantly fed by fears of national disintegration by Kurdish insurgency and the rise of Islamic “fundamentalism.” This perpetual fear is based on the idea that Turkey’s ethnic and cultural homogeneity is the foundation of its national integrity. Attempts to shatter this myth will cause disintegration and thus constitute national security threats. The West is perceived in this culture as involved in a project of undermining Turkish national unity. This trauma is historically rooted in the experience of occupation of Turkish territories by Britain, France and Greece following World War I. In the Kemalist reading of history, this attempt to occupy Turkey was foiled by a miraculous defense of the country under the commandership of Mustafa Kemal, who later established the modern Republic of Turkey and trusted its internal and external defense to the military.
As Dietrich Jung and Wolfgang Piccoli state, the same fears influence the Kemalist establishment’s perceptions in regard to Western interest in Turkey’s human-rights issues and the Kurdish problem:
The prevailing sense of distrust in its most extreme manifestations also involves Ankara’s European partners as well as Turkey’s most staunch ally, the USA. Turkey’s inability to confront the Kurdish reality has led Turkish decision makers to perceive Western pressure for enhanced democratization and respect for human and minority rights through the lens of Sèvres. European reactions to Ankara’s human-rights violations and military campaigns in South-Eastern Anatolia and Northern Iraq have increasingly aroused indignation in Turkey, where the Kurdish issue is strictly viewed through the prism of the territorial integrity of the state.11
Cumhuriyet, Turkey’s most authentic Kemalist newspaper, regards Italy’s protection of Abdullah Öcalan in 1998 as yet another paving stone on the road from Sèvres.12 Meanwhile, one of the most vocal critics of EU membership, Erol Manisali, writes in the same newspaper that the Öcalan affair revealed the inner intentions of Europeans. For him, the Europeans never will accept Turkey as belonging to their own group but view it as one of the Islamic nations like “Egypt, Iran, Pakistan and Jordan,” and their intention is to subjugate Turkey.13 Hasan Pulur, another leading Kemalist intellectual, argues that Western interest in the Kurdish question is not sincere but intended to rekindle the Sèvres dreams: “The West and their internal collaborators, who have not forgotten the Sèvres in history’s dust bin, associate human rights with the Kurdish question, as if human-rights abuses are only directed against citizens of Kurdish origin.”14
On the other hand, there is a liberal view that the source of Turkish insecurity as perceived by Kemalism is imagined, and that external challenges are exaggerated. Turgut Özal, a champion of political liberalism, accepted the view that the Kurdish problem should be solved by allowing greater cultural presence for Kurdish identity. Today his views are shared by many others both inside and outside the state apparatus. Kemalism, on the other hand, as represented by the military and some intellectuals in the media,15 denies the very existence of any ethnic problem and ardently opposes any call for cultural rights. These two different security perceptions result in different approaches to foreign policy, particularly in the case of Turkey’s EU membership prospects. For many liberal secularists, the fear of national disintegration is baseless and often used to prevent further democratization.
This liberal interpretation of Turkish security challenges the Kemalist perceptions of security threats. European norms of territorial integrity and human rights are at odds with the Kemalist ideology that feels acceptance of such norms by Turkey would threaten national security. Murat Belge asks if this fear of disintegration is caused by worries that Turkish national integrity would not be able to withstand the EU’s democratization norms, rather than by a real, conscious policy of the European Union.16
TURKEY AND THE EU
On April 14, 1987, Ali Bozer, minister of state in Turgut Özal’s cabinet, submitted Turkey’s official application for full membership in the European Community. The Commission responded negatively to this application after two years of evaluation. It judged Turkey unprepared for joining the Community for reasons that included the need to expand political pluralism and to improve human rights, as well as the persistence of disputes with Greece on the issue of Cyprus.17 Since then, Turkey has repeatedly asked for recognition of its official candidacy but did not back its demand with sufficient political reforms. After a long period of Turkish insistence and European resistance, the EU at its Helsinki summit of December 1999 accorded Turkey the status of official candidacy. Although Turkey’s record of human rights and progress in reforms basically remained the same, this change of policy on the part of the Europeans was caused by two factors. First, the rise of social democratic governments, particularly in Germany, changed the European perception of the EU as a Christian entity.18 Secondly, by hitting the ball into the Turkish court, the Europeans freed themselves from the burden of thinking about the Turkish membership problem.
