On March 3, 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress. On the surface, this was far from an extraordinary event; more Israeli heads of state have addressed the U.S. Congress than those of any other foreign nation.1 However, the circumstances surrounding the speech, and its purpose, proved unprecedented. Netanyahu had not been invited by President Barack Obama to address the U.S. Congress, nor was the president consulted about his visit beforehand.2 Netanyahu sought to use Congress to undermine the president's foreign policy.3 Specifically, he was attempting to stop the United States from negotiating an end to economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for that country's halting its nuclear program. David Axelrod, senior adviser to the president from 2009 to 2011, remarked that it was "extraordinary for a foreign leader to try and use Congress to undermine U.S. foreign policy," describing the move as "audacious."4 David Remnick, editor of The New Yorker, described President Obama as "furious; this is an absolute humiliation for him in the midst of a very delicate negotiation with Iran."5
Although it may have escalated to a new level, this tension points to an underlying issue that has been present since the beginning of America's relationship with Israel: how to achieve U.S. economic and security objectives in the Middle East while maintaining a relationship with a locally unpopular state. Assessing the policies of previous administrations might yield valuable insight into the current dilemmas. The Eisenhower administration had to formulate a policy aligned with Cold War containment. Attempting to balance America's relationship with Israel against its interests in the region, it initially pursued conflict resolution; however, seeing limited results and facing a very real crisis, it ultimately resorted to the checkbook diplomacy manifest in the Eisenhower Doctrine.
President Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, blamed the previous administration's approach to the region. "We are in the present jam," Dulles argued, "because the past administration had always dealt with the area from a political standpoint and had tried to meet the wishes of the Zionists in this country, and that had created a basic antagonism with the Arabs."6 Others in the administration echoed similar concerns. Henry Byroade, U.S. ambassador to Egypt, believed U.S.-Israeli relations alienated nationalist leaders like Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, driving them to look towards the Soviet Union for support.7 From the perspective of senior Eisenhower administration officials, President Truman could not have chosen a more unpopular bedfellow for the United States. Now they were stuck with navigating the complex world of Middle East affairs with the specter of Israel tied to their every move.
Over the course of his first term, Eisenhower's problem escalated in three distinct phases: from the intangible loss of prestige, to a tangible arms race, then, finally, to an outright attack on U.S. interests. First, a reported decline in prestige and influence sent worries through the State Department and prompted Dulles to spend three weeks visiting the region in May 1953.8 Months later, a State Department report identified the source of that decline: U.S. support for Israel.9 The State Department viewed the instability caused by ethnoreligious conflicts like the one between Arabs and Jews as providing fertile ground for communist advances.10 Soon, their worst fears seemed to be coming true.
The tangible phase of the problem occurred in September 1955, when a Czech-Egyptian arms deal posed a serious threat to American interests by giving the Soviets increased leverage, upsetting the balance of power in the region.11 Finally, Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal and the ensuing Suez Crisis manifested the Eisenhower administration's worst fears: a conflict pitting NATO members against Soviet-supported states that threatened world war.
The policy statement from the National Security Council published two years before the Suez Crisis warned of the risks to U.S. interests if Israel initiated war with its Arab neighbors: "Should Israeli aggression occur and the Western Powers fail to restore the situation, a decisive movement of the area away from the West and possibly into the Soviet sphere of influence must be anticipated."12 To prevent this, the administration embarked on an aggressive foreign policy that sought to rebuff Soviet advances by resolving Arab-Israeli disputes, thereby stabilizing the region. Despite this effort, U.S. initiatives met with increased animosity from Arab and Jew alike. All the while, the Soviet Union appeared to be making inroads with key regional players.
In sum, the U.S. problem in the Middle East progressed from perception to reality between 1953 and 1956. To mitigate this, the administration's response evolved from overt attempts at settlement to covert peace missions, and, finally, to the naked purchasing of influence.13 Desperate to improve America's standing in the region, Eisenhower sought to recast the United States as an unbiased broker of Middle East disputes with the goal of promoting regional stability and containing Soviet expansion. In so doing, his administration visibly pivoted to the Arabs and worked hard to develop a foreign policy that better addressed their demands. It began with the Jordan Valley Project, which sought to broker a water-sharing deal among Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Israel in exchange for infrastructure and economic aid from the United States. When this stalled, Operation Alpha was launched in secrecy, and lucrative military aid packages were offered to Israel and Egypt if they could agree to a peace settlement. However, not until Nasser seized the Suez Canal and war broke out in the Sinai did Eisenhower and Dulles realize that, to salvage America's position in the region, they had to jettison their demands for an Arab-Israeli settlement and adopt a more flexible policy. The Eisenhower Doctrine, as it came to be known, abandoned the aspirational preconditions that characterized earlier initiatives and, instead, dedicated large aid packages to Middle East states deemed at risk of falling to communism. As such, it was both a departure from, and the natural progression of, earlier policies, revealing the administration's growing desperation in the region and its increasing reliance on fiscal aid to achieve policy objectives. This evolution warrants close study: examining how other scholars assessed Eisenhower's foray into the Middle East can provide a benchmark from which to proceed.
Two schools of thought emerge. The first, advanced by political scientist Steven Spiegel, suggests that Eisenhower failed in the Middle East because the neutral path he pursued ultimately negated gains with both Arabs and Jews.14 Although he credits Eisenhower with developing America's first coherent policy in the region, Spiegel points to the administration's attempts at playing all sides as ultimately undermining the effectiveness of its efforts. He is also critical of the rigid, "one-dimensional nature of Eisenhower's policy making," as it prevented the administration from attempting anything other than forcing settlement plans on the opposing parties.15
The second school acknowledges factors highlighted in the first, but posits that an additional issue frustrated Washington's plans for the region. Peter Hahn recognizes that inter-Arab rivalries and the policy of impartiality made it difficult for the administration to find a solution that pleased all parties. However, he argues that a third element, U.S.-Israeli relations, ultimately soured the administration's overtures to the Arabs.16
Hahn proposes that the Eisenhower administration misdiagnosed the Arab states' priorities and failed to address what they saw as the primary threat to their national interest. While Eisenhower and Dulles saw the Soviet Union as the main threat to the region, the Arab leaders viewed Israel and each other as the real dangers. By focusing on the Cold War threat, Hahn argues, the administration did more to foment Arab-Israeli unrest than build lasting peace.17 Describing the Middle East in the 1950s as facing its own version of the Cold War, he contends that U.S.-Israeli relations fostered distrust among Arab leaders who were in competition, first, with Israel and, second, with each other.18 Hahn also addresses this from the Israeli perspective, arguing that a general "warming" to the Arabs, and a decline in support from the United States, only angered Israel.19 Combining the detrimental effects of inter-Arab rivalries, anti-Zionist sentiment, and the suspicion associated with an ally who was involved with all interested parties, this perspective presents a comprehensive assessment of the Eisenhower administration's failure in the Middle East. Accepting Hahn's approach as sound, it is possible to explore what America's relationship with Israel cost in both diplomatic energy and aid.
