In the aftermath of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the Egyptian military has become an institution with an increasingly professional outlook. It has also fallen victim to a host of internal pressures and challenges, ranging from a growing religious influence among the rank and file to public and often divisive exchanges among senior military leaders. Today, the military and security services are increasingly under pressure to perform. Given the level of confrontation between extremist elements and law enforcement agencies, many Egyptians are wondering whether Cairo can indeed be relied upon to quell a potential domestic insurgency. What kinds of pressures is the military establishment enduring? Will military responsibilities evolve? What are the military's prospects for being either a stabilizing or a fractious force for change? Will senior officers play a key role in the inevitable succession to President Mubarak? Finally, what will the impact of such developments be on Washington, Cairo's primary financial sponsor?
THE MILITARY UNTIL 1996
Although Egypt ostensibly gained its "independence" in 1922, Britain continued to maintain a military presence in the country and, more important, provided equipment and training to Egyptian forces until after World War II. When Israel was established in 1948, Cairo's British-trained forces launched a retaliatory campaign against the Jewish state and, along with Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq, fought in the first of several Arab-Israeli wars. This, and subsequent failures of Egyptian forces to hold their position against Israelis, highlighted the need to restructure and reequip existing capabilities as early as 1949. Moreover, in the aftermath of the 1952 coup d’état that brought the "Free Officers" to power, a new emphasis was placed on military developments, calling for substantial reforms in education and training. Within three years, the National Military Service Law was enacted, introducing radical changes to what was, at best, a stale force.
Over the years, and despite significant improvements via the aforementioned reforms, Israel, with British and French assistance, launched daring and highly effective attacks on Egypt, first in 1956 then in 1967. Egyptian troops failed to repel the invading armies in 1956, and the Suez Crisis was eventually resolved when Washington pressured London, Paris and Tel Aviv to disengage. Nasser's daring attempt to seize the canal emboldened Egyptian forces, however, and the military defeat proved to be a political bonanza for the charismatic president. He became a hero throughout the Arab world. Such newfound status prompted Nasser to intervene in Lebanon in 1958 and, more seriously, in the festering Yemeni civil war starting in 1963. In hindsight, this was one of Nasser's major miscalculations, drawing ill-trained and ill-equipped Egyptian troops into an unwinnable battle. The rugged Yemeni terrain prolonged the war from weeks into months and years. Consequently, many of Egypt's best troops were bogged down in Yemen when Israel attacked in 1967.1
Revisionist arguments aside, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war dealt a devastating blow to Egypt's political and military leadership and channeled the country's ailing national pride into action. To be sure, Nasser's grandiose Arab plans were shattered by the frightening blow - made worse by its embarrassing brevity - but the Egyptian president managed to salvage his leadership mantle. When the dust settled, Egypt was left with virtually no air force and little else. Relying on its technological superiority, Israel had decimated Egyptian units even before most of them could enter the battlefield. The loss eliminated "popular support for the military..., and morale within the forces plunged to its lowest level since before the military takeover of 1952."2 It also highlighted intrinsic shortcomings in Soviet equipment and training, creating the impetus to introduce radical changes at all levels of the armed forces.
Even if Cairo had been able to afford Western equipment in the 1960s (which it could not), Nasser's nonaligned positions and his go-it-alone posture foreclosed most of these sources. More important, at the time of the 1967 war, only about one in sixty Egyptian officers had a university degree. This was a significant shortcoming that received prompt attention after the catastrophic loss. Six years later, 60 percent of all Egyptian officers held university degrees.3 Improvements in equipment, training and education levels contributed to the limited successes of the 1973 war, when the much touted Bar-Lev line, erected by Israel in the Sinai, was breached. Today, Egyptian officers point to the 1973 war as a great victory, despite the ultimate draw. In fact, Egypt's ability to inflict significant damage on Israeli troops in 1973 inspired a sense of pride in the armed forces and allowed President Anwar Sadat to negotiate from a position of relative strength in the ensuing Camp David talks.
If the 1973 war imbued the Egyptian military with a sense of honor and accomplishment, the Camp David accords were the conduit to a reliable source of modem weaponry as well as substantial financial assistance. Washington has provided an average of $1.3 billion in yearly defense-procurement credits since 1979. To some extent, the Egyptian military are better equipped and trained, although the transition from Soviet hardware to Western sources has been slow and often difficult. In the mid-1990s, an estimated 50 percent of Army equipment was still of Soviet design, much of it over 20 years old.4 This shortcoming aside, the transition meant that Egyptian officers had to relearn their craft. Given that U.S. training, maintenance and repair requirements are radically different from those of their Soviet counterparts, it is not difficult to conclude that major hurdles remain. Still, today young military officers are eager to familiarize themselves with Western technology. Moreover, the $1.3 billion annual package provides International Education and Training (IMET) opportunities, generously used since the early 1980s to send soldiers and sailors to U.S. service academies, graduate schools and command and staff colleges. In-country training and assistance teams were also available under the IMET program in support of new equipment purchases.
