The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon of September 11, 2001, had an immense impact not only on the United States but also on all of the Arab Gulf monarchies. The tragedy became a force for change and a turning point for the Gulf states, for the way the world views them, for their own self-analysis, and for religions within these states. In fact, the Gulf states’ various nationals, their interpretation of Islam, their societies and their economies have all come under scrutiny. This process revealed the vulnerabilities of these states’ political systems and the fragilities of their domestic politics. For the Gulf states and for all Muslims, the epoch-making shock was that 9/11 was perpetrated by 19 of their nationals in the name of Islam.1
Although none of the Gulf states had any direct link to the September attacks, all felt the impact of its aftermath. A stream of Western commentary blamed Islam, the Gulf states’ authoritarianism and their decrepit educational systems for spawning the anger that has allegedly infected their subjects with “hatred for America.” Washington rallied the West as it objected to political and religious interpretations in the Gulf. Both the United States and the Gulf states found that there are people in the world who do not love them. The attacks focused the attention of the world, and especially that of the United States, on the Gulf states’ internal politics.
While many people in the Gulf shared a sense that America was to some extent reaping a harvest it had sown, Washington blamed the Gulf states. The United States believed that it had the cure to Gulf states’ ills. Undoubtedly the latter would benefit from a little democracy, better educational systems and extensive social reforms. Most of the Gulf states came under increased U.S. pressure to introduce democracy, improve domestic policies, improve their human-rights records, and crack down on the activities of Islamist extremists. In societies where change is driven by complex internal factors and where tradition and family associations stultify the impulses of change, Washington’s ambition to influence the process was optimistic at best.2 But, as no Gulf leader wanted to incur Washington’s wrath for being identified as a fundamentalist or militant, all of the Gulf monarchies introduced some political and educational reforms. Conservative Gulf states, which for generations were governed by political systems woven over several centuries, began to face challenges to their political culture. They were forced to go through a period of self examination, review schoolbooks and closely monitor changes to their social arrangements. The goal is to encourage a tolerant society free of past constraints.
To be sure, Gulf monarchies had long expected that improving the quality of life, modernizing the economy and encouraging the rise of a middle class would, over time, lead to radical political changes. But the prosperity brought by oil wealth cushioned these regimes from the necessity to change quickly. In fact, the Gulf states maintained their political stability by winning the hearts of their people. A political philosophy based on gradual change best suited their needs. Through the last decades of the twentieth century, gradualism was an effective policy. The events of 9/11, however, forced accelerated change on the Arab Gulf.
One important outcome of September 11 is the Gulf’s realization that Western powers no longer viewed them simply as petit-oil-rich bourgeois states sprung up in the desert. They were no longer authoritarian allies but actual enemies who were denying democratization and, therefore, instigating terrorism.3 Their faith was characterized as “evil and wicked” and their people the product of autocratic manipulation.4 Gulf leaders also realized that if they were to preserve their existing political systems and avoid the risk of a clash with the United States, they should face up to local factors that gave rise to the September terrorists. All were encouraged to undergo a profound shakeup in the centuries-old political culture, a culture that governed their daily life with some success. Under the careful supervision of the United States, all Arab Gulf states started to implement an extraordinary series of political, social and educational reform measures. The United States maintained that such reforms will, eventually, transform the lives of people throughout the Gulf states, eradicate the roots of terrorism and lead to the emergence of friendlier democratic powers. Gulf political elites, on the other hand, viewed the American pressure as a major external threat to their political stability. They argued that such pressure would create public opposition, which, in turn, might endanger ongoing gradual reforms that could lead to more political instability and intolerance.
Using the UAE as a case study, this article seeks to investigate forces of change and the challenges faced by Arab Gulf monarchies in the post 9/11 era. The research investigates three main questions. First, at the state level, how should the UAE deal with Western pressure for change while protecting its national values? Second, how should it deal with the growing public awareness as well as the influence of Islamic groups within its borders? Finally, how can it balance various sociopolitical changes successfully?
The essay will also investigate three main dilemmas faced by the UAE. First, as the promotion of democracy is a long-term effort that requires a solid foundation, which is unavailable in either the UAE or any other Gulf country, how can UAE leaders deal with this fundamental concern? Moreover, how sincere can the UAE and its Gulf neighbors be in promoting democracy in their states? Second, since the UAE and its Gulf neighbors have embarked on a series of economic, political and social reforms, how connected are these reforms to the country’s genuine needs and not to U.S. priorities? Finally, as rapid structural reforms may dramatically alter the nature of Gulf societies, would these diminish or increase opposition?
DOMESTIC POLITICS, 1980-90
The decade of the 1980s was crucial for internal development of the Gulf societies. It was the decade that was characterized by the rise of ultraconservative, politically activist Islamic movements in much of the Gulf and the Arab world. These movements, labeled “fundamentalist” in the West, sought to institutionalize Islamic laws and social principles. Although the UAE already claimed to be an Islamic government whose constitution is the Quran, the country has not been immune to this conservative trend. Internal changes in the UAE during the 1980s, however, were largely governed by economic rather than political or ideological considerations. While economic growth in other Gulf countries, such as Iran and Iraq, was causing political instability, the UAE was benefiting from its status as both an oil producer and a financial center. Changes in the form of economic prosperity, population growth, sedentarization and urbanization, and greater freedom for nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) – a sound base for the formation of civil society – were all ushered in over a short span of time.5 They signaled a transition in the history of the UAE, whose principal goal was to manage change and maintain economic and social stability within existing religious and social frameworks. State efforts yielded satisfactory results for the most part.
On the negative side, however, the 1980s marked the continuation of regional political instability: persistent chaos in Iran, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, a tenacious Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the subsequent rise of the mujahedin there, and the American decision to help the guerrillas defeat the Soviets. These events further inflamed the anxiety among the Gulf Arabs that the region was becoming an arena of superpower struggle, quite to its own detriment.6 It also cultivated a fertile platform for the Islamic resurgence that later swept the entire Gulf. To be sure, Islamic resurgence was never directed against any particular regime, but it culminated in the rise of an Islamist opposition during the 1991 Gulf War, when it finally succeeded in attracting a large public following.
