Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.
By Middle East Policy
‘The potential for a complete collapse of the Sudanese state at this point is very high,’ expert asserts.
As civilians and foreign nationals flee Sudan amid the growing civil war between the army and a major paramilitary organization, a Middle East Policy contributor warns that prolonged fighting increases the risk that religious extremists and other armed groups could join the fray, imperiling not just the country’s stability but that of its neighbors.
“Sudan has a number of tribal leaders capable of fielding well-armed militias,” Federico Manfredi Firmian, a lecturer at Sciences Po Paris, told Middle East Policy. “There is also a risk that Islamist groups of Salafi-jihadi inspiration could seize the opportunity to establish a presence in a highly strategic country located between the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.
“The potential for a complete collapse of the Sudanese state at this point is very high.”
More than 500 people are estimated to have been killed in the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces, headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo. Experts believe the death toll is likely far higher.
The fighting “has further aggravated Sudan’s multiple woes,” Firmian said in an email interview, “which include a long-running economic crisis, severe humanitarian needs, and restive borderlands with a history of armed conflict.”
The United Nations fears that nearly one million people could flee the country by the end of the year, with an exodus of over 100,000 underway and three times that number displaced internally. The organization had estimated, before the conflict broke out, that about one third of the population of more than 45 million needed food aid.
The violence was sparked by disagreements in power sharing between the military groups. The two generals have played significant roles in the transitional civilian and military administrations since the 2019 coup that deposed former President Omar al-Bashir.
(AFP)
In a Middle East Policy article, Firmian and coauthor Osman Mirghani highlight several developments that led to the military’s seizing power from the transitional government in late 2021: Islamist terror attacks in Khartoum; the Beja Uprising in eastern Sudan, which caused major shortages of wheat and fuel; and a failed coup attempt by a small number of officers, which gave the military an excuse to expand its control.
Prior to this conflict, there were other warning signs. As early as February, Firmian told Middle East Policy, “there was evidence that both the military and the RSF had been stockpiling weapons, ammunition, and other materiel, in preparation for war.” He noted that “both the army and the RSF pursued recruitment drives in recent months and even accused one another publicly of mobilizing forces for a military showdown.”
Once war broke out, Firmian said, “the rapid deployment of forces and the inability of either party to easily prevail showcased how both sides had carefully prepared for all-out war.”
Firmian and Mirghani’s article evaluates the potential for Sudan to rescue its once-hopeful transition to democracy, but observers have been forced to question its viability. “The longer the conflict drags on, the more likely it is that other armed actors will take matters in their own hands … [and] potentially intervene in the ongoing power struggle to secure their interests,” Firmian lamented in his interview.
Reviving the transition, the scholar said, requires “leaders of Sudan and the international community [taking] decisive action to reverse the coup and salvage the democratization process.”
Among the major takeaways readers can find in Firmian and Mirghani’s Middle East Policy article:
Sudan has a long history of coups, with 17 attempted since the country became independent in 1956.
This track record, along with high levels of poverty historically, is an important factor in determining the likelihood of a successful democratic transition.
Military reform has “long represented the single most contentious issue in Sudan’s transition.”
The military and its leaders have historically exerted outsized influence on politics in Sudan.
Both the Sudanese military and the Rapid Support Forces “own private companies and have acquired stakes in some of Sudan’s most profitable exports.” It is estimated that these enterprises are worth billions of dollars.
ISIS began to assert a presence in 2021, a new development in Sudan’s history, though the country has a history of association with Islamist terror groups.
The 1989 coup and former President Bashir’s reign saw the start of Islamist rule.
Sudan hosted a conference of radicals in 1991, with attendees such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps members, Hezbollah, and more. The United States designated the country a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993.
Sudan also allowed weapons to be smuggled through its borders to Egypt and the Gaza Strip.
Several major events preceded the coup and signaled the tenuous nature of the civilian government’s strength:
Islamist terror attacks in Khartoum, which left citizens and soldiers dead.
The Beja Uprising in eastern Sudan, which shut down roads from Port Sudan to Khartoum and caused shortages of wheat and fuel.
A failed coup attempt by a small number of officers that gave the military an excuse to expand its control over the transitional government.
You can read Federico Manfredi Firmian and Osman Mirghani’s article, “Can Sudan’s Democratic Transition Be Salvaged?” in Middle East Policy, available through Wiley.
Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.
