Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.
By Middle East Policy
Journal contributor: If the parties ‘return the country to a civilian rule based on robust transitional mechanisms, the tipping point can be averted.’
With civilians fleeing the capital amid deadly clashes between Sudan’s armed forces and a paramilitary group, a former defense official and Middle East Policy contributor is warning of the potential for escalation—and even the country’s collapse.
“Without an immediate cessation of hostilities and a permanent cease-fire,” Majak D’Agoôt warned in an email interview, “the country is on cusp of full-blown violence.
“Whether Sudan’s fall will be a Humpty Dumpty fall depends on how this slippery slope to collapse is trodden,” said D’Agoôt, a former deputy chief of Sudan intelligence who has also served as defense minister of South Sudan.
At the time of this writing, violence in the capital continued for a sixth day between the Sudan Armed Forces and the militia known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The death toll is 331, and nearly 3,200 people have been reported injured, according to a World Health Organization estimate released to CNN. With hospitals and homes destroyed, food supplies at risk, and bodies reported in the streets, citizens and Westerners were reportedly trying to flee Khartoum, though the international airport remained closed.
The two generals had worked together to depose the unpopular former President Omar al-Bashir in 2019, then played significant roles in the transitional civilian and military administration that followed. Despite the early cooperation between these two spheres, the military soon overpowered its counterpart.
“The civilian component of the transitional authority was subordinated to the will of the generals and was finally purged in October 2021 in a coup,” D’Agoôt told Middle East Policy. “Street protests increased, demanding the handover of power to civilians. Backdoor negotiations ensued, resulting in a framework agreement which raised the contentious issues of security sector reform and stable civil-military relations. This hastened the situation to reach a blowup on April 16.”
D’Agoôt, currently a visiting senior research fellow in the African Leadership Centre at King’s College London, added: “At the moment, there is a power vacuum.”
Burhan, who held the chief position in the power-sharing agreement, dissolved the council in 2021 and declared that elections would be held this year. But a series of disagreements in recent months contributed to rising tensions that came to a boiling point over the weekend.
In a recent Middle East Policy article, D’Agoôt examines Sudan’s history of failed democratic transitions and the difficulties posed by its longstanding ethnic and religious fissures. Cleavages among the population—North vs. South, Muslim vs. non-Muslim—and a history of biased recruitment policies created a military that could not accommodate diversity.
Another key challenge, D’Agoôt emphasizes, is the prevalence of the Gun Class in Sudan and South Sudan, which he defines as consisting of warlords, or “armed security leaders with political power, class, and the correct ethnicity.” This Gun Class, to which Burhan and Daglo belong, has “split the society and the political community…also polariz[ing] the military.”
The article advocates a “reexamination of various elements of civil-military relations,” and D’Agoôt presciently warns that, “short of an all-encompassing national compact, the crises embroiling Sudan may put it on a slippery slope to collapse.”
Reflecting on the current violence, D’Agoôt asserted in the interview,
If the warring parties accept the proposal of a cease-fire and return the country to civilian rule based on robust transitional mechanisms, the tipping point can be averted. Allowing it to move on the current trajectory for long will spread the violence beyond its current scope, thereby making it difficult to change course to peace in the immediate term.
Among the major takeaways readers can find in D’Agoôt’s Middle East Policy article:
Sudan has a history of military interventions and failed democratic transitions.
This includes events in 1956–58, 1964–69, 1985–89, and 2019-present.
Since the 1924 White Flag League insurrection, the incidence of coups has existed in the psyche of the Sudanese officer corps.
A major problem is the prevalence of the Gun Class in Sudan and South Sudan.
The Gun Class consists of warlords and can be seen as a “fusion of armed security leaders with political power, class, and the correct ethnicity.”
The state no longer maintains a monopoly on the use of force.
There are two clear power centers in the country:
Daglo, nom de guerre Hemidti, of the Rapid Support Force, and Burhan of the Sudan Armed Forces.
Following Bashir’s ouster in 2019, the two generals adopted a power-sharing formula but subordinated the transitional civilian government in 2021.
The social composition of Sudanese office corps has contributed to the growth of grievances.
Recruitment practices and military structure amplified social and ethnic cleavages and exacerbated corruption and discord.
You can read D’Agoôt’s article, “Toward Stable Civil-Military Relations in Sudan,” in Middle East Policy, available through Wiley.
Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.
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By Middle East Policy
Journal contributor: If the parties ‘return the country to a civilian rule based on robust transitional mechanisms, the tipping point can be averted.’