Meanwhile, the troubled political atmosphere caused by the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Iran-Iraq War continued to influence political developments in all of the Gulf monarchies. The UAE in particular has exhibited an astounding range of governmental reforms. Modernization affected the entire political, economic and social fabric. Various policies, supported by a governing body, implemented by a cadre of bureaucratic technocrats, and pushed forward by wealthy entrepreneurs and businessmen, saw light. Modernization was also strongly supported by the media, particularly the privately owned daily and weekly publications. Civil society and NGOs began to influence the political culture of the state. Ruling families, while deriving their authority from classical Islamic sources, were able to initiate cautious programs of economic, social and bureaucratic modernization. These mechanisms worked, although new stresses and strains began to be felt in the body politic due to lower oil income, which affected existing budgets.
Throughout the 1980s, many of the Gulf states began to take steps towards opening up their political systems to popular participation, especially because the revolution in Iran had signaled that their internal politics were problematic. While the UAE is drastically different from its Iranian counterpart, and while conditions that led to the downfall of the shah were not present in the UAE, it is still plausible that internal dissent might lead to unrest that might threaten familial regimes in the area. This would disturb the interests of many outside powers who rely on Gulf oil.
In the UAE, significant economic and social changes left few unchanging legacies. One such inheritance was the country’s tribal institutions. Through the years people have cherished the richness of their culture and traditions. They are a historical and cultural link to the past. As in the 1970s, the UAE leaders worked to ensure that the country enjoyed a dynamic, healthy, and modernized society in which people lived well. They also wanted it to remain religiously conservative and culturally traditional, with significant emphasis placed upon religion to safeguard past achievements. Policies were based on Islam. The state opposed communism as an ideology and supported efforts to combat underground “leftist” and alien movements, including Islamic militancy. Such policies indicate that the UAE aimed to uproot fanaticism and fundamentalism.
Reform in the UAE faced a major hurdle. While social and economic institutions have supported modernization policies, the political systems have lagged behind. The political structure continues to be pyramidal and hierarchical. Power flows to the ruling authority from the governing bodies that occupy the apex of the pyramid. Sheikhs and merchants are the beneficiaries of their family role, and they perceive themselves as true capitalists in support of a private-enterprise system. Below these two relatively small segments lies a large stratum of middle class that has just felt the positive impact of modernization. This layer consists primarily of low-level civil servants, teachers, skilled workers and owners of small businesses. At the bottom of the pyramid exists another layer of society. This sector of the population lives in a world alien to that of wealth, modernity, and state-of-the-art technology. Whatever benefits members of this stratum receive from the society come in the form of gifts such as free medical treatment in government hospitals and free education.
In the 1980s the vicious war between Iran and Iraq continued to drag the region into another chapter of social and political turmoil. The conflict was a source of tension not only among Gulf states but also within the UAE. While Abu Dhabi tended to support Iraq, Dubai was more sympathetic to Iran. But official neutrality was the order of day in the Emirates. When the war eventually spread to attacks on tanker traffic in the Gulf, including widespread use of mines, the UAE and other Gulf states sought to mediate between the two countries. Dubai’s dry dock remained a safe heaven for the attacked tankers, many of which were in need of urgent repair. The UAE thus turned political uncertainty to its own advantage.7
Business with Iran flourished throughout the war. By 1987, Iran had replaced Saudi Arabia as the UAE’s first trading partner: that year an estimated one-third of all Iranian imports passed through the port of Dubai. In fact, the UAE had pushed its neutrality to the extreme. It went through all the motions of solidarity towards Iraq and at same time kept its healthy trade active with Iran.8 When the war ended in 1988, Iran appeared to single out the UAE for friendly attention.9
While the UAE benefited from its trade links with both Iran and Iraq, economic hardship resulted from the slump in the oil market. Despite constructive economic efforts, the UAE found itself at a crossroads, confronting a series of domestic challenges that derived mainly from the fact that the economy was still largely reliant on oil. The hardship was evident in widespread cuts in public budgets in most government sectors. In addition, the pressure to reduce oil-export quotas led all of the Gulf states to consider desperate measures in order to seek relief from the economic recession. Reconsidering the challenges, the UAE government initiated a structural-adjustment process aimed at diversifying its economic base, led by the private sector. To the UAE’s credit, the policy of opening up the economy and bringing in foreign investors bore fruit. The UAE soon alleviated the effects of the recession and began its rise as a financial and economic center. This affected the entire regional economy. The political and economic structure of the UAE has proven unexpectedly sturdy.
The 1980s were full of anticipation and vitality, a fact that helped to transform the UAE from a traditional to a modern society. Various economic and cultural changes took place after independence that necessitated the introduction of domestic reforms. The large expatriate population transformed the country as progress catered to new needs. People from all over the world added a new dimension to an increasingly cosmopolitan society. The UAE adopted several political measures aimed at making its existing system better serve its citizens. Relaxed immigration laws allowed a large number of foreign workers to supplement the national labor force. These measures helped to turn the UAE into a melting pot for many ethnic and distinct social groups. During the boom years, these groups lived side by side and at peace. With the economic recession, however, a number of potential stresses surfaced.
Despite the pressure from the Islamic revolution in Iran, Gulf political institutions continued to function as before, with ministers often occupying their posts for life. Most were drawn from various tribal and social backgrounds having nothing to do with merit. Another serious challenge to internal security became apparent when the Gulf states’ vulnerability to external forces escalated. The Iran-Iraq War and the slump in oil prices greatly affected the ability of the government to function properly, and to carry out proposed reforms. The country’s tiny indigenous population, together with its heavy reliance on technology provided by expatriates, added much to its vulnerability. On the other hand, its extensive resources attracted international interest, which pushed the internal machinery to cope with additional changes.
