Qatar1 is leading the way in political experiments not seen before in the Arab states that compose the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).2 These countries are known for their oil wealth, religious conservatism and traditional political institutions, which concentrate political power in the hands of the rulers and their families. Thus far, except for Kuwait, there has been little direct participation by their populations in institutional structures. Qatar is changing this situation.
On June 27, 1995, the new emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa AI-Thani, assumed power from his father, Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani, in a bloodless palace coup while the latter was traveling in Switzerland.3
Almost immediately, the young emir started a series of reforms. If they continue and prove successful, they are bound to change the political life of his country and have an impact on the other GCC states. Many Middle East observers are asking themselves what a generational change in rulers will mean for the Gulf. Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad may be providing some answers. This article will explore the emir's new reforms, the influence they may have on the Qatari state and society, and how they could influence events in the rest of the GCC.
Emir Hamad is 49 years old, making him the first of the young generation of rulers in the GCC. (He has since been joined by Sheikh Hamad Al Khalifa of Bahrain, also 49, who assumed power in March 1999.) According to many observers, he may be considered the avant-garde of the new generation of rulers likely to take over in the Gulf in the next decade or two. Even before officially becoming ruler of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad was known for his efforts at reform, particularly in reducing the privileges of the ruling family and senior officials.
Almost immediately after becoming ruler, the new emir abolished the Ministry of Information, indicating that this decision was meant to convey abolition of government censorship of the press. Then, in November 1995, the emir surprised almost everyone in his country and the rest of the Gulf by announcing his intention to hold general elections for membership in the Central Municipal council. All Qatari males over the age of 18 would be eligible to vote for the 29 members that compose the Council, an advisory body attached to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Agriculture that oversees the work of the nine municipalities in the country.
This is not Qatar's first experiment in voting for a Municipal Council. In the summer of 1963, prompted by popular Arab-nationalist unrest, Qataris demanded political and social reforms. The sheikh of Qatar, Ahmad Bin Ali, made some concessions to the merchants leading the protest. Among their demands was a Municipal Council elected by all Qatari males. The council came into being that summer and lasted three to four years.
However, in contrast to the current election, the Qatari government scarcely announced the event and gave it no public attention. It appears to have faded from view without any noticeable impact on Qatar's public awareness.4
The announcement of the emir's decision on the election left ambiguous whether women would be allowed to participate. To erase that ambiguity, on June 13, 1997, the emir was asked, in an interview with CNN, whether women in Qatar would be able to vote. He replied, cautiously, that he was not sure, indicating that female suffrage was under discussion. But he also said that he hoped women would be ready to vote and that he saw nothing wrong in their voting. It is not clear whether, at that point, the emir had reached a decision on the women's vote or whether he was merely floating a trial balloon.
In the months that followed, the ruler decided not only that women should be able to vote, but that they should also be able to run as candidates for seats in the Municipal Council. The government set the date of March 8, 1999, for the election of the Central Municipal Council.
In the June 13, 1997, CNN interview, the emir was also asked whether Qatar would have an elected "majlis" (parliament). Again, the emir was cautious, saying that it might take some time before there would be an elected parliament in his country, but that Qatar would start with municipal elections and see how they went. Going further might take some years.
Less than a year and a half later, the emir did go further. On November 16, 1998, in an announcement that surprised most people, he decided to amend the temporary constitution of Qatar, adopted on April 19, 1972, shortly after independence (September 1971), and to establish a permanent constitution.5 "It is time," he said, "to develop our constitutional system in line with the evolution in the country, conforming to the needs of Qatari society, its customs and traditions."6 Consequently, the emir announced that Qatar planned to have an elected parliament to be chosen by direct popular vote.
The emir's decision to establish a parliament elected by all Qataris, men and women on an equal basis without any restrictions, is probably the single most important event in the history of the country since its independence in 1971. It is also the first time that a GCC country has introduced the modem concept of democracy: general elections based on one "person," one vote. The idea has already had an impact on Kuwait, the only Gulf state with an elected parliament, the majlis al-umma, elected by male suffrage only. Shortly after the Qatari municipal election on May 16, 1999, Kuwaiti women were given the right to vote and run for parliament, starting with the election of 2003.
