Balancing State and Society: The Islamic Movement in Kuwait

The events surrounding the 1990-91 Iraqi attempt to destroy the state of Kuwait created a societal vacuum. Everything Kuwaitis had believed in during the preceding decades regarding Arab nationalism and their Islamic identity suffered a blow. This crisis in belief created the conditions for a further Westernization of Kuwaiti society. Conservative Islamic forces, forces that sought to politicize Islam and impose strict Islamic practices and behavior on society and state, felt the need to counter these moral and behavioral changes. In order to accomplish this task these forces relied on the strength and zeal of their historical experience and, in particular, the credibility they had gained in confronting the Iraqi occupation. They also exploited the sense of alienation among some sectors of Kuwaiti society.

This study will analyze the conditions that led to the Islamic revival in Kuwait, as well as the forces and ideas behind it. It will attempt to explain how a welfare society such as Kuwait's, with a per capita income of $14,772, can support a strong Islamic movement.1 Also discussed are the regional shifts and influences that can play a role in the rise and fall of national political and cultural currents. Shedding light on Islamic groups in Kuwait should further the understanding of the dynamics affecting Islamic movements in the Arab world as a whole.

 

KUWAITI POLITICS

Contrary to popular thought, societal groups in Kuwait do hold state power in check. Formal and informal groups based on different affiliations (class, urban/rural, tribal, Islamic) bring to the government's attention their particular interests.2 The state plays one group off against another, informally shifting its alliances.

As the owner of the means of production (oil) and the country's main employer (92 percent of the work force) the state provides the core of the ruling Sabah family with the power to influence and sometimes control political events.3 The state elite in Kuwait assigns a constant flow of values and rules to the different players in society, while permitting a relatively wide margin of freedom of expression and the press, which allows for serious debate on political issues. State policies and the authoritative distribution of values were responsible, during the 1970s and 1980s (outside the normal parliamentary institutions), for the Islamic forces' access to state resources, privileges and rights.4  The same applies to the current process, by which the same movement is increasingly losing access to state privileges and resources.

The Kuwaiti model of politics can be seen as an experiment in flexible pluralistic corporatism, where the state legitimizes certain groups at the expense of other s.5 The complicated interaction between the state's Sabah rulers, formal groups and society, with all of its informal underpinnings, is a dynamic mix of fluid corporatism and restricted pluralism.6 This multiplicity of interests makes the older, more authoritarian methods of control outmoded. Attempts to use authoritarianism in such an environment would only complicate the political process and contribute to ongoing crisis. This is equally true in the broader Middle Eastern milieu, where political development characterized by state-guided democratic reform has been increasingly displacing the narrow authoritarian model prevalent since World War II.

 

GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT

Throughout the Middle East, the Arab defeat in the June War of 1967 opened the door for dormant Islamic forces that Nasserism and Arab nationalism had shut out in the early 1950s.7 As a result, when states faced internal opposition from pan­ Arab nationalist and leftist opposition forces, some in power felt that they could depend on the newly aroused Islamic forces to counter them. The Lebanese civil war that started in 1975 and the role of both Palestinian and leftist Lebanese forces in it, was quite alarming to the Kuwaiti government, due to relations between the Lebanese left and some of the Palestinian groups on the one hand and the Kuwaiti opposition on the other. The existence in Kuwait of a large Palestinian community added to the fear. In response, the government dissolved Parliament in 1976 and reached out to those who were not critical of their decision. This marked the beginning of an informal, undocumented government alliance with the then-passive, non-radical and non-political Islamic forces in Kuwait. The government rewarded the Islamic Social Reform Society (Islah al­Ijtimai), which had not condemned the dissolution of Parliament, by appointing its chairman, Yusef al-Hajji, to the position of minister of awaqf (religious endowment).8

The success of the Islamic revolution in Iran also spawned waves of religious revival. While the Sunni Muslims of the Social Reform Society were deeply suspicious of Iranian Shia intentions, they nonetheless found the Iranian model to be proof of the adaptability of Islam to the modem era.9 It inspired them to become more vocal and aggressive in their attempts to Islamize society and gain a share of power for themselves. Their ability to infiltrate the government bureaucracy increased, and they strengthened old ties with the Muslim Brothers in Egypt.

As in most Middle Eastern countries, in Kuwait prior to the mid-1970s few women wore the Islamic hijab (which permits only the hands and face to show). Prayer was practiced by many people, but the elderly were the most religious. Restrictions on the mixing of the sexes were not rigidly observed, and regulations inhibiting women's participation in sports and many kinds of work were slowly loosening. In the 1970s, female students joined their male counterparts in classes at Kuwait University; activities were jointly planned, regardless of sex.

In most Middle Eastern societies during the 1950s and 1960s, most Muslims expressed their commitment to Islam through cultural and spiritual manifestations rather than in political forums. Belief in Islam underpinned the moral rectitude of the community, where followers were asked to remember God by doing good and caring for others during the course of their lives.

