As Donald Trump lashes out at Republican “GRANDSTANDERS!” for voting to require congressional authorization of the Iran War, an open-access article in Middle East Policy questions whether the president’s diplomatic style is capable of achieving a durable settlement. Although elements of Trump’s transactionalism—including the ability to quickly produce narrowly focused deals—offer advantages over traditional US statecraft, the approach is not likely to resolve conflicts driven by maximalist demands and competing visions of regional order.
Middle East Policy has just published several incisive open-access examinations of the war, its causes, and its implications, including what lies ahead in the Strait of Hormuz; how the game of chicken between Iran and Israel spiraled into existential conflict; how the Islamic Revolution upended regional security; Iran’s forward defense in Africa; and the effects of the war on Gulf cooperation with the Asia-Pacific. You can still read our special issue on the Iran War, our Spring 2026 compilation, and an Early View of our Summer 2026 offering, the 168th in our history.
In their open-access article in the forthcoming issue, Guilain Denoeux and Robert Springborg weigh the strengths and weaknesses of Washington’s traditional approach to diplomacy against those of the transactional style that Trump imported into the executive branch. They contend, contrary to many of the president’s critics, that his method can produce rapid breakthroughs and deliver concrete results with fewer costs and commitments. However, in their case studies of post-Assad Syria, the Gaza peace process, and the Iran War, the authors conclude that only some elements of transactionalism should be retained as part of a hybrid approach to foreign relations.
For Denoeux and Springborg, traditional diplomacy is rooted in the post-World War II liberal international order, emphasizing long-term alliances, multilateral institutions, and the promotion of shared rules and values such as democracy, self-determination, and international cooperation. Rather than focusing on immediate bargains among powerful leaders, it seeks to achieve durable outcomes through institutions, established procedures, and broad-based legitimacy.
Trump appears to have tapped into deeply held concerns among the American people that the old ways have weakened the United States and advantaged its rivals. “In this view,” Denoeux and Springborg observe, “traditional diplomacy facilitated the rise of an aggressive China, the revival of a neo-Stalinist Russia, and the emergence of anti-American regional powers like Venezuela.” In an incisive distillation of transactionalism, they lay out its tenets:
Fundamental to transactionalism is the contention that principles, values, long-term alliances, and multilateral organizations or initiatives are at best irrelevant to international relations, and often stand in the way of realizing the national interest. Success should instead be measured by immediate gains and losses. In this framing, diplomacy is a process of deal making aimed at maximizing short-term benefits and minimizing concessions. This extreme utilitarianism is claimed to be a “new world order,” with Trump—a negotiator shaped by a career in the cutthroat New York real estate market—the veritable symbol of fundamental change in the methods of American foreign policy.
To better understand the potential of transactionalism, the authors examine Trump’s actions regarding post-Assad Syria, Gaza, and Iran. Denoeux and Springborg contend that the Syrian case offers the best endorsement for the president’s approach. Seeing a principles-based, democracy-oriented policy as deepening American involvement in a country best left to regional powers to sort out, Trump sought to quickly bestow legitimacy on the interim Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and to end sanctions that would reduce his capacity to exert control over the country. This required little expenditure of political capital but led al-Sharaa to make major concessions to the United States, the authors argue:
- a commitment to prevent a resurgence of the Islamic State
- broader support for the fight against terrorism
- accommodation with Israel
- backing of other American objectives in the region
- assurance that with appropriate external financial support, provided largely by Saudi Arabia and Turkey, Syria would be rebuilt and not require Washington’s continued nurturing.
While they suggest that the Syria case is a clear argument for transactional diplomacy, Denoeux and Springborg show that the approach to peace in the Gaza Strip has been far less successful. Trump was able to credibly take credit for a ceasefire—which has been repeatedly broken by deadly Israeli attacks over the last seven months—and prisoner exchanges. However, the overall result was a short-term breakthrough without a path to a durable settlement. The process marginalized Palestinians and reflected the long-running power imbalance favoring Israel.
Unfortunately for Trump, the Iran War has threatened to become a strategic failure. However, Denoeux and Springborg contend that the conflict has not represented a fair test of transactional diplomacy, as the United States under the president’s watch has never engaged in strategic bargaining with the Islamic Republic:
The meetings between Iranian and US officials leading up to the February 28, 2026, American-Israeli attacks do not qualify as transactionalism. In transactional diplomacy, the parties must be willing to engage in bargaining, giving something to get something. But an examination of interactions between the Iranians and the second Trump administration reveals that neither side intended to make concessions to secure a deal.
This does not mean that the Iran War is not a fair test of Trump’s strategic competence. The president has been unable to adapt to a situation that involves existential stakes and holds consequences for the geopolitical order. “This is further evidence that while transactionalism can be an effective method for reaching limited goals, as with the Gaza peace plan,” Denoeux and Springborg write, “it struggles to address situations with more complex dynamics or more daunting objectives.”
In assessing whether Trump’s approach can serve as a substitute for traditional American diplomacy, the authors warn of the many drawbacks of transactionalism, including excessive personalism, neglect of institutions and long-term consequences, and a tendency to favor the powerful. However, they contend that some of its components—especially speed, flexibility, and a focus on results—should be incorporated into reforms of US foreign relations. “The challenge is to nurture the more responsive, quick-acting system that underpins transactionalism, but at the same time to broaden its focus from immediate deal making to longer-term strategic objectives,” Denoeux and Springborg assert. “This process should include consideration of the potential impacts of policy on relevant values and global public goods.”
Middle East Policy, Analyzing the Gulf Conflict
AMERICA’S WAR ON IRAN
Signals, Red Lines, and Collision: The Israel-Iran Spiral and US Intervention
Buğra Sari—open access!
Trump’s Transactional Diplomacy: Breakthrough or Breakdown?
Guilain Denoeux | Robert Springborg—open access!
Between Ideology and Strategy: The Iranian Revolution and the Reconfiguration of Middle Eastern Security
Alabbas F. Alsudani—open access!
Iran’s Forward Defense in Sub-Saharan Africa
Ariel Limanya Limbu | Ronen A. Cohen—open access!
CONSEQUENCES IN THE GULF
Crisis in the Strait of Hormuz: What Lies Ahead?
Gawdat Bahgat—free to read!
GCC-Asia Pacific Energy Nexus: Navigating Shifts in Demand and Geopolitics
Umud Shokri—open access!
Outwardly Strong, Internally Brittle: Dissecting the MBS Regime
Mohammed Ayoob