Mahmood Sariolghalam
Dr. Sariolghalam is professor of International Relations at Shahid Beheshti, formerly the National University of Iran. The author would like to thank the Kuwait Program at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques and particularly Professor Gilles Kepel for their encouragement and support to complete this research.
The unpredictable momentum for change that unraveled in the Middle East in January 2011 in hindsight rested on two objectives: economic distribution and political representation.1 A number of contrasts exist between the origins of the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the Arab uprisings of 2011. First are the diverse causes. Two explanations may encapsulate the success of Iranian revolutionaries: the shah's excessive dependence on the United States and his domestic cult of personality. In essence, Iran's revolution was rooted in political causes; its economy, given the circumstances of a developing state in the 1970s, was progressing well.2 Ironically, in the Arab upheavals of 2011, anti-imperialist slogans were almost non-existent. Pan-Arabism had given way to nationalism. People were concerned about real conditions on the ground rather than remote and abstract dreams.3 Political idealism based on pan-Islamism in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution outweighed the urgency for political change within the country. Happily, the developments of 2011 in a sense were an obituary for all variations of political romanticism. While Iran is still articulating its ideological jargon, Arabs are now coming forward with realistic assessments. Even more unexpectedly, ideological pronouncements are absent from both the mass demonstrations and the narratives of the emerging elites.
Furthermore, the ideas of globalization are omnipresent. It is remarkable how these processes have corroded the anti-imperialist narrative and Pan-Arab collective idealism. The Middle East caught this trend rather late, in part due to the economic interdependencies of the 1990s and the 2000s. Nonetheless, Iran today remains the sole bastion of 1950s idealism. In this context, a review of the slogans at Tahrir Square is instructive:
• Egyptians: get your rights.
• Please leave.
• Mubaraks: leave our Egypt.
• People want to bring you down.
• You are an oppressor: leave.
• Liberty is the same as life.
• The expiration date of Mubarak: January 25, 2011.
• Leave our country so that light can enter.4
These slogans are distinguishable from those of ideologically motivated constituents of Iranian society who unendingly call for the death of real or imagined enemies. On reflection, it can be concluded that, in contrast to Turkey and the Arab world from Oman to Morocco, the discourse of the Iranian state is the only remaining idealist framework in the Middle East/North African (MENA) region. Again, this signals that Arab society today has more liberty to express its inclinations. More important, the typical Arab state is also willing to allow room for the expression of people's aspirations, with minimum impunity. Aside from the political turmoil and tortuous road to democratic change on the Arab street, these are monumental and seemingly irreversible developments.
Second, in retrospect, the most striking political asset of the Egyptian uprising is that there are no identifiable leaders. The emergence of an individual leader in an authoritarian society gradually narrows options, overwhelms decision-making circles and builds a cult of personality around the leader. Through economic change and the organization of opposition movements, it took more than a century for many Latin American countries to rid themselves of individual-based authoritarian systems.5 The Arab project has only just begun to enter the modern age, at least in the political realm. Despite more than a century and a half of social and political struggles, Iranians have yet to set up a polity founded on institutions. It may be possible for Arab countries to reach such a stage sooner than Iran. Tunisia has already taken a great leap forward, in part thanks to its enlightened Islamists and geographic proximity to Europe.
State building in the Middle East is still in its early phase, impeded by either oil income or authoritarian political culture. Internet connectivity has indeed condensed the lifespan of authoritariansim. Even in ancient countries like China and India, individuals are increasingly at the service of systemic objectives, and authority is slowly but surely gaining legal underpinnings. In democratic and institutionalized states, it is ideas and national interests that govern a country rather than the power of personalities. Personal agendas cannot as a rule supersede national ones. Here, it may be preferable to refer to the power of ideas as the framework by which governance takes place.6 Perhaps this is the first lesson that the new Egyptian elite should learn from the Iranian experience after the 1979 revolution. For centuries in Iran, personalities dominated the machinery of decision making. Self-promotion overcame collective interests. Social and political organization was systematically repressed to stifle dissent.
Much has been written in Iran on whether the country has been managed according to national-interest considerations since the revolution. In authoritarian settings, personalities who proclaim ideas are far more credible than the reasoning behind the ideas. In fact, as shown by the uncertainties of people in various professions in post-Mubarak Egypt,7 the process by which a framework is constructed will most likely be the test of the new elite's capacity for sustained change. Will there be continuity of institutions in which debate can lead to consensus and shape policy?
