With Likud's June 1996 return to power, the Middle East peace process experienced revived scrutiny. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sought, at the very least, a partial reversal of Israel's agreements with the Palestinians inherited from the previous Labor governments. While Likud opposed Oslo I and II, Netanyahu and his party applauded Labor's overtures to Jordan and voted in the Knesset in support of the 1994 Israeli Jordanian peace treaty. Likud's actions in the 1990s represent a significant shift for a party that previously considered Jordan to be either part of greater Eretz Israel or, owing to its demographic composition, the Palestinian state. The current embrace of Jordan rests on the premise that the Hashemite Kingdom shares Likud's fear of an independent Palestine in Gaza and the West Bank. Netanyahu reasons that together Jerusalem and Amman can come to some accommodation that leaves Israel in sovereign control of much of the West Bank while allowing the Palestinian inhabitants a measure of civilian authority under the tutelage of Jordan. This article will trace the evolution of Likud thought regarding Jordan and highlight the kingdom's prominent role in the Likud vision of an ultimate resolution to the Palestinian question.
THE BACKGROUND OF LIKUD1
Likud has its roots in the mid-1920s Revisionist Zionist movement of Vladimir Jabotinsky. The Revisionists opposed the path of gradualism and conciliation advocated by mainstream Zionists such as Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion. In pre-state Israel, much of the visible Revisionist agenda was propagated through its military arm, the Irgun Zva'i Leumi. After independence, Irgun leader Menachem Begin transformed the guerilla group into the nationalist Herut (Freedom) party. Begin's party participated in the first Israeli parliamentary elections and by 1955 emerged as the major opposition party to the Labor-dominated governments.
Although shut out of direct power for three decades, Herut's hardline nationalist orientation was a powerful force within the Israeli body politic. Herut's merger with a series of smaller right-of-center parties in 1965 and again in 1973 created the Likud bloc, and in the 1977 parliamentary elections, a Likud victory finally secured the prime ministership for Begin. Since 1977, Likud has been wholly out of power only during the 1992-1996 Labor governments, when agreements with Jordan and the Palestinians were struck. Other than this four-year period, Likud has either governed directly (1977-84, 1990- 1992 and since June 1996) or served with Labor in national-unity governments (1984-1990) where Likud was the senior partner. While Revisionist Zionism's opposition to a Palestinian state, as well as its fervent desire to maintain control over the West Bank, remains an ideological constant, attitudes towards Jordan have evolved through three stages: Jordan as Eretz Israel; Jordan as Palestine and finally Jordan as Jordan.
JORDAN IS ERETZ ISRAEL
For Revisionist Zionists, the Balfour Declaration (1917), Versailles Treaty (1919) and League of Nations Mandate (1922) were international promises to create a Jewish state - Eretz Israel - in the entire territory of Palestine. By 1923 however, the mainstream World Zionist Executive gave tacit acceptance to the 1922 (Churchill) White Paper. In it, Britain sought to clarify contradictory aspects of the Balfour Declaration, maintaining that it had not been the British intention to create an exclusively Jewish state in all of Palestine. Additionally, the 1922 White Paper closed the area east of the Jordan River to Zionist immigration. This was the first step in ultimately giving this territory a status separate from the Palestine Mandate. Jabotinsky contended that the Balfour Declaration and the subsequent League mandate for Palestine, which had incorporated the Declaration, promised a Jewish state with a Jewish majority on both banks of the Jordan. And in 1923, he resigned from the Executive in large part due to that body's acceptance of the White Paper. Thus the Revisionists viewed Britain's creation of Transjordan in 1922 as a severance of nearly 80 percent of the land promised to the Jewish people. When the ultimate fate of Palestine was discussed during the interwar years, Jabotinsky continued to argue for an enlarged Jewish state that included both Palestine and Transjordan, asserting that the expanded area was needed to absorb the Jewish immigration that would eventually arrive. Given Palestine's 10,000 square miles verses Transjordan's 30,000, as well as the latter's sparse population density, it was imperative to include Transjordan into the vision of Eretz Israel.2 While Jabotinsky acquiesced to Arabs living as a minority in Eretz Israel, they would only possess individual rights, not community or national ones. These broader rights of full national citizenship were reserved only for Jews. Jabotinsky's approach would become a central theme of Likud's later dealings with the Palestinians. Revisionist Zionism's territorial ambitions were best symbolized by its choice of emblem and anthem. The former pictured a hand grasping a rifle imposed over a map showing both Palestine and Transjordan. Beneath it was the Hebrew inscription "Only thus." The anthem states in part, "Two banks has the Jordan; this one's ours, the other too."
