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One of the most frequently cited journals on the Middle East in the field of international affairs, Middle East Policy has been engaging thoughtful minds for more than 40 years with high-quality, diverse analysis on the region.
By Middle East Policy
Anna Borshchevskaya’s new analysis contends that Moscow may have advantages over Washington in leveraging Kurdish groups to pursue its interests in the Middle East.
The United States has long forged partnerships with Kurdish groups, such as helping to protect an autonomous enclave in the Iraqi north, as well as supporting the campaign of Turkish forces in liberating parts of Iraq and Syria from the Islamic State. So why has the Kurdistan Regional Government not criticized the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and why have Kurdish fighters considered working with Bashar al-Assad to try to protect their gains in Syria?
Despite Russia’s autocratic tendencies and often blunt tactics, “Moscow does project soft power to build leverage over some actors,” Anna Borshchevskaya asserts in an article in the summer issue of Middle East Policy. “This authoritarian soft-power projection is especially visible in Russia’s longstanding relationship with the Kurds. In its own way, Moscow is engaged in a battle for Kurdish hearts and minds.”
Borshchevskaya’s analysis traces the long history of relations between Russia and the Kurds, from the tsarist state’s brush with nomadic tribes in the 18th century through President Vladimir Putin’s moves toward rebuilding power in the Middle East. Linguistic and cultural affinities, as well as Russia’s support of Kurdish revolts in the early 20th century, have built up Moscow’s soft power—at least in its authoritarian version.
“Soft power” is a term used to describe means of coercion that do not involve military might or economic domination. Instead, the theory goes, countries build up influence through the “attraction” of their ideas and culture. A common example is the pull that the United States was able to exert during the Cold War on societies behind the Iron Curtain through the circulation of movies and music.
Recently, this soft power has been most evident in the silence by some Kurds after Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Borshchevskaya, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, shows in her article that the president of the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq did not take sides but expressed concern that the conflict end peacefully. Indeed, earlier this year, a Russian official lauded the KRG for not participating “in the campaign against the Russian state which was started by Western media.”
In addition, Borshchevskaya notes, a top official of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party—labeled a terrorist group by the United States and other Western countries—“in essence sided with Russia when he said that Ukrainians ‘only brought trouble upon themselves.’”
In Syria, where Kurds control an autonomous zone in the northeast, Russia’s has had less success wielding its influence. Moscow did increase some soft power by pursuing relations with Kurdish groups as potential levers against Turkish or American moves against Assad. As part of this, it backed some autonomy for the Kurds in Syria. However, as Russia has prodded Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan toward normalization of relations with Assad—which would mean eventually withdrawing support for the forces dividing Syria into three—it has clearly worked against Kurdish interests.
On Tuesday, officials from the Syrian Democratic Forces—the US-backed fighters who defeated ISIS and control swathes of northeastern Syria—argued that they need Russian assistance to protect them against strikes from Turkey. There is also some evidence that Russia has pushed Kurdish forces to attack the Turkish military in northern Syria.
However, Russia is also pushing for a rapprochement between Erdogan and Assad, and Kurds are criticizing Moscow for backing down from supporting their aspirations for self-rule.
Borshchevskaya notes that the Russia-Kurd relationship has been based on “soft power as an authoritarian state defines it”—more about leverage than attraction. However, she argues, Moscow may have greater sway than does Washington: “While the United States may be less motivated by cynical realpolitik than the Kremlin, the advantage of working with Moscow is that it does not pressure the Kurds on corruption and human-rights reform. Ironically, this makes Russia a more consistent partner.”
Among the major takeaways readers can find in Borshchevskaya’s Middle East Policy article, “Russia and the Kurds: A Soft-Power Tool for the Kremlin?”:
You can read Anna Borshchevskaya’s article, “Russia and the Kurds: A Soft-Power Tool for the Kremlin?” in Middle East Policy, available through Wiley.