Given historically ingrained customs in the Middle East, progressing from individual-based rule to institutions will be a civilizational leap forward. Undoubtedly, a framework for what constitute Egypt's national interests — in contrast to the interests of a particular group — would involve jettisoning all ideological formats, adopting globally respected secularism and engaging economically with advanced countries. In this milieu, it is encouraging to discover that,
Despite popular support in the Arab world for the implementation of Sharia, for example, many Islamist groups including the Egyptian Brotherhood have gradually stripped their political platforms of explicitly Islamist content. In the last few years, instead of calling for an "Islamic State," for example, the Muslim Brotherhood began calling for a "civil, democratic state with an Islamic reference," suggesting a new-found commitment to the separation of mosque and state (although not of religion and politics).8
Third, the wave of uprisings and their potential success in building institutions in the Middle East is partly a function of media outlets and the availability of networking. Due to easy communications and the flow of democratic ideals, power that is too concentrated may prove difficult to sustain. Nonetheless, for a movement to generate and assemble results, a broad-based section of the population spanning ethnic and religious groups and socioeconomic classes must mobilize. Such a movement requires bridging the disparate interests of the rural and urban classes. This resonates with the Egyptian experience, where the unity of the opposition and the broad-based popular mobilization forced the military to oust Mubarak.
Undemocratic regimes may appear unshakable, but they are actually very vulnerable. One fundamental and binding feature of authoritarian systems is their ability to maintain a segmented society. L' ancien régime in Libya did a masterful job of disaggregating and depoliticizing society. People were barred from assembling in public, even for leisure purposes. Citizens were systematically compelled to disconnect and find refuge in passivity. Disorganization is conceivably the most noteworthy security asset of authoritarians. The endgame in Libya demonstrates the futility of repressive policies. One may conclude, then, if large segments of an authoritarian society can organize around a common objective, their success is somewhat guaranteed. Unless resistance disperses quickly, mass devastation of the opposition in the face of media and Internet attendance is almost unattainable. When Mohamed Bouazizi's fruit cart was crushed by a police officer in Tunisia, accumulated frustration, in Robert Gurr's terminology,9 was pervasive enough to spark a movement.
In all three North African countries, frustration levels were high. Marxist class consciousness among the disenchanted was intense. One could witness repression and the unresponsiveness of governments. For more than a decade, many had predicted an implosion in Egypt; levels of disparity were alarming. New communications caused collective awareness, and through a Tunisian spark, frustrations morphed into peaceful demonstrations inclusive of all social and economic strata. The diversity of information sharing in the Middle East has now disarmed repressive state machineries. In light of the youth bulge and information revolution, some states will be responsive and begin gradual reforms; others will resist and face accelerating phases of illegitimacy.
Fourth, the fact that 32 percent of Egyptian society voted non-Islamist in November 2011 is an indication that there is no consensus on the universal applicability of Islamic laws and regulations. Moreover, the presidential race between an Islamist and the last prime minister of the Mubarak regime suggests diverse tendencies. If all of the political forces, including the military, could agree to maintain the diversity of political orientations in Egypt, radicalism and idealism would fizzle out and competition to deliver efficiency and accountability would roll in. As of now, pluralism appears to be a strong political force in all spheres of Egyptian political and social life. The theoretical challenge for the new Egyptian elites is how to uphold it as a basic principle of civil liberty. Islamists and others will have to compete to improve the state of the economy and living standards. In this context, functional issues such as the economy and economically motivated foreign policy will dominate policy-making circles and social media. In almost all Muslim countries, there exists a blend of Islamist and non-Islamist tendencies with no apparent consensus on basic tenets. Forces of globalization and the urgent need for problem solving at home will perhaps make political forces focus on economic wellbeing and international interaction. Divided societies typically pose a colossal challenge to consensus building.