The end of the boom was the beginning of a noticeable change in the local workforce and in the outlook of Emirati nationals. Before the economic slump, young Emiratis had no difficulty in finding a job. In fact, “unemployment” was totally foreign. With the economic crisis, several economic sectors reduced spending while looking for profitability. This state of affairs impeded many young Emiratis from landing gainful employment. The private sector, for instance, sought to employ Asians and non-Arabs because they were much cheaper to hire. The Asian subcontinent provided the private sector with a steady influx of cheap skilled labor. In no time, the private sector was dominated by foreign workers. The economic growth of the 1970s and early 1980s contributed to turning the UAE into a human mosaic, with multiple pieces arranged in a complex hierarchical system.
One of the Emirates’ major problems since independence has been that of population. There were not enough qualified native citizens to assure the functioning of the institutions of a modern state. Although all of the Gulf states suffered from the same deficiency, nowhere in the Gulf was the problem felt as acutely as in the UAE. At the beginning of the oil boom the native population was not only tiny, but mostly illiterate. Asians, numbering around one million (400,000 Indians, 220,000 Pakistanis, 25,000 Sri Lankans, and 75,000 Bangladeshis, Filipinos and Thais), outnumbered the native population. Native Emiratis totaled not more than 250,000 in a population estimated in 1987 at 1.2 million, despite a high fertility rate and a life expectancy that grew rapidly after improved health care was made available on a large scale. Nonetheless, the UAE appeared to have few difficulties in accepting these immigrants. Despite their apparent integration, these immigrants have not played any role in the social or political life of the Emirates. Until recently, most of the Gulf states placed strict restrictions on citizenship, requiring that an individual trace his or her roots in the country to a period before 1940. Accordingly, the millions of people that have lived in the UAE and other Gulf states have only partial legal status and no political rights. Their influence was limited to cultural and economic life.10 Although they may have lived in the area for generations, they could be asked to leave at a moment’s notice.
Perhaps the most serious development of the 1980s was the readiness of the first sedentarized generation to take advantage of the country’s wealth. Not only did they become leading business partners, but young Emiratis who completed their basic education at home went to the West for advanced studies. Western countries, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, welcomed these “newcomers” and considered them recipients of Western culture. It was in the West that many students began to be influenced by different ideologies that shaped their outlook. When they returned home, many became powerful forces for change.
THE GULF WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH, 1991-2001
The 1990s were a turbulent time for the Gulf and for the UAE in particular. The 1990 Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait caused a profound shock. Prior to this crisis, the UAE had tried to demonstrate solidarity on inter-Arab issues, particularly the cause of the Palestinians. It joined other Arab nations in condemning Israel and demanding the Palestinians’ right of return to their homeland. Despite its criticisms of U.S. policies towards certain Arab issues, the UAE also perceived its evolving relationship with America as a source of protection from these crises. Thus, by 1990-91, when it joined the United States in its military effort to force Iraq out of Kuwait, the UAE had become a defacto member of the U.S. strategic umbrella over the region. The war publicly revealed the debates that were long conducted in private about the fragility of the Gulf states and their reliance on American troops for protection.
Economically, however, the 1990s were prosperous years for the UAE. After battling budget deficits during most of the 1980s, budget surpluses in both 1990 and 1991 were most welcome. The 1990s also witnessed the rise of the UAE as a powerful financial center and, despite slowdowns in the world oil market, the UAE boasted a prudently managed and successfully diversified economy.11 Business confidence in Abu Dhabi and Dubai grew steadily and economic projects revitalized their economic structures. This spilled over into the other emirates, Sharjah, Ras-al-Khaimah, Fujairah, Ajman and Umm al Qaiwain.
Between 1990 and 2000, the economy of the UAE experienced spectacular growth, with gross domestic product (GDP) expanding by 80 percent, from $33.3 billion to $60.71 billion.12 With the second largest economy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) after Saudi Arabia, the UAE remained one of the most prosperous countries in the Middle East. In terms of GDP, the UAE became one of the world’s wealthiest countries. Its per capita income, which in the late 1990s exceeded $20,000, is considered one of the highest in world.13 The hydrocarbons industry, still the bedrock of the UAE economy, provided on average 60 percent of the federal government’s budgetary revenues and 40 percent of aggregate exports. Economic prosperity helped to stabilize the country. By financing massive infrastructure projects (roads, utilities, communications and airports), improving welfare and the educational systems, the government aimed at introducing modernization at an acceptable rate.
Politically, however, the Gulf war constituted a turning point for Gulf regimes. The war, which prompted the military intervention of the United States and its Western allies, demonstrated the necessity for a new political culture. In addition, the war turned the United States into a major permanent power in the region.14 The U.S. role in the region grew as the United States became more politically involved in the internal affairs of Gulf states. Many Islamists felt “humiliated” at being defended by Christian forces, although, during the campaign against Iraq in 1991, many ulema (religious scholars) were forced to support their governments’ decision to accept the deployment of U.S. troops on their soil.15
The first signs of organized Islamist criticism of the political systems appeared right after the 1991Gulf war in the form of resentment and veiled attacks on Western and specifically American influence. For instance, some radical clerics challenged the prolongation of the U.S. military presence in the Arabian Peninsula and sharply criticized Western influence. The media helped to proliferate this resentment all over the Gulf, and the UAE was no exception. It was clear that the American presence alienated many. Political elites, aware of this development, were shaken because those who developed such sullen attitudes were thought to be their pillar of support. Restriction on political expression was imposed, and citizens were banned from public gatherings or public discourse. This caused concern among human-rights activists.