With civilians fleeing the capital amid deadly clashes between Sudan’s armed forces and a paramilitary group, a former defense official and Middle East Policy contributor is warning of the potential for escalation—and even the country’s collapse.
“Without an immediate cessation of hostilities and a permanent cease-fire,” Majak D’Agoôt warned in an email interview, “the country is on cusp of full-blown violence.
“Whether Sudan’s fall will be a Humpty Dumpty fall depends on how this slippery slope to collapse is trodden,” said D’Agoôt, a former deputy chief of Sudan intelligence who has also served as defense minister of South Sudan.
At the time of this writing, violence in the capital continued for a sixth day between the Sudan Armed Forces and the militia known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The death toll is 331, and nearly 3,200 people have been reported injured, according to a World Health Organization estimate released to CNN. With hospitals and homes destroyed, food supplies at risk, and bodies reported in the streets, citizens and Westerners were reportedly trying to flee Khartoum, though the international airport remained closed.
Multiple cease-fire agreements have failed, and further talks were unlikely at best. The Sudan Armed Forces of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan declared on Thursday that it would accept only the surrender of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, led by General Mohammed Hamdan Daglo.
The two generals had worked together to depose the unpopular former President Omar al-Bashir in 2019, then played significant roles in the transitional civilian and military administration that followed. Despite the early cooperation between these two spheres, the military soon overpowered its counterpart.
“The civilian component of the transitional authority was subordinated to the will of the generals and was finally purged in October 2021 in a coup,” D’Agoôt told Middle East Policy. “Street protests increased, demanding the handover of power to civilians. Backdoor negotiations ensued, resulting in a framework agreement which raised the contentious issues of security sector reform and stable civil-military relations. This hastened the situation to reach a blowup on April 16.”
D’Agoôt, currently a visiting senior research fellow in the African Leadership Centre at King’s College London, added: “At the moment, there is a power vacuum.”
Burhan, who held the chief position in the power-sharing agreement, dissolved the council in 2021 and declared that elections would be held this year. But a series of disagreements in recent months contributed to rising tensions that came to a boiling point over the weekend.
In a recent Middle East Policy article, D’Agoôt examines Sudan’s history of failed democratic transitions and the difficulties posed by its longstanding ethnic and religious fissures. Cleavages among the population—North vs. South, Muslim vs. non-Muslim—and a history of biased recruitment policies created a military that could not accommodate diversity.
Another key challenge, D’Agoôt emphasizes, is the prevalence of the Gun Class in Sudan and South Sudan, which he defines as consisting of warlords, or “armed security leaders with political power, class, and the correct ethnicity.” This Gun Class, to which Burhan and Daglo belong, has “split the society and the political community…also polariz[ing] the military.”
The article advocates a “reexamination of various elements of civil-military relations,” and D’Agoôt presciently warns that, “short of an all-encompassing national compact, the crises embroiling Sudan may put it on a slippery slope to collapse.”
Reflecting on the current violence, D’Agoôt asserted in the interview,
If the warring parties accept the proposal of a cease-fire and return the country to civilian rule based on robust transitional mechanisms, the tipping point can be averted. Allowing it to move on the current trajectory for long will spread the violence beyond its current scope, thereby making it difficult to change course to peace in the immediate term.
Among the major takeaways readers can find in D’Agoôt’s Middle East Policy article:
Sudan has a history of military interventions and failed democratic transitions.
This includes events in 1956–58, 1964–69, 1985–89, and 2019-present.
Since the 1924 White Flag League insurrection, the incidence of coups has existed in the psyche of the Sudanese officer corps.
A major problem is the prevalence of the Gun Class in Sudan and South Sudan.
The Gun Class consists of warlords and can be seen as a “fusion of armed security leaders with political power, class, and the correct ethnicity.”
The state no longer maintains a monopoly on the use of force.
There are two clear power centers in the country:
Daglo, nom de guerre Hemidti, of the Rapid Support Force, and Burhan of the Sudan Armed Forces.
Following Bashir’s ouster in 2019, the two generals adopted a power-sharing formula but subordinated the transitional civilian government in 2021.
The social composition of Sudanese office corps has contributed to the growth of grievances.
Recruitment practices and military structure amplified social and ethnic cleavages and exacerbated corruption and discord.
You can read D’Agoôt’s article, “Toward Stable Civil-Military Relations in Sudan,” in Middle East Policy, available through Wiley.