IRAN'S STAND-OFF
In comparison, Iranian postrevolutionary elites were never focused on economic development. Philosophical rivalries inherited from the anti-imperialist literature of the 1950s dictated almost all matters of governance. Nationalist and liberal-leaning factions within the postrevolutionary apparatus were gradually pushed aside. In a way, it can be concluded that the Iranian revolution for the most part remained a political-security entity. Even if for some 16 years (1989-2005) Iranian governments attempted to generate improvement in the economy, they were obstructed by other elements who aggressively pursued the idea of anti-imperialist struggle. Similar divisions took place in China in the 1960s. Economic prosperity required forward-looking and cooperative foreign policy, particularly with the industrialized world. Such an objective jeopardized the sanctity of anti-West tendencies. Moreover, national security founded on indigenization necessitated an arm's-length distance from all major regional and international powers. Egyptian Islamists in general seem to understand the salience of cooperation in foreign policy in advancing the state of the economy. Both the theoretical and the practical application of economic prerequisites of statecraft provide a constraint where "Islamists will likely be partners in coalition or national-unity governments."10 Unlike long-held Iranian zero-sum politics, all indications from post-Mubarak Egypt point to a political environment where parties are somewhat forced into compromise and thus less ideological.
Moreover, in contrast to the philosophical divisions within Iran over the direction of the country, contests over policy appear to shape areas of conflict in Egypt. In the Iranian experience, two orientations evolved that appear to be absent in the Egyptian case. Revolutionaries and internationalists are two groupings within the Iranian establishment that have endured to this day, having emerged after the Iran-Iraq War. It is notable that similar parallels can be drawn from the Chinese and Soviet experience in the 1970s, when they reached a peak in the contradictions of their international conduct. As a result, the Soviet Union disintegrated and China acquiesced.
Contradictions in Iran remain. The Rafsanjani presidency gave rise and provided organization to the internationalist school of thought. Akbar Rafsanjani, the speaker of the parliament and second in command in the war against Iraq, realized in the midst of the war in the mid-1980s that it could not proceed further, but he knew it was not possible to break the revolutionary inertia. Economists, diplomats and academics all agreed. To maintain his influence, Rafsanjani wavered between the revolutionary and internationalist schools of thought. But he remained the unofficial spokesman of the latter school. Those who looked out for Iran's global standing and the well-being of the average citizen clearly found themselves in the internationalist school. For them, economic development, modernization, national wealth, access to information technology, health, education, efficiency and globalization were considered the concerns of the state. The revolutionary school considered history, the plight of the Islamic world, struggle against imperialism and adherence to a code of ethical conduct as pressing issues. The revolutionary school of thought considered Islam an all-encompassing ideology. From their perspective, there was no need to extend a helping hand to foreigners. In the end, Iran had achieved no result by cooperating with the British, Russians or Americans. The international landscape is based on oppression, conspiracy and anti-Islamic sentiment.
Furthermore, the revolutionary group believes in the preservation of the ideological order, the clerical establishment and state control of culture, and considers the Western world as Iran's enemy. The internationalist group, however, does not dissociate the domestic structure from global dynamics, national economy from foreign policy and national security from economic development. The former group believes that Iran should focus on its internal agenda and maintain a calculated distance from the international community. The latter group promotes national economic development and believes that Iran should join the WTO and become a normal member of the international community. The former category asserts that Iran's security is guaranteed when it dissociates itself from the economic and political impositions of the international capitalist system led by the United States. The latter category, however, presumes that Iran's national security stems from its economic interdependence with the international community, and that Iran should focus on producing national wealth, economic diplomacy and soft politics. Whereas the threat perceptions of the former are fundamentally military and existential, the latter group perceives economic, social and soft-power issues as basic threats to the country.
From a sociopolitical perspective, the two schools of thought reflect the divergence of opinion within Iranian society. Both advocates have a strong political, economic and institutional presence within the public domain. These ideological and therefore political divisions can be overcome through debate. The revolutionary group feels insecure in dealing with foreigners. The internationalist has stronger self-esteem and is willing to compete, to influence and be influenced. The revolutionary group aims at dealing with the masses and is an advocate of populism. The internationalists believe in social organization and political parties and are convinced that efficiency results from professionalism. Masses become meaningful when they are organized into professional groups and political parties. The confrontation between these two schools of thought has produced a divided society, policy deadlocks and continued political radicalism.
This standoff has also produced antagonisms at the Middle Eastern level, particularly among Arab countries, and also at the global level, leading to an anti-Iranian Israeli-American-Western coalition. This confrontation has damaged Iran's image and projection beyond its borders.11 In fact, the revolutionaries have consistently dominated politics as well as policy making in the country, leaving little room for dialogue, debate and consensus building. The end result has been an absence of pluralism and efforts to build consensus. At least in the Egyptian and Tunisian cases, such philosophical divergence is not visible, an indication of hope and clearer direction. This is not only a reflection of decline in political and even Islamist radicalism; it is also indicative of the deep influence of economic factors in shaping political thought and practice. Pluralism and debate over national-development policy will lead to political stability and progress in both countries.
DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCES
Over a span of three decades, there has been noticeable continuity in Iran's foreign policy. In economic and social areas, however, oscillation has been the pattern, from one administration to the next and even within administrations as they experiment with diverse approaches. One reason may be that the country has been essentially de-internationalized.12 While indigenization initially stemmed from the revolutionary romanticism of the 1979 uprisings, it evolved into keeping the West at arm's length. It also furthered the national security of the Islamic polity by providing immunity from external influences. Based on this pretext, the Iranian definition of national sovereignty almost equals political isolation. Global ideas and standards were looked upon as exploitative and causing cultural pollution. Local standards replaced global standards. A gradual decline becomes detectable, with the corrosion of ideas, citizens, institutions and the environment. One tragic example of this localization was a defective car called Pride, which has caused more casualties over the last decade than the Iran-Iraq War.
Unlike Iran, which was under the illusion that it could construct a new model in the well-established global system, the Muslim states of Turkey and Malaysia have emerged as modern but with visible Islamic social features. Their domestic cultural settings draw on both Muslim and Western paradigms; citizens have the liberty to make choices, but their polities and economies are local representations of global models. In neither country is political Islam considered exemplary. No country can experience economic growth while its foreign policy opposes the global political order. Political Islam is inherently anti-status-quo and dismisses the liberal-capitalist international order. Moreover, political Islam may be an appealing ideal to those inspired by the scriptures, but it is inapplicable in the current global system. In retrospect, political Islam as it has been practiced by Iran over a span of three decades reveals a reaction to past Western wrongdoing and a desire to combat modernity without an alternative to put forward.
If the populism associated with political Islam has been able to keep modernity at arm's length through petrodollars, it has not been able to offer a competing paradigm. Any constitution founded on the principles of one religion is destined to partition a society; it is intrinsically divisive. In an era in which networking and pluralism are deemed vital for progress, such a constitution would marginalize sectors interested in globalization, cause defections among the elite and expedite the process of emigration.13 It is remarkable that the Tunisian Nahda Party discarded the idea promoted by radical elements of basing the country's constitution on the Sharia. An argument was put forth by Nahda that such a move would divide the society and that unity made it essential to cherish religious, cultural and political differences.14
An alternative functioning model to the current global order may be neither theoretically possible nor practically feasible, at least in the current century. Transitions in the last century did not involve total breakdowns. Even a socialist international order, despite its congruities with capitalism, could not last long. Ultimately, the bulk of the Communist states embraced economic privatization and representative politics. In this context, China cannot produce wealth if it rejects the contemporary global disposition. Iran's rejection of the international order has cost its economy considerably: the value of its currency has depreciated almost 4,000 percent in the last three decades. Aside from employing proxies for a policy of containing American hegemony in its geographic proximity, Iran's effort to draw even a single Muslim country into its Pan-Islamist orbit has been futile.15
For Muslim or non-Muslim leaders, the core task today is to improve the economic well-being of citizens. An indication of Malaysian credibility and respect is the fact that its citizens can travel to 135 countries without a visa.16 In this interaction with the global community, no Malaysian is forced to compromise his or her religious affinity. As G. John Ikenberry points out,
The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles. China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it…. Rising powers are finding incentives and opportunities to engage and integrate into this order, doing so to advance their own interests. For these states, the road to modernity runs through, not away, from the existing international order.17
The development of a competing Islamist construct will also be an asymmetric struggle. At best, most of the so-called indigenous conceptual pronouncements stress fair distribution of resources and non-acquiescence of governments and politicians to external pressure. Conceptual inconsistencies between political Islam and liberalism need to be paid close attention. Though widespread ambiguities exist on the exact nature of political Islam, its underlying proposition is that "others," and perhaps non-Muslims, should be barred from the process of statecraft, decision making and governance. Presumably this could be entertained if a cohesive and powerful Muslim empire existed, that could project its paradigm in a global scene where Muslims would not need others to advance.