Once the war was over, citizens devoted more time to debating public issues concerning their daily lives, their identity and what it meant to be an “Emirati.” Islamic identity, rapid modernization, demographic changes as well as increasing Westernization were major concerns. The Islamist groups took part in this national debate as well. The return to Islam became a means of regaining one’s true cultural identity, as opposed to mimicry of the dominant West. Debate about the relationship of state and citizen, religion and state, and authority and religion generated widespread speculation about the power of these groups. In fact, in this vibrant atmosphere, the Islamists successfully captured the discourse in the UAE.
It is important to recall that in its attempt to modernize; the UAE had never experienced any serious opposition that could endanger its stability. In fact, the UAE typifies how Gulf monarchies were able to adapt to modernization and westernization without any serious consequences.16 Yet, the possibility of an opposition to the modernization process always seemed to lurk beneath the surface. Although the UAE, through its emerging political and socioeconomic systems, seemed to have the major ingredients for a relatively peaceful modernization, its efforts towards rapid change were never secure. In the past, it had succeeded – largely due to its oil revenues – in creating a new kind of state, different from any political order in the Arab Gulf in the depth and extent of its influence over its citizens.17 As the society grew and developed, so did its political expectations.
One important factor in social modernization is obviously Islam. While Islam as an ideology has undergone traumatic changes since World War II, it has not lost its political legitimacy. Meanwhile “Islamic awareness” continues to be a powerful force in Gulf societies. The modernizing Muslim tends to be secular in training, perception, ideology and worldview. However, Islam is accepted as the official religion in every Gulf constitution. Even though the formal Islamic political structure has disintegrated, Islam as a way of life has survived in people’s perceptions of themselves and their values. This conflict between the modernizing Muslim and Islam contributed much to the tensions marring the process of change.
During the 1990s, there was some indication of religious protest among Emirati youths, university students and teachers. Nevertheless, the protest was limited, and participants did not engage in open criticism of the political authority or the public order. Still, many young Emiratis who had studied in the West and returned home learned to make choices. Some of these choices were difficult, but a pro-Western sentiment was not one of them. Often young Emirati became more serious about practicing their Islamic beliefs than their elders. Still others pushed their beliefs to an extreme, creating a new generation of Muslim radicals.
While they were in the West, these young people were exposed to different Muslim groups and student associations that affected their outlooks and perceptions. Many explain that while they were living in societies where Islam was not a fact of life, they were forced to think through their real relationship with it. Islam runs deep in the life of Emiratis, and although a few may have reacted by questioning their faith, in most cases the reverse was true. While some accepted the established order of state and society, others adopted fundamentalist ideas of Islam along with conservative ideas about society. Thus, the latter experienced an “Islamic resurgence.” Although Islamist publications, bookstores and clandestine audiotapes proliferated at first, there were few signs of organized activity. It was not until the end of the 1990s that an accumulation of factors would contribute to the emergence of organized Islamist protests. Declining oil wealth and living standards, intensified urbanization, the spread and visibility of Western influences, growing social disparities, and the rise in Islamist activities in other parts of the Arab world, all contributed to making the UAE and the Gulf a field of intense ferment. Meanwhile the path toward democratization, which was seen as a positive phenomenon, was encouraged in the whole region. An environment of heated ideological and political debates contributed to the vibrant changes that were taking place in UAE society.
In the wake of these heated public debates, Gulf monarchies developed their political institutions to adjust to the consequences of the new era. Consultative councils (Majlis al Shura) were introduced in every Gulf state, as demands for public participation grew stronger. The UAE’s tribal and traditional political culture helped ensure the success of this new political experiment. As the political order showed signs of willingness to bring others into the policymaking circle, public eagerness for such participation grew even stronger. The Federal National Council (FNC), or Majlis al Watani, began to play a vital role in the country’s political transformation as well. The FNC acted as a channel through which popular views were transmitted to leaders. It also helped in the development of institutions. In addition, many local governments, in their own capacity as providers of economic welfare and security, began to introduce their own Shura Councils, or Majlis al Istishari.18 The political elites developed these political structures, which kept abreast of social and political consensus at the local level. However, the role of these institutions has been eroded as calls for new reforms are being made. It is an indication that the political atmosphere was changing. Despite these highly significant developments, the UAE cannot be thought of as being even close to a fully functional democracy although it probably deserves good marks in comparison with its neighbors.19
Despite some adjustments of social and political outlook and attitudes, the area’s patriarchal ideology is still very much in place though gradual changes are evident. Social practices, apparent in the workplace, home and political arena, as well as in the religious sphere, are challenging men to reevaluate the role, status and leadership potential of women. Because women are no longer confined to their homes, this has created problems as well as challenges to political authority.20 For example, women outnumber men in higher educational institutions, but the unemployment rate among female graduates is very high. Enabling women to be active participants in public life has always been a goal of the government, and the high female unemployment rate stood as a major hurdle in the way of national development. UAE statistics show that nearly one-third of female graduates are unemployed. The same statistics also indicate that only half of the women already in the labor market work full time and mostly in government offices. These facts constitute another national dilemma. As in most of the Arab Gulf, UAE women dominate traditional occupations such as teaching and social work. While a religious prohibition against women judges has prevented them from sitting on the bench, advanced education is seen as the new merit basis for leadership and power. Clearly, the place of women is not set in stone but responds to society’s perceived needs. In the UAE, as in other Gulf countries, there is a great dependency on foreign labor. Due to the unbalanced demography as well as the shortage of skilled nationals, foreign labor is in high demand. The endless supply of workers from Southeast Asia and India, in particular, fills the private sector. Women’s employment will eventually help reduce dependency on foreign workers and encourage women to be active participants in public life.