THE JORDAN VALLEY PROJECT (JVP)
The belief that the U.S. relationship with Israel had led to a decline in U.S. influence in the greater Middle East was pervasive throughout the State Department during the Eisenhower years. Reflecting on the source of this problem in a meeting with key senators and members of the State Department, Dulles remarked, "The Arabs have felt that they could not depend on the U.S. in view of Zionist pressures which can be brought to bear in this country."20 Dulles's comment pointed to the psychological impact of U.S. relations with Israel; this lack of dependability undermined U.S. capacity to project influence among the Arab states.
The first approach the Eisenhower administration took to remedy its dependability problem focused on demonstrating that the United States could be counted on as an objective broker of disputes between Israel and its neighbors. An opportunity presented itself early in Eisenhower's first term, when a dispute among Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Israel over water rights threatened to further destabilize the region. On October 7, 1953, Eisenhower appointed Eric Johnston as his personal representative to the Near East and charged him with the vague and deceptively innocuous task of "resolv[ing] certain problems" in the region.21 More information followed six days later, and Johnston soon learned how complex and challenging his mission would be.
The multifaceted problem quickly became a crisis in September 1953, when Israeli construction on a canal designed to divert water from the Jordan River neared completion.22 The Jordan River, a strategically important body of water for Israel, Syria and Jordan, not only provided a vital resource for both agriculture and industry; it demarcated the borders of all three nations. Israel's canal enterprise, referred to as the Banat Yaacov Project, quickly roused the ire of both Syria and Jordan. They viewed the dam as a direct threat to their national security; if Israel was capable of diverting the Jordan River, it could effectively starve them of water, should hostilities escalate.
The United States also took issue with the canal project, but not because it feared Israel would use the dam to deprive the Arabs of water; in fact, the State Department largely agreed that Israel had every legal right to dam the Jordan River.23 Instead, their opposition to the canal arose out of the fact that Israel was jeopardizing a potential multilateral defense pact between its neighbors (the Baghdad Pact).24 Dulles and his agents feared that if they were unable to stop Israel from further angering its neighbors, Western efforts to build a northern tier to halt Soviet expansion would be ineffective.
Dulles initially told the Israelis that if they did not stop construction on the dam, the United States would suspend all economic aid.25 He followed through on his threat, suspending aid a month later when Israel continued its work, even in the face of UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) opposition.26 However, suspending economic aid was only meant as a temporary measure to halt construction until a more permanent solution could be devised.
Dulles hoped to work the issue through the United Nations, where the United States drafted a resolution with France and the United Kingdom calling on all parties to respect the decisions made by UNTSO Chairman General Vagn Bennike.27 But Russia, playing to the desire of both Syria and Israel to operate unencumbered by UNTSO, vetoed the measure, and Dulles was left without a UN solution to the Jordan Valley problem.28 This move by Russia not only stymied U.S. plans for resolving the dispute; it added fuel to the State Department's conviction that Russia sought to wield influence through destabilization. Although Israel agreed to temporarily halt construction on the canal, it would be only a matter of time before it began again. Finding no easy solution in the UN, Dulles placed his hopes for a peaceful resolution entirely on Eric Johnston's shoulders.
Johnston's instructions charged him with striking a water-sharing deal based on the findings of a Tennessee Valley Authority study of the Jordan Valley.29 On the surface, the study proposed distributing water on a needs basis to all parties involved; critically, however, it also sought substantial restrictions on Israel's territorial and resource-related aspirations. It allotted a greater volume of water to be diverted to Jordan than to Israel, demanded that Israel renounce its claim to unrestricted water rights, and suggested that Israel cede territory adjacent to the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers.30 Additionally, the plan called for sweeping infrastructure investment in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria so that they could better use the diverted water.
The benefits from this were twofold. It would ameliorate conditions for Palestinian refugees seeking shelter in Jordan by facilitating more permanent and sustainable accommodations for them.31 Second, estimates concluded that harnessing water from the Jordan River could bring over 200,000 acres of land into productive agricultural use while also providing a cheap source of energy for industry.32 As economic disparity between Israel and the Arab states was a source of Arab resentment, this would support the U.S. objective of improving Arab standards of living in step with the rapid improvements occurring in Israel.33 By presenting these conditions, Washington sought to garner favor from the wider Arab world, adopting a more objective posture in its approach to Arab-Israeli disputes while also demonstrating concern for the plight of Palestinian refugees. However, at this point the administration believed that inducements for Israel were still necessary to draw them to the negotiating table.
Johnston's instructions encouraged him to work for the removal of the demilitarized zones currently under the supervision of UNTSO.34 This was a sensitive condition, not only for Jordan and Syria, but for the Arab world as a whole. First, eliminating the demilitarized zones along Israel's borders would be a significant step towards making what the Arabs considered a temporary and illegitimate state into a permanent one. This would allow Israel unfettered access to all its territory, and, to prevent further hostilities, permanent borders would have to be agreed upon. Second, Israel would be able to position its military wherever it desired within its territory, an unsavory thought for neighbors who saw it as a military behemoth with expansionist aspirations. Armed with these instructions, Johnston stepped into the fray of Middle East diplomacy during the Cold War.
With Israeli work at Banat Yaacov temporarily halted, Johnston directed his initial efforts at the Arab states, outlining the conceptual foundation for a settlement agreement. The initial framework he presented sought to tie U.S. economic assistance to "willingness to accept and abide by the principles embodied in the plan."35 Although this provision may seem like standard fare for diplomatic negotiations, it established a precedent placing the United States at the center of Arab-Israeli relations and reinforced the notion that American benevolence was conditioned on the acceptance of Israel. From the Arab perspective, making the receipt of U.S. aid dependent on a nation's willingness to negotiate with Israel did little to promote Eisenhower's goal of becoming an objective broker of Middle East affairs. To them, it pointed to the power of Zionist influence and revealed the ultimate motive behind U.S. involvement in the region: strengthening and making permanent the state of Israel. But Eisenhower and Dulles's reliance on economic aid as the linchpin of Arab-Israeli relations also betrayed the direction and substance of broader U.S. policy in the region. To win favor and offset damage done by its association with Israel, the administration began to rely increasingly on financial aid. Johnston's mission was but the first in a chain of initiatives that promised aid in return for reaching accord with Israel. Surprisingly, it received a lukewarm reception from Lebanon, Jordan and Syria when introduced in 1953.
Often wracked by chronic instability and internal power struggles, the leaders of those three countries were enticed by any measure that could improve their power and popularity.36 Although it took over a year, by February 1955, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon had agreed to a slightly modified version of the JVP presented by Johnston.37 However, this placed the financial obligations of the United States at $200 million (not adjusted for inflation) over standard aid packages.38 While Eisenhower found the new figures exorbitant, what surprised Johnston and the State Department was who played spoiler and ultimately rejected the deal.39 Unwilling to cede the requisite amount of water to Jordan or Syria and concerned about appearing weak amid an election pitted against the much more hawkish Ben-Gurion, Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett rejected the deal and effectively ended Johnston's mission.40
In the end, Johnston was unable to produce a water-sharing agreement before regional events prompted Dulles and Eisenhower to explore new methods of extracting concessions from the Middle East. Although it ultimately failed, the Jordan Valley Project serves as a prime example of the willingness of the Americans to devote significant financial aid and diplomatic energy to righting the perceived wrong of America's association with Israel. Johnston spent over 18 months on the project and offered the Arab parties more than $155 million above their allotted aid packages to agree to a deal that would improve their infrastructure, standards of living and economies, all to no avail.
