The Iran War at Six Months: Energy Vulnerability and Resilience

  • Middle East Policy

    Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.

The Iran War has hit a grim milestone of six months, with Washington and Tehran locked in a standoff over the Strait of Hormuz—the strategic waterway through which more than 20 percent of globally traded crude oil and liquefied natural gas transited before President Donald Trump launched Operation Epic Fury. As part of Middle East Policy’s continuing coverage, new analyses examine the energy vulnerabilities exposed by the war, the strategies states are pursuing to make their systems more resilient, and Iran’s medium- to long-term weaknesses if it continues to face a US blockade.

Middle East Policy has published more than a dozen articles on the 2026 US war with Iran, including what lies ahead in the Strait of Hormuz; how Trump’s transactionalism is backfiring; how the Islamic Revolution upended regional security; Iran’s forward defense in Africa; and the effects of the war on Gulf cooperation with the Asia-Pacific. Many more analyses of vital interest can be found in the table of contents below. If you find this article useful, please forward it to others you believe will benefit. You can register to receive our weekly updates here. And please follow us on the social media platforms X and LinkedIn.

Six months into the conflict, the United States is still struggling to open the Strait of Hormuz—which could be freely navigated until Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu decided to conduct a regime-change campaign against Tehran. Gawdat Bahgat, in a crucial free-to-read article, identifies potential alternatives to the shipping of energy through the Gulf, including the Iranian port of Jask on the Gulf of Oman; the Iraqi Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline to the Mediterranean Sea; the Saudi Aramco East-West Pipeline to the Red Sea; and the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline to the Gulf of Oman. However, the analysis finds that these solutions would require development over the long term and, even then, there is no guarantee that they could restore the status quo antebellum:

First, all four pipelines have relatively limited capacity. They have helped to mitigate the global oil crisis but they cannot make up for the entire loss of exports due to the Persian Gulf crisis. Second, these routes transport only hydrocarbons and have limited value for the movement of other commodities. The de facto blockade in the Strait of Hormuz has not only limited oil and gas shipments but has also had a severe impact on international trade in food, fertilizers, helium, and many other essential products. Third, the four alternative pipelines have themselves been vulnerable to political instability and security challenges. They do not guarantee the safety, security, and sustainability of oil and gas supplies from the Gulf region.

The vulnerability of Gulf energy is therefore likely to persist, Bahgat argues. He anticipates that what is playing out in the talks between Oman and Iran could become a permanent feature of the global energy system: what was once free navigation could become permanently if partially restricted, subject to fees—whether or not they are dubbed “tolls”—or other mechanisms of Iranian influence. Over time, “the crisis over the Strait of Hormuz will give momentum to the diversification of the energy mix away from oil and gas,” Bahgat writes. In addition, “regions like Africa, the eastern Mediterranean, and Latin America will attract more attention and investment.”

However, Iran’s ability to disrupt exports should not be confused with the resilience of its own energy sector. Umud Shokri’s open-access evaluation shows that the Islamic Republic’s immense gas reserves mask a structurally constrained system. Production is concentrated, domestic demand absorbs most output, and Iran lacks either the ability to develop a liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry or the export infrastructure that would allow it to convert its resource wealth into flexible global market power. “Unless Tehran can restore confidence in both its production capacity and the security of its export routes,” Shokri argues, “its gas diplomacy with Iraq and Turkey will remain vulnerable to each new military escalation.” (In an additional piece for Middle East Policy, Shokri demonstrates that the war has also exposed problems among Arab Gulf producers, which are trying to deepen partnerships in the Asia Pacific as part of a diversification strategy.)

Iran’s disadvantages in the global energy system are thrown into sharp relief by Ahmet Hakan Özkan, who finds that while Iran and Qatar possess similar natural-resource advantages, they have achieved radically different outcomes. The Islamic Republic remains heavily oriented toward domestic consumption, reliant on pipelines, and poorly integrated into global gas markets. By contrast, Doha has incorporated far more flexibility and scalability.