Following World War II, the United Nations General Assembly partitioned Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state through Resolution 181. Menachem Begin, Jabotinsky's successor, bitterly opposed its passage. Like many Revisionists, he believed that both banks were a matter of Jewish historical right. He often referred to Transjordan as "our heritage" or "eastern Eretz Israel."3 For him, Resolution 181 had given the Jewish People a mere 10 percent of what had originally been promised by the international community; it divided Eretz Israel for a second time. While conceding that Jews were "over joyed" at the prospect of a state, Begin reminded his coreligionists that the "home land" had been "carved up"; it had "not been liberated but mutilated."4 Outside powers had severed Jews from even more of Eretz Israel, completing a process begun with the creation of Transjordan. On May 15 1948, the day after Israel declared independence, Begin proclaimed:
The homeland is historically and geographically an entity. Whoever fails to recognize our right to the entire homeland does not recognize our right to any of its territories. We shall never yield our natural and eternal right. We shall bear the vision of a full liberation.5
Herut also incorporated a greater Eretz Israel goal into the party's founding document. It declares "the Hebrew Homeland, whose territory extends on both sides of the Jordan, is a single historical and geographical unit," and "the role of the present generation is to restore to the bosom of Jewish sovereignty those parts of the homeland that were tom from it and delivered to foreign rule."6 Begin later declared Jordan's annexation of the West Bank in April 1950 to be null and void and denounced Ben-Gurion's tacit acceptance of it as another "Munich." Throughout the 1950s, the Herut leader advocated direct Israeli military activity to advance Jewish sovereignty over both banks of the Jordan.7
However, time and circumstances tempered this view as Herut's political coalition building pushed it toward moderation.8 Following Israel's 1967 conquest of East Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan, Herut - while still contending that Israel had "title" to the East Bank -abandoned an active policy of conquering the remainder of Jordan. As one-time Begin ally Ezer Weizman observes about the movement's transformation:
Begin, who had once written an article called "Amman too shall be ours!" now realized that this slogan had no hope of implementation. Herut remained content with safeguarding Israel's war gains, while the East Bank of the Jordan was relegated to its ideological museum.9
By discarding Jordan from the greater Eretz Israel concept, a new phase of Revisionist thinking began to emerge. With the rise of Palestinian nationalism and the Palestine Liberation Organization to prominence after 1967, Herut reoriented its strategy towards Amman. Jordan was no longer Eretz Israel; Jordan was now Palestine.
JORDAN IS PALESTINE
The capture of the West Bank-Judea and Samaria, in Revisionist parlance - prompted a shift in the movement's approach. Begin adamantly opposed Israeli acceptance of U.N. Resolution 242, which called for Israel to return territory in exchange for peaceful relations with neighboring Arab states. He regarded Judea and Samaria as part of an indivisible Eretz Israel; to adopt Resolution 242 meant sanctioning a redivision of the historic homeland. Returning any portion of Eretz Israel was out of the question; instead the territory should be permanently secured as part of the Jewish State. He repeatedly demanded that Israeli law be extended to the West Bank and advocated building Jewish settlements there. The national unity government's approval of the Rogers Plan of 1970 (which also constituted an acceptance of Resolution 242) spurred Begin's resignation from the coalition.
For many within the Herut establishment, the Palestinian-Jordanian civil war of September 1970 provided a window of opportunity to make the Jordan as-Palestine plan a reality. Ariel Sharon, for one, argued that Israel should not intervene on Jordan's behalf and instead allow the Hashemite monarchy to disappear. He foresaw the danger to Israel of Palestinian nationalism and believed that long-term Israeli interests lay in allowing Jordan to be what it demographically in actuality was, a Palestinian state. This solution would transform the conflict into one of borders and territory. "We will no longer be dealing with the issue of Palestinian identity and about their right to a political expression of their identity," Sharon reasoned, as these questions would be settled with a Palestinian takeover of Jordan.10 He conceded this change would place Israel at odds with the United States, but he believed that in the end it would leave Judea and Samaria in Israel's hands.
The Labor government of Israel did in fact come to King Hussein's aid by moving troops close to the Syrian border. After much bloodshed, the Jordanians were victorious over the Palestinian forces, causing the PLO to flee to Lebanon. Later Sharon would write, "This was one of Israel's most crucial mistakes, one whose evil consequences we are continuing to suffer."11 In spring 1982, Sharon, now defense minister, along with Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, privately argued that an Israeli invasion of Lebanon could force the PLO and enough refugees out of that country and back into Jordan. There they might overthrow Hussein and create a state.12 Sharon reportedly stated in 1982 that if he were prime minister, he would tell the king he had 48 hours to leave.13 Begin was against this scenario, preferring to decisively crush the PLO and end the debate of a Palestinian state altogether." Begin also opposed the Reagan peace plan of September 1982 because it negated the idea of Israeli sovereignty over West Bank/ Gaza and instead called for "association" between those areas and Jordan.