MIGS, MISSILES AND SOVIET MEDDLING
Ironically, Johnston may have lost domestic support for his mission long before he ran into opposition in the Middle East. In April 1954, only six months after he filed his first status report, Dulles expressed interest in identifying a "new approach" towards peace between the Arabs and Israel.41 Shortly thereafter, NSC 5428 noted that current efforts towards improving the U.S. position in the region were falling short and, "unless these trends are reversed, the Near East may well be lost to the West within the next few years."42 In January 1955, while Johnston was still at work on the JVP, the State Department initiated plans for a covert mission to win Arab support from a different, yet equally important, player in the region.43 With Johnston's multilateral approach stalling, Dulles began secret talks with the British Foreign Office about peace between Egypt and Israel — a move that, because of its clandestine origins, became known as Operation Alpha.44
Although not evident at first, the motivation for this engagement with Egypt becomes apparent when placed in the wider context. First, Egypt was not part of the Baghdad Pact negotiations and thus was militarily nonaligned and seen as vulnerable to Soviet influence. The State Department worried that Nasser, infuriated by the pact, might seek Soviet military aid and assurances to counterbalance Western promises to pact-member and regional rival Iraq. Second, Israel appeared ready to engage in dialogue with Egypt, believing that peace with Egypt was a prerequisite to peace with the wider Arab world.45 Finally, inducements for peace abounded between the two nations. Israel sought navigation rights through the Suez Canal and an easing of its neighbors' trade embargo; Nasser longed for economic and military aid to fulfill his aspiration of becoming the premier representative of the Arab world. Dulles saw an opportunity for less complicated negotiations that could enhance U.S. influence in the region and bring a potential Soviet ally into the Western fold.
Because the State Department believed Sharett was prepared to discuss peace with Egypt, initial overtures were directed at Nasser in an effort to stroke his ego and emphasize the potential for regional influence should he take the lead in making peace.46 The State Department also hoped to play on Nasser's economic and military ambitions by offering him a lucrative aid package.47 To highlight the importance of negotiations and add an air of prestige, it was decided that British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden would raise the subject during a visit to Cairo in February 1955.48 If Nasser was receptive, U.S. Ambassador Henry Byroade would continue negotiations. However, if the plan was to have any chance for success, both parties agreed that Operation Alpha had to remain a secret until they had better insight into Nasser's position on negotiations with Israel. This ensured that Nasser would not garner criticism from his rivals for appearing to be a colonial puppet and prevented the negotiations from impeding the West's principal objective: the Baghdad Pact.49
The negotiating framework for Operation Alpha consisted of two categories of inducements. The first contained concessions that Israel and Egypt would make to each other; the second consisted of elements that the United States and the UK were prepared to offer in exchange for an agreement. The issues that required resolution between Egypt and Israel revolved around territory, borders, refugees and the economic embargo.50 For the benefit of Israel, the State Department suggested permanent borders by abolishing the demilitarized zone that ran between the two. They proposed that "triangles of land" be ceded from Israel to Egypt and Jordan to create a contiguous border that would facilitate overland travel and communications.51 The framework suggested that Egypt work through the Arab League to drop the trade embargo on Israel and allow the passage of Israeli vessels through the Suez Canal.52 The State Department also proposed that Palestinian refugees, now residing in border villages in Jordan, be granted access to their traditional farmland in Israel. It was argued that 75,000 of these refugees be allowed repatriation to Israel and that those who did not return be compensated for the loss of their property.53 Finally, the United States and the UK, in conjunction with the UNTSO, offered to guarantee the integrity of the border between the two nations if an agreement were reached.54
These difficult concessions were sweetened by the offer of inducements, should an agreement be made. It was estimated that, in addition to the $486 million already obligated to the region, the United States would provide $545 million in aid to Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.55 This was a significant increase over the $200 million offered under the Johnston Plan, and it came in various forms: a $150 million loan to Israel to compensate Palestinian refugees; $45 million for Jordan, Syria and Lebanon should they subsequently join the deal; and $250 million for military aid to Egypt and Israel, a provision eagerly sought by both parties.56 However, in the eyes of the State Department, the key to enticing Nasser was an offer of $100 million in financing and technical expertise to facilitate the construction of the Aswan Dam.57 With Eden's initial effort to feel out Nasser yielding some promise, Dulles alluded to Operation Alpha in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations on August 26, 1955, and passed the mission to Ambassador Byroade to work out the details.58
Initial negotiations with Nasser and Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi appeared encouraging, but the Egyptians were unwilling to accept the "triangle" plan for a corridor connecting Egypt to Jordan. Instead, Fawzi pushed for a larger swath of land to join the two nations.59 One of Nasser's closest confidants, Fawzi understood the reasoning behind his obdurate position on the Negev corridor. A narrow, internationally supervised corridor connecting Egypt to the rest of the Arab world would make it extremely difficult for Nasser to realize his goal of a Pan-Arab Union. Israel, too, was unyielding on territorial cessions and refused outright to "give up the Negev in whole or in part."60 With the parties at an impasse, Fawzi hinted that a deal might be impossible.61 Byroade also began to lose faith in the bilateral approach: "Arab-Israeli settlement can most probably never be achieved by treating [the] matter in isolation from other matters in [the] Middle East."62 Little did Byroade know that Nasser was working behind the scenes to make a separate deal, setting in motion a chain of events that nearly precipitated world war.
On September 20, 1955, the State Department learned that Nasser had struck a significant arms deal with the Soviet Union for the heavy weapons — MiG fighters and main battle tanks — he had so long desired.63 This marked the move from a perceived problem of prestige to a very tangible crisis in the minds of the Eisenhower administration. Dulles and State Department officials had known for years that Nasser desired heavy arms, and he reminded them of it when he indicated that part of his motive for turning to the Soviets lay in several failed promises from the United States.64 Only a month prior, Eisenhower and Dulles had discussed providing arms to Egypt and agreed that this should be pursued; however, they failed to follow through. From Nasser's perspective, this was par for the course in dealing with the West.65 Further explaining his decision, Nasser pointed to a February 28, 1955, Israeli raid on Gaza as the tipping point for making arms acquisitions his top priority.66 Once again, Arab-Israeli tension seemed to be undermining U.S. efforts. Taken aback by these developments, Dulles and the State Department struggled to develop a coherent way forward.
