Many ideas contained in this paper were developed through rich discussions after the many talks that the author has been invited to give on Iraq over the past months. He would like particularly to thank the following for organizing these occasions: the Editorial Board of Middle East Report (MERI?), lnstitut Francais des Relations lnternationales (IFRI), Professors Timothy Mitchell (New York University), Abbott Gleason and Marsha Pripstein Posusney (Brown University), Gary G. Sick and Reeva Simon (Columbia University), and Eric Davis (Rutgers).
Long before the present regime came to power, Iraq had been labeled by many Arabs the Prussia of the Arab world. Since 1936, when the first coup d’état ever to take place in any Arab country succeeded in Iraq, sympathizers were looking for the coup leaders to play the role of Bismarck and unify the Arab nation. Others, usually with democratic leanings, have been in the habit of viewing Iraqis as a violent people with an almost natural inclination to go to extremes. The Iraqi experience since the accession to power of the Arab Baath (Renaissance) Socialist party in 1968, and especially since the rise of Saddam Hussein to the presidency in 1979, has reinforced these perceptions. Many opponents characterize the regime as fascist, while its supporters invoke its pan-Arab and anti-American rhetoric as evidence of an independent nationalist stance.1
Rhetoric aside, a comparison between Iraq and pre-1945 Germany is tempting. Both have been relatively newborn countries; both achieved relatively high growth rates within short spans of time. In both cases a paternalistic state played a prominent role in industrialization/modernization. And, ironically, in both cases rapid growth soon reached a deadly impasse: huge regional disparities in income and wealth generation, an economic expansion chiefly dependent on state purchases and contracts, and therefore a society geared to armaments and war. In order to legitimate this drive, a huge ideological edifice was constructed.
But it would be too simplistic to treat this ideological edifice as the mere manipulation of public attitudes by a ruling group. Chauvinistic and militaristic ideologies build upon existing disenchantment, but instead of addressing its underlying causes, they whip up aggressiveness against "others" as the source of all evils. With varying intensity, this was the rule rather than the exception in the process of state and nation building in early modern Europe.2 The Baath regime in Iraq has played skillfully on the perceived or actual insecurity of Iraqis by turning their hatred toward "foreigners," selected at will depending on the circumstances: Israel/Zionism, Western powers, communist countries, Iran, Arab states or even non-Arab or non-Sunni Iraqis.
Addressing the problem of Iraq's sense of insecurity, as well as Iraq as a source of insecurity to the region, should therefore proceed from the legacy of (at least) two decades of war-making. Much of the literature on political, economic, social and even cultural problems that Middle East (and non-industrialized) countries face emphasizes the role of Western powers in shaping their fate. While it is undoubtedly the case that supranational factors like "globalization" and the "'new world order" play a much more pronounced role in shaping local structures everywhere in the world today, global processes by themselves do not explain why Korea's path was different from China's, or why Iraq's fate diverged from that of Syria. Hence, I propose to begin by sketching the main sources of Iraq's “structural crisis” before dealing with the regional and international context and how it affects the future of Iraq.
ROMANTICIZING GEOGRAPHY
Iraq's geopolitical problem from the point of view of its ruling Baathist regime, at least, lies in the fact that it is almost landlocked; the width of its coast on the Gulf is only about 20 kilometers. Of course, neighboring Jordan has a thriving maritime activity through its narrower coast on the Red Sea. But the Iraqi leadership has always tried to invest the country's geography with metaphysical meaning. Bordering a non-Arab country was turned into "the eastern gate of the Arab nation." Wars fought for mundane and pragmatic objectives were turned into vague missions that Iraqis were destined to fulfill on behalf of all Arabs.3
The only major oil exporter with no significant independent outlets to international waters, Iraq has had to rely on the territory of neighboring Syria, Turkey and Saudi Arabia to extend export pipelines for its oil. Elementary politics says that a country in this position must invest heavily in cultivating the friendliest possible relations with its neighbors. Sadly, Iraqi politics, especially since the rise of Saddam Hussein, has followed a diametrically opposite strategy. But it would be self-deceptive to blame the whole problem on an ignorant tyrant whose removal from power would bring things back to normal. It is no coincidence that the two Gulf wars were preceded by declarations by top Iraqi officials to the effect that total export capacity would be increased to between 6 and 8 million barrels per day (mb/d) from the normal level of3-3.5 mb/d. Saddam Hussein was aware that such a prospect would strongly destabilize the status quo and radically alter the balance of power with in the region by depriving Saudi Arabia (and potentially Iran) of their privileged positions as the dominant powers in the oil market and in regional politics.4 The following argument will show that Saddam's fatal adventure in Kuwait was (at least partially) driven by these calculations.
On August 8, 1988, a cease-fire was reached in the eight-year war with Iran. Despite Iraq's portrayal of that cease-fire as an Iraqi victory, both countries ended where they began. Saddam had to forsake his main declared war aim: forcing the Iranians to accept his unilateral abrogation of the March 1975 agreement giving both countries shared sovereignty over the Shatt-al-Arab waterway. As the dream of acquiring an independent outlet to the sea by controlling both shores of the Shatt-al-Arab faded, Iraq turned to its only other alternative: the narrow waterway of Khor Abdalla, which belongs to Kuwait. A careful reading of the memoranda exchanged by Iraqi and Kuwaiti officials on the eve of Iraq's invasion reveals that Iraq's tenacious attempts to seize the two strategic Kuwaiti islands of Warba and Bubian were explicitly framed in pragmatic terms, with no reference to "pan-Arabist" sloganeering or claims to rights of sovereignty over Kuwait. 5
Iraq's pursuit of such a contradictory policy was a recipe for suicide. The Baathist leadership's crime does not lie in attempting to maximize oil exports, but in trying to do so by pursuing hegemony over its neighbors. For better or worse, a post sanctions Iraq will not be able to go back to its 1970s levels of oil exports. After all, it has control of the second-largest proven oil reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia, a population of around 23 million. More important, it has a desperate and accumulating need for foreign currency - due to the damages of both wars, the deferred demands of long years of devastation and deprivation, and a huge outstanding debt and claims for reparations. Attempts to change Iraq' s geography as a means of forcing a fait accompli on the region's oil expo1ters is an illusion that can only bring devastation to the whole region. In the meantime, Iraq's oil-exporting neighbors will most likely use all available means to forestall such a nightmare: an increase in one country's exports by some 3 mb/d.6
Iraq's only option to counter such pressures would lie in its going back to its pre-1970 regional setting, by turning west again towards Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, and north towards Turkey as its main trading partners, while trying to preserve friendly relations with its southern neighbors.7 Economically and culturally, Iraq belongs more to what the French call the Proche Orient (Near East) than to the Mayen Orient (Middle East). Iraq's western and northern neighbors need its oil.8 Iraq needs the long and closer Syrian and Turkish coasts on the Mediterranean. Iraq, Syria and Turkey share vital water resources. And the three countries, especially Turkey and Iraq, will sooner or later have to find viable solutions to the nationalist aspirations of more than 12 million Kurdish citizens.9 Such a significant shift in strategy, however, will not hinge upon a decision taken by Iraq itself, for it entails the rise of an almost new regional politico economic system. This requires the West and the United States especially to develop a radically new perception of the region, its role in world politics and economics, and the role of the component parts of this system in bringing about stability and prosperity.
THE MYTH OF ARTIFICIALITY
Following the Gulf War and the popular uprising of 1991, it became fashionable for many political analysts (but very few, if any, scholars) to remind their readers of the "artificiality" of Iraq as a political entity, and therefore the imminent risk of its partition.10 Indeed, the present atmosphere in Iraq is highly charged with tribal, regional and sectarian tones. But this phenomenon, unthinkable in the 1950s or 1960s, should not be hastily ascribed to the "non-integration" of Iraq thesis, or - worse - to the essentialist one of "Middle Eastern culture." Rather, it is directly related to the pattern of the rentier state.11
Iraq's consecutive revolutions and coups d’état have brought about a necessary, but certainly not sufficient, change toward the rise of a civil society in the long run. The republican regimes dismantled the pre-bourgeois socioeconomic structures by adopting sweeping land reforms, centralizing education and imposing uniform curricula, opening paths of upward mobility for the then-marginalized middle and lower strata from provincial towns. They also fought illiteracy and expanded and extended basic services to wider sections of the population. Tribal and religious social institutions loosened their grip on people and began losing their political, economic and social functions. The older civil groupings in the big cities, especially in Baghdad, had already been flooded by internal migrants since the end of World War II.
While the republican regimes achieved their "destructive" functions more or Jess efficiently, their "constructive" role of laying the groundwork for social and economic development and new forms of social groupings and stratification proved disastrous. Iraq's dependence on its relatively huge oil revenues spared it the typical problems that other Third World countries had faced: the search for hard currency and the means for financing its investment expenditures. Policy makers were therefore not pressed by the need to raise the competitiveness of industry and agriculture or to find export outlets for products, but by the need to find jobs for the unemployed and to raise the standard of living.
Through these policies, the ruling Baath gained the support or acquiescence of wide sections of the population. From 1958 to 1977, the number of personnel employed by the state jumped from 20,000 to more than 580,000, not including the estimated 230,000 in the armed services or some 200,000 pensioners directly dependent on the state. The most recent figures, from the period just after the Gulf War, are revealing: 822,000 on the state civilian payroll, including some 200,000 working for the various state and party security services; approximately 400,000 in the active duty armed forces; and some 350,000 pensioners. This means that the civilian state apparatus employs around 21 percent of the active work force and that around 40 percent of Iraqi households are directly dependent on government payments.12
As the atomized population was linked individually to the state apparatus, forms of collective identities to replace the old pre-capitalist ones could not emerge. The influx of Arab and Asian migrant workers, encouraged by the state, ensured the presence of laborers who could not demand better living and working conditions. The relative economic prosperity made discontent less pressing and any collective action a risky behavior that could bring down the wrath of the state. To further the atomization of the population, individual petitions requesting wage increases or special favors were sympathetically looked upon, while unions and autonomous associations were harshly suppressed. Improvements in living conditions were largesse from the leadership, not rights acquired by the people.
Under such circumstances, the state's sudden withdrawal from economic and social life following the 1987 privatization schemes, coupled with the regime's flagrant bias towards certain clans and regions in handing over privileges,13 left vulnerable sections of the population at the mercy of a savage profiteering capitalism and lawless mafias directly related to Saddam Hussein. It was only natural that individuals would lean toward whatever solidarity they could in order to compensate for their losses and defend their rights.
