With its vast oil deposits and a Francophone intellectual and ruling elite devoted to reshaping the state along

modern (albeit socialist) lines, decolonized North Africa was seen as one region where secular modernization had the greatest chance of success. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Algeria – the principal state of the region – fulfilled these expectations, as its functioning socialist economy and leadership of Third World causes made it a celebrated state throughout the Middle East and left-wing Western circles. It was a leader in the “Group of 77” and one of the proponents of the New International Economic Order.1 It was casually ignored that Algerians had not discovered the magic formula for making socialism function, but rather relied on oil revenues to mask over the shortcomings of the command economy. In the meantime, the Algerian regime’s draconian practices at home were similarly neglected in favor of the great service that the small North African state was performing in the cause of world revolution. Algeria may have been a country of contradictions and precarious stability, but it was also the Third World model that had to be acclaimed as an alternative to the decadent capitalism exported by the United States.

In the late 1980s, the dream shattered. As oil revenues declined, the governing regime no longer had the funds to subsidize its ideological dogma and was compelled to launch liberalization measures that inevitably provoked political repercussions. As the imported Western models failed to fulfill their promises, an increasingly disillusioned middle class turned to the Islamists and their devastating critique of the prevailing order. However, for the Islamists to succeed, they had to appreciate that their mandate was not the restoration of the mythical seventh century, but reconciliation of demands for cultural authenticity with equally compelling calls for political empowerment. Algeria, the greatest laboratory for this experimentation, is, ironically, the state that appeared to be the foremost model of modernization.2

Although Algeria had long been acclaimed by the Arab salon as the paradigm of secular modernization, the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) coalition that managed the extraordinary feat of besting the French empire greatly relied on religious forces and symbols to mobilize the population behind the cause of independence. Despite the clerical community’s contributions to this cause, the secular leaders of the FLN viewed religion from a utilitarian perspective, sufficient for mass mobilization but inadequate as a template for governance. For the architects of the revolution, Algeria was to spearhead the emerging Third World and usher in a new epoch among the newly independent Afro Arab states.3

In many ways, the story of Algeria unfolded in a manner all too familiar among developing Middle Eastern states. A series of military-led regimes managed for a long time to maintain power, initially through revolutionary legitimacy, later through allocation of resources. During the first two decades of the revolution, the petroleum market and its Western consumers perversely subsidized Algerian socialism.

The poor planning that favored under producing heavy industry, a neglected agricultural sector, and a bloated and corrupt bureaucracy went unnoticed as the petrodollars continued to mask the economy’s deep-seated structural flaws.

By the 1980s, as the oil market experienced a steep decline, the regime suddenly found itself confronted with soaring foreign debt, diminished revenues and a hard pressed populace increasingly disenchanted with the failed promises and pledges of state socialism.4

Ironically, the revolution’s foremost achievement was to prove its primary source of implosion. The expansion of the university system and its peculiar division between fields taught in French and those taught in Arabic provided the Islamists with a rich source of recruits. The Arab language fields of law and literature took a decisive back seat to the French-taught scientific fields in terms of funding and job opportunities. The Arab-language students soon recognized that, despite their newly acquired diplomas, they were consigned to the margins of society by the French speaking elite that dominated the economy. As the marginalized youth began to saturate the market, Algeria experienced the explosive problem of underemployment among recent graduates. In any developing society, by far the most difficult challenge for the state is not managing the poor but controlling an aggrieved intelligentsia whose aspirations remain unfulfilled. It is from this cohort that militants emerge and organize political opposition to the state. The children of the revolution were the first to question their patrimony and the foundation upon which the socialist regime rested.5

The precipitous decline of the Algerian economy in the late 1980s, beginning with the decrease in oil revenues after 1984, not only politicized the restive youth but deepened Algeria’s many cultural, political and social cleavages. The destabilizing gap between the elite and the masses, the cultural tensions between Arabs and Berbers, and the resentment of the traditional sector of society now suddenly became exacerbated. Algeria was about to enter one of the most precarious stages of its modern history.6 