Given Begin's opposition to any kind of Palestinian state, the most he was prepared to offer the Palestinians was autonomy. He broached this concept in his December 1977 self-rule plan and subsequently committed Israel to it through the Camp David accords. But the Israeli concept of autonomy was vastly different from the American or Egyptian view. For Begin (as his mentor Jabotinsky too believed), autonomy meant control over people, not land or water. Autonomy, after all, was a special status the central government grants to a region of its own country. His version of autonomy left Israel in physical and administrative control of the territories.
The prime minister did not officially embrace the "Jordan is Palestine argument".15 However, others in Likud continued to loudly champion this view and frequently ended debates over the final status of the West Bank by declaring that Israel had no intention of creating "a second Palestinian state" within Judea and Samaria. A Palestinian state already existed. "The irrefutable fact," then Foreign Minister Shamir declared, "is that Jordan is a Palestinian Arab state in everything but name.16 Shamir elucidated further:
It is important to understand the "Jordan is Palestine" aspect and that the conflict is not, and never was, between Israel and a stateless people. Once this is understood, the emotional dimension that evokes problems of conscience in some minds will be removed. If it is perceived in this light, you have on the one hand a Palestinian-Jordanian Arab state and Israel on the other, then the problem is reduced to territorial conflict between these two states. The conflict will then have been reduced to its true and manageable proportions.17
Both as foreign minister and (after 1983) as prime minister, Shamir gave his approval to Benjamin Netanyahu's creation of a network of "Jordan is Palestine" committees to dispense information abroad.18 During this time, Netanyahu was deputy chief of mission at Israel's Washington embassy and later served as its ambassador to the United Nations. Both Shamir and Netanyahu sought a propaganda campaign that would counter Palestinian nationalism and place the onus of any settlement of the Palestinian question on Jordan. These committees emphasized four central assumptions of the "Jordan is Palestine" argument: 1) Palestine historically included Jordan; 2) the original Palestine Mandate comprised both Israel and Jordan, thus partition had already created a two-state solution with a Jewish state and a Palestinian Arab state; 3) Arabs of Jordan are culturally indistinguishable from Arabs living in areas controlled by Israel, and 4) Palestinian and Jordanian leaders themselves believe the two to be identical.19 The committee's sloganeering included, "Two peoples need two states - not three," and "Good fences make good neighbors - the Jordan River is a fence for safety and peace."
While this information campaign was underway, Likud worked to tighten Israeli control over the territories by increasing the number and size of Jewish settlements. After 1984, as part of the national unity government, Likud resisted Labor's so called "Jordanian Option," which would have returned much of the West Bank to Jordan as part of a peace agreement. Regarding Judea and Samaria, Likud assailed the very idea of a "land-for-peace" scenario, advocating instead "peace for peace." Subsequently, Shamir sabotaged Shimon Peres's 1987 "London Agreement" with Jordan for the same reasons.
Both the Palestinian intifada, which proved costly to Israel's authority in the territories, and King Hussein's decision of July 1988 to disengage administrative ties with the West Bank, forced a reevaluation of Labor's Jordanian option. Amman was no longer a possible diplomatic interlocutor. With Labor inching closer to talking directly with the Palestinians over land, Likud, in an ironic twist, resurrected the previously scorned Jordanian option as a way to avoid this possibility. One manifestation of the new Likud strategy was Shamir's reluctant agreement to attend the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991 only if Jordanians and Palestinians formed a joint delegation.
While key Likud leaders such as Shamir, Sharon, Netanyahu, Moshe Arens, Ze'ev "Benny" Begin, and Ronni Milo20 continued to advocate the "Jordan is Palestine" scenario well into the early 1990s, caveats began to appear. Despite public declarations that Jordan was Palestine, these statements were coupled with palliatives designed to alleviate Jordanian apprehensions.21 Likud spokesmen reassured Amman that Israel harbored no ill-will toward the Hashemite Kingdom; these were merely declarations of "geographic" or "demographic" facts. They were "descriptive" rather than "prescriptive" and certainly were not meant to imply Israeli opposition to King Hussein's rule.22 The often contradictory pronouncements reflected a new ideological shift by the more pragmatic elements of Likud. As Labor moved closer to accepting the PLO, and the Oslo Accord opened the door to a Palestinian entity in Gaza and the West Bank, Likud embraced Jordan as a way to forestall an independent Palestine.