Undeniably, Soviet equipment and strategy were partial reasons for Egyptian military losses to Israel; as the Jewish state repeatedly demonstrated, Western goods were better. For the Egyptian leadership, the obvious became embarrassing and, if not Nasser, at least Sadat began to lose faith in the USSR. This shift was so abrupt that by 1990, Western tactical concepts were beginning to take hold in military training courses. As Egyptian officers graduated from U.S. and European military academies, they gradually institutionalized newly acquired expertise.5 Despite such training opportunities and the first-hand experience of the "Soviet failure," a cadre of Egyptian military leaders remained primarily Soviet-trained. Consequently, and for political reasons, including the desire to limit U.S. influence in the armed forces, the brightest officers are constantly tested for loyalty to the regime. As a result, U.S.-trained officers see their promotions to high-ranking positions held back or begrudgingly allocated.6
TABLE: EGYPT'S ARMED FORCES
SERVICE |
ACTIVE |
CONSCRIPTS |
RESERVES |
Army |
310,000 |
200,000 |
150,000 |
Navy |
20,000 |
12 000 |
14,000 |
Air Force |
30,000 |
10,000 |
20,000 |
Air Defense |
80,000 |
50,000 |
70,000 |
Total/ Regular Forces |
440,000 |
272,000 |
254,000 |
Central Security Forces |
300,000 |
|
|
National Guard |
60,000 |
|
|
Border Guard Forces |
12.000 |
|
|
Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1994-1995
(London: IISS, 1994), pp. 125-26.
Military Organization
The 440,000-strong Egyptian armed forces include army, navy, air force and air defense units under the supreme authority of President Husni Mubarak (see Table 1). While the president maintains a relative hold on the military by ensuring that an elaborate patronage system flourishes, a commander-in-chief is assigned the task of dealing with budgetary, administrative, industrial and policy matters. The Egyptian military also maintains a Military Operations Authority headed by the Army commander. Comparable to the functions of the U.S. joint chiefs of staff, the Army commander is further responsible for coordinating the efforts of all services. Conscripts are enlisted at the rate of approximately 80,000 per year and usually serve a three-year term on active duty and an additional nine years on reserve rolls.
In addition to the regular forces, Cairo maintains a 300,000-strong paramilitary force, the Central Security Force (CSF), staffed with conscripts. The CSF was formed in 1977 to deal with domestic disturbances. Perhaps playing to his fear of what can happen if the military and its leaders become too powerful, Mubarak has built up the CSF significantly, hoping that it "would counterbalance the military's power " 7 Never fulfilling his expectations, however, the CSF failed to meet the minimum standards for the armed services, chiefly because Cairo assumed that it would function well even if the rank and file - of whom so much was expected survived on little more than the minimum wage. In 1986, a rumor that the amount of time conscripts would spend in the CSF would be increased from three to four years resulted in a riot, with a subsequent purge of radical elements from the ranks - 20,000 members were dismissed at the time. Ironically, the president called on the army to end the rampage.
Because Cairo neglected the CSF for so long, often recruiting from the lower middle class, its loyalty has been questionable. Infiltration by extremist elements has long been suspected. In fact, when Major General Rauf Khayrat, a twenty-year undercover agent of the force, was assassinated in 1994, many observers concluded that the general's identity was impossible to detect save for "information to which only high-ranking officers in that agency would have had access." 8 The make-up of the force and, more important, the low pay of its enforcers, made it a great target of opportunity for extremist elements. Studies of arrested Islamist activists in the 1970s show that while 80 percent were college graduates, the figures dropped to 20 percent by the mid- 1990s. It is therefore realistic to expect that "those youths most negatively affected by Egypt's faltering economy are the ones most likely to be Islamist insurgents."9 In the end, the low pay as well as poor treatment of the CSF and many army enlisted men, make them prime recruits for extremist groups.
In addition to the CSF and regular military forces, Cairo boasts a National Guard as well as a Border Guard Force, mostly deployed along the Libyan border.