The regime attempted to shore up its position by co-opting the Islamist movement and solidifying its own Islamic credentials. Houari Boumediene, who replaced Ben Bella after deposing him in a coup in 1965, was especially interested in fusing the socialist principles of the regime with the precepts of Islamic law. The Boumediene regime espoused policies that helped the Islamists, including a quiet toleration by the Ministry of Religious Affairs of “radical” preachers in local mosques. Boumediene’s successor, Colonel Chadli Bendjedid (sworn in as president on February 9, 1979, following Boumediene’s death in December 1978), continued this approach. Under his leadership, a new “Family-status Code” was adopted that represented major concessions to the Islamists, especially with regard to the status of women. Chadli also invited a leading Egyptian scholar and preacher, al-Ghazali, to preside over a new Islamic educational institution, the Université Émir Abdelkader des Sciences Islamiques, in 1982. Al-Ghazali helped to legitimize the positions taken by the “radical” imams by issuing a number of fatwas (judicial rulings) favorable to their positions.

The conventional breakdown of the authoritarian state took an innovative departure in the case of Algeria. The opposition came eventually to be dominated by the forces of tradition, as the Islamists not only proved adept at mass mobilization, but offered a vision that seemed compatible with pluralism and political representation. The reality remains that Islamic politics in Algeria differs from that of other Middle Eastern states and can only be properly understood within the context of Algeria’s evolution as a state and its inability to fully reconcile its multiplicity of identities.

THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN ALGERIA

The spectacular rise of Islamism in Algeria may have stunned the Western media, but such activism has deep roots in Algerian society. The Islamic reform movement initially evolved under the shadow of French imperial rule and dedicated itself to harmonizing modernist concepts and Islamic precepts. The Islamic opposition under legendary figures such as Sheik Abd-al Hamid Ben Badis successfully responded to the intellectual challenge of colonialism by insisting that modern political institutions need not be imported but can indigenously evolve. Beyond their political contributions, Algerian Islamists devoted considerable effort to maintaining local identity and preventing the Algerian culture from being completely eclipsed by French norms and mores. This was a moderate expression of local values that made an important imprint on the emerging Algerian identity.7

In the post-independence period, the heady policies of socialism and Third Worldism pursued by the FLN elicited Islamist resistance and at times organized opposition. The most significant group to emerge in the 1960s was Al Qiyam (values), which called for Algeria’s cultural rehabilitation to complement its national autonomy. Under the leadership of Hashemi Tidjani, Ben Badis’s successor, this group successfully lobbied Ahmed Ben Bella to mandate Islamic religious education in public schools. Through its social networks and journal, Maggallot altadhib al-Islamiyya, the association stood firm against a rising tide of secularism. 

The essential blueprint of Islamic politics emerged at this point, as insistence on cultural integrity often led to political expressions inconsistent with the demands of the state.8 This process culminated in the unveiling of “A Charter for an Islamic State” at Algiers University on November 12, 1982. Demonstrations on university campuses led to clashes with police and a number of arrests in the weeks that followed.

Qiyam’s activism was complemented by that of other groups, notably Al-Irshad wa al-Islah, under the leadership of Mahfoudh Nahnah. This group similarly deprecated the leftist proclivities of the regime and the inequities fostered under the banner of socialism. In a departure from the pattern of Islamic dissent, Nahnah focused closely on socioeconomic issues and adversities that the Arab-trained graduates experienced under a state whose leadership remained in the hands of a Francophone elite. Family law, human rights and economic equity accompanied the traditional focus on cultural values. The principal aspect of these countermanded by divine revelation disclosed to a privileged few.10

The interplay of religion and politics in Algeria reveals the complexity of a movement that defies easy characterization. 