JORDAN IS JORDAN
After expressing initial concern over the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Oslo accord, Jordan came to view the agreement as a way to finally formalize its own longtime de facto relationship with Israel. Emboldened by the PLO's recognition of Israel, Hussein advanced bilateral peace negotiations with the Rabin government throughout 1994.23 During summer 1994, low-level agreements and meetings between the two countries' diplomats gave way to a Hussein-Rabin summit in Washington and a formal peace treaty that was signed in October 1994.
In the wake of Oslo and the dramatically changed regional dynamics, Likud engaged in yet another policy reformulation. The party charged that the 1993 pact with the PLO was a "crime against Zionism," and they considered its main Israeli architect, Peres, an appeaser worse than Neville Chamberlain. The latter had only imperiled the safety and freedom of other people; Peres imperiled his own.24 Netanyahu and his party rejected the Oslo I accord in the Knesset and opposed giving control of any part of Judea and Samaria to Yasser Arafat. Additionally, they maintained that both this agreement and the May 1994 Cairo accord, which culminated in the establishment of a Palestinian Authority (PA) in Gaza and Jericho, were grave dangers to the State of Israel.
Yet, in stark contrast to Likud's policy regarding the Palestinian diplomatic track, Netanyahu vociferously supported the Labor government's overtures to Jordan. As party leader, he secretly met Crown Prince Hassan in London in May and September of 1994 to express Likud's approval. For its part, Jordan sought confirmation that the party which coined "Jordan is Palestine," did indeed back Labor's efforts. Netanyahu, employing a degree of revisionist history, publicly downplayed past association with that ideological platform. In July, he told the Jordanian newspaper The Star:
That may have been the position of some in the past, but it was never a formal Likud position. It is very much neither the formal nor informal position of the Likud today....l believe the Palestinian problem should be resolved in the context of the two states, Jordan and Israel....We view the stability of Jordan and its government as an important aspect of the Likud's foreign policy, and I'd say Israel's foreign policy. 25
The Likud leader made similar declarations to Israeli audiences.26 In August 1994, he informed the Knesset that he supported Labor's Jordanian initiative because it was "good policy." For nearly a quarter century, he said Jordan and Israel had cooperated over security issues, and in the end, an agreement between the two would rest on "peace for peace," since there were no major territorial issues involved. "With Egypt we first had the agreement paper and then peace," Netanyahu intoned, "while with Jordan we first had the peace and then we have the paper.27
The Jordanian leadership's persistent courting of Likud became an important part of the kingdom's strategy: It was imperative that Amman make peace with both ideological halves of Israel. Extensive public and private conversations were conducted prior to the actual signing of the peace treaty. In the end, a reassured Crown Prince Hassan stated, "Talk of Zionist expansion east of the River Jordan has now become a thing of the past. Likewise this talk of undermining the national identity east of the River Jordan has subsided."28
For its part, Likud voted overwhelmingly to support the Jordanian Israeli peace treaty after it was signed in October 1994. 29 This treaty passed by a wider margin than either the Camp David accords or any of the agreements with the Palestinians. The final Knesset vote was 105-3-6; only the right-wing Moledet party cast any negative votes.30 Likud's affirmation of the treaty legitimated an entity called Jordan and at the expense of the Eretz Israel vision. Likud Knesset chair Moshe Qatzav captured the shift: "Today we are in fact giving up in real terms past dreams about a greater Israel." 31 Notably, the accord utilized official League of Nations documents from the mandate era to finally delineate the territorial boundaries between Israel and Jordan.
While the treaty might have been "good policy," Likud also saw the new overt Israeli-Jordanian relationship as a means to undermine the accords with the Palestinians. Within months of the Oslo I agreement, Netanyahu made secret overtures to Jordan. In messages relayed through King Juan Carlos of Spain, Likud reportedly outlined its common interest with Jordan in opposing a Palestinian state. Such a state in the West Bank would conspire against the Hashemites by ultimately seeking to annex the kingdom to Palestine and after that tum against Israel. It was therefore incumbent upon Jordan to join Israel in quelling Palestinian irredentist claims and to arrange a "strategic convergence" regarding Judea and Samaria that created a link between the population and Jordan.
The 1994 treaty also recognized a Jordanian role regarding Jerusalem. Of particular interest to Likud was Article 9, in which Israel pledged to respect the "special role" of Jordan regarding the Islamic holy places and "give high priority to the Jordanian historic role" during permanent-status negotiations. This seemingly negated the prevailing assumption, enshrined in Oslo and Cairo, that only the Palestinians would negotiate any claims over Jerusalem during the final status talks. While Likud was adamant that Jerusalem was the indivisible capital of Israel and disallowed non-Jewish sovereignty over any part of the city, the party provided for a measure of Muslim supervision over Islamic holy places. Jordan's status as protector of the Muslim holy places was far more palatable than any PLO presence. Likewise, Likud believed that as long as Israel made Arafat the chief player, as Rabin and Peres had done, then no accommodation could be reached in allotting Jordan an enhanced position in the final-status configurations.
