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Israel Shahak
Dr. Shahak predicted the catastrophe being played out today in Israel and the Occupied Territories. The following article “The Religious Settlers: Instrument of Israeli Domination” appeared in the Summer 1994 Middle East Policy journal.
The Rabin government’s support of the Jewish settlements in general and of the religious settlers in particular can be defined as two crucial issues of both current Israeli politics and the peace process. Only via a formal inquiry is it possible to find out what the Israeli government does to support settling and to protect the settlers even when on a rampage. The more perceptive Hebrew press commentators realized long ago that Rabin is no less zealous than Shamir in safeguarding the interests of all Jewish settlers in the territories, but with more circumspection.
Also clearly noticed have been the contradictions between Rabin’s policies and his support for the Oslo Agreement with the PLO. Both points were elaborated by Meron Benvenisti (Haaretz, November 11, 1993). After Rabin’s amicable meeting with leaders of the religious settlers on November 10, which occurred right after strident demonstrations under the slogan “Rabin is a traitor,” Benvenisti observed that “for all the differences in the ideology the chasm between the two positions is not as deep as some would like to depict it,” yet in practice they “cannot be easily reconciled, especially during the present stage of negotiations with the PLO.”
In substantiation of his thesis, Benvenisti points to “the extraordinary generosity with which the government keeps disbursing money to the settlers for all their daily activities, which include their anti-Arab demonstrations and acts of vandalism against Arab property. The gasoline fueling their cars is used for burning the tyres blocking the highways” (and, as other sources describe, Arab property as well.) “The settlers also use their radio equipment, paid for by the government, to coordinate their blockades.” They receive salaries [too many to describe here], all of them “defrayed by lavish supplies of money from the very same government which they detest so fiercely.” More curiosities of the same kind will be described later, in the context of discussing the U.S. support for Rabin’s policies toward the settlers.
Even earlier than Benvenisti, the military correspondent of Hadashot, Alex Fishman (October 20), described
Fishman concludes, rightly in my view, that “the status quo with regard to Jewish settlement has become an iron wall surrounding them.” The concept of an “iron wall” has been borrowed from a historic article by Zeev Jabotinsky, the ideological founding father of Likud, published as long ago as 1925. For whole decades it was regarded by the entire Zionist Labor movement with genuine or faked revulsion. The iron wall means that the Zionist state should behave like a feudal lord dominating his realm by means of his heavily armored knights intervening from behind the walls of an impregnable castle in order to maintain a status quo or a “custom” even when the behavior is incompatible with medieval notions of “justice.”
The case of the settlement Netzarim is particularly instructive. It was described in detail by Nahum Barnea (Yediot Ahronot) as early as October 1, 1993. Netzarim is a decaying kibbutz now inhabited mostly by Gush Emunim extremists, who are not doing any work. They just study the Talmud, for which they have all their expenses covered by the government. The few “farmers” among them are really overseers of workers brought from Thailand. As Barnea explains it, the “original intention” of founding Netzarim
As gleefully explained by “a senior in the [Israeli] Security System charged with overseeing arrangements for the Israeli army withdrawal from the concentrations of Palestinian population,” the Oslo Agreement promotes this scheme, because it
stipulates that all settlements are to stay on, so that every single settlement turns into a fortress of military value. Had Netzarim been merely an Israeli army base, the Palestinians could demand its abandonment, along with other bases located in the midst of densely inhabited chunks of the Gaza Strip that the army is going to abandon. But since Netzarim is plainly defined on the map as a kibbutz, the Israeli presence is assured there. The Israeli army can use it for effectively establishing its presence between the city of Gaza and “the camps of the center.”
Hence, concluded the officer, “had Netzarim not existed, it should have been invented,” because it makes it legal “to turn this settlement into a roadpost concealing the fortress containing sizable Israeli army forces.” Barnea is right when he concluded that Netzarim, “may yet become a pattern of things to come.” His predictions were fulfilled during the ensuing negotiations up to the Cairo Agreement, in all of which Israel had firmly insisted on retaining Netzarim. Rabin-government support for settlements has the effect of encouraging the Gush Emunim settlers, who are ready to settle in places like Netzarim, where their less zealous brethren are unwilling to go.
The best overview of Rabin’s settling policies can be found in an article by Yair Fidel (Hadashot, October 29):
There exist quasi-official estimates which appraise the proportion of the religious settlers who really are state employees at about 70 percent. In my view, if all employees of all kinds of religious institutions (which are also financed by the state of Israel) were added to this figure, the estimate might be as high as 90-95 percent. The figure becomes credible through the simple expedient of taking a walk in Kiryat Arba in order to roughly compare the number and the size of local businesses with the size of the town and the number of its inhabitants.