This was a historic turning point; for the first time Turkey was offered a specific road map with conditions (Copenhagen Criteria) to be fulfilled in return for membership. This created a new mood of optimism in Turkey and a strong motivation for implementing the required economic, political and human-rights reforms. However, the Turkish political establishment was very slow to put these reforms into practice, and the Nice summit of December 2000 did not name Turkey in the official strategy of expansion until 2010, causing anger in Turkish political and intellectual circles, which questioned Europe’s sincerity.19 Nevertheless, the European Council declared an Accession Partnership on February 26, 2001, and the Turkish government prepared its own National Program for the Adoption of EU membership on March 19, 2001. Turkey is now officially en route to becoming an EU member, provided that it meets the necessary Copenhagen criteria. Politically, the candidate country is required to achieve “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities.” The EU’s 1999 enlargement report states, “There has been little evolution of the situation in Turkey with regard to human rights and minority problems.” 20
In addition to Europe’s change of policy, there is a parallel change of attitude toward Europe in Turkey’s Islamic political movement. Today no political force, including the Kurdish separatist movement, opposes the country’s membership in the EU. In the context of the militarization of politics in Turkey that intensified after the February 28 process, the Islamic opposition revised its stance and has begun to give full support to the idea of membership. It would be flawed logic to frame Islamism as the only source of anti-Westernism in the country as some analysts, including Meltem Müftüler-Bac, suggest. Agreeing with Samuel Huntington that Turkey is a country torn between the modernizing state and resisting traditional societal forces,21 her simplistic account divides the country into two camps:
One is based on the modern, secular, Western-oriented discourse, and the other is traditional, Islamist, and Oriental in its formulations . . . . In the past decade a number of traditional elements, most prominently the Islamists, began to challenge Turkey’s official identity. The Islamic movement in Turkey has always opposed the process of modernization and Europeanization.22
This is at best an outdated account.
Turkish society seems to have been sharply divided into two opposing camps as far as EU membership is concerned, but not along the lines she suggests. Since the militarization of politics during Erbakan’s government in 1997, Islamists have started to campaign for EU membership. Yet even before that, there was disunity among Islamists on the membership issue. Some moderate Islamic groups, like Fethullah Gülen’s movement, supported the European integration process from the very beginning. Gülen does not share the establishment’s security fears: “We will not lose anything from our religion, nationality and culture because of developments like globalization, customs union or membership in the European Union.”23 Although Islamist parties in Turkey opposed the EU ardently, the two currently active Islamist parties support EU membership. Tayyip Erdogan, popular leader of the Islamic leaning Justice and Development party, is strongly in favor of EU membership: “In a developing and globalizing world, we view the membership as necessary in order not to remain on the fringes of civilization and development as a peripheral nation.”24
Many skeptical political observers point out that Islamist support for EU membership is tactical; they would simply like to use the membership process to improve their own political rights. However, as Ihsan Dagi suggests, this presumably purely tactical support is slowly becoming internalized into their identity.25 The main obstacle to this internalization seems to be the European indifference to many human-rights problems in Turkey that involve religious people. While the European governments and human-rights organizations including the European Court of Human Rights have been very sensitive to Kurdish human rights, they have maintained a persistent indifference to political problems like the headscarf issue and the closure of Islamic-leaning political parties. As a reaction, many Islamists perceive their support for EU membership to be a unidirectional rapprochement that does not have much resonance among Europeans themselves.