LIKUD'S RETURN TO POWER
During the 1996 Israeli electoral campaign, Likud ran on a platform endorsing a "strong Hashemite Jordan." While Netanyahu continued to denounce the Oslo accords, the candidate frequently touted the Jordanian relationship as a "splendid example of what real peace means."33 Following Likud's victory, King Hussein - the only Arab leader to meet openly with Netanyahu prior to his election - was also the only Arab leader to express public confidence that the new Israeli prime minister would continue the peace process. Hussein encouraged a "wait and see" policy and suggested Netanyahu might be more flexible than his campaign rhetoric. The king noted that the peace process was "irreversible" and had its own dynamic not dependent on any one man.34
Likud's victory succeeded in doing what six years of diplomacy had failed to do - unite the Arab world to hold a high-level summit in June 1996. At the first such gathering since the Gulf crisis of 1"990, all Arab League members (save Iraq) were represented by their top leaders. The summit was convened in an atmosphere of pessimistic urgency regarding the peace process. During the meeting, Crown Prince Hassan telephoned Netanyahu and urged him to tone down his rhetoric. "Give us something to defend," Hassan told the prime minister.35 At the Cairo gathering, King Hussein played a significant role in amending the final communique to make it less adversarial toward Israel. The communique did however restate that peace must be based on the land-for-peace principle and called for a moratorium on new Jewish settlement activity. After the summit, Netanyahu phoned Hussein to thank him for the positive role Jordan played in Cairo. The king cautioned the new Israeli government not to laud Jordan in public lest instability be created between the kingdom's Jordanian and Palestinian populations. The monarch also urged Netanyahu to visit Egypt first before coming to Jordan, which the prime minister did.36
In the rush of high-level meetings that took place in the Middle East after Likud's win, Netanyahu met secretly with Hussein in London, before the king's own trip to Syria. Speculation mounted that Hussein would deliver an Israeli message concerning the stalled peace talks with Syria. In any case, the August parley between Hussein and Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad was the first since Jordan signed its peace treaty with Israel. Days after the king's return from Damascus, Netanyahu made his inaugural visit to Jordan as prime minister. High on the agenda was strengthening the relationship between Israel and Jordan.
Inside Jordan the response to peace with Israel has been guarded. Within the corridors of Parliament and among elements of Jordanian civil society, Amman's new relationship with Israel continues to be condemned especially when the promised economic "peace dividend" has yet to materialize. Since Netanyahu's strategy rests on a stable and economically strong Jordan, the prime minister expressed the need to provide "something tangible" that would improve the kingdom's standard of living. Among the new measures announced were the lifting of Israeli bureaucratic restrictions on the import of Jordanian products, especially paper, building supplies and textiles; the establishment of an agricultural cooperation committee; the advancement of plans for more drinkable water from the Jordan River; and the opening of consulates in Eilat and Aqaba to expedite border crossings. In a separate vein, Israel lobbied Washington on Jordan's behalf for both foreign aid and debt relief.
Israeli-Jordanian relations waxed and waned during Netanyahu's first year in office. They reached an initial low point in September following Israel's opening of the Hasmonean tunnel in the Old City of Jerusalem. Hussein was incensed that, even though he had met with a key Netanyahu adviser less than 24 hours before Israel opened the tunnel, there was no mention of these plans. The ensuing violent clashes between Israeli and Palestinian forces resulted in a rushed October meeting among Netanyahu, Hussein and Arafat in Washington. At the White House, the king reportedly charged Netanyahu with engaging in an "arrogance of power."37 He cautioned the Israeli leader that he risked a deterioration in ties with Egypt and Jordan if he did not work with Arafat as a full partner.
Jordan used its good offices to mediate between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. As part of these negotiations, Hussein visited Jericho, his first sojourn on the West Bank since the 1967 war. In the end, the king was instrumental in breaking the diplomatic impasse and securing Israel's withdrawal from 85 percent of Hebron. This January 1997 agreement was significant in that it was the first accord signed between the Palestinians and a Likud government.