Algerian Islamism has deep roots and a long pedigree of resistance, first to French imperialism and later to the authoritarianism fostered by the military regime. Algerian Islamists tried to emphasize the fundamentally religious nature of native resistance to the French, beginning with the call by the religious brotherhoods on July 5, 1830, organizations is that they pressed for evolutionary change, concentrating on incremental reform and continually for a jihad to liberate Algiers. This continued through the War of Independence, during which time the anticolonial forces used propounding the notion that religion and modernity were indeed compatible.9

Along with such moderate expression of Islamism, a radical strand was always present, acclaiming the virtues of violence as a means of fostering social change. The foremost figure of this cohort was Moustafa Bouyali, whose death in 1987 at the hands of the security services neither diminished the zeal of his followers nor the potency of his vision. Bouyali had led the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA), whose militant members always opposed the gradualism of the moderates and dismissed democratic rule as an alien device for Muslim submission. As one of the intellectual architects of this movement, Said Mekhloufi, insisted, “The majority cannot be taken into account when preparing the Islamic state.” A rigid theocracy was the best means of achieving God’s vision; public opinion was to be Islamic rhetoric (terming the struggle a jihad, describing those who fell as martyrs, and so on). Indeed, the Islamists sought to link their program with the true fulfillment of Algerian independence. Abbas Madani, who was to emerge as one of the leaders of the Islamist movement, declared:

The Algerian state of 1962 had nothing to do with what had been projected on the first of November 1954, for which we had taken up arms: an independent state founded on Islamic principles. The state that has risen before our eyes was founded on secular, socialist principles. This was a serious deviation.11

In its long years of struggle, resistance and accommodation, different visions and diverse figures have emerged and competed for power and influence. From local clergy and laymen pressing for cultural and social activism to guerilla leaders calling for armed struggle, Algerian Islamism encompassed a multiplicity of voices. The notion that Islamic expression in Algeria is necessarily violent is belied by a rich history of peaceful activism. At the same time, a violent dimension of Islamism cannot be ignored and viewed as an unavoidable result of state repression.

Whatever its modalities, by the late 1980s, Islamism was to escape its narrow confines and confront the Algerian regime with the most formidable of challenges.

The Rise and Fall of the FIS

The year 1988 proved to be a watershed in Algeria’s modern history. Declining oil prices and the emergence of a global surge toward free markets led the regime to launch a liberalization and deregulation program that entailed the elimination of many social-welfare services and subsidies. The removal of state controls at a time of financial shortfall disproportionately affected the urban working class and the poor. The socially disruptive ramifications of this policy were exacerbated by high inflation and the emergence of an underground economy. The gap between rich and poor continued to grow while official corruption, an endemic feature of Algerian bureaucracy, reached alarming rates. The much-eroded social compact between the revolutionary regime and the populace ruptured with the October 1988 riots throughout Algeria’s urban centers. The brutal suppression of the marches by the military further undermined the legitimacy of a regime that based its power on its historical role as a force for liberation. In the aftermath of the riots, that pillar finally began to crumble.12

The Chadli regime’s response to the enveloping economic and political crisis was the introduction of sweeping political liberalization. Given the failure of its economic policies, the regime perceived that electoral triumphs would resurrect its sagging fortunes and once more buff up its tarnished image. The aging military men, still immured in their revolutionary vision where the army was the great liberator and therefore the legitimate repository of power, failed to note the arrival of a new generation focused on practical achievements.

The political liberalization measures came at a time when mass discontent with the ruling elite reached a fever pitch and was awaiting an avenue for its expression.13

Despite the looming problems, the liberalization policy initially appeared to yield considerable advantage. For the first time in its history, Algeria witnessed a relatively free political atmosphere with a flourishing press, competitive political parties and intense debate on the direction of the state. Hovering over this renaissance was the ominous shadow of persistent economic decline and a restive military hierarchy uneasy about departures from the status quo. Algeria’s liberal interregnum was bound to be short-lived, as the forces of radicalism would soon be plotting to reclaim the political landscape.14