After 1979 in Kuwait, Islamic forces seemed increasingly bold, as the secular nationalist forces lost many of their traditional bases of power such as the teachers' and students' associations. In most non-governmental organizations (Kuwait is known for these influential associations), every election after 1979 was characterized by an attempt on the part of Islamic forces to gain control.10

On the economic level, the movement was able to build a network in every mosque and neighborhood, and major institutions founded in the mid-1970s complemented their power. For instance, Bayt al-Tamwil (Finance House) became the second major bank in Kuwait. The movement built and solidified its base in the 1980s. Kuwaiti Islamists became key players in the financial support given to Islamic movements in Afghanistan, Egypt, Algeria and Sudan.

Since 1980 the Islamic forces have consisted of three main groups: the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood, whose base is in the Social Reform Society; the more marginal Ancestral (Salal) Islamic group, which has its base in the newly formed Heritage group (al-Turath)¹¹; and the Cultural Social Society (Jamiyyat al­ Thaqafah al-Ijtimayyah), which is under the influence of the forces inspired by the Iranian Revolution and represents the interests of segments of the Shia community (20 to 30 percent of the citizenry).12

The strength of the Islamic movement as expressed primarily in the Social Reform Society was clearly demonstrated during the parliamentary elections of 1981, the first to be held following the dissolution of Parliament in 1976.13 In the elections, the secular Pan Arabist forces were defeated by the Islamists, who became the only organized political group in Parliament. Although a minority in Parliament, they were influential. They shrewdly focused on strengthening their alliance with the state.14

The Kuwaiti government felt that coopting the Islamic current in the bureaucracy would soften its appeal, while at the same time boosting government legitimacy. This was sorely needed following the second dissolution of Parliament in 1986, which prompted both secularist and Islamic forces to confront the government on a host of issues. most of them dealing with government accountability.

By 1981 Islamist influence had spread to the teachers' association, and from there to the Ministry of Education. This laid the groundwork for the imposition of a more conservative school curriculum. Books in Arabic began citing parables from the Quran rather than from modem sources. The secular and "open" poetry of the 1970s was increasingly replaced by that of a religious and conservative nature. First­ grade Arabic primers were revised to include examples of children praying, eating and drinking and thanking God for what they had; no examples were given of people working, producing, drawing, singing, dancing and so on.15

The national day, on which boys and girls from all grades performed national songs and dances for parents, educators, officials and the media was challenged on religious grounds. In 1986, it took a threat of resignation by the minister of education, Hasan al-Ibrahim, to prevent the cancellation of the government-approved ceremony. The celebration has since been abolished.16

The influence of the Islamic movement during the 1980s was also felt in the Ministry of Information. Television programs became more conservative, and censorship increased.17 The ministry censored all kinds of books, including those critical of the Islamic current. Conversely, books and tapes with narrow interpretations of Islam flooded the market.

 

COMPLEX DYNAMICS OF THE MOVEMENT

The Islamic groups of the mainstream Brotherhood, the minority Salafi, and the Shia through the Jamiyah al-Thaqafah have demonstrated over the years exceptional organizational skills. It seems natural that Islamic forces would target influential associational groups and make use of them to further their cause. The amount of funding, equipment, and staffing available to the Islamic groups was much greater than what had been available in the past to any political group in the Middle East.18 They, by and large, are responsible for the introduction of the more formal and organized politics in Kuwait and the region as a whole. The Islamic movement made the best use possible of the diffuse nature of informal groups in Kuwaiti society. As stated above, in the 1980s, they became the only organized mass-based political force in the country.

In addition to the state's leniency regarding interest groups furthering Islamic doctrines, cultural factors played an important role in the spread of the Islamists' doctrines. Mosque and prayer and the various teachings of Islam helped make the population more accepting of narrowly based political Islam. The overall conservative attitude of society toward women, dress codes and religion exemplified the overlap between social conservatism and political Islam. By preaching the role of the elders over the young, the role of men over women, and the right of men to have more than one wife, the Islamic message attracted conservative and less-educated people, particularly the Bedouin.

In the mid-1980s the Islamic movement in Kuwait ceased being an expression of a disillusioned urban elite. The marriage between Bedouin conservative values and the movement matured. The societal process of change from traditional to modern and from rural (desert) to urban created among the Bedouin the condition of isolation that would make them more open to messages helping them define the world, simplify its meaning, and find (sometimes superficial) solutions to its problems. The majority of the relatively deprived Bedouin tribes have moved from the sidelines to the forefront in demanding societal recognition and equality, the basis for which is found in Islam.19 Several influential populist Islamists have risen from among their ranks. A similar trend of outspokenness can be seen in urban families of lesser influence seeking equal footing with the more cosmopolitan and traditionally powerful families.