Kurdish nationalist feelings should not be put on a par with sectarian or even regional loyalties. Whether the Kurds will end up as a federal part of Iraq or as an independent state, their distinct feelings of belonging to a nation cannot be overlooked. Yet Kurdishness, like any other identity, is not exclusive. It may devolve into the subnational solidarity of the present divisions between Bahdini (western) and Surani (eastern) Kurds. And it can also be accommodated with a pan-Iraqi solidarity, which many Kurds do feel, even after decades of repression.
Sectarian divisions, on the other hand, are much less acute in Iraq than they are normally portrayed. No significant Sunni or Shii community has ever voiced non-Iraqi loyalty. The ferocious battles fought by the Iraqi army, the bulk of whose rank and file is Shiite, in the war against Iran demonstrated that nationalism takes precedence over sectarian identity. The regime's deep legitimacy crisis has opened the door not for secessionist tendencies, but for redefining the concept of majority rule. In a country whose single largest community- the Shiites - has never had a leading role in policy making, it is natural that the call for democracy intermingles with sectarian slogans. If Iraq were ever able to resume its economic development, the struggle over privileges and access to livelihood would lessen the tensions that have sharpened over the past fifteen years. Additional factors are likely to play a positive role in this respect; most important is that the role of the state will have to be redefined. It is here, in the socioeconomic sphere, that lies the second source of Iraq's insecurity.
REVISITING THE "MIRACLE"
The precarious balance among the components of Iraqi society, and thus the autonomy of the state, was maintained by bribery, thanks to the oil boom. The rifts began to show in the 1980s, as Iraq's economic performance was lagging behind that of its neighbors. A decade of sanctions has exacerbated social tensions and deprived Iraqis of the means to unite against the regime. Even if in some remote future Iraq can double its oil exports (and oil prices do not drop), the per capita oil revenues will never exceed one half of their 1970s level. Without putting Iraq's record in perspective, we cannot understand how the sanctions have further atomized the population and deformed its social structures.
Gulf War smoke and a decade of sanctions have masked the fact that Iraq had been heading toward a socioeconomic crisis. In fact, the invasion of Kuwait was a failed attempt to stem it.14 But critics of the sanctions have given the impression (gained from hasty visits to Baghdad) that Iraq was a social utopia. For several years Iraqis have been bombarded with assertions about their country cast asp facts (not infrequently in superlatives). And they had to live with and consent to these statements, which they knew were not true, because the "experts" were fighting to lift the crippling sanctions.
As the pressures on the United States are justifiably mounting to lift the sanctions on Iraq, one can turn to the other side of the propaganda machine, which is no less corrupting to the human-rights discourse than that of the official U.S. media. A good example is provided by the use of the resignations of a series of respected figures from international bodies in charge of sanctions-related missions in Iraq. In October I 998, Dennis J. Halliday, assistant secretary-general of the United Nations, resigned in protest over a program that he labeled an "all-out effort to starve to death as many Iraqis as possible." Less than four months later, Hans von Sponeck, who was responsible for distributing humanitarian goods in Iraq, and Jutta Burghardt, the local director of the World Food Program, stepped down, calling the situation there "a true human tragedy" with no end in sight. ''The sanctions are taking their toll on the wrong people in every respect," Von Sponeck said. "I consider it ethically unacceptable."15
These courageous moves contributed crucially to raising international awareness not only of the tragic situation in Iraq, but also of the responsibility of the world and especially the United States in inflicting so much damage on the health and well-being of a small Third World country. Yet the humanitarian tragedy in Iraq is not an abstract notion; it could be measured using indicators pertaining to education, health services and mortality. Unfortunately, the suffering of Iraqis under their own regime has been obscured. Mr. Halliday said,
"Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq had had the best civilization in the Middle East, with universal medical care, the finest hospitals, free university education for all qualified and overseas grants for graduate students,"16 adding, "a once-proud civilization had been reduced to Third World status."
Other propagandists, now "U.N. experts," echoed these statements:
"For 20 years the Iraqi government denied pretty consistently the civil and political rights of the population. At the same time, the economic and social rights were very well respected. It was a country with a high standard of living, a terrific educational system, and the best public health in the region."17
Ironically, such aggrandizing statements concerning Iraq were launched by the United States a decade ago for exactly the opposite reason: to show how menacing Iraq had become and therefore to help cement an international alliance to face Saddam Hussein. It was at that time that the world began to know of Iraq's nuclear capabilities and the "fifth largest army on earth." Now it is these same critics of the United States that are grieving over the "reducing of Iraq to a Third World country." Such statements, though apparently neutral, convey the false image that Iraq belonged to another group of countries - the industrialized ones.
Did Iraq have the best civilization in the Middle East? The best educational standards and health services? In order to verify these claims, I have chosen to take Iraq's record over three periods of time: the 1970s, when Iraq's financial resources were at their highest and social and economic tensions at their nadir; the 1980s, when Iraq was plunged into war with Iran; and the disastrous 1990s. But Iraq's real record cannot be judged only diachronically. Also important is to look at its performance in a regional perspective. Therefore, I chose two sets of countries for comparison: Syria and Jordan, which have infinitely smaller resources than Iraq, and the oil rentier economies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.
Despite the fact that Iraqis have indeed made great socioeconomic strides throughout the 1970s and more modest ones in the 1980s, the evidence shows that Iraq was not an exceptional case in the region. Putting that experience in a regional and temporal context, Iraq shows a disappointing record even compared to its much poorer neighbors, if one bears in mind the huge revenues of the oil boom. Tables 1-6 tell Iraq's story prior to the coming into effect of the sanctions regime. The latest figures recorded in some of these tables relate to 1992. At that time, the effects of the sanctions, most of which are medium- to long-term, had not yet been felt significantly.
Table I gives a picture of the distorted effects of relying on oil. Around $80 billion in oil revenues accrued to the country within a period of six years, compared to $6.5 billion to Syria and none to Jordan. Despite this windfall gain, Iraq's per capita GDP was a little more than 80 percent that of Syria. But by 1990, it was almost four times that of Syria and Jordan. Yet, while one can take fluctuations in per capita GDP as indicators of the actual performance of most other economies, this is not the case in the rentier states. For oil-price fluctuations in the world market determine a corresponding change in the fortunes of the country, although no significant changes may have taken place in the levels of production, productivity or investments.
In addition, the impressive per capita GDP figure of 1990 hid some alarming trends of the 1980s. During the war with Iran, Iraq was kept afloat by generous grants and loans from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which pumped an average 310,000 b/d of oil on its behalf. But in actual terms, Iraq's growth rates in constant prices went down by 1.7 percent 1980-90. The per capita GDP went down by 4.7 percent, and the percentage of individual income spent on food rose from 46.3 percent in 1979 to 50.2 percent in 1988, an indicator of declining incomes.18 More alarming still is the fact that Iraq was actually de-investing throughout the 1980s. Against a spectacular rise of 21 .7 percent in gross domestic capital formation (GDCF in constant prices) in the 1970s, the rate was -7.5 percent in the 1980s. Whatever production occurred was actually financed by the assets added in the 1970s. This 7.5- percent decrease in capital formation for the economy as a whole was unevenly distributed, with GDCF decreasing by 11.2 percent in agriculture, 20.0 percent in construction, 23.7 percent in transport, 9.6 percent in manufacturing, and 8.2 percent in social and personal services. An additional indicator is that, while machines composed around 27 percent of GDCF in the 1970s, they went down to 16 percent in the I 980s.19 With such a prolonged decrease in investment in productive sectors and productive assets (machines), Iraq's prospects for regaining its 1970s growth rates in the near future were impossible.
Table 1: Iraq's Economic Record in a Regional Context
Country |
Population (mn) |
GDP(US$ mn) |
Per Capita GDP (US$) |
Total Oil Exports (US$ mn) |
Cultivated/ Cultivable Land % |
Tractors* |
Harvesters* |
||
1985 |
1980 |
1985 |
1985 |
1990 |
80-85 |
1985 |
|
|
|
Iraq |
I 5.7 |
53,586.6 |
25,469.6 |
I ,622 |
4,145 |
79,970 |
47.4 |
5.34 |
0.5 |
Syria |
10.2 7 |
13,063.6 |
20,269.1 |
1,974 |
1,147 |
6,419 |
90.9 |
8.17 |
0.61 |
Jordan |
3.53 |
3,301.6 |
3,992.9 |
1,131 |
1,140 |
0 |
28.4 |
6.52 |
0.39 |
|
12.85 |
115,973.6 |
93,658.6 |
7,289 |
7,039 |
394,801 |
25.2 |
0.25 |
0 .08 |
Saudi Arabia |
|||||||||
Kuwait |
1.92 |
28,691.8 |
I 9,766.3 |
I 0,295 |
8,575 |
72,448 |
1.2 |
0.96 |
-- |
UAE |
1.32 |
29,622 |
26,048.2 |
19,735 |
21,165 |
88,566 |
100 |
-- |
-- |
* Per 1,000 agricultural population
Sources of tables 1-5:
- The Unified Arab Economic Report (Annual report published jointly by the Arab League, The Arab Fund/or Social and Economic Development, The Arab Monetary Fund, and OAPEC), 1987 & 1994.
- The World Bank, World Development Report (various issues), Washington DC.
Iraq's high dependence on oil contributed to its vulnerability to externally imposed shocks. The three last columns in Table One provide relevant indicators. Iraq and Syria are the only two countries in this table that have a significant agricultural potential. And although Syria does not generally run an efficient economy or agriculture, Iraq lagged behind in all indicators. When Iraq's resources were strained under the impact of the war with Iran, it exploited less than half its cultivable land as compared with more than 90 percent in the case of Syria. In terms of the efficiency of its agriculture, Iraq also lagged behind, as can be gauged from the number of tractors and harvesters per 1,000 individuals in the agricultural population. This was a direct outcome of the rentier system, which encouraged massive rural-urban migration, raised urban incomes and depressed rural ones, without raising productivity in agriculture. There was no need, as the availability of foreign exchange made it easy to import food and agricultural products. The dire consequences of all this were to be seen after the imposition of sanctions in 1990.