THE MILITARY MISSION
In a 1987 interview, then-minister of defense and war production, Field Marshal Muhammad Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, delineated the two main principles of Egyptian military strategy: "military balance in relation to surrounding countries and deterrence."10 He further elaborated that military policy was " ...designed to preserve the independence of the state, the safety of its territory, and the security of its borders, coasts, territorial waters and economic interests."11
Eight years later, the minister of defense and war production, Field Marshal Muhammad Husayn Tantawi, reemphasized the same military goals, and, as a reflection of the current environment, added protection of the domestic front and "confronting disasters" to the Egyptian military mission.12 Considering the tenuous and sometimes hostile relationship with Khartoum, as well as the fragile relationship with Tripoli, protection of international borders was an undeniable concern. Recognizing increasingly difficult internal tensions, however, the minister presented the military role in encouraging development to bolster the national economy. Citing such military efforts as building schools, firefighting, relief and rescue operations, road and railway building, telephone-line extension and road maintenance, Tantawi attempted to portray a military of community service.13
The expansion of the military role in Egyptian domestic society is a sign of the times. With the signing of the Arab-Israeli peace accords, Egypt's role as interlocutor is no longer as necessary as it once was. While regional threats are of significance to military planners, internal conflicts are beginning to take center stage. Perceived and real terrorist threats are no longer the sole responsibility of security forces. In fact, the military has provided some low-profile assistance, even if it has been kept at arm’s length from internal unrest. To be sure, Cairo did not want to raise fears among the populace that the "terrorist" problem had become so significant that the military has to be called in. Ironically, trials and punishment for those accused of engaging in antigovernment or terrorist activity, has come under the purview of the military. As the role of the military evolved throughout the early 1990s, perceptions, both internal and external, profoundly affected the morale and prestige of the force.
Current security concerns are articulated by Egyptian leaders in what are viewed as the three principal threats to their national security: "a lack of regional strategic balance, stemming from the overwhelming preponderance of Israeli military power; a threat of encirclement by Muslim extremists; and internal threats to domestic order."14
EXTREMIST ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY
For better or worse, Egypt has experienced a slew of extremist elements throughout its modem history, and the military has not always remained detached. Perhaps the best organized was the Muslim Brotherhood (founded in 1928) which was partly responsible for the 1952 Free Officers' coup. Today's Brotherhood, although it has been outlawed and its members actively sought for prosecution, is considered one of the least radical of the estimated fifty Islamic groups operating in Egypt, collectively known as the Gamaa al Islamiya (Islamic Associations). More radical elements of the Gamaa include the Jihad or Holy War which was responsible for several tragic incidents.
Indeed, President Sadat was assassinated during a military parade on October 6, 1981 by Lieutenant Colonel Khalid al Istambuli, a member of the armed forces and of Jihad. Although then Vice President Husni Mubarak, an Air Force colonel who fought in the 1973 war, succeeded to the presidency, Sadat's tragic death ushered in an era of mistrust between military and civilian leaders. After the assassination, not surprisingly, the military actively sought to purge itself of extremist elements, dismissing hundreds of suspects from service.15 For a short period of time, the military was probably free of some of its potentially most troublesome elements, but, as a conscripted force, it soon regained most of what it did not want. Before long, fundamentalist sympathizers and true believers were once again inducted into the services since they represented the lower classes of society that filled the military ranks. Since the 1970s, and in a vain attempt to control potential "infiltration," the government has required that "fundamentalists" be immediately discharged, going so far as exempting relatives of suspected individuals from the draft.16
Despite such a screening process, in August 1993 three members of the Egyptian army (two cadets and a reservist) were tried along with 50 other members of the "Vanguards of the New Jihad," a group responsible for setting off a bomb in an attempt to kill the interior minister in August 1993. The "Vanguards" are former Jihad members, some of whom fled to Afghanistan after the Sadat assassination. Many have since returned as seasoned Mujahudin warriors, ready to resume the struggle to establish an Islamic state in Egypt. Interestingly, the "Vanguards" aimed to create their Islamic state by gaining control over the military.
Before an 18-month upsurge in violence that began in 1992, President Mubarak pledged to use the CSF to quell "terrorist" activities throughout Egypt. After the attempt on the life of the interior minister (who headed the CSF), Defense Minister Tantawi declared that the military was ready to intervene, as a last resort, to fight terrorism. "It is the right of the state in [Egypt] to confront this phenomenon with all decisiveness," declared Tantawi.17
In August 1993, a reliable source revealed that "the Jihad depend[ed] on underground activity and on spreading its ideology among intellectuals and officers in the army, in the belief that the military establishment [wa]s the only force capable of changing the status quo."18 In fact, extremist groups have called on the military to join them in a struggle against the state by refusing to act as an instrument of oppression. In a widely reported incident, defendants shouted from their courtroom cages: "Where are you, men of the armed forces? Where are you to defend the Islamic ideology and the message of (the prophet) Muhammad? They are killing us, they are torturing us....Move and raise the banner of Islam!"19
Such theatrics aside, the Gamaa have yet to gain support from the military, although the cumulative factor among the rank and file is impossible to determine. Still, given the fact that hundreds of extremists are or will eventually be on trial in dozens of courts throughout Egypt, opportunities abound for theatrical performances that will surely shape popular perceptions. A recent court martial saw the defendant, an army lieutenant, brandishing a Quran. To drive his point home, he defiantly called for President Mubarak's death, hoping perhaps that the Holy Scriptures would protect him from the state's wrath.20
The confrontation between the government and extremist elements has roots in the Egyptian body politic that, for better or worse, will have long-lasting repercussions. In fact, the opposition to President Mubarak, an uncorrupted leader (even if he tolerates corruption around him) who relies on the military to support the legitimacy of the state, is rising. In November 1993, the CSF uncovered a plot to assassinate Mubarak after a Gamaa al-Islamiya member was apprehended during a random raid. The defendant admitted that the group was planning to attack the president's plane at the Sidi Barrani airport. He further acknowledged that one of Mubarak's residences, to be used during a planned meeting with Libyan leader Muamar Qadhafi, was also targeted. Based on this and other confessions, several Gamaa members, including two soldiers, were secretly tried in a military court and executed by firing squad little more than a month later.
