The following is the executive summary of a September 2002 joint policy paper by the Atlantic Council of the United States (ACUS) and the German Marshall Fund of the United States, with an updated introduction by Christopher Makins, president of ACUS.
INTRODUCTION
The report, Elusive Partnership: U.S. and European Policies in the Near East and the Gulf, was coauthored by seven recognized U.S. experts on Middle East and transatlantic issues and published by the Atlantic Council of the United States and the German Marshall Fund of the United States in September 2002. The authors were Rita Hauser, J. Robinson West, Marc C. Ginsberg, Geoffrey Kemp, Craig Kennedy, Christopher J. Makins and James Steinberg. The report was substantially based on a series of in-depth discussions with European governmental and nongovernmental leaders in mid-July that were intended to explore the possibilities for more cooperative and complementary policies among the transatlantic countries.
Since the report was published there have been important changes both in U.S. and European policies and in the situation in the region. On the Israeli-Palestinian issue, the United States has recently offered a road map that responds in some measure to the report’s call for a comprehensive U.S. approach to the issue, although recent developments in both Israel and the West Bank have made the political prospects, notably in terms of Palestinian reform, even more uncertain. On Iraq, the United States committed itself on September 12 to pursuing a path of action through the United Nations, as called for in the report. However, the course of the German election campaign and the prolonged French opposition to the approach advocated by the United States in the Security Council have made the common European policy urged in the report as a basis for closer transatlantic cooperation illusory, at least for the foreseeable future.
On other issues, the prospects for the report’s recommendations are less clear. On Iran, the European Union is pursuing its conditional engagement policy, and there have been indications that the U.S. administration recognizes that in the event of a military action in Iraq it will need both to understand and to take greater account of Iranian interests in the future security of the region. In terms of broader regional development, the U.N. Arab Human Development Report, around which the recommendations in Elusive Partnership are built, is evidently being intensively studied as a possible basis for international action.
But the crux of the report’s recommendations – the need for a more intensive dialogue across the Atlantic on the problems of the region – remains as urgent as ever. The tensions that have developed among the United States, France and Germany on these issues and the separate course adopted by Britain leave the transatlantic partners as far away as ever from the concerted or at least complementary approaches that would, in the report’s view, best serve their purposes. While the obstacles may in some ways be greater now than in the past, the recommendation that all concerned look for ways to intensify and deepen their dialogue remains as crucial as it was in early September.
THE BROADER CONTEXT
The current transatlantic relationship as it concerns the Middle East can only be understood in a broader context.
The History of U.S.-European Relations on the Middle East. The affairs of the Middle East have been uniquely contentious between the principal European countries and the United States for over 50 years. This has derived primarily from differing approaches to the Arab-Israel problem. The 1990s were an unusual and short-lived interlude in this history of differences. The recent emergence of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union and a growing awareness of a broader common European interest in the region based on history, proximity, trade, migration and the changing role of Islam, have prompted the European Union to engage increasingly in the region and to seek a position as a true partner for the United States and not just as "a wallet."
Europe and the Bush Administration. Many difficulties arose between the new U.S. administration and European governments in 2001. Some of these issues have receded. But many Europeans have continued to criticize what they see as the new administration’s unilateralist approach to international affairs that does not view the Atlantic Alliance as central to U.S. interests.
The Aftermath of 9/11. The terrorist attacks of September 11 and their aftermath have complicated the transatlantic dialogue, notably by intensifying some negative perceptions on both sides of the ocean.
This background has created a premium on clarity, frankness and timeliness in the intergovernmental dialogue and consultation on current Middle East issues that has not always been achieved.
EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE PROBLEMS OFTHE MIDDLE EAST
The Israeli-Palestinian Question. Many Europeans support the goals of President Bush’s speech on June 24, 2002. Unlike the U.S. government, they believe that progress must be sought along several tracks simultaneously: the reform of the Palestinian Authority, security issues, the negotiation of a political settlement and humanitarian relief in the West Bank and Gaza. European officials are more than willing to try to thread their way through the minefield of political obstacles – several of them, as they see it, of U.S. creation – towards these goals. But they believe this will require a more continuous and extensive U.S. commitment. Moreover they are concerned about some worst case scenarios that could result from the actions of extremists on both sides and the possibility that these could spell the end of the political road mapped by Security Council Resolution 242. They fear that this could lead to a serious transatlantic rift. Europeans see every reason not to depart from that road on the grounds that doing so would likely lead to less stability on one side or the other. To the extent that the new U.S. policy is intended to impart momentum to these familiar objectives, they are willing to support it. But many are apprehensive that the administration has either not fully thought through the implications of its statements or, worse, decided not to intervene decisively to prevent the idea of a two state settlement being progressively eroded and destroyed.
Iraq. There is broad transatlantic agreement that Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq represents a real threat to the allies because of its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs. But there is less agreement on how to deal with this. Europeans typically raise several questions: how urgent is the problem; whether Saddam Hussein can be contained; the grounds for an eventual military attack on Iraq; the issue of the mandate for action; the need to press for new UN inspections as a first step and the idea of posing a credible threat of force to back up the demand for inspections; possible European participation in a military action; the post-Saddam scenario and the challenge of building a stable and better Iraq; the Iranian connection; the problem of oil; and the linkage to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Europeans do not have confidence in the Bush administration’s approach to the diplomatic and political context for its Iraq policy or the worldview that underlies it. In view of mutual mistrust on these issues, the outlook, at best, is for a host of transatlantic frictions and tactical disagreements in the coming months.