Table 2: Iraq's Human-Development Record in a Regional Context
Country |
% Urbans |
% Females to Workforce |
Life Expectancy (years at birth) |
Infant Mortality (per 1000 live births) |
||||||
1960 |
1992 |
82-85 |
90-92 |
1960 |
82-85 |
1992 |
1960 |
82-85 |
1992 |
|
Iraq |
43 |
73 |
4.9 |
6 |
45.5 |
59.8 |
65.7 |
139 |
73.8 |
59 |
Syria |
37 |
51 |
12.7 |
15 |
49.8 |
63.3 |
66.4 |
135 |
54.6 |
40 |
Jordan |
43 |
69 |
7.2 |
10 |
47.0 |
64.2 |
67.3 |
135 |
50.0 |
34 |
Saudi Arabia |
30 |
74 |
4.1 |
7 |
44.4 |
61.7 |
68.7 |
170 |
61.2 |
31 |
Kuwait |
78 |
96 |
7.3 |
24 |
59.6 |
71.6 |
74.6 |
89 |
21.8 |
15 |
UAE |
44 |
82 |
... |
6 |
53.0 |
72.7 |
70.8 |
145 |
35.6 |
23 |
Table 2 carries the story of Iraq's performance in human development further. Here the pace of urbanization is only surpassed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Whereas many have taken this rate as an indicator of how modern Iraq has become, the growth of big unproductive cities, coupled with the deteriorating agricultural sector, was caused by the rentier structure and aggravated it in return. More and more people came to depend on the state as employees and pensioners without making any commensurate contribution to the production of wealth. Thus, in a span of three decades, Iraq's urban population went from roughly the same level as Syria's, to more than 20 percent higher, matching that of Saudi Arabia. Was this a sign of modernization? A look at the percentage of women in the work force reveals an appalling record. Iraq was slightly ahead of only Saudi Arabia in the period 1982-85. Its working women equaled less than 40 percent of Syria's and around 70 percent of Jordan's and Kuwait's. By the period 1990-92, female participation in the Iraqi work force was on the same level with the UAE, 60 percent that of Jordan, 40 percent that of Syria, one percentage point behind that of Saudi Arabia, and one quarter the level of Kuwait.
What about health standards? The influx of huge windfall oil revenues on the region for almost two decades gave governments ample opportunity to raise health standards. The Middle East has indeed made positive strides in this respect despite widespread corruption, inefficiency and wasteful spending on arms and luxury goods. Here again, Iraq's record is far from impressive in relative terms. In 1960, its life expectancy was higher than Saudi Arabia's and slightly higher than Jordan's. By 1982-85, Iraq was lagging behind all the countries under comparison including the poorer Jordan and Syria. Whereas it was 1.5 years ahead of Jordan and 1.3 years less than Syria, the life-expectancy gap widened to become 4-5 years two decades later. Actually, Syria and Jordan surpassed Saudi Arabia, and only Kuwait and the UAE approached European life-expectancy levels. By 1992, the gaps between all the countries in the table were narrowing, but Iraq was still behind them all. The last three columns tell the same story: a positive record for the region over the three-decade period. In 1960, only Kuwait had an infant mortality rate of less than 100, while the rest had rates above 130 per thousand.
Table 3: Iraq's Nutrition Indicators in a Regional Context
Country |
Daily Calories as a Percent of Requirements |
Per Capita Food Production 1974-1976=100 |
Per Capita Protein Intake (gm./day) |
||||
1965 |
82-85 |
88-90 |
1973 |
82-85 |
1973 |
82-85 |
|
Iraq |
72 |
117.8 |
133 |
102.1 |
70.9 |
62.6 |
79.1 |
Syria |
72 |
127.3 |
126 |
54.3 |
111.7 |
63.7 |
85.4 |
Jordan |
75 |
117.2 |
118 |
88.3 |
115.8 |
62.0 |
73.0 |
Saudi Arabia |
64 |
134.1 |
120 |
82.5 |
118.7 |
50.7 |
88.3 |
Kuwait |
... |
... |
130 |
... |
... |
78.3 |
97.5 |
UAE |
... |
... |
151 |
... |
... |
94.3 |
83.9 |
Iraq was ahead of Saudi Arabia and the UAE and slightly behind Jordan and Syria. The "oil" quarter century witnessed a drastic reduction in infant mortality in the whole region: Kuwait to one fourth, Iraq to less than one half, but Iraq had the highest infant mortality in the region, and the gap was no longer a matter of a few percentage points, as in 1960. It was more than double the rate in the Emirates, three-and-a-half times that of Kuwait, and one-and-a-half times the rate of Jordan and Syria. Iraq had more than 10 more dead infants per 1000 than Saudi Arabia. In 1992, the whole region further improved its record, with Saudi Arabia having the fastest decrease. The gap did not narrow between Iraq and its neighbors. It grew wider with Saudi Arabia (double), almost three times that of the Emirates and four times that of Kuwait, almost double the rate of Jordan and one and a half that of Syria.
Iraq's poor performance relative to its resources until 1990, and to the performance of its neighbors, can be examined in more detail with the aid of tables 3 and 4. In absolute terms, all the countries under consideration achieved great progress during the period, as noted. But, whereas Iraq witnessed a steady decrease of its food production per capita, bringing it down by 30 percent in less than a decade, Syria more than doubled its per capita food production, despite the fact that both countries have roughly the same rate of population growth. The Iran-Iraq War contributed only partially to the decline of Iraq's agriculture, by draining human resources and damaging agricultural land, especially in the two fertile governorates of Basra and Diyala. But the real factors are more structural. For immigrant labor, especially Egyptian and Moroccan, more than offset the shortage. Table 3 shows clearly that in 1973, seven years before the beginning of the war, per capita food production was higher than that of 1974-76, indicating that the decline began long before and was related to the neglect of agriculture due to the oil-price rises of the 1970s. 20 Despite this, and relying on a spiraling food-import bill, Iraqis were second only to Saudis in their daily calorie intake on the eve of the invasion of Kuwait, while the daily protein intake in the mid-1980s was ahead of only Jordan.
Table 4 gives a more accurate picture of the efforts made by governments of the region, since, unlike agricultural production or migratory patterns, the indicators listed below depend directly on public investment and spending aimed at improving the quality of life. As can be seen from column 6, 97-100 percent of the population in all the countries had access to health services by the second half of the 1980s (although the quality is questionable). Iraq was the lowest (or second lowest) in the percentage of population that had access to safe water in 1980 and 1988-91, but in absolute terms it made a significant improvement (from 70 percent to 91 percent), while Syria improved little, from 71 percent to 73 percent. In this period, Iraq surpassed only Jordan in the percentage of population with access to a sewage system.21
Table 4: Iraq's Health Indicators in a Regional Context
Country |
Access to Safe Water* |
Population per Doctor |
Access to Health Services* |
Access to Sewage System* |
||
1980 |
88-91 |
82-85 |
1990 |
85-91 |
88-91 |
|
Iraq |
70 |
91 |
2000 |
1810 |
99 |
70 |
Syria |
71 |
73 |
2400 |
1160 |
99 |
83 |
Jordan |
80 |
98 |
1000 |
662 |
97 |
55 |
Saudi Arabia |
91 |
93 |
1400** |
660 |
98 |
82 |
Kuwait |
*** |
100 |
700 |
690 |
100 |
98 |
UAE |
93 |
100 |
700 |
1020 |
100 |
94 |
* Percent of population
••Doctors in public service only
***51 percent in 1973
Iraq's worst performance, however, was in the number of available doctors. 22 In the mid-1980s, Iraq had the second fewest per capita physicians after Syria, half the number of Jordan and almost a third that of Kuwait and the Emirates. By 1990, Iraq had made only slight progress, while other countries were forging ahead. Jordan came up to the same level as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In Syria, the number of individuals per doctor decreased by more than one half, and only the Emirates worsened its record.23
Table 5 tells a similar story about Iraq's achievements in the educational field. Its literacy rates are lower than all the countries except Saudi Arabia, which lagged far behind all others in 1970. By 1992, the whole region had made a considerable advance, most impressively Saudi Arabia (from 9 to 64 percent). Iraq had the lowest literacy rate in 1992. Yet, relying on the data in columns 3 and 4, one can assume that the situation was improving as enrollment in primary schools was at its highest. A figure of more than 100 percent is an indicator of a campaign against illiteracy that targets people above school age. Nevertheless, the 1990 figures refute the notion that Iraq was making strides ahead of its region. In primary and secondary education, Iraq lagged behind its Arab neighbors with the exception of Saudi Arabia. In higher education, it was ahead of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In higher and secondary education, Iraq was way behind Jordan.
Table 5: Iraq's Educational Record in a Regional Context
Country |
Literacy among Adults |
Enrollment in Primary Schools |
Registered in Primary Schools |
Registered in Secondary Schools |
Registered in Higher Education |
Females in Primary Schools* |
Females in Secondary Schools* |
||
1970 |
1992 |
1973 |
82-85 |
1990 |
1990 |
1990 |
mid 80s |
mid 80s |
|
Iraq |
34 |
62 |
69 |
106 |
94 |
48 |
12 .6 |
44 .9 |
32.6 |
Syria |
40 |
67 |
78 |
105 |
99 |
52 |
17 .8 |
44 ,8 |
3 5 .2 |
Jordan |
47 |
82 |
... |
100 |
91 |
63 |
21.7 |
4 7.9 |
45 .9 |
Saudi Arabia |
9 |
64 |
45 |
69 |
62 |
46 |
I 2 .5 |
4 3 .4 |
4 5 .2 |
Kuwait |
54 |
74 |
89 |
95 |
|
... |
14 .8 |
49 .5 |
46,8 |
UAE |
|
|
93 |
95 |
100 |
67 |
10.4 |
49.2 |
49.7 |
*Percentage to total students in the respective stage in public schools only
Table 6: Iraq and Iran in a World Context*
Country/ Region |
Percent Urban |
Life Expectancy |
Infant Mortality |
Access to Safe Water |
Illiteracy |
Gross Primary School Enrollment |
||
Iraq |
73 |
65.7 |
59 |
91 |
38 |
106 |
113 |
99 |
Iran |
57 |
68 |
35 |
89 |
46 |
109 |
114 |
104 |
MENA** |
55 |
66 |
52 |
84 |
45 |
97 |
103 |
90 |
LMG*** |
55 |
67 |
39 |
78 |
19 |
104 |
103 |
96 |
*Available indicators for Iran since 1988. Primary enrollment figures for Iraq relate to 1982-1985.
