Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.
Karim Mezran
Senior Fellow
This weekend has been a decisive one for Libya. Having recently made substanial progress by capturing important cities and military bases on the road to Tripoli, rebel forces have finally reached the capital. Though the fighting continues, the rebels have gained control over much of Tripoli. The dozens of British, French and Italian military advisors sent to train and organize the army of the Transitional National Council (TNC) have been successful. Still a long way from the standards of a regular army, the rebels appears to have turned into a much more disciplined and effective military force — good enough to win against the troops of the Qaddafi regime.
Military victories are indeed vital, but some relevance should also be given to the “liberation” (not “defection”) of the former second-in-command of the Libyan regime, Abdessalam Jallud. A figure little-known in the West but somewhat popular in Libya, Jallud was the number two in the group of free officers who took power in the 1969 coup d’etat. Starting in the early eighties, Jallud progressively distanced himself from Qaddafi, often voicing harsh criticism against his policies, especially his foreign policy. But Jallud opposed the leader of Libya mostly because of his adversion to the “revolutionary committees” created and dominated by Qaddafi himself, and has been in disgrace with Qaddafi since the early nineties. The Colonel, who for much less has killed or condemned to life imprisonment his opponents, has showed a strangely lenient attitude towards Jallud, allowing him to lead his life undisturbed — even allowing travel abroad, albeit under surveillance. This surprising treatment has raised many questions in Libya.
One explanation that has been adduced is that Jallud belongs to a powerful tribe, the Magarha, to which many high-level personalities of the inner circle of Qaddafi belong as well. Others suspect that Jallud is the only one who knows the whole story of Qaddafi’s coup, including eventual foreign sponsors, and that he has deposited highly damaging documents abroad, to be published in case something happened to him. No matter the cause, the fact is that during the long years of Qaddafi’s dictatorship, Abdessalam Jallud has been the only voice of criticism that the Libyans have heard, which has gained himsome popularity. Even though information about the action that freed him is still scant and fragmentary, one thing is clear: the rebels exerted all efforts and ran many risks to free him and take him to a safe and secure territory. The action was undertaken by local Tripoli rebels, with whom he has been in contact since at least mid-March and who have shown strong organization and determination. Jallud and his family, along with his closest collaborators, have been taken to the Nefusa mountains in Italy by his liberators. Why run all these risks? What does this action really mean?
To answer these questions we should look to the larger picture. Qaddafi is besieged in Tripoli or on the run elsewhere in the country. His hours are numbered and it is clear that he will not be playing any role in the future of Libya. Nevertheless, many of his supporters are going to remain and will need to be integrated into the new Libyan polity. The Transitional National Council is very fragmented and will have great difficulty organizing a peaceful transition. Such a transition can only be ensured if someone can gain the trust of the thousands of regime employees and troops whose cooperation and involvement will be important to the stability and effectiveness of any new government. A person that, in other words, could help unify elements of the old and new Libya and emerge as an important member of the post-Qaddafi leadership and contribute to the transition to a democratic government. For the rebels, Jallud could be precisely such a person, at least in the initial phase. He is strong, charismatic and largely untainted by the worst actions of the regime, popular and well-known throughout the country (he never had any problem with the Eastern provinces of Bengazi, Derna and Beida, unlike Qaddafi, who was hated in these regions). Jallud could be the barrier against the Islamist factions, while at the same time be an acceptable partner to the NATO powers. Jallud would also be seen positively by the Arab leaders. With his involvement it would be easier to begin the much needed process of national reconciliation and reconstruction of Libya.
Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.
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Karim Mezran
Senior Fellow
This weekend has been a decisive one for Libya. Having recently made substanial progress by capturing important cities and military bases on the road to Tripoli, rebel forces have finally reached the capital. Though the fighting continues, the rebels have gained control over much of Tripoli. The dozens of British, French and Italian military advisors sent to train and organize the army of the Transitional National Council (TNC) have been successful. Still a long way from the standards of a regular army, the rebels appears to have turned into a much more disciplined and effective military force — good enough to win against the troops of the Qaddafi regime.
Military victories are indeed vital, but some relevance should also be given to the “liberation” (not “defection”) of the former second-in-command of the Libyan regime, Abdessalam Jallud. A figure little-known in the West but somewhat popular in Libya, Jallud was the number two in the group of free officers who took power in the 1969 coup d’etat. Starting in the early eighties, Jallud progressively distanced himself from Qaddafi, often voicing harsh criticism against his policies, especially his foreign policy. But Jallud opposed the leader of Libya mostly because of his adversion to the “revolutionary committees” created and dominated by Qaddafi himself, and has been in disgrace with Qaddafi since the early nineties. The Colonel, who for much less has killed or condemned to life imprisonment his opponents, has showed a strangely lenient attitude towards Jallud, allowing him to lead his life undisturbed — even allowing travel abroad, albeit under surveillance. This surprising treatment has raised many questions in Libya.
One explanation that has been adduced is that Jallud belongs to a powerful tribe, the Magarha, to which many high-level personalities of the inner circle of Qaddafi belong as well. Others suspect that Jallud is the only one who knows the whole story of Qaddafi’s coup, including eventual foreign sponsors, and that he has deposited highly damaging documents abroad, to be published in case something happened to him. No matter the cause, the fact is that during the long years of Qaddafi’s dictatorship, Abdessalam Jallud has been the only voice of criticism that the Libyans have heard, which has gained him some popularity. Even though information about the action that freed him is still scant and fragmentary, one thing is clear: the rebels exerted all efforts and ran many risks to free him and take him to a safe and secure territory. The action was undertaken by local Tripoli rebels, with whom he has been in contact since at least mid-March and who have shown strong organization and determination. Jallud and his family, along with his closest collaborators, have been taken to the Nefusa mountains in Italy by his liberators. Why run all these risks? What does this action really mean?
To answer these questions we should look to the larger picture. Qaddafi is besieged in Tripoli or on the run elsewhere in the country. His hours are numbered and it is clear that he will not be playing any role in the future of Libya. Nevertheless, many of his supporters are going to remain and will need to be integrated into the new Libyan polity. The Transitional National Council is very fragmented and will have great difficulty organizing a peaceful transition. Such a transition can only be ensured if someone can gain the trust of the thousands of regime employees and troops whose cooperation and involvement will be important to the stability and effectiveness of any new government. A person that, in other words, could help unify elements of the old and new Libya and emerge as an important member of the post-Qaddafi leadership and contribute to the transition to a democratic government. For the rebels, Jallud could be precisely such a person, at least in the initial phase. He is strong, charismatic and largely untainted by the worst actions of the regime, popular and well-known throughout the country (he never had any problem with the Eastern provinces of Bengazi, Derna and Beida, unlike Qaddafi, who was hated in these regions). Jallud could be the barrier against the Islamist factions, while at the same time be an acceptable partner to the NATO powers. Jallud would also be seen positively by the Arab leaders. With his involvement it would be easier to begin the much needed process of national reconciliation and reconstruction of Libya.