To meet the country’s labor requirement throughout, the government drafted new laws on “Emiratization” (the training of indigenous personnel) and immigration, two parallel steps that would offer longterm solutions. By training national manpower, which can make its presence felt in the labor market through skill and professionalism and not merely through the imposition of rules and regulations, the government hoped to provide a long-term solution to the country’s demographic imbalance. Specific laws were drafted to solve the problem. In 1997, the UAE set up a ministerial-level commission to recommend ways to reduce dependence on foreign workers. It subsequently issued regulations limiting the number of domestic servants per household. But despite all these efforts, the demographic balance has not changed substantially.21
Meanwhile, the ruling families’ hold on power had been challenged at various times.22 More problematic was the manner in which ruling elites actually distributed “citizenship.” Since the oil-boom years, the population of the UAE has doubled, but the number of citizens has not increased correspondingly. Not surprisingly, the UAE and the rest of the Gulf states had placed strict restrictions on citizenship and did not grant it for two major reasons: first, there was reluctance to share wealth with recent arrivals; second, the tribal nature of society did not admit new members. Yet, inescapable developments obliged political elites to reconsider their attitudes.
Constitutional Amendments
One of the most important steps toward institutionalizing political power was taken in April 1996, when an amendment to the constitution was drafted, and a permanent constitution was announced. Specific steps followed that included the privatization of state-controlled enterprises, Emiratization and the development of other resources besides oil. A plan to reduce the number of foreign workers, especially illegal immigrants, was initiated. As nationals were a minority, the government adopted a policy to encourage citizens to have more children. These policies aimed to redress the demographic imbalance. Therefore, a three-month grace period was issued to all illegal immigrants to leave the country or face tough punishment. An estimated one million illegal immigrants rushed to leave the country before the expiration date. This figure highlighted the demographic dilemma of the UAE and revealed another sign of the extreme vulnerability that the nation and its citizens felt.
New Trends
Meanwhile, the emergence of new ideological trends changed the thinking among the educated class as well. Many citizens questioned the thin line between modernization and Westernization. Others questioned whether the West was really worth imitating. Instead of mimicking others, some thought that it was time to return to one’s roots, specifically Islam. In its earliest years, Islam gave the Arabs, for the first time in their history, the gifts of unity and recognition in the outside world. Islam has once again become a unifying force within the UAE, giving its tiny indigenous population a sense of belonging. This sentiment will eventually shape the outlook of Emiratis.
Economic Consequences
Although the UAE was not entirely spared the economic downturn of the late 1990s, its spirit remained one of optimism and imagination. While elsewhere in the Gulf economic developments moved slowly, in the UAE fresh ideas and economic projects proliferated. Some of them seemed a little mad, like the Dubai Media City, the Dubai Internet City and the Palm Housing Project. Yet these projects and others managed to attract investors from all over the world.23 Fairs, exhibitions, conferences and special technological events followed one another in a rapid succession. With massive financial support from the government, their promoters managed to keep the economy afloat. It is now clear that market-oriented policies and private-sector development are deeply rooted economic concepts and practices in the UAE.
Meanwhile, another major project helped to distinguish the UAE as a future economic center. The $3.3-billion al-Saadiyat project, a 26-square-kilometer island just off the Abu Dhabi coast, is being developed as an international financial and commodity market to access the economies of the emerging Middle Eastern and surrounding hinterlands. The city is being built from scratch as a dedicated business and trading haven with an international stock exchange, futures and options exchanges, a clearing house and a commodities exchange.24 Saadiyat has lined up an impressive list of incentives for finance companies and industries to move operations to the island. It is intended to become a leading financial center similar to Singapore and Hong Kong.25
The UAE government is trying to entice international financial institutions with generous spoils such as direct stock market participation, mutual funds and local banking and insurance. Enlightened leadership, the wise use of earnings from oil, and the willingness of the Emirati people to participate in a national effort to raise their country’s profile at home and abroad have achieved this remarkable renaissance in the country’s fortunes. All these efforts have enabled the society to preserve its openness and shed any doubt about a possible clash between modernity and Islam. However, the UAE efforts at gradual development received a severe blow in September 2001.
CHALLENGES IN 2002 AND BEYOND
The UAE has achieved a great deal in the past 30 years, especially in nation building and socioeconomic development. As it entered the new millennium, however, the UAE began facing a fresh set of challenges: uncertainty about unemployment (reaching 6 percent), unfulfilled career expectations, transparency, and attaining a comfortable lifestyle based on evenly distributed oil revenues, as well as recognition of civil rights and liberties. In fact, public awareness is on the rise as modern communications and satellite television, particularly the Qatari-based Al-Jazeerah news channel, have politicized audiences everywhere in the Arab Gulf.26 Many turn to these sources for objective perspectives. Ironically, this diversity of opinion has extended to mosques. While events in Palestine, Kosovo, and Bosnia formed the staple diet of past Friday sermons, more immediate concerns now take priority. Clearly, modern communications have made a huge difference and changed the country’s conservative outlook. Educated Emiratis began to form independent political views rather than being influenced by government-controlled media. Democracy, human rights and Islamic identity are issues of growing interest. Due to mass communications, people of the UAE have been able to familiarize themselves more with Arab and Muslim causes elsewhere and to form an opinion about the West and its “unjust” Middle East policies. To the average Emirati, Israelis can commit excessive acts of violence while the United States turns a blind eye towards the plight of the Palestinians. This has caused resentment towards the West and the United States, in particular. More serious still is the fact that a substantial percentage of people have come to identify many of their grievances, including against their rulers and circumstances, with the West. The political authorities, aware of such developments among the masses, seem unable to control them. In fact, by giving people the space to voice such opinions, they deflect the anger away from themselves.
September 2001 was a turning point. The tragic events of 9/11 caused many heated debates while leaving their mark on the internal structure of the Gulf monarchies. September’s events demonstrated the fragility of the Gulf states’ basic sociopolitical structures. They highlighted the type of heated debate that had long been conducted in private among Gulf elites. The tragic events destabilized not only the internal political dynamics of the Gulf but also reshaped the Gulf’s image as well as its relationship with the West. While the United States blamed the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, for being a breeding ground for the radicals who carried out the attacks, people in the region blamed Washington for its double standards in policy. It is clear that September’s events will have long-term effects on the Gulf monarchies.
