Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.
By Middle East Policy
Journal article contends that neither Tel Aviv nor Hamas has been able to register strategic victories in the three most recent wars.
Threats and even all-out war have been a permanent feature of the Israel’s conflict with Palestinians in Gaza, but neither side has been to fundamentally alter the status quo. A new article in the Fall 2023 issue of Middle East Policy analyzes the recent wars between Israel and Hamas, seeking to determine what “victory” looks like in what appears to be a frozen, if violent, conflict.
Gadi Hitman and Alona Itskovich examine three military confrontations between 2008 and 2014, arguing that each has resulted in a strategic tie, with neither side “able to produce a critical mass of tactical and operational wins to serve their security, economic, and political interests.”
Victory has been a difficult term to define, especially in the modern day, the scholars from the Middle Eastern Studies and Political Science Department at Ariel University argue. “The military, civilian, and political dimensions of war have always been intertwined,” Hitman and Itskovich observe, “but they have become inextricably entangled” as warfare has evolved.
This has affected the definition of victory, as well as whether winning on the strategic level—where politics is fundamentally altered—is even possible. The other levels are:
Tactical: gaining territory or eliminating more enemies than the losses one side takes
Operational: achieving a military objective
Strategic: using multiple tactical wins to gain politically
Systemic: reshaping international relations.
In the case of the 2008–2009 Operation Cast Lead, when Israel launched a rapid aerial and naval bombardment of Gaza followed by a ground assault, the authors argue that the state achieved a tactical victory by causing hundreds of Hamas casualties. However, it failed strategically and systemically, as Hamas was able to survive and continue to launch attacks— including 93 rocket assaults in the first month after the ceasefire.
Similarly, in the November 2012 Operation Pillar of Defense, Israel assassinated some senior Hamas leaders and destroyed equipment, but these were only tactical and operational goals. Hamas claimed strategic victory because it survived, but it was unable to achieve the political aim of restoring Islamic rule to Palestine.
Deterrence has been Israel’s main goal for years. In 2014’s Operation Protective Edge, it once again gained tactical and operational victories by damaging Hamas’s military capabilities. But Gaza’s ruling authority survived, though it suffered a systemic loss. “The group found that it had lost many of its supporters and, therefore, its legitimacy,” Hitman and Itskovich write, as middle- and upper-class Gazans lost homes during the conflict for little observable gain.
The authors contend that this historical evidence indicates Israel’s new right-wing government, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is unlikely to take the risks necessary to fight for strategic or systemic victory. Among other reasons, if Israel took the risks necessary for such victory, it would have to take responsibility for two million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.
“Both sides actually prefer the status quo to taking risks or seizing opportunities to improve their situations,” Hitman and Itskovich argue.
Israel and Hamas have fought three recent wars (2008, 2012, and 2014), with neither side able to achieve a strategic victory that fundamentally alters the status quo.
The three are evaluated at tactical, operational, strategic, and systemic levels to determine which side achieved one of seven possible outcomes, including victory, defeat, or tie.
The authors find that each conflict has resulted in a strategic tie, with no significant change in the power balance.
Hamas has claimed that its survival is a strategic victory, but this is propaganda to shore up public support.
Operation Cast Lead, December 2008–January 2009
Israel unleashed three weeks of aerial, naval, and ground assault on the Gaza Strip.
It achieved a tactical victory by causing between 300 and 700 Hamas casualties, as well as an operational victory by severely damaging Hamas’ infrastructure.
Israel failed to achieve strategic or systemic victories, as Hamas rocket attacks continued: In the first month after the ceasefire, 93 were conducted.
Hamas claimed strategic victory but failed to force Israel to change Gaza policy.
Operation Pillar of Defense, November 14–21, 2012
Israel’s primary goal was to deter terrorist activity in the Gaza Strip, as Hamas had spent three years building up its forces.
Israel assassinated senior Hamas officials and destroyed long-range missile launchers, achieving tactical and operational victories.
Hamas attained a tactical win by effectively hitting Tel Aviv with new missiles, but it failed to meet the strategic objective of restoring Islamic rule in Palestine.
Operation Protective Edge, July–August 2014
Israel launched campaign following the kidnapping of three Israeli boys on June 12, 2014; it lasted 50 days before a ceasefire.
Israel gained tactical and operational victories by successfully striking Hamas’ infrastructure and military capabilities.
Hamas achieved an operational victory by launching long-range missiles into Israeli cities. At the systemic level, the group lost supporters and undermined its legitimacy, mostly due to middle and upper classes seeing homes destroyed.
Israel did not achieve a strategic victory in any of the operations due to its preference for deterrence, which has not broken the spirit of Hamas, an outcome the Palestinian group views as a victory.
The new right-wing government will likely preserve the status quo, as an intense campaign in Gaza would be too costly. It will thus limit itself to tactical and operational victories.
Additionally, if victorious at a strategic level, Israel would have to decide the fate of two million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.
Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.
Partner with the Council
We appreciate any support towards the Middle East Policy Council to help educate Americans on the political, economic and cultural issues that affect U.S. interests in the Middle East.
One of the most frequently cited journals on the Middle East in the field of international affairs, Middle East Policy has been engaging thoughtful minds for more than 40 years with high-quality, diverse analysis on the region.
By Middle East Policy
Journal article contends that neither Tel Aviv nor Hamas has been able to register strategic victories in the three most recent wars.