The current order, whose original shape emerged in 1648 through the Treaty of Westphalia, is internationalist by nature. Hypothetically, political Islam could be internationalist if it commanded a vast geography. Such conditions do not exist for Muslims at the global level. Numbers speak volumes: German GDP is larger than that of all 55 members of the Organization of Islamic States combined. Muslims cannot claim to present a contending paradigm to the liberal international order. In reference to the Iranian experience, one needs to ask whether political Islam is a relevant political and economic construct. Debate, majority rule and consensus are liberal methods. In political Islam, majority rule understandably is rejected; God's verdict supersedes human calculations.
Sovereignty is a function of power, not populist speeches. Japan, South Korea, China, India and Turkey are classic illustrations. A fundamental deficiency in Iranian and Middle Eastern political culture is an inability to gauge the concept of power. While the Asians caught up, thanks to the Japanese example, most Middle East societies lag behind. At least in the case of Iran and those subscribing to political Islam, subjective ideas of "justice," "power," and "interest" have only prompted marginalization and isolation. In contrast to Iran, most Arab countries of the Arabian Peninsula have taken fundamental steps toward modernization.
A main pillar for development is not so much to challenge the global system; rather it is to construct robust domestic structures to benefit from the opportunities and privileges of the international order.18 India is a classic example: its parliament serves as a bastion of national sovereignty and identity. One fundamental lesson from the Iranian experience is to circumvent populism at all costs. Populism terminates policy debates, bends the academic community into a mechanism for the justification of state policies, delegates authority to those who submit, and incrementally reduces decision making to group-think. The proclivity of populists to oversimplify the policy process and focus on the short term devastates medium- to long-term national interests. Iranian populism has habituated the populace to happiness for the next three weeks, endangering long-term planning and national horizons.
Populism in Iran has also brought to power a large number of natives with unassuming backgrounds equipped with peasant cunning who have been given university degrees despite particularly sparse schooling. The overall impact of such an inexperienced bureaucracy has been sudden U-turns in policy making. One manifestation of this is that the policy to convert the Iranian Rial into foreign currencies was amended 15 times in 2011.19 This is the product of favoring short-term benefits over long-term interests, sidelining elites and pursuing an ideological foreign policy that causes invariable friction with other countries. The result has been mass emigration and a brain drain second to none.
Despite their vast populations, India, China and Brazil have successfully avoided populism. Ideology has been buried in history books; problem solving and accountability are in vogue. This is a departure from the Arab-unity paradigm as well as from the Iranian model. In fact, as globalization made new strides in the 1990s, the Arab state system began to focus on national concerns. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Morocco and, to some degree, Egypt are examples, though Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia use a great deal of modern technology and E-Government facilities in their national development.20
Arab thinkers — Islamist and non-Islamist — should draw historical lessons from a philosophical mistake Iran made after 1979. Facing a historical opportunity to maintain its relative sovereignty, remove itself from a tradition of subordination and develop economically, it chose to confront the international order based on a misreading of global realities and an impracticable Islamic idealism. While Arab states by the 1980s were preparing to bid good-bye to Pan-Arabism, Iran immersed itself in Pan-Islamism. Iran misunderstood the times and severely underestimated its limitations. Its first parliament after the revolution reflected pluralism and elitism, but as time passed, the true populist nature of the revolution surfaced. Decision making regressed from the debates in the assembly hall to the sentiment on the street. Inexperienced Muslim spokespersons and naïve activists were forced to cave in to the leftist frenzy and boisterous propaganda of anti-imperialist and anti-liberal jargon. The project of state building shifted to external adventurism to weaken those who had carried out injustices toward the Iranian nation in the past. Vindictiveness emerged as statecraft, replacing potential efforts to concentrate on expanding GDP.21
A key concept for Arab Islamists and leftists to consider is economic empowerment. The new parliament in Egypt needs to reach consensus on the direction of the country, particularly how to deliver a better standard of living to disenchanted Egyptians. Abandoning autocracy and forming a government structure based on consensual decision making will not be an easy task for a country long accustomed to patrimonial kings and military officers. Bargaining for political advantages can be a direct consequence of capacity in trade, technological innovation and market share. Brazil, India and China stand as examples. Viewed through Iranian tunnel vision, it is comforting to learn, "If Islamists join a coalition government in Egypt, moderation will prevail and the country's …peace agreement…will be accepted, however reluctantly, as a fact of life."22
Perhaps Egypt is in the process of intense state building, its national interests matter, and its economic welfare requires political compromises. Indeed, Egypt is blessed with not having the petrodollars to pursue political idealism. Efficiency and accountability have become universal values, and it appears that there exists a realistic assessment of regional and international politics even among a majority of Arab Islamists. The Muslim Brotherhood has some 85 years of organizational and political experience, and for the first time it now has an opportunity to deliver.23 Interestingly, protesters in Tahrir Square chanted slogans dealing with welfare, liberty and human dignity. Issues of foreign policy were not part of mainstream demands in the elections either. Political romanticism is at a minimum. New elites in the Arab world may learn from Asian states that their focus should be the economic welfare of their citizens for national power and prestige. From 2002 to 2011, China's reserves expanded from a mere $350 billion to $3,200 billion.24 During the same time, some 1,241 universities were established, in response to the growing demand for skills.25 Another comforting development in Egypt is the fact that not a single dominant political celebrity emerged in 2011.