Long before 9/11, the Gulf states envisioned themselves to be a model of peace and harmony in a war-torn region. With their multicultural, multiethnic societies and booming economies, Gulf states became a melting pot. Prosperity and a peaceful environment provided many immigrants with safe-havens where they could live and work. September 2001 changed the Gulf’s image. The region was no longer seen as peaceful and tolerant. More dangerous still is the undeniable fact that many Gulf residents have come to identify their grievances with the United States.
Arab Gulf communities have become breeding grounds for discontent. This discontent usually originated within Islamist groups that wished to see an end to any Western domination or influence over their societies. The political authorities sought to respond to these challenges by organizing the Islamic establishment in such a manner as to further co-opt the religious authorities (ulema) and to attempt to control appointments and sermons delivered by clerics. Therefore, while Washington was raising a battle cry against terrorism in the international arena, Gulf authorities were struggling with their own Islamist agenda at home. UAE political authorities sought to crack down on the activities of militant Islamic organizations. A small group of UAE citizens who had expressed anger towards the United States and evinced some sympathy for militant Islamists, posed more of a challenge for political authorities. Despite their public support, the UAE could not risk displaying any mercy towards them, and a series of measures were taken to curtail their activities.27 First of all, to clamp down on the rhetoric that came out of mosques, preachers were reminded to stick to their religious agendas. Fatwas were issued to the effect that it was un-Islamic to call people infidels or to incite people because it leads to violence and is contradictory to Islamic teachings. Secondly, preachers who did not abide by these regulations were secretly punished. Friday sermons were carefully written to deal only with theology. No politics were allowed from the pulpit.28 The Ministries of Justice, Islamic Affairs and Awqaf further issued guidelines that prohibited preachers from venturing into politics during sermons or to use mosques for any purposes other than worship.
Measures to restrict Islamic fundamentalism increased to include nonreligious institutions. Three UAE university professors, known for their conservative Islamic views, were banned from writing their weekly columns. The ban was not limited to the widely circulated al-Khaleej newspaper, but was extended to include all other UAE publications. This move was seen as a step towards clamping down on the activities of militant Islamic groups to prevent them from spreading their influence.29 Often criticized for their human rights records, and for their tight controls over political power, Gulf officials persuaded their subjects that such tough measures were in their own best interest.
The measures taken by the UAE government were a response to what it regarded as a sign of the increasing strength of Muslim militancy. Despite concerns as to how the public would react, the state’s determination to enforce the new regulations reflected an even greater problem. In their efforts to achieve maximum security and avoid Washington’s fury, Gulf political authorities began to question their own political culture, which the United States claimed was to blame for the September 11 attacks. Almost immediately, elected and municipal councils were set up, intended to function as forums for democracy. Even if they are marginal and cosmetic in nature, these steps represented a dramatic change for the Gulf monarchies. Although democracy required prerequisites that are scarce in the Arab Gulf, any imposition of democratic trappings is a radical step. Whether these changes suit Gulf societies or are just a reaction to the aftermath of 9/11 is still unclear.
Educational Reform
The United States strongly believes that a rise in anti-American sentiment and radicalization throughout the Arab Gulf derives from the latter’s dysfunctional educational systems. Washington claims that incompetent militants using poor textbooks produced a wide circle of radicals and fanatics among the younger generation. Moreover, the products of these educational systems are ill-prepared to deal with the outside world. This is, in part, true.
Long before 9/11, the UAE Ministry of Education was talking of overhauling school curricula and textbooks, which were blamed for students’ underachievement and unemployment. Despite the heavy resources lavished upon them, critics maintained, the educational system failed its constituencies. Students were unable to compete in the technological age or global economy. With gender inequalities especially pronounced, it was clear that the educational system had failed to produce positive results. Without implementing educational reform, economic prospects for the country seemed bleak. The Ministry of Education was fully aware of the deficiency within its system. In the mid-1990s, it initiated its own reform plan: “2020.” The aim of this plan was to assess and revise school curricula to achieve a new standard by the year 2020. The ministry’s plan was widely criticized by the public, who viewed it as another way to indoctrinate young children with un-Islamic Western values. Opposition mostly came from Islamic groups that worked to defeat the plan and replace it with what they called an “Islamic Plan.” Despite mounting criticism, the ministry remained determined to push its reforms.
September 11, 2001, highlighted the urgency for such reforms. Washington was so anxious to see these reforms implemented that the U.S. Congress authorized a commission to look into school textbooks in Saudi Arabia and what is taught to young children there. The commission issued a disturbing report that stated that the Saudis violated religious rights. The report showed that official government textbooks published by the Ministry of Education included offensive and discriminatory language, and in some cases promoted intolerance and hatred of other religious groups.30 The United States also made it clear that the rest of the Gulf states would, no doubt, benefit from reforming their educational systems. This step, it was claimed, would reduce the chance of making schools breeders of radicalism.
Thus, in the spring of 2002, the UAE Ministry of Education unveiled another plan to form local committees to oversee reforms. Their aim was to review school textbooks published by the government and eliminate any materials that might include offensive and discriminatory language. Work on revising school curricula started in earnest, although this step was not welcomed by the public at large. In fact, it was regarded as a secular attempt by the government to foster an un-Islamic identity. Public criticism grew, but the Ministry of Education remained committed to its agenda.
Emergence of Civil Society
For the UAE, the emergence of civil society is another outcome of 9/11. Civil society is important because it offers alternatives to autocratic rule and radicalism. By opening new space for local actors, positive developments might well be generated from the ground up. Yet political authority had never developed a sense of confidence in civil society or thought it was mature enough to play a positive social role. The September 11 tragedy, however, changed this attitude. Strengthening civil society became a major priority for the government of the UAE. By giving the public the space where they could air differences and voice concerns, the government allowed society to strengthen vital institutions and draw people away from radicalism. The government was aware that this was a prime area in which to promote positive change. The United States was watching events in the Gulf with trepidation. It encouraged the Gulf states to strengthen civil society, and promised to provide help. The United States believes that by supporting civil society in the Gulf, it is building reservoirs of goodwill.