The other GCC countries, with the partial exception of Oman, have nonelected "advisory consultative councils," with no real power to legislate and exercise control over governments. The members of these councils are appointed by the rulers. In the Sultanate of Oman, both men and women are allowed to vote and sit in their country's parliament, but, in the end, it is the sultan who chooses members from among a pool of elected men and women. Until now, Qatar also fit this mold. The Qatari Advisory Council is the country's only political body. Its members are appointed by the emir and empowered to debate legislation and issue recommendations. The Council has 35 members, each appointed for four years.
The emir's speech generated intense intellectual interest among the Qataris and led to a lively debate in the media on the meaning of democracy and the democratic process. The Qatari press has allocated pages to discussion on "What is Democracy?" and how democracy can be applied to all aspects of life. In addition, seminars have been held and lectures given to explain to the general public the concept behind popular participation in government through elections. This is the first time in any GCC country that such an activity has taken place with the toleration, even encouragement, of the government.
Moreover, government ministers and other public officials have taken the initiative and begun to replace, where possible, appointed bodies by elected ones in the councils attached to their ministries. The prevailing fever for democracy is so strong that the period has been dubbed "the democracy festival" (Ayd aldimukratiyyah). The first significant election to demonstrate the new spirit was that of the powerful Board of the Qatar Chamber of Commerce. The elections for that Board took place in April 1998, when some 3,700 Qatari businessmen voted in a secret ballot to elect the 17 members of the Board. Until that date, members had been appointed by the emir, based on a recommendation by the minister of finance and economy.
The ideas of democracy are even flourishing in the schools and institutions of higher education. In December 1998, the deputy assistant minister of education and higher education, a woman, issued a statement announcing that "in accordance with the orientation of His Highness, the Emir bin Khalifa AI-Thani," she would apply the democratic process in all aspects and at all levels of her ministry. She is beginning with elected student bodies, in the form of student unions, in all schools, to enable students to begin practicing democracy at their level.7 Until now, few people in Qatar dreamed of involving students in any kind of representative bodies for fear that such activities could thrust young people into politics.
With the rise of the democratic tide, Qataris also began to discover some of the "problems" associated with elections, notably election fraud. In November 1998, the first case of electoral fraud was registered when the Ministry of Finance and Economy canceled the elections to the board of the al-Muntazah Consumer Association after it was discovered that the number of ballots cast was higher than the number of voters by some 100 votes. The ministry then called for new elections.8
While debating the nature of their prospective new majlis, Qatari writers have made it clear that they are not aiming at a Western-style parliament with unlimited legislative powers. Abdul Qadir al-Emiri, a noted Qatari writer, has explained these views. “We should take the advantages of democracy but abandon its disadvantages. We, the Muslims, should borrow from democracy what is in accord with Islam and reject what does not agree with Islam.”9 Situating the new democracy in the "framework of Islam" appears to represent the majority view of what Qataris want.