Iran. The European assessment of the situation in Iran is similar to that of the United States, although the conclusions drawn from it are considerably different. Europeans generally believe that the West has no choice but to work to strengthen the moderate nationalists in Iran and that the weakening of the clerical forces is unstoppable. They see Iranian foreign and defense policy as a mixed bag – very negative in its support for terrorism and for WMD programs, but positive in relation to Afghanistan. Europeans see Iran as concerned about encirclement by the United States and most believe that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons can still be headed off. While Europeans continue to believe that engagement is critical, they now accept that it must be conditional. But it is uncertain how strong their conditions will be. Europeans generally see the United States as being on the wrong tack on Iran. The transatlantic divergence on Iran is probably greater at present than on any other regional issue, especially since the U.S. policy statement on July 12, 2002.
The Directions and Dynamics of the Middle East. Both Europeans and Americans see the flashpoints of the Middle East against a background of a region in acute distress. The Arab Human Development Report, published by the UN Development Program, represents a major effort by Arabs to propose approaches to dealing with this situation. But Europeans are not sure that it will acquire political traction in the region and do not have clear ideas about how this can be encouraged. They are especially concerned about the mixed signals that the United States is sending to the region, notably on the issue of democratic reform.
On Egypt, ideas for the resolution of the difficulties that Egypt faces, at least among Europeans, are few. Many Europeans are, however, quite critical of the United States for sending the wrong signals to Egypt, notably by appearing to prefer stability to change there.
On Saudi Arabia, Europeans are concerned about the trend of events, although few believe that the regime is seriously threatened in the near future. They fear that needed domestic reforms may prove politically impossible. Internationally, they are concerned that Saudi leaders may believe that the United States has espoused a new policy for the region in which Saudi Arabia no longer plays the central role. The vulnerability of Jordan is seen as the most critical situation.
European experts believe that the West needs to encourage a polycentric Middle East in which countries progress along the path of reform and economic development more rapidly and under more pluralistic political and economic institutions, as Islamism wanes. Failure to make progress towards resolving the Israeli-Palestinian problem is seen in Europe as a malignant influence on the region’s prospects.
Obstacles to Transatlantic Cooperation. There has been a serious failure of consultation across the Atlantic on the Middle East. This has been due to several factors: divisions among Europeans and within the U.S. administration; a European concern not to put the transatlantic relationship at risk at a time of great U.S. sensitivity; a European fear of becoming embroiled in U.S. policies with which they do not fully agree; a lack of good new ideas; and a U.S. sense that European governments will have little choice but to follow the U.S. lead on major policy decisions. Many Europeans are at pains to say that government-to-government relations are working well at present. But their concerns about U.S. policy are substantial.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions
The United States and the countries of Western Europe all have extensive and legitimate interests in the Middle East and will, and should, have active policies relating to the Middle East and its problems. Those interests overlap in many respects, but they are not identical and the differences of interest are likely to engender differences of policy approach on some key questions. The United States is more extensively engaged and in many ways has more at stake in the region than European countries. But European governments dispose of substantial assets, financial and human, in support of their policy which, if they were in the service of common or complementary policies among the allies, could be even more productively expended. European governments also have expertise and intelligence capabilities on the Middle East that can be of value to the formulation and implementation of sound U.S. as well as European policy.
The key problems in the Middle East cannot be resolved without close U.S.-European cooperation. There may be some U.S. policy goals – notably those requiring only the use of military force – that the United States can pursue and implement successfully without the support or participation – and indeed if necessary, against the opposition – of European countries. But this is not true of most of the major elements of U.S. policy, notably the successful achievement of regime change in Iraq. And, as in Afghanistan, the United States almost certainly does not have either the desire or the political will to see these problems through to successful resolution alone. U.S. public opinion consistently shows a strong preference for the United States to act internationally in concert with its allies and friends. For most purposes, European governments are the logical choices as the U.S. partners.
Transatlantic disagreements on Middle East policy are more about timing, approach and priority than about the goals of policy. (Arguably this is not true of Iran, although it is not clear that even there U.S. and European policies differ in their objectives.) That does not mean that the differences are minor or easy to bridge. Nevertheless, agreement on the acceptable political resolutions of the principal disputes provides a foundation on which to build compatible policies.
If Europe and the United States can present a unified front on key Middle East issues, the chances of success in achieving their goals are considerably increased.
Middle East issues can no longer, if they ever could, be divorced from other aspects of the transatlantic relationship. Neither side can expect that a failure to cooperate on Middle East issues will be without consequences in other areas of policy.
The transatlantic allies must therefore make a substantially greater effort to manage their relations on these important issues better. There is an urgent need to intensify and make more routine the systematic search for common or at least complementary policies.