To be sure, a commitment to one's country and its military aims, and a desire for the establishment of a just Islamic state, are not mutually exclusive goals. Many Egyptians, both civilian and military, believe that their government could be far more responsive to legitimate needs by setting sound socioeconomic policies that are true to Islamic teachings. General Salahiddin Al-Shadli, the hero of the 1973 Arab Israeli war and an individual who was highly critical of President Sadat, provided a sharp rebuke to the establishment when he stated: "If Islamic groups are calling for the implementation of Sharia, this is no crime. The government must respond to those demands because it is not the demand of the Islamic groups only, but the demand of a large sector of the people." 21
Although Al-Shadli's remarks came after his release from a three-year prison sentence for printing top-secret military information in his autobiography, they were astute. Moreover, they were embarrassing to the regime, not only because they came from a military hero, but because they were rooted in genuine Egyptian traditions. Al-Shadli cautioned that repression would escalate and, more important, that the government could not possibly win a war fought on religious terms. In the end, many argued that using force against extremist elements waving the banner of Islam was a losing proposition. In fact, organizations seeking to recruit members within the armed forces were planting permanent seeds of opposition in the one sector that the authorities needed to survive.
MILITARY JUSTICE
During the past few years, government responses to extremist activities have been draconian. Relying on presidential powers in place since the Nasser and Sadat eras, President Mubarak issued a decree that allowed civilian defendants charged with involvement in terrorist activities to be tried in military courts. Mubarak's power to take such action was legitimate under Article 6 of the Law of Military Rulings which allows the president to refer certain civilian crimes to the military justice system by decree.22 Mubarak's decision was further legitimized by the Supreme Administrative Court. Under the current state of emergency, the Court ruled, the president was indeed authorized to rule by fiat.23
Still, President Mubarak's decision to try civilians in military courts was prompted, in part, by a desire for speedy trials. Unlike lengthy and very public trials in civil courts, the military courts convene in a matter of weeks, reach swift verdicts, and pass harsh sentences that rarely allow for appeals. The president was the sole arbiter, retaining the power to ratify military death sentences or issue pardons. 24 The overall effect of such quick results, Cairo's logic maintained, was to act as a deterrent to other potential "terrorists."
Aware that this haste led to occasional injustices, President Husni Mubarak and senior government officials repeatedly argued that the internal stability of Egypt required such measures. Further responding to critics, senior government officials insisted that lengthy public trials would drag Egypt into permanent chaos, damaging its economy and threatening the security of the populace. Nevertheless, Cairo has meted out harsh sentences since 1992, often in record time and with little regard for rules of discovery. Generally speaking, defense counsels have been denied access to their clients or given little time to prepare their complicated "terrorism" cases. Even supporters of the regime acknowledged that, under the circumstances, human-rights abuses were common. London-based Amnesty International, for example, has called on Cairo to end the mass trials of civilians in military courts, calling them "a travesty of justice and a violation of international law."25
Amnesty identified key shortfalls in these hasty judgments and urged President Mubarak to respect the separation-of-powers clause in the Egyptian Constitution. Because of a close connection between the presidency and the military, Amnesty cautioned that "undue influence" might be placed on officers too eager to please their commanders. To help correct this particular problem, legal observers have cautioned Cairo on procedures for appointing judges to the bench. Given the fact that "the executive has exclusive authority to select judges and to terminate their terms at its discretion, the military judiciary is subject to greater political pressure from the executive than are the more insulated civil judges."26
Naturally, the Mubarak government was sensitive to such criticisms and in 1993 allowed a Jordanian lawyer from the International Commission of Jurists to observe a military trial of civilian "terrorists." Dr. Anis Kassim, a respected Jordanian lawyer, was given the opportunity to interrogate several of the accused. The observer reported key irregularities, including a defendant's claim that he was tortured as well as deprived of the right to counsel. Kassim expressed his astonishment that defense counsels were given a single week to prepare cases that involved reviewing over 4,000 pages of sensitive documents. The court summarily denied requests by defense lawyers for additional preparation time, illustrating the lack of due process. In the event, seven defendants were sentenced to hang. Kassim concluded that the "consequence of these trials and the execution of death penalties in such circumstances [meant] that Egypt [would] experience even more havoc and damage."27 He urged the Egyptian government to alter its methods so that it might be better served and to avoid an escalation of the violence. The jurist became discouraged, stressing that he could easily see how lack of justice would lead to additional acts of violence.