This process of "desertization," as the Bahraini thinker Muhammad Ansari labels it, is among the most destructive processes in the Middle East.20 It undermines modern life by bringing into urban society the ultraconservative values of the desert and mixing them with Islamist populism. The process destroys the hope of a nation-state whose urban centers can assimilate and acculturate newcomers. It puts the national civil framework at risk, and prevents it from maturing. Desertization of the city and the state entails populism and an increased urban-Bedouin divide. Religious fervor, in addition to creating a divisiveness based on values, also builds a sectarian (Shia-Sunni or Bedouin-urban) division on the most limited and narrowly defined issues: prayer, time of prayer, style of dress and so on.21 Short of authoritarian repression, in order to counter populism and Islamist radicalism the state has no choice but to undergo a process of democratization, societal neutrality and egalitarianism. In the new milieu, repression will work only on a temporary basis.

In Kuwait, the attitudes of the Islamists toward modernity are of a dual nature. Somewhat ironically, the overwhelming majority of Islamists among Kuwait University students are in the colleges of science; their fatalistic conservatism is somehow wedded to the fruits of modem technology. But just as the colleges of science provide ways of seeing technically, it is the social sciences that provide a global view. The educational system at Kuwait University and in the rest of the country, as well as in the region, has failed to provide a convincing set of ideas packaged in an indigenous social-science framework capable of assimilating students into more modem and forward-looking ways of thinking.

The college of Sharia at Kuwait University, like those in many other Arab universities, is a school of traditional religious indoctrination; these are the schools that produce Islamist activists. Most of the instruction is provided by professors who tend to be either fundamentalist or orthodox. It is debatable whether changes in the educational system can inspire less narrow Islamic interpretations. There is already an entire school in Islam that allows for choice between the lesser of two evils. For instance, if by forbidding alcohol more people consume it, and certain mafias make all the profit, and more people seek substitutes such as drugs, then the law is counterproductive.22 This means that countries like the United Arab Emirates or Syria or Egypt that allow the consumption of alcohol on one level or another are not introducing an anti-Islamic practice.

The Islamic current is not all negative. On the contrary, it carries with it a message of respect for the self and for Arab and Islamic history. It provides orientation for individual moral guidelines to the young in a society experiencing rapid change. However, the moment is also ripe for excess. Like any movement seeking power and influence and believing in the accuracy of its interpretations, it seeks full obedience by society to its version of truth.

 

POST-LIBERATION TENSIONS

After Kuwait's liberation in 1991, Kuwaiti society went through self-evaluation. Many young Kuwaitis looked toward the United States as a model for creating a new way of life. The country's liberation, their participation in it, and their contact with the U.S. army created among them a respect and fondness for Americans. Exiled Kuwaitis who had lived for almost a year in more open Western environments began to appreciate the need for change in their own society and values. On the other hand, social conservatism also spread among equally large sectors. For example, Kuwaitis who had lived in Saudi Arabia during the invasion were impressed by the religiosity of the Saudis. Many religiously conservative Kuwaitis felt that the invasion and occupation were punishment from God for Kuwaitis' lavish lifestyle. Only through Islam could the situation be rectified. During this period, Islamists needed to build on the confidence gained in confronting the Iraqi occupation and at the same time counter movements toward an opening of society. The opportunity was at hand, because the secular forces were weak and fragmented and the government was less capable of dealing with new societal demands. The government's own legitimacy was at stake.

Three Islamist political groups have appeared since liberation. The Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM) has its roots in the Muslim Brothers of Kuwait. Social Reform, an influential Islamic associational group that had been gaining strength since the 1970s, the Islamic Popular Alliance (IPA), better known as al­ Salaf (Ancestral), has roots in the Society for the Rebirth of Islamic Tradition. This group, which has been attracting followers since the 1980s, is more literal than the Constitutional Movement in its interpretation of Islam. The Islamic National Alliance (INA) has roots in al­ Jamiyyah al-Thaqafiyyah, which is attractive to segments of Kuwait's Shia population.

In addition, a non-governmental association was formed by Islamists linked to the Social Reform Society in order to practice what can "direct the public to do good and refrain from evil," similar to what is done in Saudi Arabia. According to its general secretary, Fahid Abdulrahman al­ Shwayyib, the group's goal was to enlist 1,000 men and establish a religious police with "a branch in every neighborhood that patrols and watches citizens, in order to spread the teachings of Islam. 23 The government responded by discrediting the practice, stating that "police will not allow any group to harm any citizen or resident in Kuwait in any form, verbal or physical.24

Several incidents of violence involving Islamists took place in Kuwait City toward the end of 1991 and prior to elections of October 1992. At the time, some Islamists were caught harboring large quantities of weapons and explosives. There were shooting incidents involving the Romanian circus, which was visiting Kuwait, and explosions occurred in several video stores.25