It is monumental work to set up a legal system of governance to replace the traditional personalist rule. One author contends, "As popular participation in politics expands and as power of the police state recedes — two interconnected dynamics will accelerate: one, the number of politically significant actors within the state will increase; two, some of these actors will establish relationships across international boundaries."26 The good news about Islamists is that their thoughts will be shaped through international, regional and national realities. Because of a networked and intertwined global liberal order, Muslim countries cannot create wholly Islamic societies. Malaysia and Turkey have ultimately allowed plurality and sharing. Tunisia has apparently and rather speedily endorsed this realism.
Iran cannot shape an order, but it does have the talent for exhausting counter-players. A basic reason for this is its detachment from great powers and its continuing frictions with Arab governments. Unlike Iranians, Islamists in the Arab world have a pragmatic streak, in part thanks to the existence of a spectrum of thought and orientation in Arab politics and an increasing interconnectedness with the global community. The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt threw its full weight behind the protests but kept a low profile is an indication of an incrementalist approach. They were careful not to use religious slogans or to overshadow secular pro-democracy activists.27 Pure Islamists cannot become liberals, but they can engage in a non-zero-sum game with other groups. Their ideas and interpretations cannot be fully applied in a well-established global context where individuality pervades. Religious jurisprudence requires people to observe and to obey, while avoiding asking questions. Islamists will learn in the rainbow of Egyptian politics not to be maximalists. Egypt needs the world to help it enrich itself. If it can bolster its domestic institutions, it will not need to confront the West and the global order in order to purchase legitimacy at home. In order to reduce social tensions, Islamists and non-Islamists will have to allow liberty, freedom of choice and pluralistic attitudes on social issues. If they intend to deal with the global economic system, they will need to adapt to the rules and regulations at the international level. Egyptian Islamists are most likely to gain influence in ministries such as health and education, while avoiding more sensitive portfolios such as defense and foreign affairs.28
It is prudent to enthusiastically consent to Islamists' taking part in elections. Bring them on board in coalitions and have them face the challenges of running governments instead of alienating them from the political process. Necmettin Erbakan of Turkey led the first democratically elected government in a Muslim country in 1996. Before reaching power, he denounced Israel and pledged to terminate military arrangements with Tel Aviv. However, once in office and faced with the exigencies of power and the plurality of Turkish politics, he was forced to deepen relations with Israel in both naval and air-force joint operations.29 One author believes that mainstream Islamists have overlapping interests with the United States in seeing Al-Qaeda dismantled, policing terrorism and improving standards of living, economic conditions and democratic governance.30 The Muslim Brotherhood leadership is media savvy, whereas Iranian politicians are careless about their image in other countries. As Shadi Hamid contends,
[M]ainstream Islamist groups are surprisingly sensitive to international opinion. They remember the outcry that followed Islamist electoral victories in Algeria in 1991 and the Palestinian territories in 2006 and know that a great deal is at stake — hundreds of millions of dollars of Western assistance, loans from international financial institutions, and trade and investment. Islamists are well aware that getting tied up in controversial foreign policy efforts would cause the international community to withdraw support from the new democracies, thus undermining the prospects for successful transition.31
Notwithstanding, Iranian income from oil and Iran's rentier government have enabled the longevity of its global isolation. Egypt has no such luxury. Iran's policy of de-internationalization has caused a gradual decay in infrastructure, the near absence of foreign investment, political irrelevance and, most important, technological obsolescence. Egypt cannot afford to de-internationalize even if its elected Islamists wish to do so.
