What is motivating Turkey’s charm offensive in the region?

  • Middle East Policy

    Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.

Medlir Mema, PhD
Fellow, Middle East Policy Council

2.25.22


Last week, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan concluded a two-day visit to the United Arab Emirates. The visit is significant in that not long ago the two countries were accusing each other of attempting to overthrow their respective governments. Additionally, the UAE is not the only country that is being wooed by the Turkish regime. Having spent the better part of the last decade alienating his counterparts across the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, Mr. Erdogan now seems determined to iron out any misunderstandings and disagreements with Turkey’s neighbors.  

Reflecting on last week’s visit, this Gulf News editorial characterizes the event as having further established “strategic ties” between Turkey and the UAE: “The UAE and Turkey are key players in this region. To achieve the long elusive peace and stability in a region, where conflicts continue to rage in several countries, the Middle East needs the collaboration of key players such as these two nations along with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. A strong relationship between the UAE and Turkey, and a closer perspective towards regional problems will help achieve the stability and prosperity the people of this region aspire to.” 

This editorial by the Khaleej Times reinforces that the visit signals turning point in the relationship between the two countries, especially as it comes after several economic, security, and technological agreements: “The UAE-Turkey relations are on the cusp of a major leap as Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdogan arrived in Abu Dhabi for a two-day state visit. … After experiencing a lull for a while, the UAE-Turkey relations have seen a huge uptick after the landmark visit by the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince. The two countries recently signed several strategic agreements and Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) to enhance cooperation. … On the political front, the UAE-Turkey cooperation will go a long way in strengthening the forces of peace in the Middle East. Erdogan’s unequivocal condemnation of Houthi attacks on the UAE sets the right tone for political cooperation.” 

Writing for the Daily Sabah, Turkish commentator Nagehan Alçı argues that Mr. Erdogan’s visit is part of Turkey’s “multipolar foreign strategy,” a strategy which seems to be dictated by a shift in regional and global dynamics. This strategy is unlikely to come without some sacrifice on the part of Turkey and its interlocutors: “The move is significant since Turkey and the UAE had estranged themselves from each other for years over several issues, including the situation in Libya and the approach to the results of the Arab Spring. From Turkey’s side, the UAE supported elements of the July 2016 coup attempt and from the UAE’s side, the Erdoğan government was siding with forces against the established Arab regimes. … The world is facing many challenges, from the Ukraine crisis to the economic problems stemming from the coronavirus pandemic and the accelerating tension between the U.S. and Russia. Since strategic partnerships and multipolar alignments are very precious in such a period of time, Turkey will continue to pursue them in the near future.”  

However, not all agree that Turkey’s about-face is genuine. In this Middle East Monitor commentary, Qutb Al-Arabi points out that the exchange of visits and the signed agreements are only temporary. Soon both Turkey and the UAE will revert back to their adversarial relationship: “Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to the UAE in mid-February was not an ordinary event like other visits, as it came after a cold war between the two countries in which the accusations exchanged reached an unprecedented level, to the level of conspiracy and threatening national security. The visit aimed to stop, if only temporarily, this cold war, and to try to replace it at the very least with a ‘cold love’ even though the UAE showed its ‘warm love’ or rather its ‘false love’ in a festive welcome that was so exaggerated, to the point that it was unbelievable and revealed that there is something behind it.”   

Notes of skepticism are also sounded by Nadav Shragai, who made it clear in his Israel Hayom op-ed that Mr. Erdogan should not be trusted, despite the latter’s apparent eagerness to turn a page on the relations between Turkey and some of its neighbors: “Given that the 2016 ‘reconciliation agreement’ Israel signed with Turkey did not end well for us, the government must proceed with caution with regard to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent courtship. His country’s economy is struggling greatly, and he is in desperate need of allies. … As such, Israel cannot trust another Turkish promise to prevent anti-Israeli activities from its soil. Been there, done that. For Jerusalem to even consider a reconciliation deal with Ankara, Erdogan must first close all Hamas offices in Turkey and deport senior members Husam Badran, Mousa al-Akari, Zaher Jabarin, Jihad Yaghmour, all of whom have Israeli blood on their hands.” 

Arab News’ Zaid M. Belbagi highlights that Turkey’s new-found fondness for better neighborly relations may be a function of Turkey’s worsening economic fundamentals: “Geopolitical tensions ensured no love was lost between Turkey and the UAE over the last decade, but Ankara, dogged by soaring inflation and a sagging lira, has sought a thawing of the cold war between them. Since the end of 2020, Turkey has reached out to Riyadh, Cairo and Abu Dhabi in an effort to recalibrate strained relations. … Rapprochement with the UAE, Egypt and Israel is intended to rebalance Turkey’s foreign relationships. Current talks with the Kurdistan Regional Government are intended to increase gas imports. Through the existing Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the planned Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and discussions with Israel, Turkey hopes to increase its geopolitical influence while keeping up with growing domestic energy demand.” 

Yet, according to this report by Hurriyet Daily News’ Nuray Babacan, Mr. Erdogan and his government may be preparing a comprehensive overhaul of Turkey’s foreign-policy stance, one that is aimed at resolving outstanding disagreements with their neighbors: “Turkey’s near-term priority in foreign policy will continue to be normalizing the strained ties with regional rivals, including Armenia, Israel and Gulf countries. … An overall assessment of Turkey’s foreign policy and its priorities was made at a briefing held at the Turkish Presidency a couple of weeks ago, which has concluded that Turkey’s success in dealing with internal problems also depends on its diplomatic performance. … An overall assessment of Turkey’s foreign policy and its priorities was made at a briefing held at the Turkish Presidency a couple of weeks ago, which has concluded that Turkey’s success in dealing with internal problems also depends on its diplomatic performance. The creation of a ‘trouble-free circle’ around Turkey and normalizing the diplomatic ties with Armenia and Israel, as well as other regional countries, have been mentioned as necessary.” 

For now, the debate on whether Turkey’s newfound penchant for diplomacy is genuine or fake remains unresolved. It seems, though, as the National’s David Lepeska highlights in this op-ed, that Turkey is scoring important victories in the foreign-policy arena: “In recent months Turkey has been able to simultaneously improve ties with regional heavy hitters in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel. Last week, the UAE welcomed Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan with great fanfare as the two countries signed more than a dozen cooperative agreements, mostly in defense and trade. … Turkey is suddenly poised to cement its renewed position of prominence in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. It’s all rather tenuous, and one wrong move could still derail this peace train. But since late 2020, what Ankara has achieved with a shift in approach, a dash of desperation and a bit of chutzpah is impressive, and shows just how fleeting isolation can be in this fast-changing geopolitical landscape.” 

  • Middle East Policy

    Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.

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