**Middle East & North Africa
***Lower-Middle Income Group to which Iraq and Iran belong
Sources: - Iraq: same as tables 1-5
- World Bank, Claiming the Future: Choosing Prosperity in the Middle East and North Africa, 1995, p. 96
I have tried to put the Iraqi "miracle" into a wider perspective by comparing Iraq's performance with Iran and the world regions in general (Tables 6 and 7). Iraq's data relate to the zenith of its progress, i.e. just before the invasion of Kuwait, while those for other regions are from the early 1990s. As can be seen, Iraq had a higher urbanization rate than Iran, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and the lower-middle income group of countries (LMG). Life expectancy was lower than in Iran and slightly lower than in the wider regions to which it belongs, yet it had the highest infant mortality rate, the difference with Iran and the LMG being quite considerable. Iraq showed a relatively impressive record only in access to safe water, where it was a little bit higher than Iran but much higher than the LMG. In the field of illiteracy, the percentage of illiterate Iraqis was double that of the LMG, but lower than MENA and Iran.
Table 7: Iraq in a World Context
Region |
Adult-literacy Rate (Percent) |
Life Expectancy (years) |
Iraq |
62 |
6 5 . 7 |
Sub-Saharan Africa |
5 5 |
5 0 .9 |
South Asia |
4 8 8 |
6 0 3 |
East Asia |
8 I |
6 8 8 |
East Asia (excl. China) |
9 5 9 |
7 I 3 |
South-East Asia & Pacific |
8 6. 0 |
6 3 7 |
Latin America & the Caribbean |
8 5 . 9 |
6 8 5 |
Industrial Countries |
9 8 .3 |
7 4 .3 |
World |
7 6 3 |
6 3 0 |
Sources:
Iraq: same as tables 1-5; UNDP, Human Development Report, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 209.
Finally, Table 7 serves as a conclusion to this section. Iraq's relatively high life expectancy and literacy rate are indicators of the improvements in the Middle East in general rather than indicators of Iraq’s performance. For we have seen that when compared to its regional surroundings, Iraq had the worst record even in comparison to countries like Jordan, which relied on external aid.
GRADING DICTATORS
The debate about Iraq's record is not confined to the age-old controversy on prioritizing social and economic rights over political rights or vice versa. The legacy of the Cold War corruption of the human rights discourse is being pursued today in "smoothing" Iraq's indefensible record of political and individual rights. If Iraq is one dictatorship among many in the Third World or the Middle East, why does the world care more about overthrowing Saddam Hussein? Iraq's highly unrepresentative regime cannot be dissociated from its structural crisis.
Undoubtedly, those outsiders who advance the view that Saddam's dictatorship is but one among many are rightly questioning the credibility of the United States and other superpowers that have defended and supported dictators (including Saddam) whenever that suited their interests, while selectively denouncing others who stood against them. Ironically, many journalists have reported the same view from Baghdad. Many Iraqis feel that Saddam Hussein is still in power thanks to some hidden U.S. agenda. And because of double standards, many people have lost their sensitivity to what is happening around them.
But the critics of the United States are no less complicit in corrupting human rights when they portray the Iraqi dictatorship as just one among many. Apart from the fact that Saddam Hussein is the only post-World War II ruler who occupied and annexed a sovereign country - which makes his regime punishable according to international law- the level of regime atrocities against "its" own people may only be compared to those of Pol Pot in Cambodia.
- Between 1987 and 1988, a ten-part genocide operation, al Anja, cost the lives of 120,000-180,000 Kurdish children, women and elderly, i.e. 1 percent of Iraq’s population at the time. The use of chemical weapons in this operation has been confirmed. In addition, more than 4,000 Kurdish villages were wiped out with the aim of putting an end to the partisan movement against the regime. This operation has been documented by Human Rights Watch, 1995.
- In March 1988, the Kurdish town of Halabcha was wiped out by air raids using chemical weapons. Around 5,000 are estimated to have perished.
- Between March and Apri1 1991, an estimated 40,000-60,000 Arab and Kurdish Iraqis were killed during the suppression of the anti-regime intifada. Eyewitnesses and videotapes reveal the burning or burying of people alive.
- The number of Iraqis living in exile is estimated at 3 million, i.e. one out of 7-8 Iraqis. The Iranian Ministry of Interior reports the number of Iraqi refugees there at 580,000, among them 200,000 Iraqi Shia collectively deported between 1980-81. Members of those families between the ages of 16 and 45 were separated from their families and "disappeared" in Iraqi prisons (Al Hayat, November 11, 1999).
- Fleeing the Iraqi Republican Guard, 33,000 Iraqis took refuge in Saudi Arabia after the suppression of the 1991 intifada. The UNHCR has found shelters for 24,000 of them in Europe, the United States and Australia.24
- An estimated 60,000-70,000 Faili Kurds were collectively deported to Iran 1970-71.
- According to the U.N. secretary-general, there are more than half a million internally displaced Iraqis living in the three Kurdish governorates of Irbil, Dhawk and Sulaimaniyya. Half of those had been displaced before 1991, 150,000 between 1991 and 1995, and I 00,000 in 1996. The latter groups have been the victims of "ethnic cleansing" (Report of the Special U.N. Rapporteur for Human Rights on Iraq, Iraqi File, No. 74, p. 68).
STARVATION AS LIBERATION?25
In the post-Cold War era, "sanctions" turned into a panacea for world ills. In the first 45 years after the establishment of the United Nations, sanctions were only imposed on two countries: South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) (see Table 8). Since 1990, the number of countries targeted by sanctions has more than quadrupled. Sanctions have become such a common means of punishment that we tend to forget they involve a very wide range of measures. Because of the precedent Iraq had set by being the first country to occupy the full territory of another sovereign member of the United Nations, the sanctions were the harshest ever imposed. In all the other cases, the punishment was for "posing a threat" to world peace.
In order to judge the effectiveness of the sanctions, we have to weigh their objectives against the costs incurred while implementing them. The following initial aims:
1. To force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait;
- To ensure a clean bill of health on WMD, including means of medium- and long-range delivery;
- To prevent the Iraqi regime from being able to threaten its neighbors.
While the objectives were more or less well defined, the mechanisms through which sanctions would achieve them were never made clear; they were just assumed. Because Iraq was only the third country targeted by U.N. sanctions, and because these sanctions had apparently contributed to the fall of white minority rule in Rhodesia and the disintegration of South Africa's apartheid regime, a vague optimistic analogy may have been at work here. Yet the same powers that imposed the sanctions on Iraq implicitly admitted their insufficiency within less than six months of their imposition. The launching of Operation Desert Storm in January 1991 and the recourse to a devastating air campaign were a plain recognition that sanctions would not force Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. The Gulf War came to a halt when the allies liberated Kuwait. But rather than revising the rationale of continuing the sanctions, the major powers continued them as a means of tightening their grip on the Iraqi regime. The question that should be asked here is: Have the sanctions contributed to forcing Iraq to dispense with its WMD and to weakening Saddam's regime? If yes, at what cost?
Table 8: Mandatory Collective U.N. Security Council Sanctions since 1946
Target Country |
Date of Adoption |
Type of Sanctions |
||||
Southern Rhodesia |
1 |
9 |
6 |
6 |
|
|
South Africa |
I |
9 |
7 |
7 |
Arms Embargo |
|
Iraq (and occupied Kuwait) |
I |
9 |
9 |
0 |
|
|
Yugoslavia |
1 |
9 |
9 |
1 |
|
|
Somalia |
1 |
9 |
9 |
2 |
|
|
Libya |
|
I |
9 |
9 |
2 |
|
Liberia |
1 |
9 |
9 |
2 |
Arms Embargo |
|
Haiti |
1 |
9 |
9 |
3 |
|
|
U N IT A/ Angola |
1 |
9 |
9 |
3 |
Arms and Oil Embargo |
Source: Nico Schrijver: The Use of Economic Sanctions by the U.N. Security Council: An International Law Perspective, in International Economic Law and Armed Conflict, ed. H.H.G. Post (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhof Publishers, 1994), pp.123-161.
One answer to this complex question is the simple "yes" we have been hearing from the U.S. administration. Saddam Hussein is weaker today than ever; UNSCOM has been able to reveal and destroy huge amounts of Iraqi WMD; therefore, the sanctions should stay in place. As for the cost, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was more than frank during that chilling interview with CBS News correspondent Lesley Stahl:
Stahl: We have heard that half a million children have died. I mean, that's more children than died in Hiroshima .... Is the price worth it?
Albright: I think this is a very hard choice, but the price -we think the price is worth it."
CBS News, 60 Minutes; May 12,1996
Unfortunately, such an answer evades both the issues at the heart of the sanctions regime and the search for sound means of ensuring a secure Iraq and a safe and secure Middle East. These should be the real objectives behind the elimination of Iraq's WMD. Without addressing these issues, the pursuit mechanism that has been applied until now would only be counterproductive.
First, why haven't the sanctions led to similar effects as those imposed on the two racist systems of Africa? The simple answer is that although the latter were forms of dictatorships, they were accountable to a (narrow) constituency: the whites. The legal channels for expressing dissent and objection and for voting out a government were in place. In the case of Iraq, the problem has never been how to foment dissent. But the tyrannical structure of the regime is far from sensitive to the people's views and aspirations. Thus, pinning one's hopes on popular pressure is self-deceptive, unless one is thinking of revolution or rebellion. Has a decade of sanctions altered the functioning of the Iraqi state and society and led to the weakening of the regime's grip on society and improved the chances for a democratic transition in Iraq? Or has it cemented the unity between the leadership and the people, as the regime's propaganda claims?
Table 9: Iraq and the Region: Population* (thousands or per thousand)
Country |
Population |
Population under 5 |
Population under 18 |
Annual # of Births |
Infant Mortality Rate |
Under-5 Mortality Rate |
Iraq |
21,800 |
3,327 |
l 0,5 9 3 |
792 |
I 03 |
125 |
Syria |
I 5,333 |
2,146 |
7,660 |
464 |
26 |
32 |
.Jo rd an |
6,304 |
999 |
3,088 |
2 I 8 |
30 |
36 |
Iran |
65,758 |
7,283 |
30,375 |
1 ,3 8 9 |
29 |
33 |
Kuwait |
I ,8 11 |
l 9 5 |
779 |
39 |
12 |
l 3 |
Saudi Arabia |
20,181 |
3,135 |
9,556 |
680 |
22 |
26 |
UAE |
2,353 |
211 |
803 |
43 |
9 |
10 |
* Data updated by Dec. 1, 1999; Source: http://www.unicef.org
As can be seen from column 3 of Table 9, sanctions on Iraq, unlike in other countries (including the two recent cases of Afghanistan and Sudan), have hit hard the lifeline of ordinary people. The comprehensiveness of the sanctions was aggravated by the fact that the country depended almost totally on imports for the survival of its population. Without claiming to present a survey, the following three tables give an idea of the relative fate of Iraqis after a decade of sanctions.