CONCLUSION
The modalities in each Arab country may differ, yet the fundamentals of change all point to a common need: pluralism, sustained regard for the private sector, the rule of law, economic internationalism, social openness and procedural improvement in the electoral process. Egyptians are historically sophisticated and advanced in their nationalist tendencies. Whereas in Iran, nationalism and Islamism have for the most part stood in confrontation with each other, in Egypt, the two have coalesced in a reinforcing fashion. Due to its own historical experience and particular cognitive and ideological map, Iran tends to separate nationalism from Islamism, whereas the two are inseparable in Arab history.
Iran is still evolving as a nation-state; its identity paradoxes are not resolved yet. Shia Islam, Iranian nationalism and global liberal tendencies are in direct theoretical and, therefore, political opposition with one another.32 For Iran to act like a nation-state, national direction needs to concentrate on economic objectives. Turkey's pluralist culture and economic prosperity have helped it stabilize politically. Similarly, Egypt needs to focus on two issues in order to stabilize: solidification of its political institutions and sustained economic development. The fact that elements within the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the Arab world are entrepreneurs and professionals who appreciate interaction with the global community is good news for the sustainability of pluralism and coalition building in Arab countries. Another positive development in Arab countries facing change is the fact that almost all of them are open to the international domain of ideas, commodities and citizens. Iran suffered the liability of following in the footsteps of the East bloc tradition of social and political insularity. Some 700 satellite stations are available to Arab audiences, exposing them to diversity and plurality. Though the Iranian concept of indigenization was initially intended to Islamize the country in all spheres of life, in the 1990s, it was developed into a security doctrine to minimize foreign influence in national decision making.33
The citizen that Iran has perhaps inadvertently aimed at creating is a political man, someone obliged to be politically correct in order to survive and advance. Professional skills are typically immaterial; advancement requires one to be in proximity to the elite apparatus. Such proximity brings a plush life as well as consecutive government positions, regardless of education or expertise. Oil income has facilitated such a process. Since 1908, Iran has earned some $1,100 billion from oil, about 63 percent of it in the last seven years.34 In contrast, Egypt is under tremendous pressure to turn to professionalism and efficiency.
The Iranian Islamist (or Shia) tendency of exceptionalism, historically embedded in its psyche, is distinct from the social and political orientations of the Sunni Arab Islamists. In Egypt and elsewhere in Arab Islamist circles, economic and social problem solving are worldly and relevant matters. In Iran, philosophizing is a far more attractive expression of power. More important, sensitivity to their global image forces Arab Islamists to be more cooperative. The protesters in the Arab street, like those in Athens, Beijing and Mexico City, seek tangible results.
Though some may reject the idea, in a globalized age, the presence of external actors, entrepreneurs and institutions in the formation of open and democratic states in the Middle East may prove to be a constructive element. In retrospect, Western "leadership from behind" in recent years and the inclusion of non-Western states like Turkey in taking down authoritarian regimes in the Middle East are signs of prudence and farsightedness. States that have effectively eliminated political interdependencies with the external world are more prone to maintain closed domestic structures. Cuba, North Korea and the Soviet Union stand out as examples. National sovereignty, nationalism and ideological (also Islamic) purity may be used as theoretical window dressing to justify self-imposed isolation. Political independence is also useful in avoiding the "burden" of sharing decision making with "others." Such political systems are inherently forced to rely on economic isolation, as economic interdependence requires political compromises. If democracy is an aim of Arab societies, no particular political tendency should dominate its decision-making apparatus. A pluralist structure symbolized in an effective parliamentary construct will guarantee a peaceful and incremental process of change.
The timing of the Arab uprisings of 2011 and the advent of the Iranian revolution in 1979 are unique. Not only do technological advancements matter, but there is accumulated knowledge and awareness by every citizen in the Arab street. In 1979, at the height of the cold war, ideology and radical thinking still shaped part of the political discourse. Today, entrepreneurship and pragmatism are in vogue. The ideas of the Iranian revolution may have been appropriate for deconstructing a monarchy, but they failed to construct a model of statecraft that fit modern times. Because of the very same ideas, Iran as a country is in decay. While a good majority of its population is worldly and reaches out to advance in modern ways, its elites are imprisoned in anti-imperialist legacies and outmoded practices. Most of the members of Iran's elites comprise engineers and physicians unschooled in economic and political literature. Over a span of three decades, they have engaged in endless trial and error, fabricating reality and designing illusions.