Kassim was correct. In October 1993, less than a year after the military trials began, an Egyptian military prosecutor presiding over a trial of the "vanguards" group was shot and wounded. The Gamaa al Islamiya claimed responsibility, calling the attack revenge for the death penalties of its militants and warning that "all members of military tribunals [were] targets for the armed wings of Gamaa al-Islamiya."28 Less than a month later, the militant group Jihad vowed to kill eight army officers for sentencing their brethren to death. In a blunt statement, Jihad promised to continue avenging the deaths of its members: "Islamic scholars are agreed that whoever abandons the rule of God... is an infidel that should be killed. The culprits have shed the blood of our Muslim strugglers by convicting them to death."29
Other organizations were equally determined to oppose Cairo's harsh response. When the government outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt faced its most serious political crisis in two decades. To be sure, the measure was a pre-election ploy by a government fearful that success by Brotherhood candidates would permanently scar its reputation. Brotherhood members, many of whom were respected professionals, were routinely arrested for "conspiring against the government and violating the constitution," even if little evidence existed against them.30 Commentators have drawn comparisons with developments in Algeria; perhaps Cairo wished to prevent the potential Brotherhood political successes that have made the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) such a threat in Algeria. Still, the approach was erroneous at best, for it undermined Cairo's quest for a semblance of democracy in Egypt. Emboldened by the ban and hundreds of arrests the Brotherhood issued a stinging criticism insisting that "the government has resorted to military rule to prevent detainees from practicing their right to stand as candidates and be elected." The statement insisted that the Mubarak regime "confirmed its rejection of any other view and insistence on obstructing the just, Islamic trend from carrying out its role."31
On November 23, 1995, 54 Brotherhood members were sentenced to three-to-five year prison terms, many at hard labor, for "...belonging to an illegal organization and propagating its aims."32 Following (or perhaps because of) the subsequent closure of their Cairo headquarters, most Brotherhood members and sympathizers grew even more militant in their actions. Ironically, these harsh measures resulted in serious contacts between and among Brotherhood and Gamaa supporters. Many drew the parallel between military rule and their members' treatment in prison.
While the targeting of past actions by radical groups of military members involved in the trial process made recruitment among the armed forces difficult, recent Muslim Brotherhood trials may have the opposite effect. Indeed, because the Brotherhood is an established entity in Egyptian political life, and openly active in providing social services where the government has failed, sympathy towards its objectives may be on the rise. Large numbers of Egyptians have, over the years, demonstrated compassion and support for the Brotherhood. Consequently, it would not be surprising to see many jailed members recruit among their guards while incarcerated. It remains to be determined whether the government can win a war of popularity by prosecuting individuals who have chosen to be in the opposition.
During the past few years, Egyptian military courts have sentenced 64 Islamists to death, of whom 46 were summarily executed. There are no indications that the trials will end anytime soon. As a consequence, military court officials will, undoubtedly, continue to be targeted by extremists seeking revenge. Whether the friction between the military justice system and the Islamists will spill over into the general military population, remains to be seen. President Mubarak's efforts to keep hard-core Islamists out of the military appears to be working, for now. Although difficult to ascertain, evidence of close military association with radical elements remains inconclusive. Noticeably, an effective screening process as well as direct exposure to the harsh treatment of radical elements have, at least so far, prevented existing contacts between military and radical forces from spilling over into the general population.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: A CHANGING BALANCE
Although Mubarak's military credentials are rock solid, the president is eager to maintain absolute control over all aspects of the security establishment, in part to eliminate challenges to his rule. One such challenge was mounted by the former minister of defense, General Abu Ghazalah, an assertive soldier who assumed the position in 1980 under President Sadat. During his tenure, Abu Ghazalah dominated the cabinet and built an extensive military-industrial base that expanded well into the private sector. Under Abu Ghazalah, the National Service Project Organization (NSPO) was developed into an active, military controlled industrial organization that produced goods for both military and civilian uses. Active-duty military personnel were involved in food production, manufactured goods and construction projects under various NSPO schemes. Indeed, the Egyptian military operated dairies, poultry farms, cattle feedlots, farms, fisheries, and factories producing doors and window frames, among other things. They also installed telephone lines and constructed roads, sewers and bridges.33 In short, they created a separate, highly effective infrastructure and developed a significant production capability.