The main defenders of the sanctions, the United States and the United Kingdom, have repeated time and again that the problem was created by Saddam himself, who is wickedly using the plight of his people. This is partly true; Iraq was allowed to import as many humanitarian supplies as it could afford. This argument seemed to gain more credibility with the adoption of UNSCR 698 (oil for food) and recently 1284, allowing Iraq to export as much oil as it could in order to satisfy civilian needs. But the human plight is still there. Impartial observers agree that even Resolution 1284 will not solve the problem. And blaming Saddam, rightly, for squandering Iraq's wealth and exploiting the people's tragedy to gain political points does not absolve the United States from being the chief responsible party in perpetuating a policy that is clearly damaging Iraqi society.
The simple reason for the failure of these resolutions to address the real problem is that Iraq's ability to import, but not to export, has been crippled by an objective reality in today's world: You can use an infinitely wide variety of material to produce WMD. And scrutinizing and banning such imports is not only futile, it is tantamount to offsetting any positive step taken on the export front, as the following facts make plain.
Of almost $25 billion earned by Iraq, less than one quarter turned into goods in Iraqi markets. Thirty percent of the revenues have been frozen on goods that had been held or not yet received, while 30 percent went for war compensation and to cover U.N. staff costs. Despite statements to the effect that restrictions and bureaucratic measures on imports will be eased, this situation is likely to persist as long as dual-use material is not redefined or a better mechanism for monitoring and checking Saddam's programs is not perfected.
What is the overall impact of this situation on Iraqi society and politics? The above tables and a host of many reliable surveys have demonstrated the impact of sanctions in terms of rising poverty, malnutrition, infant mortality, prostitution and crime. The virtual blockade on legal imports is manipulated by Iraq's power structure to cushion themselves against adverse effects. A traveler to Baghdad can easily verify the availability of practically every item on sale there. A flourishing black market via the UAE, Iran and Turkey serves to foster a network of powerful interests running from the sons of influential figures (headed by Saddam's son Udai) to merchants, sanctions-profiteers and intermediaries. The lesser beneficiaries include intelligence officers, special Republican Guard members, truck drivers, retail traders and money exchangers. The main mechanism through which these powerful strata are profiting is inflation, the logical consequence of an atmosphere of scarcity. Thus, while sanctions have been a societal and economic shock that had to produce inflation, the astronomical rates of inflation were not an inevitability. They have been created, intentionally or not, by the regime, through printing money, spreading organized rumors to extract hard currency from people, and creating market shortages.26
Table 10: Health & Living Standards
Country |
GNP per capita US$ |
Percent of Population with Access to Safe Water |
Percent of Population with Access to Adequate Sanitation |
||||
Total |
Urban |
Rural |
Total |
Urban |
Rural |
||
Iraq |
- - - |
81 |
96 |
48 |
75 |
93 |
31 |
Syria |
1,120 |
86 |
95 |
77 |
67 |
96 |
31 |
Jordan |
1,520 |
97 |
98 |
88 |
99 |
100 |
97 |
Iran |
1,780 |
95 |
99 |
86 |
64 |
79 |
37 |
Saudi Arabia |
7,150 |
95 |
100 |
74 |
86 |
100 |
30 |
Kuwait |
20,190 |
- - - |
- - - |
- - - |
- - - |
100 |
- - - |
UAE |
18,240 |
97 |
- - - |
- - - |
92 |
- - - |
- - - |
Source: same as table 8
Table 11: Educational Record
|
Adult-literacy Rate |
Primary School Enrollment Ratio (net) |
Secondary School |
||||
Country |
Enrollment Ratio (gross) |
||||||
|
Male |
Female |
Male |
Female |
Male |
Female |
|
Iraq |
71 |
45 |
81 |
71 |
88 |
80 |
|
Syria |
85 |
54 |
95 |
87 |
98 |
95 |
|
Jordan |
91 |
80 |
89 |
89 |
91 |
91 |
|
Iran |
79 |
63 |
83 |
81 |
99 |
93 |
|
Saudi Arabia |
80 |
59 |
63 |
60 |
- - - |
- - - |
|
Kuwait |
82 |
76 |
65 |
65 |
- - - |
- - - |
|
UAE |
79 |
80 |
79 |
78 |
- - - |
- - - |
A glance at the deterioration of the value of the Iraqi dinar shows first that the drop was aggravated, but not caused, by the sanctions, that the deterioration began in the 1980s, when the dinar lost some 65 percent of its value, and that the deterioration spiraled after 1993. It has been stabilized since 1996, an indicator of(at least) the partial responsibility of the fiscal policy.
Therefore, given the regime's social structure, the sanctions' main impact was to empower the already powerful and impoverish the victims and opponents of the regime. Iraqi semi-official sources today admit the widening gap between rich and poor due to the sanctions, naturally without reference to the politically powerful as the main beneficiaries. The suffering of the people due to American policy, we are told, is being exploited by a handful of profiteers. Even as the data are censored and manipulated, serious attempts at measuring the widening gap have shown alarming indicators. The Iraqi Society of Economists estimates that, in 1993, the top 20 percent of the population possessed 47 percent of Iraq's national income, the bottom 40 percent only 14 percent.27 Al Muhajir28 showed that the bottom 5 percent had to make do with 0.8 percent of total income, while the top 5 percent verged on 21.2 percent of incomes.29
Many Third World societies suffer from levels of poverty and income differentials worse than Iraq's, yet we cannot designate them as disintegrating. We have to link these phenomena in Iraq with the atomization and rentierism dealt with above. These have paralyzed Iraqi society under the sanctions and given the central state more power over members of society. The sweeping 1987 privatization program and the pressures of the war with Iran had already introduced new trends in Iraq: poverty, begging, criminality and the expansion of the informal sector. The sanctions have exponentially reinforced these trends. Rather than blaming the state for their worsening plight, people are encouraged to blame the United States and the West in general.
Most important, a weakened state has been using the ration card as a means of forcing silence or acquiescence. An efficient program for the distribution of basic needs at nominal prices has been in force since I 990. Run through centrally computerized data banks that distribute basics to households via local trading agents, this program has been an additional powerful means for controlling people's geographic mobility and enforcing government relocation programs, targeting especially the Kurds and those who emigrate to Baghdad in search of work.30 In exchange for food and a minimum of security, people are keeping a facade of silence or are at least not venturing into collective oppositional actions. Although symbolic acts of protest and signs of hatred towards the regime are rampant, they are not explicitly political. Mocking the state and the "leader" and evading and resisting the state are to be found everywhere. The state, aware of these troubling signs, is showing a degree of tolerance.
Table 12: The Shrinking Dinar
Date |
Dinarsperl1S$ |
1979 |
0 .3 I 2 |
1987 |
2.8 |
October 1989 |
3 .2 2 |
January 1992 |
13. I 5 |
March 1992 |
1 7 .5 |
January 1994 |
140.0 |
March 1995 |
1,200.0 |
January 1996* |
2,950 .0 |
December 1998 |
I,8 5 0 .0 |
February 1999** |
I,790.0 |
End 1999- Present |
l ,5 5 0 .0 |
|
|
* Udai's propaganda machine spread the word that Iraq was going to implement UNSCR 986. A wave of panic followed as the rumors proved to be false, and Udai reaped a tremendous windfall.
**End of Desert Fox air raids.
Source: Compiled by the author from various press reports and first-hand sources.
These developments might be interpreted as evidence that the regime has grown weaker. But the rate of society's increasing weakness is greater than that of the state. While an atomized and sanctions exhausted population spends the bulk of its time chasing bread, an inefficient administrative apparatus functions under lower costs, thanks to the sanctions; a sign of flexibility and adaptability of the Iraqi state to the changing times and circumstances.
This flexibility has not been the product of any deliberate state policy. It is a survival strategy. For one thing, the drastic reduction in civil servants' incomes has led to widespread absenteeism and desertion. The result has been a less costly administration, characterized by a high level of feminization of the state civil service. Bribery and corruption, tolerated despite rhetorical threats by Saddam and his aides, have turned into a means of subsidizing state activity; public service is a good that is sold to citizens via negotiated prices.
Furthermore, under the pretext of facing sanctions, the RCC has introduced the practice of self-financing, even to such institutions as state hospitals and clinics, secondary schools and institutions providing basic services. Where it has been impossible for the central coercive, judicial or other agencies to perform their activities, state-appointed shaikhs were revived, awarded material privileges, and assigned the role of intermediary or arbiter in running the affairs of their "subjects." Reviving the institution of shaikhdom, however, can be a double-edged weapon. Urban societies, in Baghdad especially, use these shaikhs as a means of circumventing the hardships of life and to provide a measure of protection against the arbitrariness of state agencies, but they are seen as tools of the regime. The shaikhs are cynically playing the old balancing game between their "constituencies" and the state. They can be an additional coercive agency against the populace whenever the regime requires it. But from the point of view of the political center, reviving this institution can be a risky venture; the Baathist regime requires a monolithic society that glorifies the state and its leader.
Despite (or perhaps because of) almost two decades of wars, rebellions, numerous coup attempts, large-scale waves of violent opposition and desertion, a breakdown in the country's infrastructure and virtual collapse of the standard of living, the Iraqi regime has shown surprising stability. Indeed, very few would have imagined in 1991 that almost a decade later the opposition in exile would still be discussing the means for overthrowing a regime that has been in power for 32 years. Given that the contemporary Iraqi state is only eight decades old, thirty years of rule by any one regime is an outstanding record and may offer an opportunity to rethink the efficacy of sanctions as a means of destabilizing it.
It would not be over-pessimistic to talk of an embargo generation that will never be able to recover from the effects of material deprivation, isolation and a sense of being not only neglected and forgotten but targeted by the international community as an enemy. Even if the embargo were lifted tomorrow, much of the damage could never be compensated.