The Eisenhower administration grappled with whether to employ the carrot or the stick. In a move to isolate Egypt, there was talk of the United States joining the Baghdad Pact and "bringing with us as many Arab states as possible."67 There were also discussions about entering a security pact with Israel, and Eisenhower even considered providing state-of-the-art Nike surface-to-air missiles and advanced interceptor aircraft to Israel.68 On the other hand, the State Department was not quite ready to abandon its recently hatched Operation Alpha and decided to keep certain inducements for Nasser on the table, such as Alpha and the offer to finance construction of the Aswan Dam.69
As the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal became a reality, and the State Department continued with Operation Alpha, Dulles and Vice President Richard Nixon discussed how best to carry on negotiations with a Soviet-oriented Egypt during an election year. The two agreed that a bipartisan political approach could neutralize objections that Eisenhower might encounter in his electoral rematch with Adlai Stevenson, and Dulles began looking for a respected emissary to continue the administration's efforts.70 He ultimately settled on Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Anderson to lead Operation Alpha into 1956. A lifelong Democrat until the 1956 election, his efforts in the Middle East would prove difficult for Stevenson and his allies in Congress to attack.71
Prior to departing for Cairo, Anderson personally met with Eisenhower and Dulles to discuss the framework for his bold attempt at shuttle diplomacy. Their conversation revealed a sense of desperation not evident in earlier dialogue on the subject. The first negotiating point revolved around the possibility of limiting the Baghdad Pact to its current members (Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and the UK) and deemphasizing U.S. support for the alliance.72 This option had not yet been discussed with the British, the pact's mainstay, and risked weakening the Northern Tier security concept. Second, there was a threat of economic warfare against Egypt: flooding the international cotton market. Lastly, the Aswan Dam, a vestige of Operation Alpha, came to play a pivotal role as negotiations evolved.73 Eisenhower had long believed that financing the dam held real promise for coaxing Nasser into a settlement with Israel. However, evidence suggests that Dulles began to doubt the wisdom of this offer shortly after the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal the previous fall.74
The final inducement for Egypt was an offer to construct a canal parallel to the Suez, financed by U.S. oil companies, that would increase traffic and revenue for Egypt. As their conversation shifted to refugee compensation and the costs associated with the plan, desperation again became evident. Anderson was essentially given a blank check, as Dulles and Eisenhower agreed that "a settlement would be so valuable to the United States and would attract such large political support that Congress would almost assuredly vote the necessary funds."75 This reveals an increasing trend of relying on checkbook diplomacy to elicit good relations from the Arab world. Coupled with this was the guidance given to Anderson regarding Israel. No new inducements were offered, and it was instead suggested that Anderson emphasize the need for Israel to compromise now that the Soviet Union had taken an active role in providing arms to the Arabs.76 With Eisenhower's personal blessing, Anderson set off for the Middle East four days later.
Anderson's initial session with Nasser on January 18, 1956, held out the possibility of a peace agreement with Israel. Nasser expressed interest in discussing terms but, ever preoccupied with the notion of a Pan-Arab union under his leadership, he worried that a deal with Israel would provide fodder for his rivals in Iraq or Saudi Arabia to undermine his prestige. He also divulged that, to ensure domestic acquiescence to an Egyptian-Israeli settlement, a six-month period of calm was required before going public.77 This rightfully alarmed Dulles and Anderson; there had not been a six-month respite from border skirmishes since Israeli statehood was declared in 1948.
Undaunted, Anderson went ahead, but Nasser soon raised the same demands about territorial concessions that Byroade encountered during his negotiations the previous fall.78 He also stood firm on a demand that all Palestinian refugees had the right to repatriation, a position wholly unacceptable to Israel. Over the next few days Nasser grew increasingly "fatalistic," pledging to go without economic and infrastructure improvements in order to continue building Egypt's military.79 He called a pact with Israel by any Arab leader political suicide; despite initial hopes, an agreement appeared unlikely. As Nasser remained obdurate, refusing direct talks with Ben-Gurion, Anderson refocused his efforts on trying to extract a written nonaggression pact from both parties.80 Provisions in the original offer began to fall by the wayside, and one of them, the financing of the Aswan Dam, was neglected completely.
As early as March 1956, Dulles confided to Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban that Anderson's mission was a failure, urging the Israelis not to upset the delicate truce that had taken hold along the border.81 As a result of the Anderson debacle, the State Department decided to stall on further discussions of financing the Aswan Dam.82 However, it is unclear whether Eisenhower was on board with this decision; weeks later, he asked Under Secretary of State Hoover about the status of the project.83 This episode reveals one of the few splits between Eisenhower and Dulles. The president believed the $100 million offer was critical in preventing the Soviets from drawing Egypt further into their orbit. Dulles, on the other hand, saw the offer to finance the dam on the heels of the Egyptian-Soviet arms deal as a reward for bad behavior and worried that it would be hard to explain to allies who had not defied U.S. requests.84 Dulles and the State Department won out; with the help of the British, they decided to delay all discussions about the Aswan Dam, hoping this would show Nasser that he could not "cooperate with the Soviet Union and at the same time enjoy most-favored-nation treatment from the United States."85
In his diary, Eisenhower pointed to the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal and Nasser's unwillingness to compromise as the primary motives behind the U.S. decision to drop its support for the dam.86 It had far-reaching consequences, and Nasser's response triggered an escalation of regional tensions previously unseen. In hindsight, the State Department may have wished they had heeded the Iraqi ambassador's advice. He told Henry Byroade, "I know there are many who say it is wrong to aid your enemy. If Nasser were alone I would agree. However, behind him is the Soviet Union, which is our real enemy, and if you fail [to] aid Nasser you are not halting your enemy, you are actually strengthening him."87
Operation Alpha and the subsequent Anderson mission represented the second phase of U.S. efforts to exert influence in the Middle East by fostering a settlement between Israel and Egypt. The 1955 Soviet-Egyptian arms deal heightened the urgency of this effort and betrayed a sense of U.S. desperation. The administration made generous offers to finance arms and infrastructure to the amount of $545 million over existing aid packages, should Israel and its neighbors agree to live peaceably. Eisenhower and Dulles discussed weakening the Baghdad Pact, and Anderson was given a blank check to offer incentives for a deal. However, these inducements were not enough to yield concessions from Nasser, who saw any agreement with Israel as political suicide. Instead, Nasser sought aid from the Soviet Union, where it was not conditioned on negotiations with Israel. This drove Eisenhower and Dulles to drop their offer to finance the Aswan Dam, and the two began considering a policy of "weakening Nasser" instead of building him up.88 Israel, too, proved unwilling to compromise on the territorial concessions placed before it and began enhancing its military stockpiles in response to the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal. Before Eisenhower and Dulles could defuse this powder keg, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, one week after the United States officially withdrew its offer to help finance the Aswan Dam.
THE SUEZ CRISIS AND THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE
Nasser's announcement about the canal was broadcast live from Alexandria; it served as the trigger for Egyptian officials to seize control of canal infrastructure and operations from the British. The speech was also a diatribe against the West and Israel: "They strengthened Israel so they can annihilate us and convert us into a state of refugees."89 Revealing his aspiration of leading a Pan-Arab Union, Nasser espoused solidarity with his Arab neighbors and marked a new course in the nation's foreign policy.