Into this explosive arena stepped the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), determined to compete for political power and even displace the existing ruling system. In order to challenge the nationalistic patrimony of the FLN, the FIS sought to include under its banner the totality of Islamist expression: militants and moderates, clergy and laymen, young and old. The contradictory character of the FIS was best illustrated by its choice of leaders, which included the moderate Abbas Madani and the radical firebrand Ali Belhaj. While Madani pressed for inclusive politics and constructive participation in a pluralistic society, Belhaj denounced democratic order as a sinister tool of the West. The reality remains that the FIS decision to participate in the elections in the first place and accept the limits and restrictions of the electoral process reflected the triumph of the moderate wing. The radicals were present, but so long as the democratic process moved forward, their leadership claims were marginal and largely ignored.15

In line with most opposition parties, the FIS never published a detailed program and limited itself to bland assurances of prosperity and order. In part, this was due to the fact that the FIS had no real mechanism for adopting policies. In theory, the FIS was guided by a majlis al-shura (consultative council). Yet no statutes or regulations for its operation were ever published, and its meetings were held in private at irregular times. It essentially brought together the different factions and groups that comprised the FIS, but there was no way to streamline or institutionalize its operations.

Concerning the economy, the FIS program advocated a vibrant private sector coexisting with enhanced social-welfare provisions. Traditional Algerian themes of independence, self-sufficiency and autonomy from Western imperialism constituted the hallmark of FIS rhetoric. The FIS soon declared, “Whether we production or consumption, we must proceed with investment in order to alleviate poverty and in order to find objectives for the promotion of man.” The great macroeconomic challenges facing Algeria in a global economy remained largely unaddressed by the FIS. Although such opacity is the prerogative of opposition parties, in the case of the FIS it stemmed from internal contradictions and an inability to craft a consensus on a detailed economic blueprint.16

While the FIS economic platform was discursive, its political proclamations seemed outright contradictory. Madani continued to assert his intention to accept the rules of democracy and deprecated the  proceed with  notion that FIS sought to superimpose a theocratic ideology on Algeria. As the principal FIS leader, Madani made his democratic commitments clear: “Pluralism is a guarantee of the cultural wealth and diversity needed for development. Democracy, as we understand it, means pluralism, choice and freedom.”17 A survey of Islamist publications such as El Forkane and El Mungidh reveals a surprising injection of democratic discourse, with power rotation and pluralism continually invoked as guiding principles.18

At the same time that important elements of FIS appeared to accommodate democratic norms, another segment remained defiant in its denunciation of such heretical thoughts. Belhaj led the charge against pluralism or any governing framework that detracted from the religious mission of the state. “When we are in power there will be no more elections because God will be ruling,” professed Belhaj.19 Democracy was seen as an insidious foreign innovation that would subvert the divine order. Belhaj and his followers were vociferous in their condemnation of democratic rule as a contrived Western instrument for undermining the cohesion of the umma. It was blasphemy to suggest that God’s will (as revealed and interpreted) should submit to the popular will in the governance of the country. The most that the radicals would concede was that elections might prove to be the instrument by which Islamists could come to power in Algeria. The task at hand for the Algerian leaders, therefore, was to ensure the ascendance of the moderates and the continued marginalization of the radicals.20

In a sense, the unity of the FIS was always precarious, as it rested on an alliance of disparate forces. The main constituents of the FIS were small merchants, civil servants and first-generation college graduates. All these groups struggled with diminishing economic fortunes, loss of cultural identity and rampant corruption. These elders of the FIS sought an accountable government and greater representation in the context of cultural continuity. However, this element of the FIS always had an uneasy relationship with the other wing of the party, which was primarily composed of desperate young men suffering from escalating unemployment. The claims of these disillusioned youth were more immediate and their patience was always more limited. The task of the authorities was to ensure that the leadership of the FIS rested with the moderates and that their tempering influence on the firebrands remained intact. This was the task that the regime utterly failed to perform.21