Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.
By Middle East Policy
A new journal article by Emil A. Souleimanov and Yury Fedorov explains the economic benefits of Moscow’s weakness, but perils remain as these states navigate the divide between the former superpower and the West.
Russia’s vulnerabilities in the face of its Ukraine invasion are again on display, with Armenia criticizing Moscow for failing to ensure its security in the face of perceived aggression from neighboring Azerbaijan. “This example should demonstrate to us that dependence on just one partner in security matters is a strategic mistake,” Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan warned in an interview with La Repubblica.
A new article in Middle East Policy explores many such dilemmas facing the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus following the Ukraine invasion and the widening of the East-West divide. After decades of economic and military integration with Russia, “the post-Soviet South must weigh the risks of aligning with the weakening great power,” Emil A. Souleimanov and Yury Fedorov argue.
The nations of the post-Soviet South are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
The Ukraine war has forced Moscow to turn its attention and resources away from commitments in the Caucasus, prompting regional states to look elsewhere for partners. Just this week, US and Armenian forces began combined military exercises just outside Yerevan, the capital. Armenia lost its 2020 war for Nagorno-Karabakh, a territory in Azerbaijan with an ethnic Armenian majority.
But it is in the economic arena that the dilemmas facing these states are most acute. Western sanctions have led Russia to boost its trade with the post-Soviet South and to reduce export prices, the scholars observe. In 2022, Russia’s trade with the region increased from $7.4 billion to $11.3 billion. The emigration of hundreds of thousands of highly skilled Russian citizens contributed to the boom.
The overall gains have been stunning, with GDP growth across these states hitting 5.1 percent last year, well over the expected 3.6 percent, the authors report.
This immediate upturn has only increased the perils. Souleimanov, a professor at Charles University of the Czech Republic, and Fedorov, an independent researcher, contend that the former superpower will be unable to export the kinds of heavy equipment and technological know-how that it has previously, and that the Russian nationals who fled to the post-Soviet South to avoid mobilization are likely to return home.
More important than the likely decrease in economic growth is an unfortunate irony: Russia’s weakness and its favorable trade terms have made the states of the post-Soviet South more dependent on it, so “taking a stand against the invasion could expose them to retaliatory measures from Moscow,” the scholars write. This presents a double-edged sword, as they may also face secondary sanctions from the West for taking advantage of these opportunities.
However, the United States and European Union may be reluctant to punish the former Soviet republics, as this could push them back toward the Russian orbit. Moscow has found itself politically and not just economically weakened. As Souleimanov and Fedorov show, it has been unable to convince the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a group of Central Asian states headed by China and Russia, to explicitly back the Ukraine war. At the 2022 summit, the authors say, “The leaders of China, India, and Turkey openly advocated for a diplomatic resolution.”
Despite finding themselves “between a rock and a hard place,” Souleimanov and Fedorov conclude, the “positive economic impact appears to outweigh the potential risks” to these states of taking firm positions for or against Russia or the West.
The invasion of Ukraine presented nations of the South Caucasus and Central Asia with a dilemma: Do they distance themselves from Russia and risk retaliation? Or do they cooperate despite the possibility of secondary sanctions from the West?
They are trying to maneuver between the global and regional powers.
No states in the post-Soviet South have recognized occupied Ukraine as Russian territory or condemned the invasion.
The eight states are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
However, Russia’s influence has clearly waned:
Azerbaijan has taken advantage of Russia’s distraction by asserting its influence over the Armenian-majority region of Nagorno-Karabakh, where it won a second war in 2020. Armenia, traditionally allied with Moscow, is seeking help from the West.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a Central Asian group led by Russia and China, has remained relatively neutral. Many members favor talks between Kyiv and Moscow so they can focus on other regional issues.
Post-Soviet countries are experiencing economic growth due to the war, but they are ironically more reliant on Moscow at a time when its power is decreasing.
The post-Soviet South has gained economically since the war began, with GDP growth in 2022 hitting 5.1 percent, far higher than expected.
Sanctions have made Russia more dependent on those markets and open to reducing export prices.
Thousands of skilled Russian workers emigrated to those states, fearing mobilization.
However, the economic gains are a double-edged sword.
Russian workers will likely return home.
Russia’s weaknesses may restrict its ability to supply machinery and to serve as a hub for technology and business knowledge.
The gains have made these states dependent on Moscow and subject to secondary sanctions from the West.
For instance, the US and EU have warned the Kazakh government about the increasing supply of computers and other products with microelectronic components to Russia.
The West prefers not to inflict secondary sanctions, as they will push the states closer to the Russian orbit and risk those states’ nationalizing assets.
Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.
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By Middle East Policy
A new journal article by Emil A. Souleimanov and Yury Fedorov explains the economic benefits of Moscow’s weakness, but perils remain as these states navigate the divide between the former superpower and the West.