In this context Abdullah al-Mutawa, director of the Social Reform Association, saw the need for an immediate application of Sharia, including severing thieves' hands, outlawing interest rates, segregating the sexes, and enforcing the dress code for women. AI-Mutawa also announced the need to change the wording of the Kuwaiti constitution from "the State's religion is Islam, and the Islamic Sharia is a source of legislation" to "Islamic Sharia is the only and main source of legislation."26 Likewise, Sheikh Jasim Muhalhal al-Yasin, secretary of the Constitutional Movement, called for the application of the Sharia immediately.27

Because the constitution, written in 1962, made Islam the state religion and Sharia a source (though not the only one) of legislation, Kuwait did not ban waqf (endowments), nor did it follow anti­Islamic policies, as did many socialist and revolutionary Middle Eastern states. It interpreted its rules on the bases of reason and necessity rather than on a particular interpretation of the Sharia. The application of the Sharia in a literal sense is, therefore, a controversial and often­ debated issue in Kuwait.

The Sharia is applied in laws governing personal matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and waqf, but other laws strike a balance between the Sharia and social and international practices. For example, alcohol is prohibited by law, but punishment is not according to the Sharia. Those who trade in alcohol receive imprisonment, while a person consuming it in public can be fined and may at a maximum be imprisoned for a certain period. There is no punishment for consuming alcohol in the privacy of one's own home.28 Furthermore the state tends to tum a blind eye on this matter. Itis such flexibility in Kuwaiti laws that the Islamists want to change. Islamic groups increasingly have distributed cassettes in commercial centers and in front of mosques that preach the need to practice the Sharia, in particular its more conservative orthodox interpretation. Since 1991, most of the Islamists' leading representatives have begun writing actively in the daily newspapers.

The emir of Kuwait, sensing the changing current, reacted immediately by establishing a higher consultative committee to work toward completing the enforcement of Islamic law. Established in December 1991, the committee was an attempt to institutionally coopt the Islamists, many of whom were opposed to its formation. It had a long-term mandate but no enforcement capabilities and has yet to issue a recommendation.

Despite the invigoration of the Islamist movement, relations between secular groups and intellectuals and Islamists in Kuwait continued to be fairly positive. The main issue - the return to parliamentary life - dominated political discourse in the country throughout 1991 and until elections in October 1992. The Islamic groups continued, for political reasons, to be conciliatory toward non-Islamic groups.

The 1992 elections created a new atmosphere in Kuwait. The parliamentarians from Islamist groups believed that the vote could be interpreted as a mandate for the Islamization of the country's laws and regulations. This led the assembly during its first year to introduce an array of measures, which ultimately failed, that can be characterized as contradictory to anything expected from a democratic institution.

At the time, the Parliament consisted of the religious right, the center, and the traditional left. The fourteen or so members of the religious right were leading the hesitant center - another fourteen or more members - on most religious and conservative issues. The center was fearful of losing its local and tribal constituency. The secular-oriented liberal group of former Arab nationalists, the Democratic Forum (al-Manbar al-Dimuqrati), which was formed after liberation, and several other independent and liberal factions appeared fragmented.29 Elected six years after the suspension of the previous parliament - a period that included the Iraqi invasion-the members wasted a good deal of time on issues that should have been settled or dismissed quickly.

The suggestion by five Islamic parliamentarians to establish an "authority to direct the public to do good and refrain from evil" is an example of the dominant trend.30 The authority's main role would be to fight foreign behavior that infringes on Kuwaiti traditions and contradicts Islam....This is done by planning and supervising public behavior.... In order to achieve its goals, the authority will hear complaints from citizens regarding any phenomena contradicting public decency.... It will also open offices in every area and district....It will call ministries such as education and information and interior to inform them of non-Islamic behavior. The authority will study monthly reports that the Ministry of Interior will commit itself to providing regarding cases of morality, regardless of whether it was transferred to court or was kept and pardoned....The authority will give lectures, distribute pamphlets, and print books.31

Khalid al-Oudwah, a leading Islamist in parliament, called for making "Kuwait the state of belief and Quran."32 Another leading Islamist from the Islamic Constitutional Movement called this attempt the only way to solve moral degeneration in Kuwait.33 Another parliamentarian, Mufaraj Nahar al-Mutayri, explained that "police station files are full of moral crimes....We are a country that went through a difficult crisis, and God put at our disposal all the countries of the world to defend us; our land has been liberated by those among us who contributed to the poor in the rest of the world."34 By extrapolation, it is time to thank God - not politics or politicians or even the Western coalition - by practicing Islam and returning to its doctrines.35 The non-governmental associations controlled by the Islamists released a statement calling for the application of the authority project.36 The suggestion to establish an authority to direct the public by the enforcement of law initiated a major and divisive debate. In general, the Islamist deputies' assertions that government laws were non-Islamic, based, of course, on their narrow interpretation of Islam, led to the collapse of the alliance between the Islamists and liberals as opposition forces, an alliance forged during the years after parliament was banned in 1986. During this debate, in some cases the differences between the branches of the opposition were greater than the differences between the opposition as a whole and the government. At one point, the minority of secular and liberal deputies realized to what ends the Islamic groups would go to make use of the coalition.37 Columnists in major newspapers blasted the authority proposal and succeeded in defeating it.38