Feeling targeted by the West, Nasser turned to the Soviet Union, which had formally agreed to help finance construction of the Aswan Dam two days earlier, on July 24, 1956.90 With his dream of damming the Nile revived, Nasser jumped at the opportunity to secure a second revenue stream to augment the aid promised by the Soviets. Egypt was in dire financial straits; the government was estimated to be hemorrhaging between $2 million and $4 million per month.91 Nasser hoped that nationalizing the canal would not only halt this fiscal bleeding but provide the additional funds required to complete construction on the dam.92 As the West had never delivered the arms they had promised, and had reneged on the offer to finance the dam, Nasser saw nothing left to lose when he defied Egypt's former colonial masters by dismantling the Suez Canal Company.
As the Suez Crisis escalated between July 1956 and March 1957, the Eisenhower administration confronted its worst fear: Nasser seized control of Europe's oil lifeline and, in response, England, France and Israel initiated a war that threatened to involve the Soviet Union.93 In the context of the previous year's arms deal with the Soviets, and their recent agreement to finance the Aswan Dam, the State Department began to view Egypt as a blossoming Soviet satellite that now had the ability to control the flow of oil to Europe. According to Dulles, "this would be just about as effective as if they threatened them with atomic destruction."94 Describing Nasser's actions to a bipartisan meeting of congressmen, Dulles "referred to a desire on the part of Nasser to unite the Arab world and if possible the Moslem world, and to use Mid-East oil and the Suez Canal as weapons against the West."95 Such dire consequences called for desperate measures, the third phase of the administration's policy in the region. In the end, this new approach was manifest in the Eisenhower Doctrine: the receipt of U.S. aid was no longer conditioned on acquiescence towards Israel, and money flowed freely to any state deemed critical in the fight against communism.
In the immediate aftermath of Nasser's decision to nationalize the canal, the Eisenhower administration attempted to do damage control while calming their furious European allies. The British and French stood to lose the most from nationalization. Not only did they hold the lion's share of stock in the canal company; more important, their economies relied on the oil that flowed through Suez. French Prime Minister Guy Mollet was enraged, demanding unity among the United States, the UK and France in turning back Nasser, lest "all western positions in the Middle East and North Africa be lost within the next 12 months."96 Anthony Eden was equally unnerved and wrote Eisenhower urging swift economic and political action to pressure Nasser to relinquish control of the canal.97 He also noted that the UK was prepared to use force and that he had instructed his chiefs of staff to begin planning military contingencies to remove Nasser from the canal.
Eisenhower, on the other hand, urged restraint, recognizing that Western intervention to regain control of the canal by force would be interpreted by world opinion as undiluted colonialism.98 He preferred a calculated response as a safeguard against a haphazard reaction that could trigger Soviet intervention on behalf of Egypt. Dulles's first task, therefore, was to quell the British and French inclination for armed intervention. He worried that such an act would destroy "the influence of the West in the Middle East and most of Africa for a generation, if not a century." This would be a windfall for the Russians, who could further exploit Arab anger and expand their position in the region.99 Eisenhower and Dulles desperately sought a diplomatic solution that Egypt would agree to. Temporarily halting the European march to war, the UK, France and the United States, along with 19 other nations, agreed to meet in London to discuss the way forward.
Recognizing their shaky legal grounds, the London Conference sought to broker a new Suez Canal Convention with Egypt that respected its sovereignty and offered more reasonable revenue sharing but vested authority over canal operations in a multinational Suez Canal Board.100 The conference designated five representatives, led by Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies, to travel to Cairo and present their plan to Nasser. As the Suez Committee prepared for its first meeting, Dulles was optimistic about their prospects. He told Eisenhower he was pleased with having recruited four non-Western countries — Ethiopia, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey — to endorse the Suez Committee: "The program becomes not just a Western program but one with Asian and African support."101 Dulles's obvious concern was to ensure that the Suez Committee did not come across as a veiled attempt by the old colonial powers to take back the Suez — a charge made by Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov on the closing day of the conference.
However, Dulles neglected the fact that three of these nations (Iran, Pakistan and Turkey) were Baghdad Pact members, a feature that likely undid any potential benefit from Nasser's perspective. Dulles also downplayed the fact that Prime Minister Eden, despite his public endorsement, was unhappy with the Suez Committee's mission.102 Instead of a negotiation, Eden hoped the London Conference would have produced an ultimatum for Nasser and that, after its rejection, war would become the next viable option. He urged Dulles to ensure negotiations with Nasser were swift and tough, thereby lessening the chances for success.103
Eden was not alone in his displeasure with the outcome of the London Conference. The French foreign minister, Christian Pineau, waxed indignant, claiming the Suez Committee was doomed to fail and recommending that planning begin immediately for the inevitable military action to follow.104 The Arab world also disapproved of the London Conference; several nations observed five minutes of silence for the "assassination of liberty."105 Robert Anderson, by this time exploring Arab-Israeli peace options with the Saudis, had an audience with King Saud and Prince Faisal, who applauded Nasser's move and characterized the London Conference as an attempt to undermine Egyptian sovereignty.106 With the UK, Russia, France and Saudi Arabia each castigating the London Conference in its own way, the Suez Committee appeared doomed from the start.
Nasser was predictably unmoved by the Committee and refused to acquiesce to key elements of its platform. In the final meeting on September 2, 1956, Nasser showed his resolve but was relatively level headed and reasonable in his repudiation, asking the committee, "What is your problem? Freedom of navigation? I'm ready to discuss that. Tolls? I'm ready to discuss that. The British press charges that I'm trying to build an empire? We can discuss that too if you want, but I will not discuss Egyptian sovereignty."107 To protect this sovereignty, Nasser dismissed the idea of an international supervisory board and refused to relinquish the authority to determine toll charges. However, he assured the committee he would continue to guarantee freedom of navigation for all nations, aside from Israel, through the canal.108
The Egyptian press was less forgiving and parodied the London Conference while taking a direct jab at Menzies. Al Akhbar compared the Suez Committee's efforts to those of an urbane fashionista in London or Paris demanding the right to determine how the Australian sheep that provide the wool for his clothes are raised and maintained.109 Nasser, at the height of his popularity across the Middle East, was portrayed as a hero for dismantling a vestige of colonialism and checking the West's ploy to reclaim their position. Defeated, the Suez Committee returned to London for a second go at drafting an approach to the issue. However, before they could finalize their plans, Israel, with the support of Britain and France, intervened in a manner that undermined the potential for a diplomatic solution.110
On October 29, 1956, Israel invaded Egypt across the Sinai and, four days later, reached its objective, securing the eastern shore of the Suez Canal.111 With the hawkish Ben-Gurion at the helm, Israel had been eager for an opportunity to preemptively defeat the Egyptian army before it could receive the bulk of the weapons promised in the previous year's arms deal with Czechoslovakia. However, Israel's invasion was not a product of its own design. The operation was hatched by the British and French as a means of regaining control of the canal and undermining Nasser's nationalist strides.112 According to the plan, once Israel invaded, the British and French would intervene as neutrals and demand a ceasefire; the Israelis would comply, but the Egyptians would refuse, providing the pretext for the British and French to enter the fray to "protect" the canal.113
On October 31, 1956, the British and French issued their ceasefire ultimatum, demanding that both Egypt and Israel withdraw all military forces within 10 miles of the Suez Canal. The audacity of this proposition cannot be overstated. Had the Egyptians agreed, this would have confined Egyptian forces approximately 110 miles inside their own border while leaving Israeli troops over 100 miles inside Egypt.114 Not surprisingly, Nasser refused. The British and French initiated airstrikes that night and, five days later, on the eve of the U.S. presidential election, launched an amphibious assault and invasion of their own.115 Meanwhile, Eisenhower and Dulles, caught completely off guard by the assault, scrambled to deescalate the situation.