The power and prestige Abu Ghazalah amassed while expanding his military industrial base and developing a network of supporters, including many in the United States, undoubtedly made Mubarak uncomfortable. Although the president could not openly criticize his own military organization, he encouraged the opposition to question Abu Ghazalah's meetings in Washington and his perceived bow to U.S. political pressures.34 This weak attempt to discredit the powerful minister did little to affect Abu Ghazalah's growing power base, either in Egypt or the United States. Still, and despite his exalted position, the general lacked the power to appoint Egypt's top military officers. Aware of this vulnerability, Mubarak moved to place loyal supporters in positions of authority as a counterweight to Abu Ghazalah's ambitions. Allegations that he has received generous financial payoffs from U.S. firms doing business in Egypt discredited Abu Ghazala. When charges that Abu Ghazalah was involved in an arms-smuggling scandal were published in 1989, President Mubarak quickly replaced his defense minister, appointing Tantawi to the post and, to further diminish Abu Ghazalah's privileged status as the only living field marshal, bestowed the same title on Tantawi. Clearly, Mubarak learned a costly lesson from this episode and seems determined not to allow any other ambitious military officer to position himself as a challenger. Tantawi remains a "... relatively undistinguished general" who is rumored to owe his rapid promotion to "...the fact that he organized the security detachment around the presidential retreat in Ismailiyah."35
Egyptian politics, at least since the 1952 revolution, has been skewed in favor of the military, yet, because of their overall performance, military prestige, pay and benefits have all been reduced. Under Abu Ghazalah, on the other hand, military spending was relatively high, with regular pay raises and an increasing number of perks for officers. Since that time, military salaries have failed to keep pace with inflation, a possible justification for accepting patronage money. Sadly, the lack of accountability of the military-run production and manufacturing businesses provides ample opportunity for "skimming” or "leakage."36 Outside businesses trying to procure lucrative contracts with the Egyptian military are still potential sources of income for many. In 1993, the Wall Street Journal uncovered several cases of payoffs from U.S. defense contractors to the Egyptian military. The perks ranged from expense-paid weekends in New York to$ 1.1 million in "fat" that was added to a defense contract "to make every Egyptian officer happy."37
MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Despite apparent anti-American sentiment within the military establishment, the continuing flow of financial support from the United States essentially means that Egypt will continue to maintain a special relationship with Washington. To be sure, U.S. funds allocated for purchases of military hardware are actually credits that must be used to purchase armaments designed and manufactured by U.S. companies. Current programs allow the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation, located in Cairo, and several other program overseers, to provide guidance on procurement plans and objectives. The recent purchase of U.S. Navy frigates and destroyers, for example, ensures a successful integration of Navy forces and provides extensive training opportunities and exchanges between the two navies.
In Egypt's FY 1997 white paper, "Request for Military Assistance," policy objectives express recognition of the importance of purchasing military equipment that is compatible with that of allies while at the same time seeking independence from the United States. Two of the four stated policy objectives are: (1) Modernizing the Egyptian Armed Forces to include relying upon quality versus quantity as a necessary aspect of continuing reductions in force size; limiting Soviet equipment; and improving interoperability with the United States and other friendly forces; and (2) Achieving military self-sufficiency at the earliest possible date.38
Despite an expressed desire for self-sufficiency, the white paper consistently justifies the importance of maintaining current funding levels and even suggests that U.S. military aid does not keep Egypt ahead of opponents in the region. Justifications for increased or even current aid levels include a potential for a military power imbalance in the region, the need to confront international and domestic terrorism, and Egypt's continuing role as a leading African nation.39 The conflict between wanting to wean itself from American support, in the interest of national pride, and a continuing need for military hardware, is not likely to resolve itself in the near term.
TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS
Keeping a combined military and internal security force of almost one million men well-equipped and trained is proving a difficult task for Cairo. In the mid-1990s, Egypt was spending close to 11 percent of its annual GDP (including U.S. aid) on defense, an excessive amount given its relatively secure position within the Middle East and North Africa. In the absence of a credible foreign threat, Cairo has scrambled to find a mission to justify keeping a portion of Egypt's otherwise productive population under arms. Officers serving in the Egyptian military are deeply concerned about their role and position in society. "You have a dissatisfied military that is very sensitive to whether their status is respected," says Mohammed Sid Ahmed, a political columnist in Cairo.40 Other commentators echo similar conclusions.