Even at the height of dictatorial rule, Arab populations were exposed to the intricacies of the world, had access to diverse media and could travel internationally to witness change. College education has soared in the MENA region, more than tripling in Tunisia, quadrupling in Egypt and expanding tenfold in Libya.35 Real issues will assist the adoption of real policies. In this respect, the Middle East has both the fastest-rising levels of schooling and the highest level of youth unemployment in the world, 25 percent compared to a global average of 14.4. Youth unemployment is highest among those with more education. Approximately half of all Egyptian men 25-29 are unmarried.36 These facts will aid the process of transition. The construction of institutions, effective government machinery and political accountability will all be facilitated though engaging the world and allowing new ideas and practices to modify domestic structures. Media and civil-society empowerment will be the keys to sustaining a gradual and effective transition.
1 For a comprehensive review of the differences between the uprisings in the three North African countries, see Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 2-7.
2 See Said Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution of Iran (Oxford University Press, 1988); and Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York University Press, 1993).
3 See Fouad Ajami, "The Arab Spring at One," Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (March/April 2012): 56-65.
4 Karima Khalil, ed., Messages from Tahrir: Signs from Egypt's Revolution (American University of Cairo Press, 2011).
5 See Ben Ross Schneider, "Organizing Interests and Coalitions in the Politics of Market Reform in Latin America," World Politics 56 (April 2004): 456-79.
6 David Potter et al., Democratization (Polity Press, 1997), 46-194.
7 Mike Giglio, "Cairo Loses its Voice," Newsweek, January 23, 2012, 46-50.
8 Shadi Hamid, "The Rise of the Islamists," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 41.
9 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Paradigm Publishers, 2011).
10 Shadi Hamid, "The Rise of the Islamists," 43.
11 See Mahmood Sariolghalam, "Iran's Emerging Regional Security Doctrine: Domestic Sources and the Role of International Constraints," in The Gulf Challenges of the Future (The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2005), 163-184.
12 Mahmood Sariolghalam, "Iran in Search of Itself," Current History 107, issue 713 (December 2008): 425-31.
13 See Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (I.B. Tauris, 2002); and Mohammad Zahid, The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's Succession Crisis: The Politics of Liberalisation and Reform in the Middle East (I. B. Tauris, 2012).
14Deutsche Welle, March 25, 2012.
15 Mahmood Sariolghalam, "Sources of Continuity in Iran's Foreign Policy," in an edited book on the Middle East (Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore, 2012).
16http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visa_requirements_for_Malaysia_citizens.
17 G. John Ikenberry, "The Future of the Liberal World Order," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 57, 61.
18 Stephen Krasner, Structural Conflict (University of California Press, 1985), 3-31.
19Donyaye Eghtesad (Farsi economics daily), April 2, 2012, 12.
20 See World Economic Forum, The Global Information Technology Report, 2010-2011, prepared by Soumitra Dutta and Irene Mia.
21 Daniel Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran (The University of Chicago Press, 2001), 120-151.
22 Shadi Hamid, "The Rise of the Islamists," 44.
23 Nathan Brown, "Brotherhood Prepares for Power in Egypt," Jewish Daily Forward, January 25, 2012.
24http://www.chinability.com/Reserves.htm.
25Time 177, no. 4 (January 31, 2011), 26 and 42; and Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World (Penguin Books, 2009), 293-94.
26 Michael Scott Doran, "The Heirs of Nasser," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 19.
27 Dina Shebata, "The Fall of the Pharaoh," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 30.
28 Shadi Hamid, "The Rise of the Islamists," 43.
29 Ibid., 44.
30 Ibid., 47.
31 Ibid., 44.
32 See Mahmood Sariolghalam, "Justice for all," Washington Quarterly 24, no. 3 (2011): 113-125; and Mahmood Sariolghalam, "Understanding Iran: Getting Past Stereotypes and Mythology," Washington Quarterly 26, no.4 (2003): 69-82.
33 On this issue, see the parallels in the former Communist countries in Czeslaw Milosz, The Captive Mind (Vintage Books, 1990), 135-174.
34 Iran's oil income complied from http://www.opec.org, http://www.cbi.ir, http://www.scribd.com/doc/3265563/BP_History, www.mop.ir.
35 Jack A. Goldstone, "Understanding the Revolutions of 2011," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 12.
36 Dina Shebata, "The Fall of the Pharaoh," 28.
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