THE NEW ROLE OF QATARI WOMEN
The new "democratic order" in Qatar is giving Qatari women rights they have never enjoyed before, while at the same time putting them at the forefront of female progress in the GCC. Kuwaiti women are not far behind, but their right to vote must be ratified by the Kuwaiti parliament to be elected in July 1999. This new status, it should be noted, is built on a firm foundation. Women in Qatar have already achieved a number of high-level government positions, such as deputy assistant minister. They are allowed to travel and study abroad by themselves and, although they are segregated in Qatar at all levels of education including the university, university women receive official recognition for their publications and scholastic achievements. The Department of Sociology at Qatar University, for example, is headed by a woman, Dr. Juhaina Sultan al-Isa, who was the education counselor for University of Qatar Affairs at the Qatari embassy in Washington in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Nonetheless, allowing women to vote, to be candidates, and to hold public office in the new Municipal Council and the projected parliament, has opened unprecedented new horizons for Qatari women in fields that were heretofore the sole prerogative of men. Women in Qatar have enthusiastically welcomed their new found rights. By midnight on October 17, 1998, the deadline for registration of candidacy for the Municipal Council election, there were 280 candidates, including eight women. The number of women who registered as voters was high, some 45 percent of the eligible population. This is a percentage that compares favorably with similar numbers in many developing countries.10
The new transition for Qatari women has been greatly facilitated by the help and support of Princess (Sheikha) Mozza bin Nasser al-Misnid, the wife of the new emir. A commoner, Princess Mozza has a university degree and is reported to speak three foreign languages: English, French and Spanish.11
Contrary to her counterparts in other GCC countries, where the rulers' wives rarely show themselves in public, Princess Mozza is very active in the public life of the country. She was recently appointed by her husband to be head of the Higher Council for Family Affairs, and she often gives speeches on public occasions, such as the graduation ceremony for female students at the University of Qatar. In December 1998, she led a two-hour, all female march through the streets of Doha in support of a local charity, the first event of its kind, not only in Qatar but in the whole region. She is, for all practical purposes, assuming a Qatari version of the role of "First Lady." This was exemplified in December 1998, when she traveled to the United States and visited several institutions, including Yale and the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. At the latter institution, she attended an official dinner arranged in her honor by the president of the University and the Board of Trustees and gave a speech appropriate to the occasion. As far as is known, this is the first time that the wife of any GCC ruler has undertaken such activities.
Princess Mazza is not the only female member of the ruling family playing a role in changing the status of women in Qatari society. The emir also named his sister, Princess Aisah, to be head of the Women's Information Committee, an organization devoted to encouraging women to participate in the election for the Central Municipal Council and teaching them the virtues of democracy. The committee has organized seminars, published pamphlets and directed press campaigns, not only on the role of women in elections, but also on constitutional and human rights.
The eight women who registered as candidates for the Council showed the diversity of female participation. They included a civil servant, an employee of the Qatari TV and Radio Station, the director of a nursing high school, a psychiatrist, and the head of the Women's Section of the Qatari Red Crescent Organization, the Muslim equivalent of the Red Cross. On March 8, 1999, however, many candidates dropped out, bringing the number of those running for election to 227, including six women.
These women candidates, along with their male colleagues, were quite aware of the importance of the event and the significance of their participation in it. In describing their motives for running, patriotic sentiment was most frequently cited. Some said that they were doing it to serve their country, others that it was a "historic event" for all women in Qatar.
They also exhibited a remarkable self-assurance, claiming that they were not afraid to compete with men for public office for the first time in the history of the country. One of them, Dr. Mazza al Malaki, when asked how she felt about her competition, replied: “This competition with men does not concern me; all the voters are happy with me and they are going to elect me to represent them in the Council.”12 But Dr. al-Malaki's ambitions are not confined to a seat in the Municipal Council; she is aiming higher, at becoming a deputy in the projected parliament. “My election to the Municipal Council,” she proclaimed, “is only a step to the coming Qatari Majlis, as the Majlis will realize further aspirations. The Municipal Council deals only with small and local aspirations.”13
During the few weeks preceding the election, the candidates mounted real electoral campaigns, complete with campaign managers, a staff and electoral programs, for the first time in their country's history. The programs were generally "apolitical," dealing with local issues such as road building, family life, and improvement of public health and the environment.
The elections themselves took place, as scheduled, on February 8, 1999, without any noted incidents. Registered voters totaled around 22,225 with women comprising about 45 percent of the total. Women cast their ballots in places separate from men. Voting participation was extraordinarily heavy, with a turnout of about 95 percent of registered voters in Doha and 75 percent in the rest of the country.