Another divisive issue that captured the country's attention for several months was the niqab. The issue started with a November 1991 incident in which the dean of the faculty of medicine at Kuwait University attempted to prohibit medical students in laboratories, for reasons of safety, from wearing the niqab, which covers the entire body, including the face and hands. This matter, involving four students, was given priority by the Islamists later elected to parliament. Month after month this issue took the assembly's time. Parliamentary committees, such as those on education and legislation, were consumed with following up on the matter. The Islamist parliamentarians tried to issue legislation nullifying the dean's decision prohibiting the niqab; university professors protested parliament's interference. Jamal al-Kindari, secretary of the educational committee, advised the university "not to challenge the parliament."39

Furthermore, Islamic parliamentarians initially approved the segregation of the coeducational Kuwait University, which happened to have a woman president. In December 1994, a vote for segregation failed by one vote to gamer a majority. The government had lobbied heavily against the measure, as had liberal deputies and Minister of Higher Education Ahmad al-Ribi, creating something of an alliance between liberals and the government. This alliance once again prevailed in February 1995, when the Islamists failed to push through a vote of no confidence against al-Ribi.

Also in 1994, 35 members of parliament signed and delivered a petition to the emir regarding the Sharia and the changing of the second article of the constitution to make Sharia "the main source of legislation" (instead of a main source).40 In fact, all elected members of parliament signed the petition, with the exception of six liberals, who became the objects of accusations. Despite this apparent support, such a measure would not pass easily, because it requires the agreement of two-thirds of parliament and the approval of the emir.

However, the segregation law passed in 1996, and the society, not just the intellectuals, went through intense debates on the matter. Finally a compromise formula favorable to the Islamists was found that allows Kuwait University to be coed for five years. The compromise also included non-interference in coed private schools. The passage of the law was a setback to liberal forces. But, since the passage of the law, it has not been enforced; no steps have been taken to segregate the university after five years. The second day the university announced it could not apply the law for lack of practicality, since Kuwait University has been coed for more than 20 years. However, after five years, the Islamic groups could again bring the matter to the forefront.

While such efforts were a reflection of sectors of society that consider heretical certain activities perceived by others as personal freedoms, some in society considered the Islamists' proposed laws undemocratic and out of touch with the age. Journalists and opinion makers, in addition to public opinion, torpedoed each one of the measures, highlighting those aspects that infringed on personal freedoms. Popular pressure affected the parliamentarians.

The Islamic movement did have a positive religious influence, but its more narrowly based interpretations of Islam - on issues of dress, modernity, East-West relations, personal freedom and the need to control society and state behavior - alienated many intellectuals including individuals in sympathy with the movement. Although its totalitarian message appealed to a wide population, "Islam is the solution" for Kuwait today sounded like "Arab unity" or "the liberation of Palestine is the solution" in the 1950s. The constant challenges to the movement, from both society and state and from intellectuals and the modem world will in the Jong run weaken its appeal in favor of a more liberal Islamic interpretation of both personal and political relations and behavior.

 

THE 1996 PARLIAMENT

The elections of October 1996 resulted in some ways in a similar parliament to the one elected in 1992; however, 16 old timers and active members of the 1992 parliament lost. The membership change amounted to 50 percent. The new parliament differed in one main respect: It is composed of a higher percentage (21) of members who tend to be moderate and believe in a cooperative policy with the government on at least some of the issues. But the Islamic representation continued to be high (18), though more of them came from the Salaf and fewer from the constitutional movement. This new parliament is also composed of 11 secular members of traditional urban-critical or opposition orientation to the government.41 But there are several members who tend to be sympathetic to the Islamic movement in the independent camp. Such a divided parliament will have difficulty building consensus, yet the Islamists can easily get more than half the vote on any serious Islamic issue, such as sexual segregation in Kuwait University or the application of the Shari.42

Again, the new parliament sought the application of the Sharia by suggesting a change in Article 2 of the constitution. But this time 9 out of 45 (five parliamentarians are serving as ministers in the new govern­ mint formed after the October elections) refused the suggested change.43 Only four had refused the idea in the previous parliament. Many others who voted for the suggestion did it out of concern for their public and Islamic image. They know very well that the whole idea will be vetoed by the emir. Furthermore, the new parliament raised the issue of sexually integrated fashion shows. The parliamentarians challenged the government on its policy of openness. While the parliament asked the government to limit such events, the government paid little attention to the request. This added to the anger and mistrust between Islamic members of parliament and the government.44

Since the October 1996 election, the divisive atmosphere between liberals and Islamists has increased. This time the Islamists led a campaign against several university professors and writers. For example, Alya Shuayb, a professor of philosophy at Kuwait University, was accused of spreading degenerative ideas when she stated in an interview with a Kuwaiti magazine that lesbianism is widespread at Kuwait University.45 The reaction was intense, and the rector of the university had to form a committee of investigation. The committee recommended expelling her from the university, and now the issue is on the desk of the minister of education, who is trying to delay making any decision despite pressures on him from the Islamists to accept the committee's harsh verdict.