Meeting at the White House on the evening of October 29, 1956, Eisenhower and Dulles quickly realized that England and France were behind the Israeli invasion. The president was outraged at his European allies, who, in the run-up to the invasion, had virtually ceased all diplomatic communications with the United States. He felt betrayed, describing the action as a "double-cross."116 Emotions aside, Eisenhower and Dulles struggled with how to proceed. Their first stumbling block was whether to make good on their Tripartite Pact obligation to intervene militarily on behalf of Egypt.117 This would put them at odds with their traditional allies and on the side of the Soviet Union, a course that Dulles was unwilling to accept. Eisenhower was initially inclined to go this route, telling the cabinet, "He did not fancy helping Egypt in the present circumstances but he felt our word must be made good."118 However, it was decided first to take the matter before the United Nations and condemn Israeli aggression, demand their withdrawal and make clear the U.S. position.119
The following day, October 30, 1956, Henry Cabot Lodge, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council condemning Israel's invasion of Egypt and demanding an immediate withdrawal.120 The Soviet Union also submitted a draft resolution calling for Israel to withdraw. However, Arkady Sobolev, the Soviet ambassador, removed provisions of the U.S. resolution that sought to prevent member nations from intervening militarily in the conflict. In the debate surrounding these resolutions, both England and France defended the Israeli invasion by characterizing it as defensive, in light of the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal.121 They also stressed the need for Western intervention to end the hostilities and shared their plan to deploy forces to the canal zone if Israel and Egypt did not agree to a ceasefire by October 31. When the resolutions came to a vote, both England and France vetoed the U.S. and Soviet measures, marking the first time in its 10-year history that a Security Council member other than the Soviet Union vetoed a resolution.122 Lodge then turned to the General Assembly, where he passed the resolution, as England and France were unable to block it. Although this failed to dislodge Israel from Egyptian territory, it garnered wide praise from across the Arab world, with numerous laudatory telegrams pouring into the White House.123
These telegrams reveal that Eisenhower earned credit for his principled stand, at least initially, with the victims of aggression in the Middle East. However, this move placed him in a difficult position that reflected the significance of the situation beyond the future of the Suez Canal. Having signaled through the United Nations a willingness to side with Egypt, the Arab world was left hoping for tough measures, even military intervention, by the United States.124 Instead, they heard offers of military assistance from the Soviet Union, which, after England and France invaded on November 5, 1956, had threatened London and Paris with a nuclear response.125 Although this was just bluster, Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin went so far as to write Eisenhower, urging that the United States and the USSR work in concert to expel the British, French and Israelis with military force, if necessary.126 Eisenhower had no intention of intervening militarily in the hostilities, not on behalf of Egypt, and certainly not in an alliance with the Soviet Union against England and France.127 Instead, the administration decided to pursue a ceasefire through the United Nations while independently pressuring England, France and Israel to withdraw their forces.128
This strategy paid off. On November 6, 1956, the General Assembly adopted Resolutions 997 and 998, providing the framework for a ceasefire and authorizing a UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to supervise a tenuous peace.129 With all parties agreeing to the ceasefire, England and France withdrew their forces from Egypt in December. Israel, however, required considerable coaxing from Eisenhower before Ben-Gurion agreed to evacuate his troops from Egyptian territory in March 1957. 130 With the Suez Crisis resolved, the Eisenhower administration was finally able to reassess its Middle East policy and determine where it had gone wrong.
Dulles and the State Department began formulating the doctrine that would bear the president's name as early as November 1956.131 While the Eisenhower Doctrine was a logical evolution of the administration's previous policy, it differed in one significant regard. Whereas earlier aid packages offered as part of the Jordan Valley Project and Operation Alpha were conditioned on Arab states accommodating Israel, under the Eisenhower Doctrine, aid was made available to any nation put at risk by communism.132 The administration hoped that aid provided to Arab nations without strings attached to Israel would stabilize the region and stiffen their resistance to Soviet overtures.
From a transactional perspective, this new doctrine presented the Arab nations with a much better deal, as aid would no longer be conditioned on their relationship with Israel. For the United States, the transaction came at a cost; the potential return on investment was significantly less than it had been. Previous deals held out the prospect of Arab-Israeli peace and stability, important ingredients for a successful containment strategy. However, under the Eisenhower Doctrine, the United States relinquished its hope of constructing a lasting settlement between Israel and its neighbors in favor of a more direct, albeit brittle, means of thwarting Moscow's rapprochement with the Arab world. Israel too was rewarded under the doctrine, but not with money. Recognizing that the doctrine sought to strengthen the U.S. relationship with Arab states, Israel never affirmed it and, therefore, received no funds under it.133 However, for the remainder of the Eisenhower administration, Israel was spared pressure to reach a settlement with the Arabs and never paid a price for its aggression against Egypt.
As the doctrine neared completion, the State Department began preparing for its reception in the Middle East. In a hand-written postscript at the bottom of a cable sent from Dulles to Ambassador Byroade, the secretary of state stressed the importance of the administration's new, no-strings-attached approach. "It should be emphasized," wrote Dulles, "that when America, through bilateral or multilateral agreements, provides help of any kind to another, it does so without seeking special advantages or influence over them."134 Dulles also made preparations on the domestic front, as the doctrine needed congressional approval for the $200 million in aid it required.
In a meeting with former Senate Majority Leader William Knowland, Dulles explained the purpose behind the administration's new doctrine. He pointed to the Suez Crisis as an indication that U.S. influence in the region had faltered and that "the United States must make its presence more strongly felt in the area."135 Dulles described the bilateral nature of potential agreements as providing maneuverability to the administration's foreign policy. He stressed that the aid was intended "to bolster the military defense abilities and economies of countries whose governments showed a determination to combat communist infiltration."136 Senator Knowland agreed with this reasoning, believing the course was much more feasible than other options, such as joining the Baghdad Pact, that Dulles presented. Comfortable with its reception at home and abroad, Dulles was ready to pitch the concept to the president.