The election results produced a number of surprises for the country and the rest of the Gulf. None of the female candidates won a seat in the Municipal Council, proving - if proof be needed - that Qatar remains a traditional society that is uneasy at the prospect of placing women in high positions, even in local politics. The female candidates themselves echoed this conclusion. One of them, Dr. Mazza al-Maliki, voiced deep bitterness, claiming the election results showed that Qatar remains "a male-dominated society to the bone," where husbands dictate to their wives how they should vote.14 However, almost all the female candidates claimed that they were not discouraged by the vote and that they would post their candidacy in the next municipal election four years hence or in the election for the as-yet-to-be-established parliament.15
The winners in the Council election were mostly young government workers and businessmen, indicating the coming of age of a new class: technocrats and professionals. It may well be a class on which the new-generation emir can rely for support in moving Qatar along into the twenty-first century. It may be equally significant that the election brought failure to two noted Qatari political figures. One was Najib Muhammad al-Rubai, a former minister of justice, who was not only expected to win but to head the new Municipal Council. The other was Muhammad Salih al-Kawari, a former opposition figure. Their failure is believed to be due to the "political tone" of their campaigns, indicating a hesitation to open the Pandora's box of real political dynamics. Voters appear to have cast their ballots in traditional fashion, either on the basis of personal preference or practical programs or of family, clan and tribal ties. The strength of tribal allegiance was shown by the election of four members (out of 29) who all belong to the al-Murrah tribe.
One of the most significant aspects of this new phenomenon of the involvement of women in elections and the public-policy process is the changing attitudes of families and relatives of the women involved. Their views probably reflect those of society as a whole. The Qatari media have welcomed the participation of women in politics, whether as voters or candidates. Women running for office, when asked about the attitudes of their families toward what they were doing, were full of praise for the support they were getting on the home front. By contrast, when Saudi Arabia allowed the opening of all female branches of banks in 1980, the Saudi media was divided between supporters and opponents, and there were even Saudi women who criticized the idea of working women.
These factors, together with the support of the ruler, his wife and his sister, have changed the whole atmosphere in Qatar toward participation of women in elections. Islamic groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood of Qatar, have taken a position in favor of this participation. Mamun al-Hudaibi, the official spokesman for the group, expressed his full support for the idea of partnership between men and women in their quest to serve the homeland. “There is nothing in Islam that prevents women from participating in the elections and being a member of parliament; thus there is a role for women in all aspects of life, side by side with men.”16 These winds of change have already started to influence the rest of the Gulf, as the Kuwaiti example shows, and will probably spread further.
DEMOLISHING THE WALLS OF CENSORSHIP
One of the most striking examples of the new era of freedoms in Qatar is al-Jazira, Qatar's now famous Satellite TV channel. This station began its programs in 1996 as an independent TV channel owned by private capital. It is now testing the limits of media openness to an extent never seen or heard before in any Arab country, except perhaps Lebanon in its heyday.
Al-Jazira can be seen and heard in all Arab countries and Europe. The station has introduced daring and provocative programs and news bulletins unknown before in the Arab world. These include direct broadcasting from "hot spots" around the world and criticism of Arab rulers and governments and their internal and external policies. Chief among these "ground-breaking" innovations is the popular program, "The Opposite Direction" (al-Ittijah al-Muaks), a “talk and call-in show” anchored by Dr. Faysal al-Qasim. The two-hour weekly program brings together Arab journalists, opposition figures, intellectuals and politicians, both male and female, to engage in lively, even stormy, debates on topics of the day. The show takes direct telephone questions and comments from listeners throughout the Arab world and abroad. Debates range widely on topics from the failures of Arab politicians and policies and the lack of freedoms in the Arab world, to the necessity for changes in Islamic law to accommodate women's rights.
On several occasions, al-Jazira has caused real diplomatic crises between Qatar and other Arab countries, such as Bahrain, Egypt and Jordan. They have responded in some cases by verbal or media attacks on Qatar and by closing the station's offices in their countries. Al-Jazira's ultimate goal is to become the "Arab CNN," expanding its network to cover the world on a continuous 24-hour basis. Al-Jazira enjoys the unlimited protection of the Qatari government because it accepts one de facto limitation on its freedom: it does not criticize the Qatari government in any way.