Likewise, Ahmad al-Baghdadi, the chairman of the political-science department, and Sulaiman al-Badir, a former minister of education, were accused of insulting Prophet Muhammad. Both had said in an interview with a Kuwaiti newspaper that in the early period of Islam the prophet "failed" in Mecca, which forced his move to Medina.46 The word "failed" became an issue; several Islamists took it to parliament and called for punishment and resignation. Others threatened Baghdadi's life, and some sued him in court, while others wanted to force him to divorce his wife, as happened to Abu Zaid in Egypt. The issue became intense on all levels; it was clear that an organized Islamist effort stood behind the reaction.

Another writer, Layla al-Othman, became an object of a court order in January 1997, due to short stories that she wrote 10 years ago describing love relationships. The stories had long been on bookshelves when they came to the attention of the Islamists. Four Islamists pursued the author in the courts. Again there was a flare-up in the press, as liberal writers accused the Islamists of an organized campaign against freedom of thought. Meetings were organized by the association of artists, and many journalists and non-governmental organizations in the Arab world stated positions and wrote in support of freedom of thought as expressed by al-Othman and Shuayb. This case, like others, is buried in the court system; no decision is anticipated.47

 

FLEXIBILITY IN ISLAM

In certain ways, the lack of public debate since 1986 contributed to the Islamic groups' growing strength and popularity. During the long period between parliamentary elections (1985-1992), people turned to rigid interpretations of Islam as a protection against change, modern life, social inequality, state differentiation between groups etc. They sought Islam at a time of defeat, lack of democracy, and failure and hardship in their personal lives.

In each Islamic grouping, there exist trends being pulled by the past and others being pushed toward the future. Public debate and long-term experience with the democratic process can be expected to create conditions for a more reasoned, forward-looking view of Islam among the population. Only through this process will the transformation of Islam take place, allowing it to become more active, participatory and modem.

A small moderate trend already exists in the Islamic movement. While it is a minority, it may, as a result of the losses of the Islamic mainstream, at another stage play a larger role. Khalid al-Mathkur, the chairman of the government-appointed committee to study the application of the Sharia, is, for example, a leading scholar among those who have a moderate and practical understanding of Islam.

Member of Parliament (ICM) Dr. Ismail al-Shatti, a former editor of al-Mujtama the weekly magazine of the Muslim Brothers and one of the most soft­ spoken Islamic leaders, has called for a transition in stages toward the application of the Sharia. He has criticized attempts to apply it in other countries as failures. Time is important, according to al-Shatti: "We did not solve the problem of Sharia and music and theater, among other things. How can we create Islamic information?...It is wrong to start the application of the Sharia with al-hudud [restrictions]. The origin in people is honor and goodness, not delinquency ....We must first provide good, honest lives for people and then ask them about restrictions and applications of rule in other matters." He goes on to note, "The Quran came in stages." To further make his point, al-Shatti cites the Sudanese experiment with the Sharia as a failure. There, leaders started with the sword, cutting off the hands of those who stole, whipping those who committed adultery. They did not start with economic recovery or education and development.48

However, al-Shatti is indebted to the Islamic Constitutional Movement for his place in parliament. The ideologues of the movement do not trust their politicians and continue supervising their statements. This makes all potential changes among individuals the domain of the group. It is clear that the wider the public debate, the more rational thought and secular thinking are presented publicly; at the same time, the followers and the more adversely affected will be leaders of the Islamic groups. Public debate will aid the process of moving toward rational, modem and democratic Islamic thinking.

Public debate equally helps in bringing to light those Islamic ideas that are susceptible to modernity and change. There is a whole range of modern interpretations of Islam expressed in books and articles. These interpretations link democracy with Islam and consider women's and individual rights compatible with Islamic beliefs and practices. This reformation, in its formative stage in the Arab world, is of great value. The writings of Muhammad Shahrur, Muhammad Arkun, Hussain Ahmad Amin, Nasr Abu Zayd and al-Sadiq al-Nayhum a e already stirring intense debate. Shahrur's al-Kitab wal Quran (the Book and the Quran) was at one time banned in Kuwait, but today it can be found in bookstores.49

Despite the time wasted and the focus on divisive issues, the parliament elected in 1992 did succeed in dealing with some economic issues and approving a law allowing the children of Kuwaitis born after their fathers gained Kuwaiti citizenship to vote and run for office. In other words children of naturalized citizens can now vote and campaign. They also approved a law that made it possible for naturalized Kuwaitis to vote for parliament after 20 years of earning their citizenship. The waiting period for the older law was 30 years. These measures also mean opening the way, with the approval of government, for further electoral reform. It is also to the credit of the parliament that it established a human-rights committee to monitor abuses in Kuwait.