However, this progress was short-lived, as Netanyahu announced plans in March to build new Jewish housing units in Jerusalem. The peace process was further complicated by the Israeli government's decision to redeploy from less territory in the West Bank than expected. The resulting crisis prompted Hussein to write a harsh letter to Netanyahu in which he queried, "How can I work with you as a partner and true friend in this confused and confusing atmosphere when I sense an intent to destroy all I worked to build between our peoples...?”38
This tense situation was amplified when a Jordanian soldier opened fire on a group of Israeli school children, killing seven. A contrite Hussein visited the victims' families in Israel. His visit ushered in a period of renewed calm between Israel and Jordan. Since then the king and Netanyahu have met at least twice. They revived plans for joint usage of the Aqaba airport, and Israel agreed to channel additional drinking water to Jordan during the dry summer months. Both sides attempted to highlight aspects of the "peace dividend," mindful that the Jordanian government is saddled with an increasingly unpopular peace treaty with Israel as it heads into the scheduled parliamentary elections in November 1997.
IS THERE A PALESTINE?
A stable Jordan is the linchpin to Likud's Palestinian strategy. The new Israeli government recognizes that from a Palestinian perspective the lack of tangible results from the post-Oslo relationship with Israel will cost Arafat and the Palestinian Authority credibility with their people. Consequently, Netanyahu hopes that dissatisfaction with the Palestinian leadership can be finessed by Israel to create an expanded Jordanian role in the management of the West Bank.
Thus, upon assuming office, Netanyahu did everything in his power to undermine the letter and spirit of Oslo and denigrate Arafat before reluctantly meeting with him for the first time in September 1996. Prior to this meeting, while Likud contacts with Jordan and Egypt were at their highest levels, discussions with the Palestinian Authority were initially relegated to non-ministerial contacts between Netanyahu's aide Dore Gold and Mahmoud Abbas, Arafat's representative. The final-status talks and the Hebron deployment, both postponed because of the Israeli election, were placed "under review." Long delays occurred in seemingly ordinary transactions such as granting Arafat's aircraft permission to travel from Gaza to the West Bank. In addition, the Israeli government announced new funding for expanded Jewish settlements and bypass roads in the West Bank.
During his first year in office, Netanyahu has been deliberately opaque in public regarding his West Bank policy. While he did tell an American audience in July 1996 that if they want to know his thoughts they should "read his books," he is not forthcoming about outlining details as prime minister.39 Netanyahu's 1993 book, A Place Among the Nations: Israel and the World, does provide a number of clues in respect to his thinking. First, the future prime minister reasoned that Israeli settlements "represent no new Jewish claim and no new Jewish right," for they are based on the same rights recognized by the international community at Versailles and practiced by Jews until 1948, when the area was occupied by Jordan. 40 Thus expansion of settlements is likely under his government.
Second, he holds Begin's view of Camp David, in that there can be no national rights for the Palestinians and no additional state west of the Jordan River. Netanyahu offers broad civilian authority to the Palestinians but no powers approaching a sovereign entity. This leaves a formula which Netanyahu believes must include Jordan in its configuration. His Jordan centered bent posits that "Palestinian Arab self-determination will have to be realized within the framework of Jordan."41 This doctrine appears to be a meshing of Labor's Jordanian option with a warmed over version of Begin's interpretation of Camp David autonomy.42 Netanyahu maintains that Israel would retain "the powers and prerogatives of the sovereign" in such areas as water, military defense, foreign affairs, trade and control of the currency, leaving the Palestinians to manage the remaining areas of daily life.43 "This could be similar to an arrangement for the division of responsibility between a national government and a local authority."44 Hence, Palestinian authority would be restricted to a municipal level.
One tangible indicator of Netanyahu's vision surfaced in June 1997. A final status plan circulated suggesting that Israel would retain some 60 percent of the West Bank following a settlement with the Palestinians. This plan, dubbed "AllonPlus" after a 30-year-old blueprint that conceived of dividing the West Bank between Israel and Jordan, was not officially claimed as government policy. Netanyahu called the idea "an accommodation with reality." He refused to comment on the map's territorial points, but he did offer that "the areas that we believe should remain under direct Israeli control are a united Jerusalem and its immediate environs, the Jordan Valley and the areas that abut the former Green Line...."45
While the prime minister did not address the specifics of the "Allon-Plus" map, in A Place Among the Nations his final plan envisions four "self-managing" counties in the areas around Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah and Hebron, where the majority of Palestinians live. Here self-rule could take place. Palestinians would also administer Gaza, since it "does not impose an extraordinary security risk for Israel."46 At the end of a 20-year "cooling-off period," citizenship in either Israel or Jordan could be chosen. 47 An independent Palestine is not advanced as an option.
Ironically, in 1997 the realities of Oslo have the Palestinian Authority already in full or mixed control of roughly 27 percent of the territory and 95 percent of the Palestinian population. This neatly mirrors Netanyahu's 1993 plan. If one can ascertain Netanyahu's future approach based on these passages and the "Allon Plus" scheme, he would leave the "counties" unattached. Non-contiguous territorial areas, dissected by security roads and large stretches of Israeli-held land cannot be molded into a Palestinian state.48 In other words, Oslo stops here. What was envisioned to be an "interim" phase might in fact become the final one.