EU membership enjoys the support of Turkish society in general. According to a public-opinion poll conducted by Piar Gallup in September 2000, 68.7 percent of the respondents living in 17 large Turkish cities were in favor of EU membership, while only 9.9 percent indicated their opposition. The overwhelming majority also supports political and cultural reforms demanded by EU membership. Those who favor EU membership believe that it would bring economic benefits (49.6 percent) and enhance Turkey’s strength and significance(12.4 percent).26
According to another poll conducted in November 2001 by Anar, an Ankara-based social research center, both the supporters and opponents of the membership increased, suggesting a polarization on the issue. 72.5 percent of the respondents in this poll indicated their support, while 20.9 percent were opposed. Interestingly, the majority of the respondents in the same poll stated that they were observing their Ramadan fasts regularly (67.9 percent) or occasionally (12.4 percent).27 This suggests that conservative values and EU membership are not considered irreconcilable.
Despite this popular support, the political establishment is rather slow in making the necessary progress towards membership. The EU has placed radical demands on Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy. At the top of these conditions is the democratic principle of civilian control of the military, which would decrease the political leverage powerful generals have enjoyed. Both military and civilian leaders coming from nationalist and Kemalist ideological backgrounds would like to see the continuation of the militarization of politics, which they perceive as a guarantor for the regime. Hence, they oppose any call for further democratization. Because of Turkey’s “special” conditions, they argue, the democratization process has reached its natural threshold, and moving it further would only jeopardize national security. Does Europe force democratization beyond these natural limits in order to destabilize Turkey, or is this fear of destabilization the result of a culture of insecurity? Kemalist and nationalist political circles believe in a grand European design to put Sèvres back into practice, while the liberals think this belief is a result of historical trauma. Ahmet Davutoglu explains why this insecurity syndrome is linked to the process of European integration:
The historical reflex caused by the division of the Ottoman Empire by European powers first through religion-based and then ethnic-based differentiations is the primary reason why Turkish policy makers mistrust the Copenhagen criteria that appear quite objective to other candidates. Turkish policy makers think that the Turkish Republic, born on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, obtained sovereignty and security guarantees through the Treaty of Lausanne [in 1912] and perceive that any changes in this would produce security risks.28
The fear of national disintegration seems to divide policy makers sharply. Even the government – comprising three parties, the Democratic Leftist party (DSP), the Nationalist Movement party (MHP) and the Motherland party (ANAP) – is divided. As regards membership, there are sharp divisions between MHP and the others. Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of MHP and the deputy prime minister, accused the EU supporters in Turkey of lobbying for the interests of the EU in Turkey. His party fiercely opposes reforms such as amending the laws limiting freedom of expression. In this sense, it is now the political party closest to the sensitivities of the military and commonly regarded to have replaced the Republican People’s party (CHP) as the party closest to the political establishment. European diplomats are also concerned with the synchronization of the ideas of the military and MHP, referring to a letter written by MHP’s vice-president Sevket Bülent Yahnici, who sternly criticized Turkey’s longing for EU membership.29 In this regard, MHP’s worries resonate closely with those of the military.
As the bastion of Kemalism and the self-appointed guardian of national security, the military resists political reforms that would challenge the official myth of ethnic homogeneity that, for them, is the basis of national integrity. They view all cultural rights in this context. For instance, the reform that would allow Kurdish-language TV broadcasting is regarded as a security problem, because, like headscarf-wearing university students, a TV channel in the Kurdish language reveals diversity in Turkish society and indicates Kemalism’s failure to create a homogeneous nation. Policy makers and intellectuals adhering to this culture of insecurity perceive themselves as surrounded by enemies with internal collaborators. In this regard, the European integration process is viewed as a siege on Turkey, pressuring it to make highly fraught reforms that would endanger its national security.
The military leaders have expressed their anti-EU opinions in recent years. Retired General Suat Ilhan, an outspoken critic of Turkey’s EU membership, brings up some of these concerns in his book Why “No” to the European Union?. He believes that Turkey’s membership in the EU would be detrimental to its political independence and therefore against Turkish national interests. His rationale, however, is rather cynical: the support of Greece as well as the Kurdish political groups for Turkish membership are presented in his book as evidence of the threats it would pose to the country:
[Look at those] who were delighted by Turkey’s EU candidacy: Greece, the Patriarch of the Fener Rum Orthodox Church Bartholomeos, the Greek Cypriot, the PKK supporters who in fact demonstrated against our candidacy in Europe, HADEP and Apo (Abdullah Öcalan). Please tell me candidly, don’t you at least suspect that there is something wrong with this?