THE FUTURE IN PERSPECTIVE
Almost everyone in the Gulf is following events in Qatar very closely, assessing their potential impact on the rest of the GCC. Interest is particularly high in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar are "Wahhabi" in orientation, followers of the conservative religious precepts of the eighteenth century religious scholar, Muhammad ibn al-Wahhab. But Qataris are more relaxed than Saudis about applying the traditional conservative Islamic codes of law. The emir's reforms, especially those improving women's rights and introducing an elected parliament, are sure to displease influential Saudi ulama (religious scholars). For years, the shadow of Saudi Arabia has hung over Qatar's internal and external policies. Thus far, both Saudi officials and its media have been silent on the changes taking place, especially the move toward elections and a change in the constitution. In this case, silence is a sure sign of displeasure. Nevertheless, on at least one occasion, the Qatari media came very close to accusing the Saudis of financing a press campaign aimed at undermining the changes taking place in Qatar. In November and December 1998, al-Zaman, a new Arabic daily published in London, printed articles attacking the reforms in Qatar as superficial and unrealistic. It challenged Qatar to allow the newspaper (including the anti-Qatar articles) to be distributed in Qatar. Al-Sharq, the Qatari daily newspaper, responded by publishing articles that accused an unnamed country (presumably Saudi Arabia) of financing these attacks. It also published documents showing how the Qatari censorship office at Doha Airport had allowed al-Zaman to be sold in Qatar, thereby revealing that there is still some sort of censorship in the country aimed at sifting through incoming foreign press.
The other Gulf country most concerned with the Qatari "democratic experience" is Bahrain. Bahrain had a short-lived experiment in parliamentary life between 1971 and 1975 that ended abruptly when the ruler dissolved the legislature and suspended those articles of the constitution dealing with parliament. The reason was the parliament's efforts to exercise some control over finances and accusations of corruption by influential people. Since then, the reestablishment of parliament and the restoration of the constitution have become issues of dispute between the Bahrain government and its opposition. Not surprisingly, the Bahraini opposition has warmly welcomed the moves toward a parliament in Qatar, claiming that the ruler of Bahrain is alarmed by what is going on in Qatar and its possible consequences in Bahrain.
Opposition to Qatar from other GCC states is not solely directed at its reforms; the Qataris are also challenging the Saudis and some other Gulf countries on foreign policy issues. In November 1997, Qatar challenged the position of most Arab countries by holding the Middle East Economic Conference in Doha, with Israel in attendance, although the meeting was boycotted by many Arab countries for lack of progress on the peace process. Qatari foreign policy toward Iraq is another example. While several GCC countries have been reluctant to strengthen ties with Saddam Hussein and his regime, Qatar has restored diplomatic relations, returning an ambassador to Baghdad in 1992.
In addition to pressures from abroad, there are several internal factors that could endanger the democratic experiment as well. If the new emir does give the country a permanent constitution and a parliament with substantial legislative power, the deputies will have to tread a fine line between the powers of the rulers and the prerogatives of the parliament. They will have to learn, in this case, from mistakes made elsewhere by both governments and parliaments, especially in Kuwait and Bahrain, where parliamentary excesses alarmed the rulers and caused them to shut the legislatures down.
Nonetheless, there are several factors unique to Qatar that could help forestall these contingencies and contribute to a peaceful transition toward a more participatory system:
- Qatar is very wealthy, with few tensions between "rich" and "poor." GNP is $11.2 billion (1997 est.); per capita income is $16,700 (1997 est.). Unemployment, for all practical purposes, is non-existent. Bahrain, by contrast, has an estimated unemployment rate of 16-20 percent among its Shia population (70 percent of the total).
- Qatar is religiously and socially homogeneous. Although there is a small Shia minority in Qatar, it is only 7-12 percent of the population. There is no history of Sunni-Shia conflict, unlike the case of Bahrain and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. Qatar's Shia feel that they are treated fairly by the government. Shia preachers have no restrictions on their travel to Iran and sometimes study in the holy city of Qum.
- There are no "stateless" people in the population, such as the "biduns" of Kuwait, a group that has been alienated from the government, along with some of the Shia. The existence of such groups in Bahrain and Kuwait has created both social and political problems.
