EU Aid Enables Authoritarian Persistence in MENA

  • Middle East Policy Council

    The Middle East Policy Council is a tax-exempt, 501(c)(3) nonprofit, nonpartisan, educational organization founded in 1981 to provide policymakers and the public with credible, comprehensive information and analysis on political, economic, and cultural issues pertaining to U.S.-Middle East.

Nassim Ali Ahmad

Nassim is the Congressional Fellow at the Middle East Policy Council. He is also currently pursuing an MA in International Relations at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) where he focuses on geopolitics and economics in the Middle East & North Africa. Prior to being a Congressional Fellow, Nassim interned at the U.S. Department of State and worked at the Massachusetts House of Representatives. He holds a B.A. in Economics from Clark University in Worcester, MA.


The past year has seen the European Union bolster the aid it has been giving to countries in its southern neighborhood of the Mediterranean. The latest edition of the EU’s financial wave includes a one billion-euro package to Lebanon, joining an earlier 7.4 billion-euro deal for Egypt and the continuous stream to Tunisia over the past year – including a potential billion-euro deal on the horizon. This year, the EU has pledged over eight billion euros ($8.58bn) to these three Middle East and North African countries, alongside pending deals with Mauritania and Morocco. The funds aim to curb migration flows to Europe through fortified border security and economic stimuli to disincentivize movement. 

However, the Union’s current approach of providing substantial financial assistance to Mediterranean countries is fundamentally flawed. This strategy fails to address underlying issues of corruption and mismanagement in these regions, which leads to ineffective use of funds and perpetuates the migration crisis rather than alleviating it. For a sustainable solution, the EU must focus on improving governance in these countries to create real economic and social stability that reduces the impetus for migration.

The EU’s significant influx of aid to countries in the MENA region emerged as part of an externalization strategy of trading financial assistance for stricter migration control. Funds that are earmarked for migration measures predominantly aim to buttress security forces, particularly the maritime surveillance that intercepts those making the journey. On the other hand, aid packages attempt to bolster the targeted domestic economies to dissuade those emigrating in pursuit of a better quality of life. 

In Lebanon, for example, the EU financial package is designated to conduct banking reforms amidst the country’s grueling financial crisis while strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces. Ensuring more austere border security in Lebanon is driven by the arrival of roughly 25,000 Syrian refugees that landed in Cyprus from Lebanon this year.

This year’s renewed efforts in EU-Mediterranean migration deals come as Egypt and Tunisia grow as major migrant crossroads for those coming up from sub-Saharan Africa, with the two countries acting as both the destination and launch point. The economies of Lebanon, Egypt, and Tunisia are becoming distressed with the influx of these refugees, causing a portion of them, alongside their native counterparts, to flee to Europe. In Egypt, over 460,000 Sudanese refugees have arrived over the past year, while roughly 20% of Mediterranean migrants that arrived to Italy were Egyptian – instigating the EU’s largest migration deal of 2024. The Union’s engagement with Tunisia comes as the North African country surpasses its neighbors as the most frequent launch point for African migrant boats trekking to Europe. The deals look to aid the southern Mediterranean in absorbing the incoming sub-Saharan refugees into their domestic economies.

To make matters more dire, the Mediterranean Sea has become one of the EU’s most frequent immigration routes; 2023 marked its deadliest year on record, as more and more people attempt to flee failing conditions. The year saw a 58% increase in irregular migration in the sea, accompanied by a harrowing 20% increase in death count. Without domestic reforms in these countries, their populations are likely to continue to risk this journey to Europe.

When examining the case studies of Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia, economic conditions serve as primary causes for emigration. Egypt’s inflation rate peaked at 39% in September 2023— it is now 33%. Meanwhile, the country is slowly recovering from economic collapse by renegotiating its IMF bailout loan from $3 billion to $8 billion. The financial crisis in Lebanon continues as the economic collapse has resulted in 80% of the population living below the poverty line, and the pressure is mounting for Tunisia as economic growth stagnates and unemployment creeps higher. As migrants from sub-Saharan Africa come to North Africa for a better outlook, they, similarly, are met with hindering conditions that push them and North African citizens towards the EU.

Political considerations and crises in the region serve as further incentives for relocation. The Israel-Hamas war has heightened tensions in Lebanon, halting meaningful reform and progress as their parliament now begins its 22nd month without a president. Further, sentiments against refugees in Lebanon have become volatile. Prime Minister Najib Mikati aims to begin deporting Syrians as his government cracks down on undocumented refugees around the country. Similarly, sentiments against sub-Saharan Africans have worsened in Tunisia, with President Kais Saied stoking tensions through racial remarks on the incoming migrants and espousing a conspiracy that they aim “to transform the demographic composition of Tunisia.”

Despite ongoing EU funding efforts, 2024 has seen a continuation of these migration trends. From 2021-2022, Tunisia received a 48 million euro grant attempting to assist labor market growth, strengthen cross-border cooperation for migration, and improve policing efforts. Since then, Tunisia has surpassed Libya as the most frequent launch point to the EU, and Mediterranean migration has risen every year since 2020. As of September 5, 2024, the UNHCR has estimated nearly 115,000 arrivals of irregular migration this year. 

The EU-MENA immigration nexus has a deep-rooted problem. As multiple Middle Eastern and North African leaders – including Egyptian, Tunisian, and Lebanese political leadership – have been exposed for human rights abuses, systemic corruption, and severe mismanagement of resources, the EU has faced significant backlash for the deals. For example, human rights and activist organizations in Lebanon are expressing concern over an incoming billion-euro stimulus, which many fear will “undermine any efforts and any hopes of the Lebanese people to rid themselves of a corrupt and deeply dysfunctional political elite.” Aid to Lebanon has also been mismanaged and used to bribe political officials, challenges that drove Lebanon’s former economic minister to describe EU funds as fueling government corruption.

Distress has also come from within the European political system, as members of the European Parliament’s human rights, justice, and foreign affairs committees have accused the European Commission of directly funding the highly-autocratic leaders of the region. French parliamentary member Mounir Satori, for example, stated that “[i]t seems that we are bankrolling dictators across the region,” in response to the 150 million-euro gift to Tunisia that was reported to deposit directly into President Saied’s account. Further criticism is hurled at the EU’s partnerships writ-large as their border management mission, Frontex, recovers from the resignation of their director, Fabrice Leggeri, following accusations of serious rights violations

The current finance-for-security model the EU is pursuing to curb migration is untenable. If the organization wishes to be serious about significantly reducing the influx of migration to their member states, they need to pursue a more sustainable policy that aims to improve the governance through economic reform, labor laws, and protection of civil rights. Brookings Institute’s Tamara Cofman Wittes outlines four key characteristics needed for strong governance: “inclusive, more transparent, more effective, and more accountable.” As Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia receive some of the largest EU packages this year, they also face financial mismanagement and corruption that continues to distance them from economic stabilization and sustainable systems of rule. With the status quo, living conditions for their citizens will only worsen, perpetuating the desperation and urgency that propel people to flee across the Mediterranean in search of a better tomorrow.

  • Middle East Policy Council

    The Middle East Policy Council is a tax-exempt, 501(c)(3) nonprofit, nonpartisan, educational organization founded in 1981 to provide policymakers and the public with credible, comprehensive information and analysis on political, economic, and cultural issues pertaining to U.S.-Middle East.

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