. . . . If Turkey joins the EU, the independence of [our] country will lose its present meaning; we will be part of EU’s independent [entity] and sacrifice our own sovereignty . . . . The independence that Atatürk longed for was not this . . . . Atatürk showed [us] civilization rather than Europeanization as [our] mission. Integration with Europe is incongruous with Atatürkist thought.30
What Ilhan and many others close to the political establishment fear is the transformation of state sovereignty in the European Union. The EU itself does not deny that membership transforms sovereignty. The official EU website informs that, “in accepting the European Treaties, Member States relinquish a measure of sovereignty to independent institutions representing national and shared interests.”31 The Turkish military is ideologically unprepared to accept any degree of change in the definition of sovereignty or the ceding of any national rights to European supranational institutions. The Sèvres trauma is caused by anxiety over the changing nature of national sovereignty within the EU. While European integration melts sovereign states into a supranational entity, ethnic and cultural characteristics are emphasized. This is a two-way process: the decreasing weight of nation-states leads to the increased significance of cultural minorities that were suppressed within the boundaries of nation-states.
The ideology of Turkish nationalism with its state-based definition of national sovereignty resists the changing notion of sovereignty in Europe, as the Union evolves into a supranational political entity with a common economic and defense policy. However, the liberals respond to these concerns by arguing that Turkish participation in European integration will result in increased territorial security. Cengiz Çandar, for instance, argues that EU membership will end the risks of territorial disintegration and of the possibility of a state based on religious rules, because the entire Turkish territory will be under EU protection.32 Similarly, Etyen Mahçupyan alleges that anti-EU groups in Turkey do not fear that EU membership will divide the country:
Today those who chant slogans of independence are bringing the country to the verge of national disintegration themselves, as their independence can only survive with the supremacy of the state. For the sake of an ill-fated independence, they are making the country more authoritarian and repressive. The EU is really an “imminent and explicit” threat to this project, not for the reasons they cite, but because it requires democratization.33
Many political analysts believe that the state’s policies are the determinant factors in the rise of Kurdish ethno-nationalism.34 Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller argue that the main difficulty in solving the Kurdish problem is that it has been perceived as a “national security problem,” making all public debates largely taboo.35 Many nationalists would regard such liberal views as naïve if not ill intentioned. For them, there is a real danger to Turkish national security if Turkey participates in the European integration process. They fear that EU protection would mean the delegation of authority from Ankara to Brussels. They ask what would remain of the country’s independence. Dogu Perinçek, leader of the Workers party and one of the most radical EU critics, raises these concerns:
Once you decide to enter the European Union, your capital becomes Brussels; your parliament and your government will be located there. If relinquishing the Turkish parliament, [the national capital city] Ankara, national industry and agriculture, Turkish [national currency] lira and dismantling Kemalist revolutions is a “dishonor,” then there is no honorable entry to the EU.36
These worries are strongly shared by many, including some of the high-ranking members of the armed forces. Major European newspapers interpreted the recent militarization of politics in Turkey and what they understood as the military’s attempt to block required reforms as an indication of their uneasiness with the prospects of membership. For instance, Die Welt remarks on the role of the military-dominated National Security Council in watering down reform proposals. It cites Serafettin Elçi, a liberal Kurdish politician, as claiming, “There are very powerful circles who would do everything in order to block Turkey’s route to the EU.”37
The military’s opposition to EU membership was most explicitly revealed by an official declaration issued by the office of the chief of staff stating that the membership process with its reform conditions encourages the terrorist PKK (the Kurdistan Worker’s party) movement. The office of the Turkish chief of staff chose the day when Prime Minister Ecevit was in France attending the EU summit to issue a declaration accusing those who advocate extending cultural rights to Kurds as those “who speak the same tongue as the PKK”:
The developments that encourage the PKK, which has been trying to gain a place for itself in the platform of so called democracy and human rights, take place in the context of Turkey’s entry into the European Union . . . . Some EU members have been the main factors behind [the PKK] movement’s survival by offering overt and covert assistance to it.38
Shortly after this declaration, Turkey’s Military Academy organized a seminar on EU membership, where high-ranking military officers found a chance to declare their “individual” ideas. The academy’s commander, Nahit Senogul, declared that EU membership is extremely dangerous for Turkish security and that, if Turkey accepted all the conditions, it would never survive the consequent disintegration and fundamentalism. General Simsek’s speech at the same conference was more interesting, in that for the first time a military officer used rhetoric commonly attributed to the Welfare party, saying that the EU was a Christian club based on Christian culture, which is a system of values and way of life shaped by Christian beliefs under the Vatican’s influence.39
The military and the nationalists have influenced the EU membership process most significantly by shaping Turkey’s reform program, endorsed by the cabinet on March 19, 2001. The program falls short of meeting all the demands of the EU, especially regarding Kurdish politics, the position of the military in politics, and the future of Cyprus. The 1000-page National Plan was interpreted by many observers as a declaration of Turkey’s unwillingness to join the EU rather than its desire to participate in the ongoing integration process. To the dissatisfaction of European leaders and domestic supporters of membership, the program confirmed the military’s position that
the official language and formal language of instruction of the Republic of Turkey is Turkish. This, however, does not prohibit the free usage of different languages, dialects and tongues by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. This freedom may not be abused for the purposes of separatism and division.
The military and nationalists in government resisted the inclusion of many of the required reforms in the plan.40 Generals gave final shape to the plan in the National Security Council, blocking reforms that would allow a number of cultural rights for Kurds.41 The reference to Turkish as the only language of instruction in schools does not correspond with the reality that English, French and German are widely used as languages of instruction and broadcasting. Education or broadcasting in these languages does not provoke fears of territorial disintegration or challenge the Kemalist myth of ethnic homogeneity and perceptions of national security.
In recent months the EU-membership debate gained additional momentum following a diplomatic scandal. The anti-EU forces acquired hundreds of the emails of Ambassador Karen Fogg, the EU representative in Turkey, and leaked them to the press through Dogu Perinçek. These emails contained conventional criticism of the Turkish state and its standard of democracy, but the nationalist circles succeeded in framing it as a scandal. Many Turkish politicians, however, perceived this as a plot, and Foreign Minister Ismail Cem described it as “an ugly crime,” prompting legal action against Perinçek.42 Many observers believe that the leak was organized by influential forces within the political establishment, though the Turkish intelligence service (MIT) and the General Staff immediately denied any involvement.
The military continues to practice its high-profile criticism of the EU, however, attesting to the fact that foreign-policy decision making in Turkey is extremely decentralized. A quite surprising criticism of the EU came from General Tuncer Kilinç, general secretary of the powerful National Security Council. Arguing that Europe looks negatively on Turkish national interests, the general suggested that Turkish foreign policy explore the possibility of strengthening ties with Russia and Iran.43 While Kilinç insisted that this statement reflects his personal opinions, General Huseyin Kivrikoglu, the chief of staff, backed up the military’s criticism of Europe by making a statement to an influential Turkish defense magazine that “terrorist organizations working against Turkey enjoy support and protection in many European countries.”44 Traditionally independent-minded generals are apparently annoyed by the treatment Turkey receives from the Europeans, including their refusal to list the PKK as a terrorist organization. Furthermore, they would like to create a larger strategic role for Turkish foreign policy in the context of September 11, particularly in the energy corridors of Central Asia and the Caucasus. However, this expansion of the Turkish sphere of influence would not be achieved by a complete retreat from Europe. On the other hand, the Turkish military offers contradictory views on foreign policy.
