Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.
By Jean-Loup Samaan
Scholar who analyzed Israeli military reforms for Middle East Policy re-examines the evidence.
In its Fall 2023 issue, Middle East Policy published my study of Israel’s quest for a new military strategy. It was based on a series of interviews and a research trip to Israel between 2021 and 2022. It also built on a study, conducted over the past 15 years, of Israel’s conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah.
The news of Hamas’s October 7 offensive came as a shock. My first instinct, like that of most people, was to assume that nothing had predicted this. After talking with colleagues and journalists eager to make sense of the events, I forced myself to re-read the article, thinking it was now made completely irrelevant (a common nightmare among scholars of the Middle East).
But somehow, inside the article, you can see pieces of the puzzle. Hamas had steadily improved its military performance throughout each previous conflict, and it had developed the potential for surprise attacks with the combination of rocket salvos and infiltrations. There were also frustrations within the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) regarding its strategies. Many feared that the success of the Iron Dome air-defense system was creating a Maginot Line mindset, a sense that sophisticated fortifications rendered Israeli territory untouchable. And domestic politics was seen as hijacking the decision-making process within the IDF.
My article did not predict any of the events that are now unfolding, and it was not written with that purpose in mind. However, reading it today is humbling: It reveals that a lot of signals were actually there, in front of analysts and policymakers. The people in charge were not blind or incompetent, but they were trapped in their routines and chaotic politics.
In coming months and years, more will be discovered about the causes behind that failure of Israeli intelligence and the military establishment. But we can already bet that the findings will echo what Roberta Wolhstetter wrote about Pearl Harbor: “There was never a single, definitive signal that said ‘Get ready, get set, go’ but rather a number of signals which, when put together, tended to crystallise suspicion. The true signals were always embedded in the noise or irrelevance of false ones.”
In 2020, Lieutenant General Aviv Kochavi, chief of the General Staff, announced “Decisive Victory,” a strategic concept changing the way Israel fights and redefining battlefield victory.
The evolution of nonstate, irregular threats like Hamas and Hezbollah, and the potential of facing multiple fronts, drove the change.
While the Israel Defense Forces had succeeded in some areas, such as missile defense through the Iron Dome system, the inability to declare victory inspired the new approach.
Decisive Victory is intended to reform training, interoperability among the services, weapons procurement, and civil-military relations.
Israel’s interest in reforming its operational capabilities reflects changes in regional threats.
The recent history of asymmetric warfare, short-term high-intensity confrontations, and the proliferation of precision-guided munitions offer a picture of what future wars could look like.
Decisive Victory focuses on two primary objectives: a quick end to a potential conflict and the use of overwhelming force to destroy enemy capabilities.
This generally requires comprehensive intelligence and the ability to swiftly mobilize high-intensity assets against the opposition’s military power.
The newest four-year plan (2020–24) emphasizes:
“momentum,” based on the reorganization of the IDF’s leadership
operational structures to emphasize rapid coordination and deployment, as well as unit autonomy.
Despite early political opposition, Decisive Victory was embraced by the Netanyahu, Bennett, and Lapid administrations due to its emphasis on winning.
Despite this, the strategic concept still faces skepticism:
The projected budget of $1.25 billion per year faces domestic and international political challenges.
The emphasis on winning has sparked concern among some military experts.
It may not be possible to develop a comprehensive intelligence assessment of enemy capabilities, such as the positions of rocket launchers and the locations of tunnels.
Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.
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One of the most frequently cited journals on the Middle East in the field of international affairs, Middle East Policy has been engaging thoughtful minds for more than 40 years with high-quality, diverse analysis on the region.
By Jean-Loup Samaan
Scholar who analyzed Israeli military reforms for Middle East Policy re-examines the evidence.
In its Fall 2023 issue, Middle East Policy published my study of Israel’s quest for a new military strategy. It was based on a series of interviews and a research trip to Israel between 2021 and 2022. It also built on a study, conducted over the past 15 years, of Israel’s conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah.
The news of Hamas’s October 7 offensive came as a shock. My first instinct, like that of most people, was to assume that nothing had predicted this. After talking with colleagues and journalists eager to make sense of the events, I forced myself to re-read the article, thinking it was now made completely irrelevant (a common nightmare among scholars of the Middle East).
But somehow, inside the article, you can see pieces of the puzzle. Hamas had steadily improved its military performance throughout each previous conflict, and it had developed the potential for surprise attacks with the combination of rocket salvos and infiltrations. There were also frustrations within the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) regarding its strategies. Many feared that the success of the Iron Dome air-defense system was creating a Maginot Line mindset, a sense that sophisticated fortifications rendered Israeli territory untouchable. And domestic politics was seen as hijacking the decision-making process within the IDF.
My article did not predict any of the events that are now unfolding, and it was not written with that purpose in mind. However, reading it today is humbling: It reveals that a lot of signals were actually there, in front of analysts and policymakers. The people in charge were not blind or incompetent, but they were trapped in their routines and chaotic politics.
In coming months and years, more will be discovered about the causes behind that failure of Israeli intelligence and the military establishment. But we can already bet that the findings will echo what Roberta Wolhstetter wrote about Pearl Harbor: “There was never a single, definitive signal that said ‘Get ready, get set, go’ but rather a number of signals which, when put together, tended to crystallise suspicion. The true signals were always embedded in the noise or irrelevance of false ones.”
Among the major takeaways readers can find in Samaan’s Middle East Policy article, “‘Decisive Victory’ and Israel’s Quest for a New Military Strategy”:
In 2020, Lieutenant General Aviv Kochavi, chief of the General Staff, announced “Decisive Victory,” a strategic concept changing the way Israel fights and redefining battlefield victory.
The evolution of nonstate, irregular threats like Hamas and Hezbollah, and the potential of facing multiple fronts, drove the change.
While the Israel Defense Forces had succeeded in some areas, such as missile defense through the Iron Dome system, the inability to declare victory inspired the new approach.
Decisive Victory is intended to reform training, interoperability among the services, weapons procurement, and civil-military relations.
Israel’s interest in reforming its operational capabilities reflects changes in regional threats.
The recent history of asymmetric warfare, short-term high-intensity confrontations, and the proliferation of precision-guided munitions offer a picture of what future wars could look like.
Decisive Victory focuses on two primary objectives: a quick end to a potential conflict and the use of overwhelming force to destroy enemy capabilities.
This generally requires comprehensive intelligence and the ability to swiftly mobilize high-intensity assets against the opposition’s military power.
The newest four-year plan (2020–24) emphasizes:
“momentum,” based on the reorganization of the IDF’s leadership
operational structures to emphasize rapid coordination and deployment, as well as unit autonomy.
Despite early political opposition, Decisive Victory was embraced by the Netanyahu, Bennett, and Lapid administrations due to its emphasis on winning.
Despite this, the strategic concept still faces skepticism:
The projected budget of $1.25 billion per year faces domestic and international political challenges.
The emphasis on winning has sparked concern among some military experts.
It may not be possible to develop a comprehensive intelligence assessment of enemy capabilities, such as the positions of rocket launchers and the locations of tunnels.
You can read Jean-Loup Samaan’s article, “‘Decisive Victory’ and Israel’s Quest for a New Military Strategy,” in the Fall 2023 issue of Middle East Policy.