CONCLUSION
Despite an elected Palestinian council and president, the Netanyahu government still holds out hope for some form of Jordanian responsibility in the West Bank and Gazan enclaves.49 Likud is gambling that the unresolved issues of Palestinian refugees from the 1948 and 1967 wars, border demarcation, and control over water sources - which affect not only the Palestinians but also Israel and Jordan, will force the latter two to work together. The Oslo Accords already give Amman a part to play regarding refugees; Jordan, along with Egypt, Israel and the Palestinians, sits on a committee with this mandate.
Since the Palestinian issue is both a domestic and a foreign-policy concern for Jordan, the kingdom strives to keep a voice in these matters. Yet Amman will have to perform a delicate balancing act. Even over the most vital of security concerns, expect King Hussein to keep a low public profile so as not to appear to be usurping Palestinian leadership or alienating his own Palestinian citizens. Jordan may indeed share some of Likud's fears over an independent Palestine, but its apprehensions stem not from the concept of Palestinian self-government, but come more from the relatively rapid pace of Palestinian self-rule granted under the Oslo process and the lack of consultation by both Israel and Arafat over issues vital to Jordan. A well-defined final-status agreement that gives Palestinians control but also takes into account Jordanian vital interests could very well be acceptable to the king.
Likud's patchwork plan of Palestinian "counties," having Jordan and Israel ultimately in control, is unlikely to be embraced by Hussein. Even if he desired expanded authority in the West Bank, Hussein cannot claim to speak for the Palestinians and hope to survive. The 1996 bread riots and the widespread suspicion that many Jordanians continue to harbor over the pace of normalization with Israel demonstrate the potential for instability within the kingdom.
Instead of Jordan acting as a substitute for the Palestinians, Likud might opt for Hussein serving as a conciliator between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. This is a role the king played very well during the Netanyahu-Arafat Washington meeting and again during the Hebron negotiations. For Likud, the realities of a post-Oslo Middle East have clearly delineated that Jordan is not part of Eretz Israel, nor is it Palestine. What remains for Netanyahu and his party to decide, given the post-Oslo realities is this: What is Israel, and what is Palestine?
1 For a comprehensive examination see Colin Shindler, Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream (London: 1.8. Tauris, 1995).
2 Vladimir Jabotinsky, The War and the Jew (New York: The Dial Press, 1942), p. 207.
3 See for example Menachem Begin, The Revolt (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1977), p. 58. (Originally published I 951). Even as prime minister, Begin continued to refer to Israel and the occupied territories as "western Eretz Israel," implying that Jordan was "eastern Eretz Israel."[See The New York Times May 4, 1982, p. A3.]
4 Begin, The Revolt, pp. 433-34.
5 Ibid., p. 24.
6 Herut document quoted in Sasson Sofer, Begin: An Anatomy of Leadership (New York: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1988), p. 126.
7 See Mohammad Ibrahim Faddah, The Middle East in Transition; A Study of Jordan's Foreign Policy (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1974), pp. 107-108; Sofer, pp. 115-116 and Shindler, pp. 42-46.
8 Shindler, pp. 60-61.
9 Ezer Weizman, The Battle For Peace (New York: Bantam Books, I 981 ), p. 37. See also Sofer, p. 115.
10 Ariel Sharon, Warrior, An Autobiography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 246-247. See also Sharon's interviews in Time, October 5, 1981, p. 33 and April 17, 1989, pp. 40-42.
11 Sharon, Warrior, p. 247.
12 Time, March I, 1982, p. 24.
13 Shindler. pp. 122 and 159.
14 In 1982, the Begin Government gave assurances to the United States that it had no plans to topple Hussein. See Ha'aretz report in Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Middle East and Africa (FBIS-MEA) September I, 1982, p, 15.
15 Begin told Israeli Radio in September 1981, "I have never said such a thing. There are some friends who claim so and that is their prerogative. I have said that our right [over the West Bank] continues to exist and that is enough for me." Quoted in FBIS-MEA, September 29, I 981, pp. 116. "I do not share the view that the Palestinian state is in Jordan." Begin quoted in FBIS-MEA, October 6, 1981, p. 19.
16 Excerpts from Yitzhak Shamir's speech to the Foreign Policy Association reprinted in The New York Times, October 6, 1981, p. 10.
17 Ibid., Shamir makes similar arguments in his "Israel's Role in a Changing Middle East," Foreign Affairs 60 (4) Spring 1982, p. 791.