Former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan’s visit to Iran was blasted by the military as an indication of the growing influence of Islamism, and Iran was mentioned explicitly in the February 28 decisions as a national-security threat. Turkish politics is truly unpredictable when generals talk about a strategic partnership with Iran and Islamists have become supporters of the EU.
ALTERNATIVES IN FOREIGN POLICY
General Kilinç’s “personal” recommendation that Turkey look for strategic alternatives in the East reflects the growing unease with the prospect of EU membership. Although several civilian politicians have stated that achieving EU membership is state policy, there are clear signs that reactions to Europe are growing stronger within the Turkish political establishment. Interestingly, anti-EU groups are also the ones that have traditionally opposed strong Turkish involvement in the Middle East, except through partnership with Israel. Turkey’s Islamic identity is always viewed from Kemalism’s secularist perspective as a fact to deal with rather than an opportunity. However, the fact remains that Turkey can tear itself from neither the West nor the Muslim world. It is a permanent bridge between the two.
In the aftermath of September 11, there have been some claims, by both Turkish and Western policy makers, that secularist Turkey can be a model for the Muslim world. It also seems that U.S. policy makers are inclined to perceive Turkey in such terms. Although the Turkish interpretation of Islam offers an alternative and certainly an antidote to terrorism, a model requires both a successful presentation and some demand on the part of the Muslim world. The current Turkish political system with its dominant ideology of radical secularism is simply not welcomed by most Muslims. On the other hand, restrictions on cultural plurality and the continuous violation of human rights prevent Turkey from being perceived as a model of Muslim democracy. As M. Hakan Yavuz argues, the Turkish model can only be viable if it is based on universalism, Anatolian Turkish-Islamic civilization and the teachings of Islam, as opposed to radical secularism.45
Turkey, which has totally stripped itself of its Islamic identity, has found itself in the awkward situation of being accepted by neither the Muslim world nor the West.
There are some strong indications that Turkish foreign-policy officials have recently begun to realize this fact. Foreign ministers of the countries that are members of the EU and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) came together in a historic summit meeting in Istanbul on February 13, 2002, to discuss the impact of September 11 on their relations. The meeting, accompanied by a series of intellectual panels on civilizational dialogue, highlighted a significant change of orientation in Turkish foreign policy. For the first time, Turkey accepted and brought together two of its presumably conflicting identities, in obvious contradiction with radical secularist ideology. Turkey’s leading role in the OIC was welcomed both by European and Islamic leaders and scholars. It also enjoyed widespread support from Turkish intellectual circles. For instance, veteran foreign-affairs columnist Sami Kohen described the organization as the “the most successful initiative of Turkish diplomacy in recent years.”46 Through this meeting, Turkey emphasized the European aspect of its national identity and had the European leaders endorse it. Although the architect of this idea was Foreign Minister Cem, a member of the Democratic Leftist party, it remains to be seen if this will be endorsed by influential isolationist circles within the Turkish political establishment, who not only firmly oppose Turkey’s active involvement in the Islamic world, but also resist implementation of the political reforms required for EU membership.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Turkish membership in the EU is now the most important item on the political agenda in Turkey. Participants in this discussion include politicians, academicians, journalists and even the military. Some view membership, with its attached conditions, as a threat to Turkish national security and sovereignty; some view it as an opportunity to expand Turkey’s sphere of influence. The politically powerful anti-EU groups in Turkey are able to influence the process of political and cultural reform and thus slow down the progress of the country toward membership. Yet they are not able to present a viable alternative for Turkish foreign policy. Kemalists have forcefully Westernized Turkish society and now find it difficult to reverse the process. Even the Islamic political and social groups strongly desire EU membership. Radical Kemalists and ultra-nationalists remain the only opponents. Their reactions attest to the fact that Westernization policies have not caused an internalization of the West into their national identity. Therefore, the evolution of Europe into a supranational entity disturbs these groups, who are sensitive to national sovereignty. They also fear that democratization and cultural reform would transform the concept of a “homogeneous nation,” which they perceive as the basis of national security. However, this idea simply does not appeal to Turkey’s extremely young, increasingly better educated and socially mobile middle class within the limited boundaries of an isolationist nation-state. The new generation does not support the old foreign-policy doctrines based on fear and insecurity. This new generation is dynamic and outwardly oriented, desiring to participate in the world economy and receive their share. If the Turkish political system cannot channel the energy of its population into productivity, it will be a fertile ground for social and political problems.