 

GOVERNMENT POLICY SINCE 1992

The government formed after the October 1992 elections was composed of six elected parliamentarians and ten appointed ministers. After it was seated, the state discovered that it had given the Islamists more strength. The minister of waqf was from the Constitutional Movement, as was the minister of commerce. Other Islamic sympathizers in the government limited its cohesiveness and ability to make decisions.

The Islamists' strength was also an irritant in internal Kuwaiti as well as Arab and international relations. The idea that the Sharia and Islamic law would be applied alienated many Kuwaitis and non­-Kuwaitis in the country. Ambassadors in Kuwait expressed their disappointment with what was going on in parliament. Egyptian officials questioned the freedom of Islamists in Kuwait to collect money and send contributions to Islamists abroad. Kuwait was again in the spotlight and at a crossroads. The government may even have considered dissolving parliament and calling for new elections. The final decision, however, was to allow the experiment to mature and to let time and politics take care of the situation.

The intense lobbying and attempts to Islamize rules and laws created fear in the government. The administration formed in April 1994 appeared to be one in which the government and the liberals joined forces, putting distance between themselves and the Islamic groups. Two Islamic ministers with Brotherhood affiliation were dropped in the formation of the new government.

While the government has responded positively to the new era in Kuwait, many elements of the past continue to haunt the present. The government's six-day closure of al-Anba for publishing interviews with representatives of the Islamic movement brought all forces in the civil society together, resurrecting some old alliances. The government had previously abolished a Jaw penalizing newspapers for publishing opinions considered critical of it. One of the interviews in al-Anba called for an Islamic coalition and for a popular government in the parliamentary election of October 1996.50

It was felt that the government had exceeded its prerogatives and that penalizing the newspaper for publishing an opinion was counter to the law. This particular event showed that contradictions within the opposition between liberals and Islamists are one thing, but the government's use of its power beyond the laws and rules of the country is another. It looks from this experience as if the liberals’ ability to cooperate with the government is dependent on the government’s ability to live up to the rule of law and to respect its promises in regard to openness and democratization. People may not protest if the government dissolves the elected parliament, but they will defy the government if it does not, in accordance with the constitution, hold new elections within two months.

Insofar as civil society is an important safety valve, the state remains decisive. The Kuwaiti state is still seeking development in the midst of difficulties. Much work is needed in the direction of reevaluating the state's previous informal alliance built over the years with Islamic groups. The state needs to refocus its interests in the context of an alliance with more liberal and cosmopolitan elements in the Islamic movement. Signs of such a change are perceptible in Kuwait; however, the state is hesitant, over calculates its moves, and in many cases is hobbled by indecisiveness.

For a take-off that can lead Kuwait into the twenty-first century, a set of decisions must be made to help reshape the balance of forces in society. Kuwait has been a commercial center throughout its history. The country's only hope lies in its ability to deepen its democratic experience and reshape its commercial rules. The process of openness must gain momentum. Today the country is in the process of starting a free-zone area, trying to forge less-rigid laws and more-flexible rules. The existence of a strong Islamic movement with narrow interpretations of Islam undermines the process. New arrangements need not exclude the more pragmatic wings of the Islamic forces, who could help in laying the foundation for limiting narrow interpretations of Islam and striking the proper balance between Islam, development and state building. This may mean genuine reform on the grass-roots level that permits new societal forces to participate in the development of the country. It does mean government neutrality in its appointments. which should be based on merit and an ability to halt corruption and favoritism. In the past, these qualities contributed to the ability of the Islamists to attract followers and plant roots, in particular among the less fortunate and alienated segments of the population, primarily Kuwaitis of Bedouin origin.51 This will be a central theme in Kuwaiti politics for the coming era. The ability of the government to open up and its willingness to undertake a far-reaching program with all the forces seeking reform and development will have significant effects on the direction of the country.

* The author would like to thank Kuwait University (research administration) for the grant that made this study possible.

1 State of Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office, Statistical Review, 1994, issue 17.

2 See Jill Crystal, Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State {Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 65-89.

3 In 1988, out of a work force of 115,000 people, 103,000 worked in the government sector and 10,000 in the private sector. Statistical Review, 1994, issue 17.

4 Khaldun al-Nuqib, Al-Mujatama' wal dawlahfi al-Khalij wal Jazirah al-Arabiyya: min manzur mukhtalif (State and Society in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula: A different Perspective [Beriut: Center of Arab Unity Studies, 1989]), p. 152.

5 Andrew Cox and Noel O'Sullivan, eds., The Corporate State: Corporatism and the State Tradition in Western Europe (Hants, 'England: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1988).