Here is my own personal testimony on how the Israeli government winks at fictitious occupations for the religious settlers (letter-to-the-editor, Davar, November 15).
My conclusion was,
For these reasons, the political power of the religious settlers should be regarded as much greater than their numbers. I anticipate their influence on actual Israeli policies as remaining high under the Rabin government. Let me give an example. The most important single freedom which the Palestinians won as a result of the Israel-PLO agreement was the right to display their flag and other national emblems. Yet on November 12, 1993, Hillel Cohen could report (Kol Hair) that “in the entire city of Hebron one cannot see a single Palestinian flag on display.” Why? Because the religious settlers of Kiryat Arba and Hebron itself, immediately assault any house or even a whole neighborhood where this flag can be seen, smash the windows and other property, beat the people indiscriminately, often right in front of the Israeli soldiers.
Violent assaults upon the Palestinians in the territories are in the overwhelming majority perpetrated by Jewish religious settlers, and they have two peculiarities. In the first place, these assaults are overtly and avowedly aimed at innocent, randomly chosen individuals or groups of people. Their avowed “purpose” is either “to relieve the feelings of distress of the assaulters,” or “to teach the Arabs a lesson,” or somehow to “influence” the Palestinian population to prevent future violence. (The first of these rationalizations is recognized by the Israeli government as valid.) Regardless of whether the assaults cause injury to persons or “only” to property, they imply the recourse to violence against innocent bystanders for the sake of a political purpose. As such they can be regarded as acts of terror. The organizations responsible for these assaults are in my view terroristic organizations, even though they are perfectly legal and generously assisted financially and otherwise by the Israeli government.
Accordingly, the Israeli government, which not only tolerates the violence in question but also, as will be shown below, abets it, can only be defined as a terror-supporting government. (When Israel accuses the governments of Syria or Iran of “supporting terror” it uses exactly the same argument.) Let me refer here to the criteria by which terror is defined by Benjamin Netanyahu, the Likud leader, as quoted by Amnon Abramovitz (Maariv, August 6, 1993). Abramovitz borrowed the definition from the book bearing the title How the West Can Win [translation from the Hebrew], which Netanyahu edited in the late 1970s. In a preface he himself wrote, Netanyahu defined terror as “violence aimed at people who have no connection with the aims of the terrorists.” He also claims that “the terrorists consciously and deliberately choose the civilians as their targets,” that they “threaten and intimidate the civilians in order to thus achieve a political aim,” and that “for a terrorist the civilians are the key concept.” As will be shown below, these definitions fit settler terrorism to perfection.
Let me begin the description and analysis of typical incidents of settler terrorism with an article byHaolam Haze correspondent Amit Gurevitz (November 17), which deserves extensive coverage. Gurevitz happened to do his reserve service in a paratrooper unit stationed in Hebron shortly before he wrote his article, which draws much from the author’s personal experience, including his conversations with fellow soldiers, most of whom proudly defined themselves as voters for the right-wing Likud and Tzomet parties, and who yet professed their loathing of religious settlers of the Hebron area. Some of them confided to him,
The article appeared shortly after a Hamas guerrilla assault resulted in the killing of a religious settler, Ephraim Ayubi, who worked as the driver of Rabbi Druckman, one of the most extreme Gush Emunim leaders. This is why Gurevitz is careful to point out at the beginning of his article that
Although the most publicized (especially by the U.S. press) exploits of settler terrorism do follow acts of violence by Palestinian guerrilla units, their retaliatory character is in doubt. As in Ayubi’s case, they may provoke the Palestinians to retaliate. This is acknowledged by the internal communications of the Israeli army, which often admit that a given action of Palestinian guerrillas was “a retaliation.” But in Israeli (let alone U.S.) propaganda, Palestinian violence is invariably described as “unprovoked” by anything which the settlers or the Israeli government may have done.