While the West Bank has witnessed some of its worst violence in decades this year, the Gaza Strip has been relatively quiet. But that may not last, as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine are vowing to escalate in retaliation for what they call “Israel’s aggression.” The closure of the Gaza border to bar residents from their workplaces and the potential Israeli-Saudi normalization have inflamed tensions.
Threats and even all-out war have been a permanent feature of the Israel’s conflict with Palestinians in Gaza, but neither side has been to fundamentally alter the status quo. A new article in the Fall 2023 issue of Middle East Policy analyzes the recent wars between Israel and Hamas, seeking to determine what “victory” looks like in what appears to be a frozen, if violent, conflict.
Gadi Hitman and Alona Itskovich examine three military confrontations between 2008 and 2014, arguing that each has resulted in a strategic tie, with neither side “able to produce a critical mass of tactical and operational wins to serve their security, economic, and political interests.”
Victory has been a difficult term to define, especially in the modern day, the scholars from the Middle Eastern Studies and Political Science Department at Ariel University argue. “The military, civilian, and political dimensions of war have always been intertwined,” Hitman and Itskovich observe, “but they have become inextricably entangled” as warfare has evolved.
This has affected the definition of victory, as well as whether winning on the strategic level—where politics is fundamentally altered—is even possible. The other levels are:
Tactical: gaining territory or eliminating more enemies than the losses one side takes
Operational: achieving a military objective
Strategic: using multiple tactical wins to gain politically
Systemic: reshaping international relations.
In the case of the 2008–2009 Operation Cast Lead, when Israel launched a rapid aerial and naval bombardment of Gaza followed by a ground assault, the authors argue that the state achieved a tactical victory by causing hundreds of Hamas casualties. However, it failed strategically and systemically, as Hamas was able to survive and continue to launch attacks— including 93 rocket assaults in the first month after the ceasefire.
Similarly, in the November 2012 Operation Pillar of Defense, Israel assassinated some senior Hamas leaders and destroyed equipment, but these were only tactical and operational goals. Hamas claimed strategic victory because it survived, but it was unable to achieve the political aim of restoring Islamic rule to Palestine.
Deterrence has been Israel’s main goal for years. In 2014’s Operation Protective Edge, it once again gained tactical and operational victories by damaging Hamas’s military capabilities. But Gaza’s ruling authority survived, though it suffered a systemic loss. “The group found that it had lost many of its supporters and, therefore, its legitimacy,” Hitman and Itskovich write, as middle- and upper-class Gazans lost homes during the conflict for little observable gain.
The authors contend that this historical evidence indicates Israel’s new right-wing government, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is unlikely to take the risks necessary to fight for strategic or systemic victory. Among other reasons, if Israel took the risks necessary for such victory, it would have to take responsibility for two million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.
“Both sides actually prefer the status quo to taking risks or seizing opportunities to improve their situations,” Hitman and Itskovich argue.
Among the major takeaways readers can find in Gadi Hitman and Alona Itskovich’s Middle East Policy article, “The Winner Does Not Take All: Lessons from the Israel-Hamas Conflict”:
Israel and Hamas have fought three recent wars (2008, 2012, and 2014), with neither side able to achieve a strategic victory that fundamentally alters the status quo.
The three are evaluated at tactical, operational, strategic, and systemic levels to determine which side achieved one of seven possible outcomes, including victory, defeat, or tie.
The authors find that each conflict has resulted in a strategic tie, with no significant change in the power balance.
Hamas has claimed that its survival is a strategic victory, but this is propaganda to shore up public support.
Operation Cast Lead, December 2008–January 2009
Israel unleashed three weeks of aerial, naval, and ground assault on the Gaza Strip.
It achieved a tactical victory by causing between 300 and 700 Hamas casualties, as well as an operational victory by severely damaging Hamas’ infrastructure.
Israel failed to achieve strategic or systemic victories, as Hamas rocket attacks continued: In the first month after the ceasefire, 93 were conducted.
Hamas claimed strategic victory but failed to force Israel to change Gaza policy.
Operation Pillar of Defense, November 14–21, 2012
Israel’s primary goal was to deter terrorist activity in the Gaza Strip, as Hamas had spent three years building up its forces.
Israel assassinated senior Hamas officials and destroyed long-range missile launchers, achieving tactical and operational victories.
Hamas attained a tactical win by effectively hitting Tel Aviv with new missiles, but it failed to meet the strategic objective of restoring Islamic rule in Palestine.
Operation Protective Edge, July–August 2014
Israel launched campaign following the kidnapping of three Israeli boys on June 12, 2014; it lasted 50 days before a ceasefire.
Israel gained tactical and operational victories by successfully striking Hamas’ infrastructure and military capabilities.
Hamas achieved an operational victory by launching long-range missiles into Israeli cities. At the systemic level, the group lost supporters and undermined its legitimacy, mostly due to middle and upper classes seeing homes destroyed.
Israel did not achieve a strategic victory in any of the operations due to its preference for deterrence, which has not broken the spirit of Hamas, an outcome the Palestinian group views as a victory.
The new right-wing government will likely preserve the status quo, as an intense campaign in Gaza would be too costly. It will thus limit itself to tactical and operational victories.
Additionally, if victorious at a strategic level, Israel would have to decide the fate of two million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.
You can read “The Winner Does Not Take All: Lessons from the Israel-Hamas Conflict” by Gadi Hitman and Alona Itskovich in the Fall 2023 issue of Middle East Policy.