NOW WHAT? U.S. POLICY
While the United States regularly denounces various countries as "rogue states," in the eyes of many countries it is becoming a rogue superpower.31 Even when the Baathist system was enjoying the friendship of both camps in the Cold War and the support of most Arab countries, it tried to build an aura of itself as standing against all, sacrificing blood in order to defend some lofty cause of the nation. This type of aggressive ideology is well suited to facing isolation. The humiliating defeat in the Gulf War has been reversed in Iraqi official propaganda on the grounds that facing the armed forces of 30 countries led by the United States is a victory in itself. Facing sanctions is shown as another battle that Iraq has to wage in defense of Baathist principles. The Iraqi people, who have shown their overwhelming opposition to the regime, are being identified by the United States with their jailer. They are being punished for Saddam's violations of international law, thus creating the false impression that the dictator is acting under a mandate from the people. This is more than welcomed by Saddam.
While no one denies that this regime will always adopt an aggressive attitude toward its people and the region, I have tried to show that sanctions cannot provide an adequate mechanism for enforcing U.N. resolutions. We are living in a world where almost anyone can manufacture biological or chemical weapons. To search every inch of a country almost as big as France in search of WMD is futile and ridiculous. Moreover, it is easy to ascertain that Iraq no longer has the means for delivering them.
The impasse in U.S. policy lies in the fact that it has blindly put its faith in the panacea of sanctions. A short-term alternative could be a strategy of deterrence. An internationally approved set of principles could draw red lines for Iraq, define actions that would be considered threatening to its neighbors or to its people. But such a strategy must in the meantime address Iraq's security concerns. While crossing the red lines would be deterred, the world must commit itself to defending Iraq's sovereignty and integrity. As for the punishment of the regime's main figures, who have committed genocide or war crimes, this should be left to the Iraqi people and the parties who have suffered from them.
Short-term measures cannot address the "Iraq question" adequately unless they are integrated within a wider and more constructive vision of the future of the country. And it is here that the curse of Iraq's geography comes back again. For almost its entire post-World War II history, Iraq's achievements or setbacks have been watched by the major powers, its weaker neighbors and certainly Israel only in regional or international terms. Until the 1958 revolution, decisions on the level of Iraqi oil production were taken with an eye to balancing, punishing or checking any nationalist tide in Iran. In addition, Iraq was a component of Cold War strategy through the Baghdad Pact. Until the victory of Iran's revolution, the major powers cared about Iraq's development only as it affected the balance of power between the Arabs and Israel. In the 1980s, Iraq was needed by the Gulf and the United States to bully the Iranian revolution. No one asked, how do we want Iraq to "check the threat" of Iran, which is three times bigger in population and area, while posing no threat to tiny Kuwait?
Raising this question is important. Iraq's place in the region should not rest only on its balancing role, but also on what brings stability and prosperity to its people. These are not contradictory objectives if we genuinely believe that a prosperous and democratic society is less tempted to go to war. This is not to say that Iraqi regimes were innocent victims or pawns. But the way the world helped or withheld help has greatly contributed to inflating the megalomania of leaders who fancied a regional role for themselves, or to pushing them to take a defensive position. As long as Iraq is only taken as a regional player, not as a society of human beings with dreams and aspirations, any path that Iraqis choose for their future development will be viewed with suspicion or fear. Reorienting Iraq's choices toward the Fertile Crescent (Syria, Lebanon and Jordan), which I strongly support as an economically and culturally sound project that can bring prosperity and stability, will only be seen by strategists as "destabilizing" the regional balance of power.
The direct bearing of international politics on the fate of Iraqis lies in the way the sanctions are viewed. For the issue is no longer whether it is the regime or the people that have been weakened by the sanctions. The message of the West is that Iraq (as a polity, infrastructure and society) has been weakened. And that is seen as fair as long as Iraq does not threaten Israel or its southern neighbors. An improving atmosphere in Iran will spare us the need for the Iraqi bully, for the time being at least.
I have tried to show that the major threat is not weapons of mass destruction; the potential for manufacturing them will always be there anyway. The danger lies in the will to manufacture them and the temptation to use them. A revanchist embargo generation deprived of other means to compensate for its lost chances would certainly be attracted to such ideas. And ordinary Iraqis, like many Third World citizens, have developed a cynicism towards grand slogans by brother Arabs or the major powers. After all, the American religion of democracy, as the French foreign minister has recently called it, has been used quite selectively. But the French counter-religion of non-interference has also been instrumental in shielding brutal dictators.
1 Immediately after the cease-fire in the Gulf War, Iraqi papers ran articles on Germany's recovery after World War II. Traditionally, Arab journalists and writers have invoked more moderate and revolutionary analogues, such as Vietnam or Eastern Europe after World War II.
2 For a classical study, see Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1953). For a concise, but problematic, analysis, see Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capitol, and European States, AD 990-1990, (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, I 990).
3 The romantic portrayal of the nation as destined to fight all others alone is a precondition for almost every racist and fascist ideology. Note, for example, the following passage in the speech of the founder and secretary general of the Baath party, Michel Atlaq, a few months after the Iraqi attack on Iran: "The true and profound character of the battle fought by Baathist Iraq is revealed [as it faces] this alliance of the Christian West, Jewish Zionism, atheist communism and Persian racism under the disguise of Islam" (Al Thowra, April 7,1981). Four months after the cease-fire in the second Gulf war, Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yassin Ramadhan responded to a journalist's question about relations with the U.S.S.R. and China: "The Arab nation has no friends. The mere fact that thirty countries with great powers among them have agreed to fight Iraq is a victory that the Arabs have achieved for the first time in their history." (Interview with the Palestinian weekly al Hadal, June 2,1991 ).
4The fact that Iraq's total sea territory is 924 sq. km, and the length of its coasts is only 15 km, while Iran's is 2,300 km. has been emphasized in no less than ten speeches or letters by Saddam during the early days of the Iran-Iraq War (e.g. speech of September 28, 1980, press conference of November I 0, 1980, speech in the cabinet meeting of December 24, 1980 and interview with Der Spiegel, June I, 1981 ). In her semi-official narrative of Saddam's politics, Christine Moss Helms (Iraq, Eastern Flank of the Arab World, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1984, pp. 54-55) cites a particularly important letter sent by Saddam to the Kuwaiti daily al Watan (September 17, 1980) that summarizes the benefits of unity with Syria: contagious territory, complementary economies, internal strength in the face of external threats, and the "need for sea outlets, especially in this oil era."
5 Three months before the invasion, an official Iraqi memorandum to the Kuwaiti government states. ...The de facto situation, since the formation of our two states in this century, is that of two neighboring countries . . . that have not reached an agreement yet on the demarcation of their land and sea borders." The memorandum proceeds to lay out the principles upon which Iraq aspires to demarcate the borders: "(F)irm respect of the sovereignty of each of us on our respective territory, and a firm and authentic mutual respect between us as states and brothers" (Iraqi memorandum, April 30, 1990, italics added). Iraq's memorandum to the Arab League (July 21, 1990; i.e. ten days before the invasion) accepts demarcating the borders. but on the condition that Iraq be "in the position that it historically and factually deserves, and that enables it to defend national security in this region." This entails that "Iraq be given facilities of the kind that it had during the war with Iran." Iraq's self-styled triumph over Iran was seen as a sufficient reason to acquire additional territorial concessions from other states, especially Kuwait. (The texts of both memoranda were published in Al Thowra, July 25, 1990.)
6 Saudi Arabia could use Saddam Hussein's same argument in waging his war against Kuwait: cutting throats is a lesser evil than cutting revenues. Thus Iraq's doubling of its exports can be viewed as such; IPSA I & 2, the two Iraqi pipelines passing through Saudi territory to the Red Sea would be shut down! We should remember that it was Saddam Hussein and the Saudis who initiated the practice of oil warfare, when they flooded the oil market in 1979 in order to bring revolutionary Iran to its knees. Or Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and especially Iran could insist on the payment of Iraq's debts and war reparations, thus crippling its recovery.
7 A substantial increase in Iraq's export capacity will not only be worrying to its neighbors. Fadhil al Chalabi, a leading authority on the political economy of oil, notes that "Iraq's low-cost oil threatens the huge U.S. investments in high-cost places: inside the United States, the Caspian Sea, West Africa, and the Gulf of Mexico. In 1998, when oil prices dropped below $10, U.S. high-cost production went down by 600,000 bid." (Iraqi File, No. 97, January 2000, pp. 22-23).
8 That includes Syria, which exports limited quantities of oil, but the quality of its domestically produced oil has made her reliant on imports from other countries including Iran.
9 In order that the genuine and justifiable suspicions of Iraq's ambitions among Kuwaitis and other Gulf Arabs be appeased, Iraq should be very cautious in espousing any "integrating" schemes with its southern neighbors.
10 See, for example. Reeva S. Simon, "The Imposition of Nationalism on a Non-Nation State: The Case of Iraq During the Interwar Period 1921-1941," in Rethinking Nationalism in the Middle East, eds. Jankowski and Gershoni (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 87-105; and Adeed Dawisha, "Iraqi Politics: The Past and Present as Context for the Future," in The Future of Iraq, ed. John Calbrese (Washington, DC: The Middle East Institute, 1997), pp. 7-16.
11 The following three passages in this section draw heavily on Isam al-Khafaji, "Repression, Conformity and Legitimacy: Prospects for an Iraqi Social Contract," in The Future of Iraq, op.cit., pp. 17-30.
12 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Baathists, and Free Officers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 1126; United Nations, Report to the Secretary General on Humanitarian Needs in Iraq by a Mission Led by Sadruddin Aga Khan, Executive Delegate of the Secretary General, New York: July 15, 1991.
13 See Judith Yaphe, '"Tribalism in Iraq, the Old and the New," Middle East Policy, Vol. 7, No. 3, June 2000.
14 This statement in no way means that Iraq would have collapsed if it had not invaded Kuwait, nor that the Iraqi leadership viewed Iraq's prospects as totally dim. A (mis)calculation that Iraq had gained a privileged regional position following the war with Iran, and an attempt at establishing Iraq as a secondary international player in all probability motivated the Iraqi leadership to solve problems through means that it thought would further enhance the country's position.