If Turkey remains a country at war with its religious and cultural diversity, unwilling to participate in regional integration project, and crippled by a fear of national disintegration and a sense of being surrounded by enemies, it cannot offer anything to others. As a member of the European Union, Turkey could better respond to the demands of its population and offer itself as a viable model to the Islamic world. Both Europeans and Islamic nations would benefit from the example of the nation accepting its dual national identities in peaceful coexistence. With its rich cultural and religious heritage, it can offer itself as a platform for a dialogue of civilizations.
1 Dietrich Jung, “Die Rache Der Janitscharen: Der Türkische Modernisierungsprozeß Und Seine Blockade,” Orient, Vol. 40, No. 2, 1999, pp. 211-233.
2 Kevin Robins, “Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe,” Questions of Cultural Identity, Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay, eds. (London: Sage Publications, 1996), p. 71.
3 Emmet Kennedy, “The Tangled History of Secularism,” Modern Age, Vol. 42, No. 1, 2000, pp. 31-38.
4 Mustafa Erdogan, “Islam in Turkish Politics, Turkey’s Quest for Democracy without Islam,” Liberal Düsünce, Vol. 4, No. 14, 1999.
5 For a discussion of the link between sports and nationalism, see Vic Duke and Liz Crolley, Football, Nationality, and the State (London: Longman, 1996).
6 “Avrupa Dizçöktü,” Milliyet, August 26, 2000.
7 “Ahlaksiz Fransiz,” Milliyet, March 14, 2001.
8 Oktay Eksi, “Onlar Budur . . .,” Hürriyet, March 15, 2001.
9 For further information on this issue, see Resat Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century (New York: SUNY Press, 1989).
10 The influence of the Balkan crisis on Turkish national identity is discussed by M. Hakan Yavuz, “Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism,” Critique, No. 12, 1998.
11 Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, “The Turkish-Israeli Alignment: Paranoia or Pragmatism?,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2001, p. 94.
12 “Sevr’e giden yol,” Cumhuriyet, December 5, 1998.
13 Erol Manisali, “Avrupa’nin Önyargilari ve Avrupa Birligi Rüyasi Görenler,” Cumhuriyet, February 24, 1998. Manisali presents his arguments in opposition to integration with the European Union and the Customs Union in two books: Erol Manisali, Türkiye-Avrupa Iliskileri (Istanbul: Çagdas Yayinlari, 1998); and Erol Manisali, Gümrük Birligi’nin Siyasal ve Ekonomik Bedeli (Istanbul: Baglam Yayinlari, 1996).
14 Hasan Pulur, “Türkiye’de Türkiye’yi Amerika’ya Sikayet,” Milliyet, February 10, 1999. Also see Metin Toker’s three-day article, “Kosova ve Sevr Özlemi,” Milliyet, June 15-17, 1999.
15 Turkish secularist newspaper Cumhuriyet is single-mindedly Kemalist, whereas other establishment newspapers such as Milliyet, Hürriyet and Sabah maintain a Kemalist outlook in their editorials and in the way they frame the news, while having a number of liberal-leaning columnists. Pro-establishment views of these newspapers can be attributed to their business interests that involves a wide spectrum of business fields; see Adrew Finkel, “Who Guards the Turkish Press? A Perspective on Press Corruption in Turkey,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2000, pp. 147-166.
16 Murat Belge, “Avrupa ve Bölünme,” Radikal, January 14, 2001.
17 Commission report on Turkish application December 18, 1989, Brussels, Annex 89(0280).
18 Many social democrats, however, still think that the cultural boundaries of Europe do not include Turkey. For instance, Helmut Schmidt, former Social Democratic party (SPD) leader and German chancellor, argues that Turkey should be excluded from the Union due to its unsuitable civilization. See Helmut Schmidt, Die Selbstbehauptung Europas, Perspectiven für das 21. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2000).