Eisenhower was largely pleased with the initial draft of the doctrine he received on December 22, 1956, and made only minor changes to it.137 Emblematic of their relationship, his revisions support the notion that he had to reel in his energetic and, at times, fiery secretary of state. He revised language that characterized the United Nations as "undependable," emphasizing the willingness with which the United States stood up to its allies, England and France, during the recent crisis.138 He also softened the harsh tone directed at the Arab states, which Dulles characterized as weak and divided. Having refined the draft, Eisenhower presented it to Congress on January 5, 1957. Joint Resolution 117, optimistically titled "Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East," passed on March 9, 1957.
The Eisenhower Doctrine required semi-annual reports to Congress on its progress. Judging from the sums allocated, the State Department wasted no time in exercising the new program throughout the region. These reports place its total cost at approximately $214 million: $122.8 million allotted for economic development, $51.1 million for direct military investment and $40.9 million in contributions to the UNEF.139 Funds were distributed across 15 nations comprising the soft underbelly of the communist juggernaut to the north. Unlike the funds allocated for the Jordan Valley Project ($200 million) and Operation Alpha ($545 million), which were earmarked but never distributed, the $214.8 million allotted under the Eisenhower Doctrine was distributed in the form of economic aid and military hardware between 1957 and 1960. This further supports the claim that, between 1952 and 1956, the Eisenhower administration became increasingly desperate to improve its image and influence in the Middle East. However, by 1957, they had rejected the notion that this was possible by brokering peace between Israel and its neighbors. Aid offered under the Jordan Valley Project and Operation Alpha was conditioned on Arab states' reaching a settlement with Israel, but the $214.8 million spent under the Eisenhower Doctrine bought them no such accord.
1 Office of the Historian, United States House of Representatives, "Foreign Leaders and Dignitaries who have Addressed the U.S. Congress," accessed January 23, 2016, http://history.h ouse.gov/Institution/Foreign-Leaders/Fast-Facts/.
2 Frontline, season 34, episode 1, "Netanyahu at War," Produced by Michael Kirk, aired January 5, 2016, on PBS.
6 Memorandum of a Conversation with the Secretary of State, October 18, 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-1957, vol. XIV; Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955, ed. John P. Glennon and Carl N. Raether (Washington, D.C., 1989), doc. 343.
7 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, June 9, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 123.
8 The Visit of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Mutual Security Administrator Harold Stassen to the Near and Middle East, May 9-29, 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1952-1954, vol. IX, part 1; The Near and Middle East (in two parts), ed. John P. Glennon, Paul Claussen, Joan M. Lee, and Carl N. Raether (Washington, D.C., 1986), doc. 1.
9 Special Report Prepared by the Psychological Strategy Board, September 11, 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. I, part 2, General: Economic and Political Matters (in two parts), eds. William Z. Slany, David M. Baehler, Herbert A. Fine, Ralph R. Goodwin, N. Stephen Kane, Ronald D. Landa, Lisle A. Rose, William F. Sanford, Jr., and Ilana Stern (Washington, D.C., 1983), 1480-1525.
10 Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, NSC 5428, United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East, July 23, 1954, FRUS,1952-1954, vol. IX, part 1, doc. 219.
11 Address by John Foster Dulles Before the United Nations General Assembly, September 19, 1957, John Foster Dulles Papers, 1951-1959, General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, Box 1, Memos of Conversation – General – S(2), Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (hereafter DDEL).
12 Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, NSC 5428, United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East, July 23, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, part 1, doc 219.
13 Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East (New York, 1981), 265.
14 Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy from Truman to Reagan (Chicago, 1986), 92-93.
15 Ibid., 92-93.
16 Peter Hahn, Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2004), 275.
17 Ibid., 277.
18 Ibid., 275.
19 Ibid., 288.
20 Memorandum of Conversation, April 23, 1956, Dulles, John Foster: Papers, 1951-1959, Subject Series, Box 10, Israeli Relations 1951-1957 (2), DDEL.
21 President Dwight Eisenhower Letter to Eric Johnston, October 7, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, part 1, doc. 686.
22 Hahn, Caught in the Middle East, 172.
23 The Chargé in Israel (Russell) to the Department of State, September 10, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, part 1, doc. 661.
24 The Ambassador in Syria (Moose) to the Department of State, September 9, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, part 1, doc 659.
25 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel, September 8, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, part 1, doc. 658.
26 Hahn, Caught in the Middle East, 172.
27 United Nations Security Council, "The Palestine Question, S/3151/Rev.2," January 20, 1954, Dag Hammarskjöld Library, accessed November 7, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view _doc.asp?symbol=S/3151/Rev.2.
28 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Official Records, January 22, 1954, accessed November 7, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.656.
29 The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Advisory Board for International Development (Johnston), October 13, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, part 1, doc. 686.
32 Report by the President's Special Representative (Johnston) to the President, November 17, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, part 1, doc. 732.
33 Eli Ginzberg, Memorandum for Record, January 30, 1956, Dulles, John Foster: Papers, 1951-1959, Subject Series, Box 10, Israeli Relations 1951-1957 (3), DDEL.
34 The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Advisory Board for International Development (Johnston), October 13, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, part 1, doc. 686.
35 Report by the President's Special Representative (Johnston) to the President, November 17, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, part 1, doc. 732.
36 Eli Ginzberg, Memorandum for Record, January 30, 1956, Dulles, John Foster: Papers, 1951-1959, Subject Series, Box 10, Israeli Relations 1951-1957 (3), DDEL.
37 Telegram from Ambassador Eric Johnston to the Department of State, February 20, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 27.
38 Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, March 16, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 50.
39 Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, February 14, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 20.
40 Telegram from Ambassador Eric Johnston to the Department of State, February 24, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 28.
41 Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade), April 10, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, part 1, doc. 788.
42 Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, NSC 5428, July 23, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. IX, part 1, doc. 219.
43 Despatch from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, January 7, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 4.
44 Memorandum of a Conversation between Dulles et al., January 27, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 10.
45 Despatch From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, January 7, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 4.
46 Points of Agreement in London Discussions of Arab-Israel Settlement, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 48.
47 Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover), January 14, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 5.
48 Despatch from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 24.
49 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt, March 31, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 60.
50 Memorandum from the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover), May 23, 1955, Attachment, Memorandum from Francis H. Russel to the Secretary of State, May 18, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 106.
58 Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Department of State, February 24, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 29; and "Partial Transcript of Dulles' Talk," New York Times, August 31, 1955.
59 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, August 17, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 195.
60 Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, September 6, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 264.
61 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, September 14, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc 274.
62 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, September 11, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 268.
63 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, September 21, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 290.
64 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, October 1, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 321.
65 Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, August 5, 1955, vol. XIV, doc. 182; and telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, September 20, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 287.
66 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, October 1, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 321.
67 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt, September 20, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 289.
68 Memorandum from Undersecretary (Hoover) of State to Secretary of State, March 1, 1956, Dulles, John Foster: Papers, 1951-1959, Subject Series, Box 10, Israeli Relations 1951-1957 (3), DDEL.