The Iran War nevertheless shows that Qatar is still dependent on unrestricted shipping. This has created a sort of paradox, Özkan shows:

The disruption in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates that structurally constrained systems may still acquire situational geopolitical leverage. Although Iran remains constrained in its ability to monetize its gas reserves, its geographic position enables it to exert influence over a maritime chokepoint on which globally integrated LNG exporters such as Qatar continue to depend. Thus, export capacity alone does not guarantee secure market access; instead, resilience under geopolitical stress depends on how market-access architectures distribute flexibility, exposure, scalability, and strategic dependence across different forms of disruption.

In a separate open-access article for Middle East Policy, Özkan tackles another dimension of energy resilience in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The two regional powers have been using current hydrocarbon revenues to finance renewables and other alternatives to reduce future dependence on fossil fuels. The war makes that strategy more difficult by increasing revenue volatility, threatening export continuity, and complicating investment.

In addition to severely testing the resilience of the Saudi energy strategy, Osama Sweidan examines whether and how the war threatens Riyadh’s planned economic transformation. The author acknowledges that the Gulf crisis has in the short term benefited Saudi coffers. However, while the surge in oil prices could help to finance investment in renewable energy and, more important, the development of indigenous technology and defense sectors, the windfall is more likely to reduce the government’s interest in moving away from the economic status quo.

In the longer term, Sweidan contends, the effects of the Iran War will provide further reasons for Riyadh to pare back its commitment to diversification, as it is more likely to devote attention and resources to increasing security and stabilizing the regional order. “Although evidence at this stage does not permit a precise assessment of wartime changes in Saudi defense spending, data from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database indicate that Saudi military expenditure amounted to approximately 6.5 percent of GDP, about $83.2 billion, in 2025,” Sweidan observes. “Given this substantial existing commitment, any sustained increase in security requirements could further constrain resources available for diversification.”

These incisive analyses show that while Iran is at a distinct disadvantage in the development and export of oil and gas—and its overall economic outlook is perilous—the reverberations from Trump’s campaign affect not just the immediate performance of the energy sector but the longer-term fortunes of states across the Gulf.

Middle East Policy

New coverage of the Iran War!

Crisis in the Strait of Hormuz: What Lies Ahead?
Gawdat Bahgat—free to read!

Iran’s Gas Sector in Conflict: Infrastructure Vulnerability & Market Implications
Umud Shokri—open access!

Qatar and Iran: Market Access Under Geopolitical Conflict
Ahmet Hakan Özkan—open access!

Israel’s Netanyahu Trap
Bulent Aras—open access!

Russia’s Strategic Paradox: Short-Term Gains, Long-Term Risks from the Iran War
Namig Abbasov | Emil S. Aslan—open access!

Russia and Iran: The Axis of Transactions Unraveled
Federico Manfredi Firmian

Rethinking Political Islam in Iran: Contestation, Authority, and Reform
Nagapushpa Devendra—open access!

Iran’s Revolutionary Situation and Digital Authoritarianism: 1979 vs. 2026
Mohsen Askari—open access!

Signals, Red Lines, and Collision: The Israel-Iran Spiral and US Intervention
Buğra Sari—open access!

Trump’s Transactional Diplomacy: Breakthrough or Breakdown?
Guilain Denoeux | Robert Springborg—open access!

Saudi Arabia’s Economic Diversification and Geopolitical Risk
Osama D. Sweidan

Gulf Energy Transition: The UAE and Saudi Arabia
Ahmet Hakan Özkan—open access!

GCC-Asia Pacific Energy Nexus: Navigating Shifts in Demand and Geopolitics
Umud Shokri—open access!

Between Ideology and Strategy: The Iranian Revolution and the Reconfiguration of Middle Eastern Security
Alabbas F. Alsudani—open access!

Iran’s Forward Defense in Sub-Saharan Africa
Ariel Limanya Limbu | Ronen A. Cohen—open access!

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  • Middle East Policy

    Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.

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