Despite such problems, the military appears supportive of the Mubarak regime and satisfied with current conditions since many officers are, first and foremost, careerists. To be sure, the exalted position of high-ranking military officers and their status as political "insiders" help to ensure their loyalty. Shortly after the 1995 assassination attempt on Mubarak in Ethiopia, one observer wrote, "One of the many truths about Egypt that the assassination attempt underlined to its people was that, 43 years after the army coup that toppled the monarchy and turned the country into a republic, the military and police security forces are still the final arbiters of power."41 But, will the military remain a reliable force if it is tasked to squelch extremist yet popular groups? Some observers argue that the American education many officers have received will help ensure their loyalty; others disagree.
A respected retired Egyptian general questioned the trust between Mubarak and the military when he declared that "the regime knows that only the army can change the government, so they'll keep the troops in the barracks at all costs."42 Similarly, an Islamist leader believed that even well-disciplined troops could not possibly shoot at their own people. Retired General Dessouki agreed: "I deeply doubt the military will shoot people for the sake of such an unpopular government."43
As the socioeconomic malaise afflicting Egypt spreads, President Mubarak may indeed find it necessary to use his military to fight radical forces. Still, uneducated and poorly paid security conscripts remain a prime target for extremist recruiters. Maintaining the morale of a force repeatedly called upon to repress violent outbreaks among neighbors and friends will undoubtedly prove an impossible task. The problem will become insurmountable if militant elements succeed in their unrelenting recruitment activities, making the alternative of using the military all the more unattractive for the government. One militant leader explained the tactic of "undercutting the government's base" and admitted to active recruitment efforts, stating that "morale [among] security forces, especially in southern Egypt, is bad." He sternly concluded that the opposition was "talking to a lot of these young recruits, trying to get them to join us."44
As internal pressure on the Mubarak regime continue to grow, support of the military will be paramount to Egypt's political stability. Indeed, there is little doubt that repressive measures against Islamists have affected basic freedoms and overall security. Opposition political parties are controlled, the press is routinely censored, freedom of speech is restricted and freedom of movement is limited. For one Egyptian journalist, who was interrogated by security forces at Cairo airport because her name appeared on a travel blacklist (possibly for a trip to Israel 20 years earlier), denial of basic human rights abounds. Brutal repression and torture of suspected Islamists have, she asserts, caused the local populace to "...look upon Mubarak not just as 'kafir' [sinner] but as 'shaytan' [Satan]."45 For many, and despite its thinly veiled front as a Western-style "democracy," Egypt more closely resembles a military dictatorship in both style and form. In fact, the use of military courts to try suspected radical elements further reinforces such a perspective.
Washington may find it increasingly difficult to work with a leadership that is far more concerned with internal issues than with regional concerns. President Mubarak's recent rebuff of a U.S. request that he join Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Jordan's King Hussein in meetings on renewed violence in the occupied territories, confirmed Egypt's unwillingness or inability to act as a peace broker with Jerusalem. Although Egypt would undoubtedly like to wean itself from dependence on U.S. political and financial aid, an ailing economy with flat growth and a per capita income of $650 make it difficult to tap internal resources to support a costly battle against extremism. On the other hand, military aid provides a continuing opportunity for U.S. influence and the ability to check the pulse of the Egyptian military through U.S.-based education programs, combined training and exercises. This remains attractive to both sides.
Although military leaders have ruled Egypt since the charismatic and widely popular Gama! Abdel Nasser, President Mubarak has clearly been aware of potential opposition from within the ranks. Mubarak's promotion of officers unlikely to challenge his position may, in the long run, result in a loss of prestige for the military and, more important, lead to a scramble for genuine authority should Egypt experience a succession problem. As the war against Islamists continues to gain momentum, the military will undoubtedly be called upon to accept an expanded role. Such a move could fuel internal opposition against military leaders, further enhancing the popularity of Islamic forces as viable alternatives. In any event, the regime's repressive methods, repeated violation of civil and human rights, as well as its failure to reduce the disparity between the haves and the have-nots will provide the fuel for dissension and revolt. As a keen observer of the Egyptian scene recently concluded, "Cairo's corrupt and self-perpetuating military autocracy, now in its fifth decade of rule, no longer offers hope for democracy or a better life to millions of desperately poor Egyptian peasants. Islamic fundamentalism, the most potent revolutionary force in the modem Middle East, ruthlessly exploits this vulnerability."46 Whether Cairo and Washington will heed the implicit warning remains to be determined. Can Egypt, still the Arab world's most important sociopolitical locus, afford to ignore it?