6 On these concepts, See Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, I 984).

7 Shafeeq Ghabra, "Voluntary Associations in Kuwait: Foundations of a New Society?" Middle East Journal, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 199-215.

8 Ibid., p. 206.

9 See Jam'iyyat al-lslah al-ljtimaa 'i: 25 'Aman min al Ta'sis (The Social Reform Society: 25 Years Since Its Establishment [Kuwait: The Social Reform Society, 1988)),pp. 11-39.

10 See Ghabra, "Voluntary Associations in Kuwait" pp. 199-215.

11 See ibid., pp. 206-ll.

12 See James Bill, "Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 63, No. I {Fall 1984), p. 120.

13 Sawt al-Khalij, March 5, 1981, p. 12.

14 See interview with Abdullah al-Mutawwa, chairman of the Social Reform Society and one of the founders of the Muslim Brothers in Kuwait, al-Mujtama Weekly Magazine (Kuwait),December 15, 1981.

15 Based on a review of the school curriculum and on several interviews with teachers and members of the Kuwait Ministry of Education, spring 1994.

16 Discussion with Hasan al-Ibrahim, former Kuwaiti minister of education, spring 1994.

17 Comparisons between television programs in the 1980s and today reveal many differences. Today, although such pressures remain, they can be challenged:

18 On the previous dearth of organizational skills in Arab mass politics, see James Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990), p. 89.

19 Shafeeq Ghabra, Al-Kuwayt: Dirasahfi aliyyat al-dawlah al-qutriyyah wal sultah wal mujtama (Kuwait: A study of the dynamics of state, authority, and society [Cairo: Dar Ibn Khaldun for Developmental Studies and Dar al-Amin lil-Nashr, 1995]), pp. 53-60.

20 Muhammad Jabir al-Ansari, Takwin al-Arab al-siyasi wa maghzah al-daw/ah al-qutriyya (Arab political formation and the meaning of the state [Beirut: Center of Arab Unity Studies, 1994]).

21 See al-Qabas, March 6, 1993, for the story of a Shia child denied the right to pray in school.

22 Muhammad Said al-Ishmawi, al-Islam al-siyyasi (Political Islam, 3rd ed. [Cairo: Sina Iii Nashr, 1992]), p. 59.

23 Al-Qabas, August 31, 1991.

24 Ibid.

25 Majalat al-Majalah (London), August 14, 1993.

26 Al-Anba, December 21, 1991.

27 Al-Mujtama, June 7, 1992.

28 Najib al-Waqayyan, a lawyer, quoted in al-Anba, December 22, 1991.

29 On the 1992 elections, see Shafeeq Ghabra, "Democratization in a Middle Eastern State: Kuwait, 1993," Middle East Policy, Vol.3, No. l (1994), pp. 102-19.

30 Arab Times, October 27, 1993, p. 1.

31 From the original draft of the proposed law as published in al-Anba, March 1, 1993.

32 Al-Qabas, March 14, 1993.

33 Al-Mujtama, March 23, 1993.

34 Al-Siyasah, March 14, 1993.

35 See the column of Abdul Rahman al-Najjar, al-Anba, March 12, 1993.

36 Al-Watan, March 18, 1993.

37 "Salah al-Hasihm" (The honeymoon is over), al-Qabas, March 18, 1993.

38 Al-Qabas, March 4, 1993; al-Taliah, March 10, 1993; Sarni Abud al Latifal-Nisif, al-Qabas, April 7, 1993, p. 11; Abdul Rahman al-Najjar, a/-Anba, March 12, 1993; al-Siyasah, March 20, 1993.

39 Al-Watan, December 6, 1992, p. 1.

40 Arab Times, August 31, 1993; "MPs Seek Constitutional Change to Islamise Law," Arab Times, August 27, 1993, p. l.

41 "Surprises in the Elections...," al-Qabas, October 8, 1996, p. 1.

42 "The Islamists control half the seats in Parliament," al-watan al-Arabi (weekly), October 18, 1996, p. 18.

43 "37 Members Seek Constitutional Change," al-Siyyasah, January 23, 1997, p.5.

44 Al-Qabas, December 25, 1996, p. l; December 29, p. 7.

45 Interview with Alya Shuayb in al-Hadath (monthly), November 1996, pp. 22-24.

46 Interview with Ahmad Baghdadi, al-Shu/ah (student monthly), July 1996; interview with Sulaiman al-Badir, al-Anba (daily), December 10, 1996.

47 Al-Siyyasah, January 2, 1997, p. 1.

48 AI-Anba, December 21, 1991.

49 Muhammad Shahrur, al-Kitab wal Quran (The Book and the Quran, 3rd ed. [Beirut: Sharilcat al-Matbuat Ji) Tawzi Wal Nashr, 1993]).

50 Al-Wotan (daily), July 30, 1995; al-Qabas, July 30, 1995, p. 9.

51 Ghabra, Al-Kuwayt, pp. 221-41.