15 Maggie Farley,"2 Cite Iraq Sanctions in Resignations," Los Angeles Times, February 18, 2000.
16 Edward W. Miller, "Genocide, American Style," The Coastal Post, October 1999.
17 Phyllis Bennis, interview with Z magazine, July/August 1999. Ms. Bennis, who is now an "Iraq expert," never bothered to consult a serious book on Iraq in order to learn, for example, that the regime which she describes as "'military" is ruled by civilians!
18 Ahmed Braihi al Ali, Taqweem al Siyasat al lqtisadiyya Iraq lilfatra 1980-1991 (Evaluating Iraq's Economic Policies for the Period 1980-1991) (Baghdad: Ministry of Planning, 1991 ); Central Bureau of Statistics, Annual Abstract of Statistics (Baghdad: Ministry of Planning, 1989), p. 358.
19 Jamiyyat al Iqtisadiyyieen al Jraqiyeen (Iraqi Association of Economists), Taqreer al Tanmiya al Bashariya (Human Development Report), Baghdad, 1995, pp. 64-6.
20 In the late 1980s, the regime's brutality coupled with generous U.S. wheat supplies (25 percent of all U.S. wheat exports) had a direct bearing on Iraqi agriculture. Taped cassettes captured by the rebellions of 1991 record the following threats by Kurdistan's unchallenged governor and cousin of Saddam Hussein: "By next summer there will be no more villages remaining that are spread out here and there throughout the region, but only camps .... From now on I won't give the villagers flour, sugar, kerosene, water, or electricity as long as they continue living there .... Why should I let them live there like donkeys ... ? For the wheat? I don't want their wheat. We've been importing wheat for the past twenty years. Let's increase it to another five years .... I don't want their agriculture. I don't want tomatoes; I don't want okra or cucumbers." (Human Rights Watch/Middle East, Iraq's Crime o/Genocide. The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995, p. 255).
21 A semi-official report dealing with the housing problem is worth quoting here: According to the 1977 census, total housing units in Iraq were 1.47 million, inhabited by 1.83 million families. 660,000 of these houses (45 percent) were built of mud or were tents. The deficiency in houses was 1.02 million units. By 1987, the housing deficit rose to 1.13 million. Thus, while the average persons per house in 1957 was 5.2, it rose, against the trend all over the world, to 7.4 in 1987, compared to the 1990 average of 5.5 worldwide. and 5.6 in the ESCWA region to which Iraq belongs (Jamiyyat, op. cit., pp. 24,100). The report admits that the reason behind this surprising rise is the acute housing crisis (Muhammed Kadhum al Muhajir, Al Fuqr fl Iraq qabla wabada Harbii Khalee) [Poverty in Iraq Before and After the Gulf War] New York: U.N. Economic and Social Committee for West Asia, 1997).
22 Iraq's hemorrhage of physicians and highly qualified professionals began long before the sanctions. In 1980, Saddam Hussein ordered the expulsion of some 40 of the highest qualified specialists from the elite medical faculty at the University of Baghdad. This was followed by a wave of panic among many other physicians, who began fleeing or resigning from public services. An indicator of this was the ads published in Baghdad dailies on vacancies in the faculties of medicine. The requirements for a faculty member were the unthinkable Bachelor of Science degree! In California and Michigan, there are virtual communities of Iraqi physicians. In the U.K., Iraqi physicians managed to place an Iraqi in the 60-member Council of Physicians. A member requires at least 300 votes to be elected to this body.
23 One should bear in mind that much of the available services that are mentioned in the tables (women in the workforce, doctors, etc.) relate to the non-indigenous population.
24 Al Sharq al Awsat, December 2, J 999.
25 See, for example, UNICEF reports, Peter Boone, Haris Gazdar and Athar Hussain, Sanctions against Iraq: (Costs of Failure, report prepared for the Center of Economic and Social Rights on the impact of United Nations-imposed economic sanctions on the economic well-being of the civilian population of Iraq, London, 1997: Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999).
26 Until 1996, it was widely known among Iraqis that apart from the Central Bank, Hussein Kamel and Udai Saddam Hussein had printing machines that produced "their own" Iraqi dinars. A peculiar consequence of this is that there are today two exchange rates for the Iraqi dinar, one for what Iraqis call the "Swiss dinar," the old prc-1990 dinar, while the other is for the new and much cheaper dinar. The first dinar is only used in Iraqi Kurdistan and is worth around $0.6, the other $0.006.
27 Jamiyyat, op. cit., p. 176.
28 Al Muhajir. op. cit., p. 40.
29 The significance of these figures lies in the fact that they are admissions by state-controlled agencies and not in the actual income gap in Iraqi society. Given the high level of secrecy, corruption and parallel activities, one can safely assume that the actual ratios are several multiples of the stated ones.
30 Though a scholar conducting field work in Baghdad informed the author that many have managed to circumvent these restrictions either by going once a month to where they are registered to collect their ration, or by letting their families collect their shares and sell them in the free market. I am indebted to L. al Rasheed for this information.
31 Samuel P. Huntington, ""The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2, 1999, p. 42.
Comments
Phebe Marr, scholar and analyst of southwest Asia and a leading expert on Iraq.
This is a very rich paper with a wealth of ideas and well-researched information. It is particularly valuable in putting the current sanctions issue in a historical perspective. Not all of the ideas raised in the paper can be dealt with here. I would like instead to comment on several issues raised in the paper which I feel shed light on an important question: How much of Iraq's current posture is due to historical legacies, and how much can we expect to see changed in the future?
THE GEOSTRATEGIC ISSUE
The paper begins by dealing with Iraq's geostrategic position on the Gulf, and Iraq's perception of itself as "landlocked." This issue is not simply a Baath legacy, nor will it disappear with the Baath, although the Baath regime has greatly exacerbated it. Resentment over the demarcation of Iraq's Gulf borders with both Iran and Kuwait goes back to mandate days and beyond. In 1937, a treaty with Iran, adjusting a portion of the Shatt-al-Arab border in Iran's favor, was highly unpopular in Iraq. In the late 1930s, King Ghazi's broadcasting station attacked the control exercised by both the British and the Gulf rulers, especially the Kuwaitis. One of Nuri as-Said's last acts was an unsuccessful attempt to get British agreement to include Kuwait in a confederation with Iraq and Jordan. But until 1958, Iraq was firmly in the Western alliance system, and these conflicts were contained. Iraq's Western orientation took precedence.
This changed after the 1958 revolution, when Iraq moved out of the Western orbit, developed ties with the Soviet Union and took a more independent stance on foreign relations. In 1961, Qasim 's claim to Kuwait, and the ensuing military response by Britain and then by the Arab League, clearly raised the level of conflict over this issue and was a harbinger of things to come. Since then, oil, more than any other factor, has focused Iraq's attention on the Gulf and the problem of being "landlocked." Britain's announcement of its withdrawal in 1968, the nationalization of Iraq's oil industry in 1972, the development of its rich southern fields in Rumaylah, and above all, its increased reliance on oil income, reaching a high point at the end of the 1970s, all made direct access to the Gulf to market its oil an Iraqi obsession. These factors were exacerbated by the shah's new role in the Gulf, particularly as the chosen U.S. instrument to fill the vacuum left by the departing British. In 1969, Iran abrogated the agreement on the Shatt, and by the mid- I 970s, Iran and Iraq were engaged in a "proxy" war, involving not only the Shatt, but also the Kurds in northern Iraq and the Arabs in Khuzistan. This round of the conflict was settled in 1975 by Iraq's capitulation to Iran on the Shatt in return for peace in the north. Scarcely a year after the Islamic Revolution ( 1979), Iraq initiated a second round by launching a devastating eight-year war with Iran. At its end, the Shatt issue has still not be resolved by any internationally recognized agreement.
The Iran-Iraq War and its outcome inevitably focused Iraq's attention on its second outlet to the Gulf- the Khor Abd Allah channel and the port of Umm Qasr, both of which border Kuwait. Thus, the longstanding Kuwait issue, including the absence of mutually agreed-upon borders, was revived in acute form. Although this was not the only factor contributing to the second Gulf war, it was a major contributor. Both of these border issues, and Iraq's desire for independent access to the Gulf, are likely to continue. However, the issue of access to the Gulf, as Khafaji rightly points out, is less one of geography than of how this geography is handled. If Iraq's access to the Gulf is narrow and must be shared with neighbors, it behooves Iraq to develop good relations with these neighbors, rather than attempting to change geography through threats and the use of force. This is not to say that Iraq is not entitled to protect itself against aggression or encroachment (as with Iran) or to negotiate border changes that would give it better Gulf access (as with Kuwait). But both of these tasks are now likely to be made more, rather than less, difficult after two wars initiated by the current regime. Iraq's claim that it is virtually "landlocked" (it controls some 15 km of Gulf frontage) is likely to remain, but it is the means of dealing with these geostrategic realities that has brought such disaster on the current regime.
THE LONGEVITY OF THE STATE
Khafaji also raised the issue of Iraq's "artificiality" as a state and rightly discounts its imminent collapse or partition. Iraq is now three-quarters of a century old and, despite the extraordinary pressures of revolutions, wars and instability, has not disintegrated. This said, however, there is some reason to be concerned about the state's cohesion in the wake of the disasters it has suffered in the last few decades. Although Khafaji addresses these issues, he does not, in my view, give enough emphasis to the revival, under the Baath dictatorship, of both ethnic and sectarian sentiment. This is more an issue of cultural identity and mutual communal fears and suspicions - than a result of economic phenomena, such as the rentier state.
In the north, a substantial portion of the population has been governing itself, under the aegis of the two Kurdish nationalist parties, for a decade. Although the territory they rule is now divided in two parts - one under the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), the other under the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PU K) aspirations for continued self-rule are high. While none of Iraq's neighbors will countenance an independent entity in northern Iraq, the fact that the central government has not had a functioning administration there for ten years will make it harder, not easier, to reintegrate the north into Iraq under any regime. But, as these divisions indicate, there is not likely to be one unified Kurdistan in any case but rather more localized self-government.
The Shia, even less homogeneous than the Kurds, are also developing a more distinct communal and sectarian identity, based on their near exclusion at the top ranks of government. Khafaji correctly points out that most Shia have called, not for separatism, but for reform of the social and political structure of Iraq, in which Shia representation would be commensurate with their numbers. Since they constitute a majority, this would put them in control of government, a prospect that gives some of the ruling Arab Sunni minority considerable qualms. Shia have also called for a revision of school curricula to reflect their views on history and culture. While such a change in political structure, if it came to pass, might well result in a change in Iraq's policy and foreign orientation, it is unlikely to result in a breakup of the state.