Economic Impact
September 11 had an impact on the UAE economy as well. Until September 2001, Gulf states’ markets were showing signs of increased confidence. Oil prices held strong; business and consumer confidence were buoyant; much-discussed and keenly anticipated privatization programs had begun to gather pace; and the introduction of legislation aimed at attracting increased foreign investment was on track. Yet, after 9/11, shockwaves reverberated through the international business community. Tourism, a sector the UAE, with its geographical diversity, is actively promoting, was among the first industries to be hit. Within days of the attacks the number of European and Western visitors had plummeted.
For years the UAE’s economy functioned on a free and open basis. Money flowed in and out with ease as the estimated three million expatriate workers transferred financial assets to their families, mainly on the Asian subcontinent. Almost $5 billion is transferred each year through the hawalah system.31 No restrictions were imposed on the flow of money from or to the UAE, and it was this openness that suffered badly after the September 11 attacks.
Accusations that Muslim terrorist organizations have used the UAE as a hub to transfer money throughout the world flourished. These allegations hit the money market hard and discredited the UAE as a major financial center. They were fueled by the fact that one suspected al-Qaeda supporter was arrested in the UAE. Following the attacks on the United States, Jamal Beghal, of Algerian descent, was arrested in Abu Dhabi. Although he was immediately extradited to France, his case raised great concern about possible links between al-Qaeda and the UAE. According to authorities in Abu Dhabi, Beghal confessed to having planned to bomb the U.S. embassy and an American cultural center in Paris. UAE authorities, however, downplayed this link. Beghal is said to have made his confession after Emirati religious scholars convinced him that terrorism was against Islam. Still, Beghal’s lawyer denied any link between his client and al-Qaeda and claimed that his client made his statement under duress.32 Thus, in order to clamp down on the flow of money to terrorist organizations, restrictions were imposed on money entering or leaving the UAE. Despite these heavy restrictions, the UAE has not lost its position as the Middle East’s most active business center.
Today the UAE is trying hard to alleviate the effects of 9/11. Although the UAE still enjoys an excellent credit rating in capital markets and holds a modest and non-guaranteed external debt of almost $16 billion (26 percent of GDP), there are certain risks.33 Short-term trade credit linked to Dubai’s re-export businesses accounts for around 80 percent of the total debt. In fact, it is the country’s long-term policy of economic diversification that is bearing fruit as every effort is made to increase the non-oil share of total GDP from 35 percent in the 1970s to its current 75 percent. This ratio is the highest among core OPEC producers. A diversified productive base has increased the UAE’s flexibility to compete in the global marketplace and helped generate new sources of non-oil revenues. Today each individual emirate is pursuing separate development strategies, based on natural resources.
Nationalization of Palestinians
One outcome of 9/11 was U.S. pressure on Gulf states to naturalize hundreds of Palestinians living and working in the Gulf. Although the status of foreign immigrants has long been a subject of discussion among the United States, the United Nations and the Gulf states, it was never an urgent issue. Many interpreted Washington’s pressure as a purely political move to ease Palestinian-Israeli tensions.
In the past, Gulf states have placed strict limits on granting Palestinians citizenship. They attributed these restrictions to the nature of the tribal society, in which a person has to trace his or her lineage to a particular ancestor. In such surroundings, newcomers needed more than citizenship to be accepted into society. Irrational naturalization would eventually alter the nature of Gulf societies. As the pressure on Gulf states to naturalize Palestinians rose, so did the complaints. Nonetheless, hundreds of Palestinians who were living and working in the Gulf states were granted citizenship.
The U.S.-Gulf relationship, although close, remains tenuous and strained. There is a growing awareness among Gulf elites that the presence of U.S. forces on their soil is an abomination to Islamic fundamentalist factions, a fact that generates extraordinary animosity towards the United States.34 Not only democracy but also a push for human rights and other principles of transparency and reform may well be necessary as an integral part of the U.S. agenda towards the Gulf. Gulf political elites, once known for their close relationships with the United States, are facing increasing difficulties in convincing their own citizens of the benefit of such close relationships. The task is made harder when American policies towards Muslim and Arab causes remain unchanged, thus contributing much to the ill feeling towards Washington. Many predict a move towards more fanaticism, radicalism and anti-Americanism throughout the whole region. Gulf states are also aware that public support for the Palestinian cause will continue to be an obstacle towards normalizing relations with Washington. The UAE shares with the rest of the Arab and Muslim world a concern for the plight of the stateless Palestinians, who lack the means to regain part of their homeland. In fact, the UAE does not hesitate to publicly criticize the American double standard towards the Middle East conflict. This and other examples are indications that Washington’s closest allies in the Gulf have finally come of age.
Despite the international shouting match over terrorism and its root causes, the UAE remains committed to its agenda for internal reforms. There is a genuine belief among political elites that these reforms will help transform the lives of their subjects and work toward the betterment of society. An immediate outcome is the new awareness in the Emirates of what it means to be a “citizen” and not just a welfare recipient. Great public interest was exhibited towards participation in policy-making mechanisms, and political elites were quick to exploit this interest to further legitimatize their rule. In Dubai, for instance, the newly formed Dubai Executive Council (DEC) decided to form district municipal councils, covering different areas in the emirate. The DEC, chaired by Sheikh Mohammad bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, Dubai’s crown prince, ordered the formation of councils as part of the government’s effort to enable the public to participate democratically in the decision making process.35 Although it cannot be implied that participatory government is fully operational throughout the Gulf, public interest has been exhibited in policymaking – an involvement that exceeded even the imagination of the policy planners. This development has several implications. It indicates the expansion of public participation by providing citizens with a degree of meaningful collective control over public policy. It also indicates that Gulf societies have reached an appropriate level of development to support the process of democratization. Being in the eye of the storm has helped UAE and other Gulf societies to push through extraordinary reforms and establish a more open society.