69 Telegram from the Department of State to the Secretary of State, October 29, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 368.
70 Memorandum of a Conversation with the Secretary of State, October 18, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 343.
71 Eric Pace, "Robert B. Anderson, Ex-Treasury Chief, Dies at 79," New York Times, August 16, 1989.
72 Memorandum of a Conversation, January 11, 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-1957, vol. XV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1-July 26, 1956, ed. John P. Glennon and Carl N. Rather (Washington, D.C., 1989), doc. 14.
74 Memorandum of a Conversation, October 28, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 363.
75 Memorandum of a Conversation, January 11, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XV, doc. 14.
78 Message from Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State, January 21, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XV, doc. 26.
79 Message from Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State, January 22, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XV, doc. 27.
81 Notes for Talk with Eban, March 28, 1956, Dulles, John Foster: Papers, 1951-59, Subject Series, Box 10, Israeli Relations 1951-1957 (3), DDEL.
82 Memorandum by the Director of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins), March 14, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XV, doc. 192.
83 Memorandum from Eisenhower to Hoover, May 2, 1956, Eisenhower, Dwight D., Papers as President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), Dulles-Herter Series, Box 7, Dulles, Foster, May 1956, DDEL.
84 Memorandum of a Conversation, October 28, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 363.
85 Memorandum for the President, March 28, 1956, Dulles, John Foster: Papers, 1951-1959, Subject Series, Box 10, Israeli Relations 1951-1957 (3), DDEL.
86 Eisenhower Diary, August 8, 1956, Eisenhower, Dwight D., Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), DDE Diary Series, Box 17, DDEL.
87 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, June 24, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XV, doc. 409.
88 Eisenhower to Dulles, July 17, 1956, Eisenhower, Dwight D., Papers as President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), Dulles-Herter Series, Box 7, Dulles, John Foster, July 1956, DDEL.
89 Neff, Warriors at Suez, 270.
90 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, July 26, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XV, doc 505.
91 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, August 15, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, doc. 193.
92 Diary Entry by President Eisenhower, August 8, 1956, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), DDE Diary Series, Box 17, August 1956 Diary, DDEL.
93 Memorandum of Conversation, March 30, 1956, Dulles, John Foster: Papers, 1951-1959, Subject Series, Box 10, Israeli Relations 1951-1957 (2), DDEL.
95 Memorandum of a Conversation, August 12, 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, ed. John P. Glennon and Nina J. Norning (Washington, D.C., 1990), doc. 79.
96 Telegram from Embassy in France to Department of State, July 31, 1956, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), Dulles-Herter Series, Box 7, Dulles, John Foster, July 1956, DDEL.
97 Message from Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower, July 27, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, doc. 5.
98 Neff, Warriors at Suez, 280.
99 Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, August 30, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, doc. 151.
100 Editorial Note, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, doc. 110.
101 Message from the Secretary of State to the President, August 21, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, doc. 111.
102 Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Secretary Lloyd, August 23, 1956 FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, doc. 126; and Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Prime Minister Eden, August 24, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, doc. 129.
103 Memorandum of a Conversation, August 19, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, doc. 99.
104 Memorandum of a Conversation between the Ambassador to France (Dillon) and Foreign Minister Pineau, August 20, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, doc. 107.
105 Neff, Warriors at Suez, 297.
106 Editorial Note, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, doc. 136.
107 Neff, Warriors at Suez, 302-303.
108 Memorandum from Robert Anderson to President Eisenhower, August 31, 1956, Dulles, John Foster: Papers, 1951-1959, JFD Chronological Series, Box 14, DDEL.
109 Neff, Warriors at Suez, 302.
110 "A Diluted Plan," London Times, September 29, 1956, White House Central Files, Official File, 1953-1961, OF 116-GG "G" Big Four Conference, Box 504, DDEL.
111 Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln, NE, 2004), 37-38.
112 Ibid., 30.
113 Neff, Warriors at Suez, 378-379.
114 Ibid., 376.
115 Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War, 36-38.
116 Memorandum of a Conference with the President, October 29, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, doc. 411.
120 United Nations Security Council, "The Palestine Question: Steps for the Immediate Cessation of the Military Action of Israel in Egypt, S/3710," October 30, 1956, accessed January 12, 2017, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/3710.
121 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Official Records, 749th Meeting, October 30, 1956, Dag Hammarskjöld Library, accessed January 12, 2017, http://www.un.org/en/ga/searc h/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.749.
123 Various Telegraphs, October 31 - November 2, 1956, White House Central Files, Official File, 1953-1961, OF 116-GG "G" Big Four Conference, Box 504, OF 116-LL, Middle East-Suez Situation Involving Israel, Egypt, Great Britain and France (Beginning 10-29-56) (1), DDEL.
125 Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, November 5, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, doc. 511.
126 Letter from Prime Minister Bulganin to President Eisenhower, November 5, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, doc. 505.
127 Memorandum of Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the National Security Council, November 1, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, doc. 455.
128 Hahn, Caught in the Middle East, 206.
129 United Nations General Assembly, Resolutions Adopted Without Reference to a Committee, Resolution 997 (ES-I) and Resolution 998 (ES-I), November 2-4, 1956, Dag Hammarskjöld Library, accessed January 25, 2017, http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/dag/docs/ares997-998e.pdf.
130 Hahn, Caught in the Middle East, 216.
131 Memorandum of a Conversation with the President, December 3, 1956, Papers of John Foster Dulles, White House Memoranda Series, Box 4, Meetings with the President August thru December 1956 (2), DDEL.
132 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "U.S. Role in the Middle East," address to the U.S. Congress, January 5, 1957, Council on Foreign Relations, accessed March 17, 2017, http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/president-eisenhowers-s….
133 Peter L. Hahn, "Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957," Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (March 1, 2006): 38-47, accessed March 5, 2017, http://www.jstor.or g/stable/27552745.
134 Cable from Secretary of State to American Embassy Cairo, December 19, 1956, Papers of John Foster Dulles, White House Memoranda Series, Box 4, Meetings with the President August-December 1956 (1), DDEL.
135 Memorandum of Conversation with Senator Knowland, December 9, 1956, Dulles, John Foster: Papers, 1951-1959, General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, Box 1, Memos of Conversation - General J Through K (2), DDEL.
137 Memorandum of Conversation with the President, December 22, 1956, Papers of John Foster Dulles, White House Memoranda Series, Box 4, Meetings with the President August thru December 1956 (1), DDEL.
139 Report by the International Cooperation Administration for General A.J. Goodpaster, July 31, 1957, White House Central Files, Official File, 1953-1961, OF 116-GG "G" Big Four Conference, Box 504 OF 116-MM, Middle East Doctrine, 1/5/57 (1); and report to the Congress of the United States, March 5, 1958; Memorandum for the President, July 29, 1960, White House Central Files, Official File, 1953-1961, OF 116-GG "G" Big Four Conference, Box 504, OF 116-MM, Middle East Doctrine, 1/5/57 (2), DDEL.