Gurevitz quotes a unit officer:
One of the unit’s major assignments in Hebron was the guarding of the Patriarchs’ Cave, a prayer site for both the religious settlers and the Muslims:
Let me omit other disturbing facts in Gurevitz’s description in order to concentrate on what is crucial in his article: namely on the reasons for which the soldiers cannot call the religious settlers to order. These reasons are not often discussed by Hebrew papers now supporting Rabin. But Gurevitz was told by a unit officer that “the soldiers are forbidden to arrest a Jew, except if he hits a soldier or injures an Arab by shooting in the presence of an Israeli army soldier.” Beating the Arabs, or humiliating them otherwise, or vandalizing their property before the very eyes of the army soldiers is not regarded as “a sufficient reason” for arresting a settler. Let me add that no Jew can be arrested if he does the same. A rule to this effect has remained in force for many years, but has never been announced in public. It is explicitly communicated only to high-ranking officers. Gurevitz quotes
That story by Gurevitz, which happened to be published in the Hebrew press, is by no means an isolated instance. Hanna Kim (Hadashot, November 9) inspected a roadblock set up by religious settlers from the settlement of Yaqir, where
Hillel Cohen (Kol Hair, November 12) reports how in Hebron,
On Sunday, after a settler was killed by Hamas guerrillas,
Cohen comments that “breaking the windows of an Arab car is in Hebron an everyday occurrence which long ago stopped attracting any attention.” After the army did not let Cohen enter Hebron, he simply, together with his photographer, boarded the religious settlers’ bus in Jerusalem. In this way he could enter the city undisturbed:
Like any Jew, settler or visitor, Cohen could walk freely through “the city of Hebron even under curfew, when its streets were deserted” with none of its Arab inhabitants in sight. He noticed “evidence of the settlers’ rampages from previous days” everywhere: shattered windows, overturned cars and traces of arson. Grafitti in Hebrew, noticed by other reporters, like Gideon Levy (Haaretz Supplement, November 26) were in full view. Religious settlers threatened the locals with dire consequences if they dared wipe out those grafitti. According to Levy, the most frequent among them was the beginning of verse 7 of Psalm 149: “To execute vengeance upon the Gentiles”; whereas the next in frequency was “Death to the Arabs.” Apartheid manifests itself in the territories also in that the Israeli army orders the local Palestinians to wipe out any grafitti in Arabic, even those which express longing for peace; but grafitti in Hebrew spraypainted by the settlers are left untouched.
Another story by Nahum Barnea (Yediot Ahronot, November 26) concerns Muhammad Lutfi Darwish al-Raouf al-Zaru and his pregnant wife Rima. Al-Zaru was driving his car on the way to his sister. Due to a beating, Rima al-Zaru miscarried her twin children. Barnea stresses that al-Zaru had in his youth worked for ten years in factories owned by Jews and learned to speak fluent Hebrew.
Here is a part of Barnea’s story. Al-Zaru, 33, now supports himself by driving Palestinian workers to work in a rented Peugeot 504 car. On November 6, at 9:40 a.m., he was with his wife driving his car on a highway to the east of Hebron. Their destination was the home of his sister. The assault on him was thus described to Barnea in his own words:
I am omitting the rest of the story, which recounts the unavailing attempts of al-Zaru even to submit a complaint, but in another incident on Saturday, December 4, a border guard who happened to be a Druze called upon a religious settler of Hebron to identify himself. The latter answered: “A Jew who identifies himself to a Gentile on Sabbath desecrates Sabbath and commits a religious sin.” The Border Guard didn’t insist. The incident was reported by the Police minister, Shahal, at the next day’s government meeting. Some junior ministers denounced that religious settler as a “racist” (Haaretz and other Hebrew papers, December 5). Rabin and the two senior ministers, Peres and Shohat (Finance), however, refrained from making any comment. And the government didn’t issue any instructions to the effect that settlers refusing to identify themselves, on Sabbath or at any other time, were to be detained, charged and brought to court.
A minority of religious settlers belonging to various splinters of the Kahane (“Kach”) movement are in a class by themselves. Many of them are American Jews, particularly from New York City, and their plentiful supplies of money come mostly from the United States. All the bickering between the splinters notwithstanding, for the purpose of assaulting the Palestinians most Kach progeny in the territories are organizationally united in the so-called Committee for Safety on Highways, an organization which began its career as far back as January 1988. The committee and its leaders have been openly admitting their involvement in assaults on the Arabs and their property for almost six years, during which the Israeli government has done nothing to stop them. The last time they did it in an interview granted “by a veteran member of the Committee, who requested to remain anonymous,” in which “he spoke about the Committee’s character and activities” toHaaretz correspondent Naday Shragai (November 23). Of particular concern is the fact that this committee takes full advantage of the rules restricting the options of the Israeli army in dealing with the Jews, as Gurevitz described them (November 17). Presumably as a quid pro quo for their following the rules, “the Committee members could have carried out hundreds of actions, but the Israeli army, police, security forces [i.e. the Shabak] and the judiciary have hardly ever responded” (a quote from Shragai).
The openness with which the Committee professes its aims and acts is truly remarkable. Says the “veteran member”:
None of this could have been done except under the very noses of the Israeli army.
Shragai then asked: “Have firearms been used?” The veteran answered:
Question: “What happens to those who defy you?” The veteran’s answer:
Such atrocities are perpetrated not only in Hebron and the adjoining area. The veteran informs that the Committee
To all appearances this is true. The veteran also provides the already well-known information about the Committee’s members such as
The same is in my view the case in all religious settlements, but not in the secular ones, because all major Israeli secular parties abhor Kach, Likud even more than Labor.
