The Arab Spring of 2011, as many analysts termed it, led to renewed interest in democratization studies. The popular protests toppled governments and forced long-entrenched autocrats out of office in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. The uprisings caught many political analysts by surprise, as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region was long considered resistant to democratic change, an exception in terms of democratic transitions. Nine years in retrospect, the initial euphoria surrounding the potential for democratic governance in the MENA has faded away as autocratic governments regained power and cracked down on civil liberties. Worse still, the region is plagued by political chaos, instability, civil wars and violence perpetrated by various state and nonstate actors.Today, with the exception of Tunisia, the Arab Spring has given way to a longstanding Arab winter.

Tunisia and Egypt were the two countries that inspired optimism given their promising steps towards democracy soon after authoritarian breakdowns. The two have many features in common: relatively homogenous populations, similar former regimes and origins of their uprisings, the decisions by their armed forces ultimately to side with the protesters, the electoral victories of Islamist parties in the first free elections, and the ideological polarization between Islamists and secularists that plagued their constitutional-drafting processes in 2012–13. However, their transitions ended in markedly different outcomes. While Tunisia is a beacon of hope in the entire region, Egypt reverted to military-bureaucratic tutelage. This divergence raises an important question: Why did these two transitions turn out so differently?

The new political elites faced the arduous task of designing a transition process: the sequencing of elections and basic laws, the timing of elections, the drafting of an electoral law and — perhaps most importantly — reaching consensus on how to establish a constituent assembly and craft a constitution. How a transition is designed and decisions are taken by an interim government might either allow for a smooth transition to democracy or endanger it at its outset. A comparison of the divergent experiences of Tunisia and Egypt illustrates how strategic decisions in the initial phase guided the transitions. This article investigates three decisive aspects of the post-2011 transitions in Tunisia and Egypt: the sequencing of elections and the constitution, the electoral law, and the constitutional-drafting process.

SEQUENCING OF ELECTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION

When an authoritarian regime falls, the central focus turns to elections and the granting of power to an authority that is accountable to the people. The elected government holds the legitimacy to guide a transition toward democracy: to implement broad reforms and draft a constitution to address grievances, allow space for individual freedom and provide justice. On the other hand, it could opt for moving the country toward another form of authoritarianism, be it ideological, military or religious, restricting personal freedom and working for partisan interests. Thus, giving precedence to elections has far-reaching consequences. In countries like Tunisia and Egypt, strategic choices surround electoral processes and constitution drafting, as they either allow or rule out eliminating the legacy embedded in existing authoritarian structures.