Despite these caveats, there is little doubt that two wars, rebellions, economic devastation and, above all, regime repression have taken a severe toll on Iraq's sense of national community and national identity. A central fact in Iraq today is that the regime in Baghdad rests on the narrowest power base in Iraq's history. Not only is it in the hands of a small coterie of Arab Sunnis led by one man and his extended family, largely drawn from a Tikrit-based clan, its outer circle of Baath party members is also highly dependent on an older generation of underground party stalwarts and on a newer group hailing largely from provincial Arab Sunni towns of the northwest. These elements do not even represent the larger Sunni community of which they are a part, particularly its better-educated, middle class professionals. This narrowly based group and its intense monopoly on power have sharpened sectarian, ethnic and regional cleavages in Iraq. A common sense of community, which had been developing in the 1950s and 1960s, has now been badly eroded and will require not only political and social restructuring, but a different ideological orientation at the center to repair.
The suggestion in Khafaji's paper that Iraq should reorient its policy toward the "Fertile Crescent" and Turkey is intriguing and makes sense in economic, and even cultural, terms. But this, too, will require ideological reorientation by Iraq's leadership. In the past, this formula has been tried and found problematic. Iraq's foreign-policy problems are related to its domestic constituencies. Efforts of Arab nationalist parties in the 1950s and 1960s, supported by domestic Arab constituencies (Sunni and Shia), have been oriented to the Fertile Crescent. These parties, including the Baath, have made repeated efforts in the past at some kind of integration with other Arab countries - mainly Syria, Jordan and Egypt - and have looked to them for support. Turkey and Iran, Iraq's two large non-Arab neighbors, have always been wary of these efforts. So, too, have many domestic constituencies in Iraq, especially the Kurds, oriented more to Turkey and sometimes also Iran but not necessarily to Arab states, but also a number of Arab Shia, who have greater affinity for and need for support from Iran. On the other hand, when Iraq has concluded alliances with Turkey and Iran (the Saadabad Pact of 1937, the Baghdad Pact of 1955), the domestic Arab nationalist constituency has rebelled. A foreign policy based on Iraqi state interests and a concentration on Iraq's domestic affairs makes sense but would undoubtedly require a focus on the distribution of power inside Iraq that current political elites do not want to face. Efforts to restructure and reform Iraq's polity, especially in the late 1950s and I 960s, were turbulent and unsuccessful. The attempt to accommodate Kurdish aspirations, including autonomy efforts, have not yet succeeded, while the portion of Shia represented in the citadels of power has declined since the 1960s. Instability, and a decade of military coups in the I 960s, finally succeeded in putting into power a minority of Sunnis dominated by Tikritis. It is this situation which must be addressed before Iraq's sense of national identity can be restored and it can develop reasonable relations with any of its neighbors, not only the Arabs of the Fertile Crescent and Turkey but also Iran and the critical Arab oil neighbors to the south.
THE QUESTION OF MONEY
Khafaji emphasizes Iraq's growing character as a rentier state and the importance of oil in shaping not just its economy but its society. While I agree on oil's growing importance, he may be putting too much emphasis on the oil factor and not enough on the political culture. The same is true of sanctions and their role in impoverishing Iraq. I would argue that Iraq's problems require more fundamental solutions. While there is no doubt that Iraq needs a restored economy and that more money would alleviate suffering, money is not the answer to Iraq's problems. It is not so much a question of how much money Iraq gets as how it will be spent. Money will undoubtedly ameliorate some hardships, but it will not solve structural and ideological problems. On the contrary, Iraq is a case where too much money in the hands of leaders with inappropriate ambitions and visions can lead to disaster. Indeed, Khafaji's own well-documented study shows this very well.
As Khafaji clearly shows, Iraq, like other Middle East oil countries, enjoyed a huge influx of money in the 1970s. Its national income rose over seven fold, from ID 1.412 billion to ID 10.588 biIlion in the years between 1973 and 1979. Many younger Iraqis look back to the late 1970s as "a golden age." One of the most valuable contributions of this paper is to put this brief period of prosperity in some perspective. If it was a "golden age," it was brief, lasting not more than five to seven years. It was followed by a long war, which ate up resources and prevented real development. More important is the point that Khafaji's paper makes - indeed this is a unique contribution and should be part of any sanctions policy discussion - that while Iraq did spend sums on better health care and universal education, it barely kept up with regional neighbors, some of whom had less money to spend, in key areas of development - literacy, employment of women and even healthcare. True, Iraq's standard of living improved over previous decades as oil income rose, but so, too, did that of virtually every other Middle East country. In the end, Iraq had less to show for its efforts than most of its neighbors. (In fairness, much of this was due to the Iran-Iraq War, but this was a war that Iraq initiated). This is a clear indication that even in its good days Iraq's management of its funds - its expenditures and its priorities-can be questioned. As we now know, much of that money was siphoned off into military expenditure, which may have helped to precipitate the war with Kuwait. The same factors must be kept in mind in finding sanctions relief.
It was the Iran-Iraq War that began Iraq's free fall economically and socially, cutting its oil revenues over four fold, draining its human and economic resources, and creating a huge debt that would have taken years to pay. Even this parlous situation could have been remedied at the end of the Iran-Iraq War with a different debt strategy and different spending priorities, but these solutions would have required Iraq's government to become both more transparent and more accountable. Instead, Iraq chose to solve its debt problem by intimidating its Gulf allies, and, when that failed, by an invasion of Kuwait. The Kuwait war and its aftermath, including sanctions, have brought Iraqi society to its lowest point, but given the prior history of this regime's use of its wealth and priorities, there is little evidence that money alone will solve Iraq's problems.
ATOMIZATION OF SOCIETY: THE RISE OF THE NEW MAFIA
Lastly, Khafaji repeatedly refers to the "atomization" of Iraqi society. While there is little doubt about the decline, even disintegration, of autonomous civic institutions in Iraq (never very strong), lam not certain that "atomization" is the word I would use to describe the result. Rather, people have fallen back to a large degree on more primary associations, namely family and kin. One cannot exaggerate the degree to which Iraqis today have reverted to traditional kin and clan relations to see them through successive crises. Nowhere is this clearer than at the top of the political spectrum, but it is also true at its base. In my view, the Iraqi state today is one in which there is essentially a multi-layered structure.
At the top, the kinship system reigns supreme. The Al Bu Nasir clan from Tikrit dominates the decision-making structure and the top layers of security. This not only includes Saddam Hussein and his sons, but members of allied clans as well, such as the Dulaimis and the Ubaidis. Members of these clans are interlaced in all key posts in the multiple military and intelligence organizations that provide for the regime's security. The military itself has been reorganized into competing and separate units, but command and control has been kept in the hands of one family and its clan.
In the countryside, clan and tribal ties have also been revived, along with a reversion to some traditional customs, such as "tribal justice" and "tribal compensation," that were well on their way to extinction several decades ago. Local administration has devolved on hand-picked tribal leaders who receive benefits, such as land ownership, cars and other economic perks. As indicated earlier, in ethnic, sectarian and regional terms, the group at the top, recruited mainly from provincial Arab Sunni towns and villages of northwest Iraq, has a very narrow base. This is a reversal of trends underway not only in the later days of the old regime but under earlier revolutionary regimes as well. In particular, there has been a reversal in the empowerment of Iraq’s growing educated and professional middle class. Some have referred to this process as "the ruralization" of Iraq, as better-educated and more sophisticated elements have been replaced by those less well-educated and less exposed to outside influences.
This political layer at the top is now supported by an emerging class of nouveaux riches, an economic and social "mafia." This group is broader-based than the political elite, and includes Shia as well as Sunnis, Kurds as well as Arabs, but all are tied, directly or indirectly, to the Tikriti family in power. This growing economic group deals in the black and gray areas of the economy - in smuggling, currency exchange and trade - as well as such legitimate productive enterprises as can be conducted in an economy of scarcity and lack of spare parts. Although dependent on the regime for licenses and favors, this new class is now well entrenched and constitutes a protective layer for the regime. They may be difficult to remove, even if sanctions should be relaxed or lifted. Indeed, under the present system, they would be the likely beneficiaries.
The third layer of this state structure consists of the institutions created by previous regimes, and by the current Baath regime itself, prior to the Gulf War: the military, especially the Republican Guard; the security establishment; and the Baath party and the bureaucracy, staffed mainly by the remains of the old, educated middle class. This middle class, and the institutions they inhabit, still exist, but - except for the security system - they have been greatly weakened, not only by sanctions, but by wars and the regime's own deliberate policies. Defeat in war, rebellions in the north and the south, and constant purges since 1990 have hollowed out these institutions and debilitated the middle-class professionals who staff them. So, too, has the sanctions regime. The hold of these central institutions over the north of the country is non-existent; in the south, it is fragile. In the center, the security organizations are dominant. How much cohesion remains in these institutions is a question. The bureaucracy, for example, runs on bribery to an extent unknown in the past, clearly eroding its professionalism. Nonetheless, this erosion, including the erosion of the middle class, is not complete. Professionals still perform their functions. Institutions, including the party and the military, still obey the central government and have kept control of the state under extraordinary circumstances. But whatever the level at which they function, all of these institutions are firmly under the thumb of the government, dominated by clan and kin relations, while the new economic mafia is taking a disproportionate share of resources. An infusion of money is not likely to strengthen the independence or autonomy of the "old" middle class or the formal institutions of state. Rather, unless measures are taken to prevent it, more money is likely to strengthen the current nexus of power based on family and clan and the new free wheeling economic mafia that now supports it. This new structure could keep the regime in power for some time to come.
It is this reality that should form the basis of analysis on where we might go from here on policy. Clearly, the Iraqi population must have help, economically and socially. Its middle class must be relieved of the intense isolation it has suffered. But in shaping policies to improve this situation, we must be realistic about how much change can be effected from outside. Simply getting more money into Iraq, even opening Iraq up to more external influence (both processes are already underway and both are firmly under regime control) are not, in and of themselves, likely to change Iraq's social structure or its ideology. This will take a much longer time and will need to be addressed in any new policy options. In the meantime, the West is likely to be confronted with the unpleasant reality that is Iraq today.
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