18 See Shindler, pp. 221-222. Jordan is Palestine Committees were established in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, France, Holland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, the UK and the US. Netanyahu's articles on the subject were frequently included in Committee packets. See in particular his "The question of Palestine," (c) 1989, Jordan is Palestine Committee -New York
19 See Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle, "Is Jordan Palestine?" Commentary, October 1988, pp. 35-42.
20 See for example, Ariel Sharon, "Jordan is the Palestinian State," Jerusalem Post (International Edition), April 13, 1991, p. 8; Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among the Nations: Israel and the World(New York: Bantam Books, 1993), pp. 144-149 and 343-345; Moshe Arens in a BBC interview reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Near East and South Asia (FE/S NES), March 13, 1991, p. 34.; Ze'ev B. Begin, "The Likud Vision for Israel at Peace," Foreign Affairs 70(4), Fall 199 l, pp. 23-24 and Ronni Milo quoted in Jerusalem Post (International), November 11, 1989, p. I.
21 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the intifada, the massive emigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union to Israel and the unrest generated by the Gulf War, convinced Hussein at various times that the Shamir government was on the verge of a mass expulsion of Palestinians which would topple the monarchy.
22 See for example Yitzhak Shamir, "Israel at 40: Looking Back, Looking Ahead," Foreign Affairs 66(3) 1987/1888, p. 576 or Shamir's statements reprinted in FBIS-NES, 27 February 1990, p. 28.
23 See Robert J. Bookmiller, "Approaching the Rubicon: Jordan and the Peace Process," SAIS Review, Summer/Fall 1994, pp. I 09-123.
24 See Shindler, pp. 285-288.
25 Interview with The Star, July 21-26, 1994 reprinted in FBIS-NES, July 21, 1994, p. 32.
26 For other Netanyahu statements to Israeli and Jordanian audiences regarding his belief that the integrity of Jordan and the continuance of a Hashemite monarchy were in Israel's best interests see FBIS-NES September 23, 1994, p. 27 and December 7, 1994, p. 22.
27 Netanyahu's Knesset address, August 3, 1994 reprinted in FBIS-NES August 4, 1994, pp. 28-30.
28 Hassan speech reprinted in FBIS-NES, October 24, 1994, p. 59.
29 See Netanyahu's Knesset speech reprinted in FB/S-NES, October 28, 1994, pp. 29-31.
30 Five of the six abstentions however did come from Likud members. They were Dov Shilansky, Mikhael Eytan, Ron Nahman, Ariel Sharon and Limor Livnat. The latter two are currently the minister of national infrastructures and minister of communications respectively.
31 Qatzav's October 25, 1994 speech reprinted in FBIS-NES October 26, 1994, p.30. He also noted that if Judea and Samaria were given over to the PLO the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan would disappear.
32 See January 27, 1994 Qol Yisrael report in FBIS-NES January 27, 1994, p. 23.
33 Netanyahu's interview with al-Hayah April 6, \996 reprinted in FBIS-NES, April 10, 1996, p. 25. "Hussein's interview with Ma'ariv June 2, 1996 reprinted in FBIS-NES, June 3, 1996, p. 47.
35 Quoted in Middle East International, July 5, 1996, p. 11.
36 See June 23, 1996 report on Jordan Radio reprinted in the BBC's Summary of World Broadcasts - Middle East (hereafter SWB) June 24, 1996, p. 4 and July I, 1996 Ha'aretz article reprinted in SWB July 2, 1996, p. 8.
37 Quoted in Middle East International, October 25, 1996, p. 6.
38 Text of letter reprinted in FBIS-NES, March 14, 1997.
39 See Netanyahu address to Middle East Insight Symposium July 10, 1996 in Middle East insight, VXII (4-5), May-August 1996, p. 35.
40 Netanyahu, A Place Among the Nations, p. 174.
41 Ibid., p. 357.
42 See Begin's plan reprinted in Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough (New York: Alfred A Knopf, Inc., 1981), pp. 359-361.
43 Netanyahu, A Place· Among the Nations, p. 351.
44 Ibid.
45 Interview with The Washington Post, June 15, 1997, p. C2.
46 Netanyahu, A Place Among the Nations, p. 351.
47 Ibid., pp. 352-353.
48 It is also similar to Sharon's 1980 plan which envisioned a half-dozen self-governing Arab enclaves with Israel controlling the territory in between. See FBIS-MEA, September 8, 1980, N3-5. See also "Middle East's Mapmakers Wage the Ultimate Border Skirmish," Wall Street Journal, February 6, 1997, p. A10.
49 Israel's Ambassador to Amman, Oded Eran told the Jordan Times, "Jordan will play a central role when we start the negotiations with our Palestinian partners on the final status negotiations...there will be a need for a very deep, honest and direct dialogue between Israel and Jordan." [June 24, 1997, p. 1].
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