Recommendations
Several actions on both sides of the ocean could help achieve this goal.
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- On the U.S. side, there is a strong case even in U.S. interests for the president to strengthen his Middle East team, possibly by the addition of a special representative of the President and the Secretary of State for the Middle East as a whole, and to resolve the divergent approaches of the agencies principally involved into an agreed line of policy that can be pursued consistently. European governments would much prefer to deal with a unified and consolidated U.S. policy even if there were aspects of it with which they disagreed, than to face ambiguities and confusion in Washington.
- On the European side, the principal governments need to harmonize their approaches more and to work together in their dialogue with the United States to seek complementary U.S. and European policies. If the major European governments could operate even more by consensus and through a single institutional agency, if not necessarily through a single individual, their impact would be substantially greater. This is, no doubt, a counsel of perfection given the difficulties of making rapid progress towards a common foreign policy. Nevertheless, European governments should have an incentive to act more in harmony towards the region unless they wish to continue in the unsatisfying role of reluctant adjutants to U.S. policy.
- For both sides there would be advantage in the creation of a new high level contact group or consultative forum for the Middle East. This forum, which could be based on, but would need to supplement and possibly expand, the existing Quartet, could be the umbrella under which to achieve common political and intelligence assessments of the region and the threats it poses and to reach an understanding about some worst case possibilities and possible responses to averting or, if necessary, managing them.
A more intensive government-to-government dialogue must be accompanied by a greater effort on both sides to explain their policies publicly to the elites and public opinion of the other. Two areas are important:
Threat analysis. The United States must do a better job of explaining to European parliaments and publics the nature of the threats and why, in the long run, they are just as much threats to Europe as to the United States. Such an effective campaign may require going public with sensitive intelligence information.
- Political realities. European governments should be more assertive and proactive in Washington in explaining European concerns. Some of the key factors that shape European policy towards the region are little understood in Washington, either in the Congress or in the general public. Europeans have done a poor job of explaining EU policy towards Iran, in particular. The details of the proposed trade and cooperation agreement are not well understood in Washington. This may not convince U.S. skeptics that the EU will truly employ strict and serious conditionality towards Iranian behavior, but explaining it will go a long way to tone down the harsh, sometimes strident, comments that greeted its announcement in the United States.
On the substance of the principal issues addressed in the report:
- The Israeli-Palestinian Question. The U.S. government should commit and stick to a process in which the different components of its policy – the ‘reform,’ security, humanitarian, and the political settlement tracks – are pursued in parallel, with clear milestones and benchmarks for each track to be met by both the Palestinians and the Israelis. This elaboration of the president’s June speech, if constructed in consultation with European governments and based on a set of actions that took account of the interests of both sides, should be a program which European governments could undertake to support. It could become the basis for a clear and agreed division of labor between the United States and European governments. It should also be a basis on which the United States and the allies could jointly solicit the support and engagement of other governments in the region. If the humanitarian situation in the Palestinian areas further deteriorates, the allies should give high priority to contributing to a strong and swift international response.
- Iraq. The U.S. government should make every effort, through the UN Secretary General and the Security Council, to launch the UNMOVIC inspection process in an attempt to bring Iraq into demonstrated compliance with its obligations on WMD and, if that should fail, establishing the legitimacy of a recourse to military force. The White House should make plain that actions or statements that cast doubt on the U.S. commitment to this effort, such as recent statements by some senior officials, do not represent U.S. policy. European governments should, after consultation with the United States on the precise way in which the UN processes would be carried through, including reasonable timetables and milestones for progress, commit publicly to supporting the use of military force to resolve the question of Iraqi non-compliance if the UN inspection process is not successful in doing so. The U.S. and major European governments should also immediately embark on a confidential, intensive dialogue about the options for a post-Saddam political scenario in Iraq, the requirements for an international force to manage the process, and their respective contributions to building a stable new political situation in Iraq.
- Iran. The U.S. government should, within the parameters of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and the strength of Congressional support for it, move back towards a policy of careful and conditional engagement with Iran and encourage the EU to continue on its current approach, with close U.S.-European cooperation on intelligence assessments on the evolution of Iranian policies towards WMD, human rights and support for terrorism.
- Regional Development. The United States and the EU should jointly develop a strategy to support the implementation of policies based on the Arab Human Development Report in all the major countries of the region. This strategy could usefully emphasize, in line with the report’s conclusions, the issue of good governance and the damage that corruption is doing to the interests of both the countries in the region, (not least Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia), and the West. This should involve discussions with the Saudis and Egyptians, in particular. The goal should be to move the assistance and other policies of both the United States and European governments towards explicitly supporting the priorities of the report and regional governments which move towards its implementation.
Finally, there is an urgent need on both sides of the Atlantic to ensure that the different components of Middle East policy fit together into a coherent whole in terms of both substance and timing. There has been much discussion on the question of ‘Jerusalem first or Baghdad first?’ The reality is that both sets of problems will have to be pursued simultaneously, with neither receiving priority. Allied governments should, by means of the proposed enhanced consultative process, assess and understand as best can be done the likely interactions, for good or ill, of the different possible sequences of action and undertake contingency planning related to these interactions.
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