1 Richard Nyrop, editor, Egypt: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1991), p. 297.
2 Ibid ., p. 299.
3 Gregory Copley, "Egypt Revives," Defense and Foreign Affairs 17:12, December, 1989 p. 12.
4 Edward B. Atkeson, "The Middle East: A Dynamic New Military Assessment for the 1990s," The Washington Quarterly 16:2, Spring 1993, p. 115.
5 Jacques Lucas, "The Egyptian Armed Forces," Military Technology 14:11, November 1990, p. 22.
6 Cassandra, "The Impending Crisis in Egypt," The Middle East Journal 49:1, Winter 1995, p. 26.
7 "Egypt: Defense Organization/Strength," Periscope Service Report, July 3, 1995.
8 Cassandra, op. cit., p. 24.
9 Ibid., p. 20.
10 "Abu Ghazalah Interviewed on Military Policy," Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report-Near East and South Asia [Hereafter FBIS-NES) -87-153, August 10, 1987, p. C1.
11 Ibid., p. C2.
12 "Defense Minister Explains Military Policy to Assembly," FBIS-NES-95-011, January 18, 1995, p. 27.
13 Ibid., p. 27.
14 Atkeson, op. cit., pp. 115.
15 "Egypt: Defense Organization/Strength," Periscope Service Report, July 3, 1995.
16 John Adams "West Fears Worldwide Havoc from Muslim Extremists," Overseas News, August 22, 1993, p. 3.
17 "Armed Forces will be Last Line of Defense Against [Islamists] Seeking Overthrow of Government," Reuters Textline BBC Monitoring Service: Middle East, October 14, 1993.
18 "Egyptian Militants Aim to Infiltrate Armed Forces," Reuters News Service - Middle East, August 19, 1993.
19 Samia Nakhoul, "Egypt Militants Say More Violence to Come," Reuters News Service Middle East, August 25, 1993.
20 Robert Fisk, "Algeria's Past May be Egypt's Future; Corruption, Unemployment, Violence and Islamic Fundamentalism," The Independent, February 21, 1994, p. 10.
21 "Egypt's October War Hero Wants Islamic State," Reuters Textline Moneyclips, October 19, 1993.
22 Michael Farhang, "Terrorism and Military Trials in Egypt: Presidential Decree No. 375 and the Consequences for Judicial Authority," Harvard International Law Journal 31:1, Winter 1994, p. 231.
23 Ibid., p. 231.
24 Ibid., p. 234.
25 "UK: Amnesty Urges Egypt to Stop Mass Military Trials," Reuters News Service, September 23, 1993.
26 Farhang, op. cit., pp. 234-235.
27 Dr. Anis F. Kassim, "Civilians Before Military Courts; The Trial of Muslim Fundamentalists in Egypt," The International Commission of Jurists, The Review, Number 51, 1993, p. 55.
28 "Egypt: Military Prosecutor attacked; Gamaah al-Islamiyah Claims Responsibility," BBC Monitoring Service: Middle East, October 12, 1993.
29 John West, "Jihad Group Vows to Kill Egyptian Military Judges," Reuters Textline News Service, November 1, 1993.
30 Samia Nakhoul, "Moslem professionals in Egyptian Military Court," Reuters News Service Middle East, September I 8, 1995.
31 "Egypt Opposition Slams Army Trial for Islamists," Reuters News Service - Middle East, September 3, 1995.
32 "Egypt: Vote or Fight," The Economist, December 2, 1995, p. 39.
33 Nyrop, op. cit., p. 327.
34 Robert Springborg, "The President and the Field Marshal, Civil-Military Relations in Egypt Today," Middle East Report, July-August 1987, p. 16.
35 Cassandra, op. cit., p. 23.
36 Ibid ., p. 23.
37 Andy Pasztor and Bruce Ingersoll, "Some Weapons Makers Are Said to Continue Illicit Foreign Outlays," The Wall Street Journal, November 5, 1993, p. A5.
38 The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, "A Partnership for Peace, Stability and Progress; Egypt's FY 1997 Request for Military Assistance," Cairo: Government Printing Press, 1996, p. 11.
39 lbid., pp. 6-10.
40 Peter Waldman, "A Disgruntled Army and Mounting Unrest Face Egyptian Regime," The Wall Street Journal, June 14, 1993, p. A9.
41 Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Behind Smiles, Egyptians Tell Mubarak to Shape Up," The New York Times, July 3, 1995, pp. Al, A9.
42 Ibid., p. A9.
43 Ibid., p. A9.
44 Chris Hedges, "Mubarak's Challenge," The New York Times, April 3, 1995, p. A2.
45 Sana Hasan, "My Lost Egypt," The New York Times Magazine, October 22, 1995, p. 60.
46 "Mr. Mubarak: Valuable and Vulnerable," The New York Times, July 4, 1995, p. 30.
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