In December 2017, countrywide protests broke out in Iran in response to almost four decades of a brutal dictatorship that had presided over a deteriorating economy and an increasingly corrupt establishment. "Death to the Islamic Republic," "Death to [Supreme Leader] Khamenei," and "Death to [President] Rohani" were among the slogans that highlighted the crisis of legitimacy the regime is facing for its neglect of the people's misery. After the elections in May 2017, and most recently on January 22, 2018, in a live television interview, Rohani promised that, before the end of his second term in 2021, he would abolish absolute poverty¹ in Iran. However, such promises are merely empty words. Forty years seems time enough to ameliorate poverty, the primary social concern among millions of Iranians, who have no expectation of any profound change. The severity of the situation can be seen, not only in the protests but also in the scholarly research and official and semi-official media discussed below.

Countless studies have already dealt with poverty in Iran, but very few are critical of the official data, not least due to the strict academic censorship administered by the regime's security apparatus. Official statistics often contain internal discrepancies, and there are contradictions between official and independent statistics. Thus, this research has been undertaken to make the literature more complete through critical investigation.

A TOTALITARIAN REGIME

Iran is ruled by a regime that falls entirely within Sartori's definition of "totalitarian."² Its legitimacy is based on ideology (Shia Islam), not on free elections, empowering an elite group (Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his followers) to pronounce on public and private matters and enforce their decisions through coercion.

Ali Khamenei replaced Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as the supreme leader after the latter's death in 1989. His powers are observable within the de facto politics of the country, where the elected president and all other regime officials are permitted to act only within the scope set by the supreme leader. Although the constitution gives the president the right to select cabinet ministers, Khamenei has on several occasions intervened in this process and chosen his own preferred people. The most widely known incident was the reinstallation of Heidar Moslehi in the spring of 2011 as the head of the regime's notorious Ministry of Intelligence (VAJA) after President Ahmadinejad had ordered his dismissal.

The supreme leader's power derives from his control over the Council of Guardians, which supervises national elections; the Expediency Council, which resolves conflicts between the parliament and the Council of Guardians by having the last word in negotiations; the judiciary; the broadcast media; the military; the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); the intelligence community; the organs of law enforcement; the supreme leader's own representatives, who are placed in all governmental organizations; the Special Clerical Court, which investigates offenses within the clerical establishment; and the many bonyads (foundations) he controls.

The bonyads that the supreme leader oversees allow him to mobilize support among the poor, although the demonstrations since December 2017 may be a sign that this is becoming difficult. The bonyads have access to billions of dollars. According to Karbassian, they account for about 11 percent of the country's gross domestic product.⁴ Katzman estimates that number much higher, at 33-40 percent.⁵ The principal bonyad under Khamenei's supervision is the Islamic Revolution’s Mostazafan Foundation. Katzman claims that it "manages over 400 companies and factories, with a total value estimated by Iranian experts at as much as $12 billion, and it is considered the largest economic entity after the government."

The IRGC, over which Khamenei has immense influence, is another important player in the economic sector. A BBC report concludes that the IRGC’s share in the Iranian economy is one full third.⁶ At least 60 percent of the Iranian economy, according to Milani, is controlled by the Corps, and it has the capacity to conduct missions outside Iran.⁷

Sadjadpour asserts that the power of the regime stems from its total control of about 80 percent of the country’s economy.⁸ This claim aligns with Karbassian’s⁹; according to semi-official estimates, the private sector in Iran makes up only 15-20 percent of the economy. It is unnecessary to add that the private sector itself is controlled extensively by the state, through the intelligence community and other parts of the state apparatus and through the state officials who invest in the private sector.