- Qatar has a small population (about 150,000), and almost all have tribal roots. Most belong to the same tribal lineage and have coexisted for many years, forging social bonds and intermarrying, creating clans such as the al-Qubaisi, al-Hawajir, al-Qawari and al-Mani, that are interrelated and coexist peacefully.17
- There are no political parties in Qatar and none in view. Neither is there a history of feuds between the "Left" and the "Right," or experience with Muslim extremists. There are a few Baathists (mainly from the pro-Iraqi faction) and some Muslim Brothers, but their influence on the rest of society remains weak.
- Qatar has little history of public political demands. The most noted events of this kind were the 1963 unrest, previously mentioned, and a popular petition in January 1992, when 50 leading Qatari citizens demanded that the emir establish a consultative assembly with legislative powers. They also expressed concern over abuse of power in the emirate and proposed reforms in the economy and the education system. These are now being instituted.
As a whole, Qataris have welcomed the emir's calls for reforms with little reservation. However, there is one noted case of resistance expressed by an Islamic figure, Abd al-Rahman Bin Umar al Nuaimi. In June 1998, he presented a petition signed by 18 persons (all noted Islamic figures) to the emir's Advisory Council. They objected to the emir's reforms, mainly those allowing women to be elected to the Central Municipal Council, where they would have "public authority" and the potential for "leadership over men." The petition rejected opening the door wide for women.18 All indicators suggest that, if the Qatari parliament materializes, it will be a conservative, Muslim-oriented majlis, somewhere between the Omani and Kuwaiti types, but probably closer to the latter.
The Qatari democratic reforms may already have affected Oman, where some Middle East observers predict similar moves in the not so distant future.19 Predictably, the Gulf country that has most warmly welcomed the newest democratic experience in the Gulf has been Kuwait, which has a functioning parliament of its own and would undoubtedly like some company in its democratic experiment. Both the Kuwaiti government and parliament issued statements supporting the democratic reforms in Qatar. Elsewhere in the Gulf, however, the emir of Qatar is reportedly under pressure from rulers not to grant his country a permanent constitution that would give large powers to a parliament, for fear that this kind of "democracy" could affect traditional ways of governing. If the current trend continues, this assessment is likely to prove correct.
1 11,437 sq. km. (smaller than Connecticut). Pop: 670,274 (1997 est.), including 516,508 non-nationals.
2 Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Sultanate of Oman.
3 Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa had been deputy emir and heir apparent prior to his take-over of the top position. He was also minister of defense and commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. Since 1962, his father had granted the son control over Emirate affairs (except for the Treasury). The new ruler has received military training and is a graduate of Sandhurst Military Academy in England.
4 Interview with Rosemarie Zahlan, noted historian of Qatar, April 1, 1999.
5 For the text of the emir's speech, see The Gulf Times, Doha, November 17, 1998.
6 Ibid.
7 Al-Sharq, Doha, December 7, 1998.
8 Al-Sharq, Doha, November 30, 1998.
9 Abdul Qadir al-Emiri, "Between Democracy and al-Shura," al-Sharq, Doha, November 23, 1998.
10 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, London, December 17, 1998.
11 Although she is the third wife of the ruler, he has chosen her son, Prince Jassim bin Hamad Al-Thani, to be his heir apparent, despite the fact that he is not the oldest of his three sons.
12 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, London, December 17, 1998.
13 Ibid.
14 Maza al-Maliki, Interview with the BBC News, March 9, 1999. BBC World Service, Internet.
15 The closest a female candidate came to winning was Dr. Wadha al-Suwaidi, who lost by a margin of 28 votes; her male opponent received 200 votes while she received 172.
16 Al-Sharq, Doha, January 3, 1999.
17 Interview with H.E. Saad Muhammad al-Qubaisi, ambassador of Qatar to the United States, Washington, DC, November 23, 1998.
18 Al-Hayat, London, December 31, 1998. AI-Nuaimi was detained briefly and then subsequently released by the government.
19 Michael Dunn, a Middle East commentator, predicted recently that Oman would abandon its semi-elected consultative council in favor of one directly elected at the end of that council's term in the year 2000 (The Estimate, X:24, November 20, 1998, p. 2).
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