Russia’s vulnerabilities in the face of its Ukraine invasion are again on display, with Armenia criticizing Moscow for failing to ensure its security in the face of perceived aggression from neighboring Azerbaijan. “This example should demonstrate to us that dependence on just one partner in security matters is a strategic mistake,” Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan warned in an interview with La Repubblica.
A new article in Middle East Policy explores many such dilemmas facing the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus following the Ukraine invasion and the widening of the East-West divide. After decades of economic and military integration with Russia, “the post-Soviet South must weigh the risks of aligning with the weakening great power,” Emil A. Souleimanov and Yury Fedorov argue.
The nations of the post-Soviet South are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
The Ukraine war has forced Moscow to turn its attention and resources away from commitments in the Caucasus, prompting regional states to look elsewhere for partners. Just this week, US and Armenian forces began combined military exercises just outside Yerevan, the capital. Armenia lost its 2020 war for Nagorno-Karabakh, a territory in Azerbaijan with an ethnic Armenian majority.
But it is in the economic arena that the dilemmas facing these states are most acute. Western sanctions have led Russia to boost its trade with the post-Soviet South and to reduce export prices, the scholars observe. In 2022, Russia’s trade with the region increased from $7.4 billion to $11.3 billion. The emigration of hundreds of thousands of highly skilled Russian citizens contributed to the boom.
The overall gains have been stunning, with GDP growth across these states hitting 5.1 percent last year, well over the expected 3.6 percent, the authors report.
This immediate upturn has only increased the perils. Souleimanov, a professor at Charles University of the Czech Republic, and Fedorov, an independent researcher, contend that the former superpower will be unable to export the kinds of heavy equipment and technological know-how that it has previously, and that the Russian nationals who fled to the post-Soviet South to avoid mobilization are likely to return home.
More important than the likely decrease in economic growth is an unfortunate irony: Russia’s weakness and its favorable trade terms have made the states of the post-Soviet South more dependent on it, so “taking a stand against the invasion could expose them to retaliatory measures from Moscow,” the scholars write. This presents a double-edged sword, as they may also face secondary sanctions from the West for taking advantage of these opportunities.
However, the United States and European Union may be reluctant to punish the former Soviet republics, as this could push them back toward the Russian orbit. Moscow has found itself politically and not just economically weakened. As Souleimanov and Fedorov show, it has been unable to convince the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a group of Central Asian states headed by China and Russia, to explicitly back the Ukraine war. At the 2022 summit, the authors say, “The leaders of China, India, and Turkey openly advocated for a diplomatic resolution.”
Despite finding themselves “between a rock and a hard place,” Souleimanov and Fedorov conclude, the “positive economic impact appears to outweigh the potential risks” to these states of taking firm positions for or against Russia or the West.
Among the major takeaways readers can find in Emil A. Souleimanov and Yury Fedorov’s Middle East Policy article, “The War in Ukraine: Risks and Opportunities for the ‘Post-Soviet South’”:
The invasion of Ukraine presented nations of the South Caucasus and Central Asia with a dilemma: Do they distance themselves from Russia and risk retaliation? Or do they cooperate despite the possibility of secondary sanctions from the West?
They are trying to maneuver between the global and regional powers.
No states in the post-Soviet South have recognized occupied Ukraine as Russian territory or condemned the invasion.
The eight states are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
However, Russia’s influence has clearly waned:
Azerbaijan has taken advantage of Russia’s distraction by asserting its influence over the Armenian-majority region of Nagorno-Karabakh, where it won a second war in 2020. Armenia, traditionally allied with Moscow, is seeking help from the West.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a Central Asian group led by Russia and China, has remained relatively neutral. Many members favor talks between Kyiv and Moscow so they can focus on other regional issues.
Post-Soviet countries are experiencing economic growth due to the war, but they are ironically more reliant on Moscow at a time when its power is decreasing.
The post-Soviet South has gained economically since the war began, with GDP growth in 2022 hitting 5.1 percent, far higher than expected.
Sanctions have made Russia more dependent on those markets and open to reducing export prices.
Thousands of skilled Russian workers emigrated to those states, fearing mobilization.
However, the economic gains are a double-edged sword.
Russian workers will likely return home.
Russia’s weaknesses may restrict its ability to supply machinery and to serve as a hub for technology and business knowledge.
The gains have made these states dependent on Moscow and subject to secondary sanctions from the West.
For instance, the US and EU have warned the Kazakh government about the increasing supply of computers and other products with microelectronic components to Russia.
The West prefers not to inflict secondary sanctions, as they will push the states closer to the Russian orbit and risk those states’ nationalizing assets.
You can read Emil A. Souleimanov and Yury Fedorov’s open-access article, “The War in Ukraine: Risks and Opportunities for the ‘Post-Soviet South,’” online for free. It will appear in the Fall 2023 issue of Middle East Policy, which is forthcoming.