A specter haunts the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI): growing instability in civil-military relations. To be sure, the IRI is also possibly facing the threats of either a war with a coalition of foreign powers or a revolution by an increasingly disillusioned population. While these are not remote possibilities, the thrust of this paper suggests that the recent trajectory of civil-military relations in the IRI bears watching closely because they could unravel, pitting the state's coercive apparatus against the people or even against the state itself if the armed forces believe they have to step in. A major rift between the government and the armed forces would constitute a threat to the stability and legitimacy of the nezam, the IRI's political, socioeconomic and cultural "system." If the rift were to end up in a direct takeover of the state, this would sound the death-knell of the Islamic Republic.

This paper, a summary of a longer project on Iranian civil-military relations, aims to provide a succinct history of the evolution of the relationship between the military and the political process from 1979 to 2018. Space constraints do not allow for discussion of the rich theoretical and conceptual literature.¹ The general literature on Iranian civil-military relations has been sparse in comparison with that devoted to Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey. In the early years of the IRI, there were some efforts to explore civil-military relations;² however, data were still sparse, access to Iranian discussions of civil-military relations well-nigh impossible, and there were "more exciting things" to study concerning Iran.

While Iran has not suffered military coups over the course of its modern history, the Iranian military has still been a force to be reckoned with in the political and socioeconomic spheres. Civil-military relations in the Global South are not solely about whether the military takes over the government. The military can also exert great influence on political and socioeconomic processes and structures without directly ruling the state.

A set of pressures, both foreign and domestic, has affected the trajectory of IRI civil-military relations from the 1979 revolution to the present. Each set of pressures represents a danger to the stability of civil-military relations; occurring simultaneously, they present an alarming and ongoing threat to the stability of the IRI. Both the external and domestic pressures that the IRI is facing threaten to destabilize civil-military relations. The IRI is under pressure from unbending ideological external enemies who now want "regime change." It is mired in a conflict in Syria, helping its ally against common foes. Some Iranian bloggers have called this costly involvement "Iran's Vietnam." The IRI's exchange of fire with another foreign power, Israel — also involved in the Syrian war, but more prudently — threatens to involve Iran in war with the most powerful military in the Middle East. The IRI is facing serious domestic socioeconomic pressures from a long-suffering population that is profoundly alienated and seeking a new identity for the country. The discontent has accelerated since the U.S. decision to impose severe sanctions on Iran following the Trump withdrawal from the nuclear accord, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

REVOLUTION: 1978-79

In 1977, His Majesty Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, shahinshah, aryamehr (king of kings and light of the aryans), was at the pinnacle of his power. Thanks to oil, Iran was in the throes of massive socioeconomic progress and development. The shah was in complete control of an impressive military, to the extent that he promoted officers above the rank of major and interfered in operational matters that would ordinarily concern only staff officers. The most senior officers were tightly linked to the dynasty. In 1972, 60 per cent of the highest-ranking officers were members of elite Tehran families or tightly linked through marriage to prominent families that were, in turn, connected to the Pahlavi dynasty. A prominent exception was Mohammad Khatami, the commander of the Iranian air force, who came from a lower-middle-class family in Rashd, married into royalty and became rich through dubious real estate and construction deals.

In 1978, the truth of the Iranian "miracle" was unveiled when the populace erupted against inequitable wealth distribution, inflation, political oppression, revulsion at rampant cultural "Westernization," and subordination to the United States. Massive demonstrations in which almost every social stratum was represented and which the police and military were unable to put down led to a collapse of law and order and a precipitous fall in government legitimacy. Paralysis set in as neither the shah nor the military knew what to do; both the ruler and his treasured institution withered in the face of massive adversity. In 1979, the revolution triumphed.

The revolutionary coalition that triumphed against Mohammad Reza Shah was united on one thing only: getting rid of him. However, there were many rival ideological views and groups. They began to fall out almost immediately.⁴ There was a struggle over control of the armed forces, viewed as a 'counterrevolutionary' threat by all the revolutionary forces. The clerics and a number of lay Islamists and pious nationalists who were united around the leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, took power and established an Islamic republic with him as the supreme religious ruler. Once the Islamists had outwitted their erstwhile allies, one of their most important goals was to ensure control over a military establishment they were profoundly suspicious of, but whose maintenance they viewed as essential to the protection of the revolution and the state.