An example of the committee’s performance which occurred far away from Hebron was reported by Haaretz on November 21. The above-mentioned Baruch Marzel together with another well-known Kach militant, Noam Federman, were detained a day before for having gone on a rampage during the visit of the president of Israel, Ezer Weizmann, to Kiryat Arba. Weizmann’s intention was to encourage the settlers, but Marzel and Federman nevertheless abused him violently. When they were brought before the magistrate in Western Jerusalem (as settlers they have the privilege of standing trial in Israel), the police asked to remand them on the ground that “they could not be found while being pursued since November 4 for an offense they were suspected of committing on that day.” Let me parenthetically comment that at the time the two “could not be found” they were engaged in public activities. The police told the magistrate, Yehudit Tzur, that it suspects Marzel and Federman of “arriving in a rented taxi in the Arab village of Al-Hadar in the district of Bethlehem, in the company of some armed settlers. Upon arriving there, they went to a local grocery. One of them aimed his gun at the grocer, while others burned the Palestinian flags on sale.” Thereupon, the whole group crisscrossed the village, burning all the flags that could be found, and forcing the inhabitants to watch the fires under threats of shooting and actually shooting into the air. According to my sources, incidents of this type are quite common in many West Bank villages, though not in the Gaza Strip. The assaulters are hardly ever apprehended, and the Israeli army dismisses the complaints of the villagers with contempt. In this particular case, however, the assaulters were watched from a nearby Israeli army lookout and telescopically photographed, presumably by soldiers uninformed of what the army really wanted. The photographs, which were clear enough to identify the assaulters, were handed over to the police. The latter, which then had Marzel and Federman under detetion for insulting the president, asked that they be remanded for seven more days. The sequel of the story is instructive. Marzel and Federman wanted to be freed on bail in view of the “petty” nature of offenses they were charged with. Marzel argued that charging him “with such petty offenses proves that the police are biased against” him. Accepting such “arguments,” Ms. Tzur freed the two on a minuscule bail, in addition to instructing Marzel to spend the next four days in Jerusalem in some place where he could be located by the police.
Such kindness toward the Kach members and other religious settlers is typical of, if not all Jewish judges of Jerusalem, then of a large majority of them. Their leniency is so well-known that, in the rare cases when the Israeli police or the attorney general’s office really want to prosecute Kach members from the territories, they assign them to magistrates and judges in other Israeli cities, which is perfectly legal.
The most important conclusion warranted by evidence presented here is analogous to that made at the beginning of the article. I argued there that Rabin’s real policy is to support the settlements in order to guarantee continuing Israeli domination over the territories under the cover of pretended concessions to the Palestinians. To pursue that policy, Rabin needs to bestow particular favors upon religious settlers, because they alone are willing to settle in places like Netzarim and even Hebron, for that matter. For the same reason Rabin must condone the violence of the religious settlers against the Palestinians. Ruling a population which refuses to accord to its rulers any legitimacy requires a continuous recourse to violence, however limited in its scope, for the purpose of cowing the people and keeping them intimidated.
This is exactly what the religious settlers are doing, and it is also the reason why the Israeli army does nothing to restrain them although it easily could. The religious settlers (including Kach, as long as it sticks to the rules of the game) should be regarded as a vital segment of the Israeli security system, on a par with the army, the Shabak and the police, which are inhibited by the constraints of their roles as official arms of the Israeli government. It is therefore delusory to expect any segment of that security system to take meaningful action against another.
Another conclusion to be drawn is that in social and political terms, systematic violence such as described here, even if purposefully limited, is much more important than the murders (even of children) or tortures inflicted only on relatively few Palestinians. On the contrary, the present report shows that, with the exception of the “wanted,” the Israeli Security System is not interested in having too many Palestinians murdered or even wounded. It is interested in having them continually harassed, humiliated and, therefore, feeling vulnerable. I do not mean to minimize the significance of murder and torture. For years on end, I have done my best to struggle against the murders of Palestinians committed by the state of Israel, and I was one of the first Israelis to openly protest after 1967 against torture of Palestinians. I merely say that socially and politically what matters most is what has the strongest impact upon the everyday life of the greatest numbers of people — in this case upon everybody, at least potentially. Such an impact cannot avoid affecting and ultimately shaping people’s consciousness, though not necessarily to the oppressors’ liking. In this case, mass violence of the kind described will, in my view, contribute to stepping up Palestinian resistance, regardless of what the fate of the agreement between Israel and the PLO may yet be.