CONCLUSION
In the last 30 years, the UAE has succeeded in becoming the model of a prosperous, stable and politically viable society. This success could be attributed mainly to its economic openness and international trade links, an adaptable political culture, abundant oil wealth, and a wise and well-counseled leadership, factors that have been the source of its economic and social comfort. However, the impact of 9/11 threatened to destabilize the entire society, shackling the economic structure, disturbing social arrangements and threatening to upset the fine balance between modernity and Islam. September 11 changed many dimensions of the close relationship between Gulf political elites and the United States as terrorism and counterterrorism became of great concern for both. The United States became more interested in a show of solidarity by its allies and friends. The Gulf monarchies, which initially aired their deeply felt differences with Washington, are now openly cooperating with the United States. The campaign against terrorism means that Gulf states are being forced to make strategic calculations based on which way the American winds are blowing.
The future of the area will be determined to a great extent by the interplay between internal and external factors, between regional stability and the ability to survive amidst these rapid changes, between geopolitical realties and external pressures from the West. It is clear that restructuring the UAE’s political system will be laden with difficulties, but it will certainly be feasible. To move forward along the desired path of modernization, the UAE will continue to concentrate on two main areas – further diversification away from oil dependency and increased democratization. If all goes according to plan, the success of one will fuel success for the other.
1 Fifteen out of the 19 hijackers involved in the 9/11 attacks were Saudi nationals despite the fact that Saudi Arabia at first denied it. The others included Egyptians, Lebanese and some other nationalities.
2 See Amy Hawthorne, “Can the United States Promote Democracy in the Middle East?” Current History, January 2003, pp. 21-26.
3 Adam Garfinkle, “The Impossible Imperative? Conjuring Arab Democracy,” The National Interest, Fall 2002, p. 159.
4 Abbas Hamdani, “Is the War on Terrorism a Clash of Civilizations?” DOMES, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 2002, p. 52.
5 Most of the non-government organizations were established during the late 1970s and early 1980s where laws were enacted giving these societies the freedom of movement.
6 See Turki al-Hamad, “Will the Gulf Monarchies Work Together?” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 1997, p. 47.
7 An example of successful regional projects is the Arab Shipbuilding Yard in Bahrain. It is one of the few ship repair yards in the world designed to handle super tankers. Seven OAPEC countries own the yard. Since it began operations in September 1977, it has shown an impressive record of success.
8 The attack on Abu al-Bakoouch oil platform off Abu Dhabi on November 25, 1986, was considered an error by Iraq.
9 By 1992, the UAE was the Arab country with which Iran had the closest commercial ties. Thus, the crisis that erupted in April 1992 over disputed islands in the Gulf seemed unexpected.
10 Turki al-Hamad believes that India and Pakistan can pose a threat to the UAE as much as any other regional powers. They might interfere in the domestic affairs of the Emirates by calling on their nationals to claim their full rights, as expressed by the U.N. Human Rights Declaration, or to go on strike if state-to-state relations deteriorated. Such steps would paralyze the whole country, which would be forced to do what those outside powers demand. See Turki al-Hamad, pp. 52-53.
11 The UAE was able to end its unhealthy dependency on a single source: oil.
12 The Middle East, March 2001, Issue No. 310.
13 It exceeds that of Saudi Arabia, which witnessed in 2001 the fall of its per capita income from $28,600 to
$6,800. See Robert Bear, “The Fall of the House of Saud,” Atlantic Monthly, May 2003, pp. 53-62.
14 For more details, see Rosemary Hollis, “Managing New Development in the Gulf,” Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2000.
15 See Gwen Okruhlik, “Networks of Dissent: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia,” Current History, January 2002, pp. 22-28.
16 See William A. Rugh, “The United Arab Emirates: What are the Sources of its Stability?” Middle East Policy, Vol. 5, No. 3, September 1997, pp. 14-24.
17 The federation of South Arabia failed because it did not have the means to build the kind of welfare state enjoyed by its neighbors.
18 In Abu Dhabi, Sharjah and Ras-al-Khaimah, these councils were founded to act as independent bodies. Their role is to legitimize power and authority by giving people the chance to have a say in running the local government.
19 In the UAE, political rights are actually granted to citizens by the governing elite.
20 Elizabeth Fernea, “The Challenges for Middle Eastern Women,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 54, No. 2, Spring 2000, p. 186.
21 William Rugh, p.16.
22 In 1986, Sharjah experienced a palace coup. A cousin of the emir of Sharjah accused Sharjah’s ruler of mismanaging the emirate’s finances. The coup succeeded in overthrowing the sultan. However, the sultan was later reinstated.
23 See Middle East Economic Digest, Vol. 45, No. 8, February 22, 2002.
24 The Middle East, February 2001, No. 309.
25 Ibid.
26 Louay Bahry, “The New Arab Media Phenomenon: Qatar’s Al-Jazeera,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 3, No. 2, June 2001, p. 90.
27 In the emirate of Dubai the jamitith al islah al ijtimaei was closed by an official order. Later when it was permitted to recommence its activities, it was carefully monitored by government officials.
28 A-Khaleej newspaper, April 16, 2003.
29 Among these professors are Dr. Said A.Harib and Dr. Mohammed Al-Raken, who are known for their Islamic views.
30 NBC Meet the Press, Interview with the Saudi foreign policy adviser, Adel AlJubeir, Sunday, May 18, 2003.
31 See the UAE Yearbook, 2002.
32 See Middle East International, October 12, 2001, No. 660, p. 20.
33 The Middle East, March 2001, No. 310.
34 The United States announced in the spring of 2003 that it would withdraw its forces from Saudi Arabia in an attempt to eliminate threats from radical Islamic organizations such as al-Qaeda to American interests in the world.
35 Gulf News, Dubai, April 2, 2003.
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