Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.
Dr. Thomas R. Mattair
Executive Director, Middle East Policy Council
In his speech yesterday, the president committed his administration to supporting reform and transitions to democracy across the region, opposing the use of brute force by states against their populations, confronting Iran’s challenges to its neighbors and its own people, and pursuing Arab-Israeli peace, each one a worthy objective. But the president did not wrestle adequately with the dilemmas and obstacles that make these objectives so difficult to attain, and he did not offer clear enough explanations of how the United States will try to attain them.
• The level of economic support offered to Egypt may be insufficient to address that country’s severe economic circumstances.
• The sanctions against Syrian officials will likely not dissuade them from doing everything in their power to ensure the survival of the regime.
• The exhortations to the Bahraini government may not turn them away from rooting out opponents and toward a national dialogue that leads to real reform.
• The strategy of selective negotiations with preconditions and sanctions and covert actions is not changing the foreign or domestic policies of Iran.
• Finally, re-stating old generalities about only some elements of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, deferring consideration of others, and arguing that it is up to the parties themselves is probably less likely to yield success than previous administration efforts.
As the United States withdraws from Iraq, transfers more responsibility to the Afghan government to enable U.S. withdrawal from that country, and reassesses its counter-terror strategy after Osama Bin Laden, the administration should consider:
• How costly it has been to try to re-make the cultures of Iraq and Afghanistan;
• The need for larger levels of economic support for fledgling popular governments in Egypt and Tunisia;
• The need to adopt a long timeline for achieving stable popular reform throughout the region;
• The possibility that there are regimes we cannot change;
• The possibility that the popular will in some countries might result in less individual freedom than current regimes are fostering;
• The need finally to address every outstanding issue at stake in our relations with Iran in order to enhance the security of our friends;
• The need to either put a blueprint and map on the table for Israeli-Palestinian peace and press the parties to agree, or at least accept and support the will of the international community on a Palestinian state when it comes up for a vote at the United Nations in September.
Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.
Partner with the Council
We appreciate any support towards the Middle East Policy Council to help educate Americans on the political, economic and cultural issues that affect U.S. interests in the Middle East.
One of the most frequently cited journals on the Middle East in the field of international affairs, Middle East Policy has been engaging thoughtful minds for more than 40 years with high-quality, diverse analysis on the region.
Dr. Thomas R. Mattair
Executive Director, Middle East Policy Council
In his speech yesterday, the president committed his administration to supporting reform and transitions to democracy across the region, opposing the use of brute force by states against their populations, confronting Iran’s challenges to its neighbors and its own people, and pursuing Arab-Israeli peace, each one a worthy objective. But the president did not wrestle adequately with the dilemmas and obstacles that make these objectives so difficult to attain, and he did not offer clear enough explanations of how the United States will try to attain them.
• The level of economic support offered to Egypt may be insufficient to address that country’s severe economic circumstances.
• The sanctions against Syrian officials will likely not dissuade them from doing everything in their power to ensure the survival of the regime.
• The exhortations to the Bahraini government may not turn them away from rooting out opponents and toward a national dialogue that leads to real reform.
• The strategy of selective negotiations with preconditions and sanctions and covert actions is not changing the foreign or domestic policies of Iran.
• Finally, re-stating old generalities about only some elements of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, deferring consideration of others, and arguing that it is up to the parties themselves is probably less likely to yield success than previous administration efforts.
As the United States withdraws from Iraq, transfers more responsibility to the Afghan government to enable U.S. withdrawal from that country, and reassesses its counter-terror strategy after Osama Bin Laden, the administration should consider:
• How costly it has been to try to re-make the cultures of Iraq and Afghanistan;
• The need for larger levels of economic support for fledgling popular governments in Egypt and Tunisia;
• The need to adopt a long timeline for achieving stable popular reform throughout the region;
• The possibility that there are regimes we cannot change;
• The possibility that the popular will in some countries might result in less individual freedom than current regimes are fostering;
• The need finally to address every outstanding issue at stake in our relations with Iran in order to enhance the security of our friends;
• The need to either put a blueprint and map on the table for Israeli-Palestinian peace and press the parties to agree, or at least accept and support the will of the international community on a Palestinian state when it comes up for a vote at the United Nations in September.