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By Middle East Policy
‘The potential for a complete collapse of the Sudanese state at this point is very high,’ expert asserts.
As civilians and foreign nationals flee Sudan amid the growing civil war between the army and a major paramilitary organization, a Middle East Policy contributor warns that prolonged fighting increases the risk that religious extremists and other armed groups could join the fray, imperiling not just the country’s stability but that of its neighbors.
“Sudan has a number of tribal leaders capable of fielding well-armed militias,” Federico Manfredi Firmian, a lecturer at Sciences Po Paris, told Middle East Policy. “There is also a risk that Islamist groups of Salafi-jihadi inspiration could seize the opportunity to establish a presence in a highly strategic country located between the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.
“The potential for a complete collapse of the Sudanese state at this point is very high.”
More than 500 people are estimated to have been killed in the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces, headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo. Experts believe the death toll is likely far higher.
The fighting “has further aggravated Sudan’s multiple woes,” Firmian said in an email interview, “which include a long-running economic crisis, severe humanitarian needs, and restive borderlands with a history of armed conflict.”
The United Nations fears that nearly one million people could flee the country by the end of the year, with an exodus of over 100,000 underway and three times that number displaced internally. The organization had estimated, before the conflict broke out, that about one third of the population of more than 45 million needed food aid.
On Thursday, President Joe Biden authorized sanctions against the warring factions, though the executive order held off on imposing the measures.
The violence was sparked by disagreements in power sharing between the military groups. The two generals have played significant roles in the transitional civilian and military administrations since the 2019 coup that deposed former President Omar al-Bashir.
(AFP)
In a Middle East Policy article, Firmian and coauthor Osman Mirghani highlight several developments that led to the military’s seizing power from the transitional government in late 2021: Islamist terror attacks in Khartoum; the Beja Uprising in eastern Sudan, which caused major shortages of wheat and fuel; and a failed coup attempt by a small number of officers, which gave the military an excuse to expand its control.
Prior to this conflict, there were other warning signs. As early as February, Firmian told Middle East Policy, “there was evidence that both the military and the RSF had been stockpiling weapons, ammunition, and other materiel, in preparation for war.” He noted that “both the army and the RSF pursued recruitment drives in recent months and even accused one another publicly of mobilizing forces for a military showdown.”
Once war broke out, Firmian said, “the rapid deployment of forces and the inability of either party to easily prevail showcased how both sides had carefully prepared for all-out war.”
Firmian and Mirghani’s article evaluates the potential for Sudan to rescue its once-hopeful transition to democracy, but observers have been forced to question its viability. “The longer the conflict drags on, the more likely it is that other armed actors will take matters in their own hands … [and] potentially intervene in the ongoing power struggle to secure their interests,” Firmian lamented in his interview.
Reviving the transition, the scholar said, requires “leaders of Sudan and the international community [taking] decisive action to reverse the coup and salvage the democratization process.”
Among the major takeaways readers can find in Firmian and Mirghani’s Middle East Policy article:
Sudan has a long history of coups, with 17 attempted since the country became independent in 1956.
This track record, along with high levels of poverty historically, is an important factor in determining the likelihood of a successful democratic transition.
Military reform has “long represented the single most contentious issue in Sudan’s transition.”
The military and its leaders have historically exerted outsized influence on politics in Sudan.
Both the Sudanese military and the Rapid Support Forces “own private companies and have acquired stakes in some of Sudan’s most profitable exports.” It is estimated that these enterprises are worth billions of dollars.
ISIS began to assert a presence in 2021, a new development in Sudan’s history, though the country has a history of association with Islamist terror groups.
The 1989 coup and former President Bashir’s reign saw the start of Islamist rule.
Sudan hosted a conference of radicals in 1991, with attendees such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps members, Hezbollah, and more. The United States designated the country a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993.
Sudan also allowed weapons to be smuggled through its borders to Egypt and the Gaza Strip.
Several major events preceded the coup and signaled the tenuous nature of the civilian government’s strength:
Islamist terror attacks in Khartoum, which left citizens and soldiers dead.
The Beja Uprising in eastern Sudan, which shut down roads from Port Sudan to Khartoum and caused shortages of wheat and fuel.
A failed coup attempt by a small number of officers that gave the military an excuse to expand its control over the transitional government.
You can read Federico Manfredi Firmian and Osman Mirghani’s article, “Can Sudan’s Democratic Transition Be Salvaged?” in Middle East Policy, available through Wiley.