19 “Yine pas geçtiler,” Milliyet, December 10, 2000.
20 “Progress Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession by each of the candidate countries October 13, 1999,” http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_10_99/overview.htm.
21 Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, pp. 22-49; and Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon&Schuster, 1996).
22 Meltem Müftüler-Bac, “Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2000, p 31.
23 Fethullah Gülen, “Hosgörü ve Medya,” http://www.m-fgulen.org/eser/article.php?id=4142.
24 Etyen Mahcupyan, “Tayyip Erdogan’in Gerçek Görüsü,” Zaman, March 14, 2002.
25 Ihsan Dagi, “Islami Siyasette Bati Ufku,” Radikal, February 6, 2002.
26 “Aklimiz Avrupa’da,” Milliyet, September 21, 2000.
27 ANAR (Ankara Sosyal Arastirmalar Merkezi), Kasim 2001 Türkiye Gündemi Arastirmasi, December 2, 2001.
28 Ahmet Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik, Türkiye’nin Uluslararasi Konumu, (Istanbul: Küre Yayinlari, 2001), p. 515.
29 Murat Yetkin, “Avrupali Soruyor: Asker ve MHP Ayni Çizgide mi?,” Radikal, February 13, 2001.
30 Suat Ilhan, Avrupa Birligi’ne Neden Hayir?, Istanbul: Ötüken, 2000, cited in “AB’ye Sevinemiyorum,” Milliyet, August 5, 2000. Also, Suat Ilhan, Dünya Yeniden Kuruluyor: Jeopolitik ve Jeokültür Tartismalari, Istanbul: Ötüken, 1999.
31 see http://www.dellbn.cec.eu.int/europ/brief/euh.htm.
32 Cengiz Çandar, “Güvenceler: AB ve Ecevit,” Sabah, December 23, 1999. Hasan Cemal also argues that EU integration will improve Turkey’s territorial security. See Hasan Cemal, “Türkiye: AB’nin içinde mi bölünür, disinda mi?,” Milliyet, January 13-14, 2001.
33 Etyen Mahçupyan, “AB yakin ve açik tehlike mi?,” Zaman, February 18, 2002.
34 M. Hakan Yavuz, “Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2001, pp. 211-233.
35 Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), p. 3.
36 Dogu Perinçek, “AB’ye Serefli Giris Ne Demek?,” Aydinlik, March 10, 2002.
37 Evangelos Antonaros, “Das Militär blockiert Reformen in der Türkei,” Die Welt, June 28, 2000. Also, “Can the Turks who want their country to become a modern democracy stand up to the generals?,” The Economist, January 11, 2001.
38 “Ordudan Son Dakika Golü” [Last Minute Goal from the Military], Milliyet, December 8, 2000.
39 “AB Hiristiyan Kulübü,” Radikal, January 14, 2001. Also, Douglas Frantz, “Military Bestrides Turkey’s Path to the European Union,” The New York Times, January 14, 2001.
40 Amberin Zaman, “Turkey Offers Reform Plan in Hopes of EU Admission,” Los Angeles Times, March 20, 2001.
41 EU National Plan unofficial translation, http://www.byegm.gov.tr/on-sayfa/ab/eu-np.htm (March 24, 2001); for the original text, www.byegm.gov.tr/on-sayfa/ab/ab-up.htm.
42 “Ismail Cem Uyardi: E-Postayi Kirmak Çirkin Bir Suç,” Milliyet, February 14, 2002.
43 “A General Speak His Mind,” The Economist, March 14, 2002.
44 “Askerden Iki Sürpriz,” Milliyet, March 08, 2002.
45 M. Hakan Yavuz, “Türk Islam’i Çözüm mü?,” Zaman, March 07, 2002.
46 Sami Kohen, “Foruma On Üzerinden On,” Milliyet, February 14, 2002.
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