The six-day Arab-Israeli war of 1967 ushered in the demise of Arab nationalist regimes led by the late Gamal Abdel-Nasser. It was a devastating blow that changed the region. The 1973 war followed, with peace treaties eventually signed between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. But this was a partial settlement, in that it did not lead to total openness and people-to-people normalization.
More important, the opening of diplomatic relations between the three states brought no peace to Palestinians, who remained under occupation and total encirclement by Israel. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which followed hard upon the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai, resulted in an 18-year occupation of south Lebanon and the start of resistance led by Hezbollah. Israel’s goal of favorably changing the balance of power inside Lebanon faltered. The election in January 2024 of a new Lebanese president, Joseph Aoun, could be used as a US-Israeli wedge, or it could be a fresh start for a sovereign country.
The war launched by Israel against those who inherited the mantle of resistance—in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen—has shaken up the Middle East once again. The right-wing government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may not achieve its maximalist ambitions, but the balance of power in the region has shifted in its favor for the time being, aided by the highest level of support yet from the United States and Britain.
The misery inflicted on the people of the region by Israel, by abusive Arab regimes, and by the dynamics unleashed by the fall of the Assad regime in Syria is likely to persist, as durable peace becomes more difficult to establish on shifting sands and continuing turmoil. The likely expansion of the Abraham Accords under the incoming Trump administration will add to the complexity of regional politics. The reshaping of the Middle East is unfolding, to be sure, but the direction it will take is far from predictable.
It all starts with Gaza. The Israeli onslaught launched in October 2023 was a disproportionate response to the violence perpetrated by Palestinians who broke out of their outdoor prison on the 7th of that month. Many of the Israelis and several Americans killed on that day were likely victims of friendly fire by Israeli forces responding to Palestinians attacks and apparently not able to distinguish who was who in the chaos. Nor were the hostages taken by Hamas the central motivation for the Israeli forces charging into Gaza: The Netanyahu government has ignored several opportunities to exchange the hostages for Palestinian prisoners it has long held.
Instead, revenge was uppermost on Israeli minds after the shock of the attack by Hamas. Stories quickly circulated of gender-based attacks by Palestinians, random violence, and mutilations. Regardless of how factual these accounts were, they deeply impacted Israelis and their allies, who saw the violence unleashed upon Gaza’s civilians as justified retribution. Right-wing ministers in the Israeli cabinet reflected sentiment among settlers and supporters of the government in calling for and predicting permanent occupation of the Gaza Strip, to include the building of settlements on land cleared of its Palestinian population.
The plan to turn the Palestinian enclave into the new Dubai took shape even as the fighting was intensifying. Adding to fantasies of revenge and right-wing ideology, some business-minded Israelis began envisioning a futuristic Gaza replete with skyscrapers, hi-tech projects, and beach clubs. Well before the 2024 election, Donald Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, envisioned the development plans he could undertake on behalf of Israel, vaguely linked to a normalization deal with Saudi Arabia. He bluntly suggested this could start once the Palestinians are driven out, perhaps into “secure areas in the Negev or even into Egypt.”
Fifteen months after the start of this war it is easy, if macabre, to count the blows and assess the damage done to Gaza, as well as to Lebanon and Israel, in terms of the human and economic cost. It is much more difficult to find clear winners. Sifting through the rubble in Gaza, analysts find Hamas to have been bloodied but not bowed. Despite the decapitation of its leadership, the organization still exists and continues to resist, and its production, storage, and use of weaponry have persisted.
Lebanese Hezbollah, long considered the most formidable of Israel’s foes in the region, has because of its losses in this latest war been much maligned and ridiculed by its opponents in Lebanon and the region. The organization’s top leadership has been decimated, and intelligence breaches, both technical and human, have revealed a weakness long overlooked by friends and independent analysts alike. Despite its valiant efforts on the ground against invading Israeli forces and the abundance of its precision-guided missiles, Hezbollah was unable to stop an onslaught that devasted Beirut’s southern suburb and destroyed infrastructure and social and economic institutions across Lebanon.
The decoupling of the wars in Lebanon and Gaza was blatant in the acceptance by Hezbollah’s new leader, Naim Qassem, of ceasefire terms worked out between US envoy Amos Hochstein and Nabih Berri, Lebanon’s speaker of parliament—something the late Hassan Nasrallah had vowed never to allow. Hezbollah has clearly suffered a serious setback. Nevertheless, it would be foolish to dismiss the possibility that the group can stage a comeback and continue to be a major player in Lebanese politics.
Filling the vacant presidency in Lebanon has been a major political challenge since Michel Aoun finished his term in 2022. Two major blocs, one led by Hezbollah and its allies and another by Maronites, had insisted on their own candidates. This led to a stalemate, with neither faction garnering the required two-thirds majority in parliament. In early January, a weakened Hezbollah under Qassem’s leadership showed some flexibility, and Joseph Aoun rose to the presidency as a result of flexibility on both sides. However, neither group can claim victory.
Politically, there is at least the chance for new harmony to develop between the rival Lebanese camps. Militarily, the relationship between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is a complex one, which often demanded careful coordination. In the many local and regional conflicts over the past 30 years, the two have strictly avoided facing each other as adversaries. The compromise between independent action across the border by Hezbollah and a forced disarmament of the group by the LAF could mean forging a merger. The LAF is already led by a collective leadership council but lacks a national-defense strategy that all political factions can endorse. This would require a compromise between opponents calling for the total dissolution of Hezbollah’s military and supporters calling for its revival as an autonomous resistance force.
No member of Hezbollah has come out with anything close to that position, at least in public. But in a recent speech, Qassem made it clear that allowing the Lebanese state to help preserve the ceasefire aligns with his group’s stance toward the homeland. He also reiterated, as his predecessor had long expressed, that he has nothing but respect for the Lebanese army. He indicated they would coordinate closely as the party moves out of the south to fulfill its ceasefire obligations. The agreement between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah is a much needed respite for civilians caught up in the fighting. However, it does not end the conflict, which will persist as long as the Gaza war continues and Palestinians remain under Israeli occupation.
The fall of the Assad regime in Syria, while a boon for Israel, also represents a rekindling of the Arab uprising against authoritarian rule in 2011, which at the time failed to upset the power structure in Damascus. Syria’s new leadership quickly expressed its vehement disagreement with Tehran’s strategy and ideology, leaving no doubt that the state will no longer allow the use of its territory for Iran’s weapon manufacturing and trafficking. Ahmed al-Shara, who led the rebel takeover, has also largely ignored the Israeli expansion inside Syria and stated that it does not want war with its neighbor.
A new start between Washington and Damascus has been signaled. With stunning speed, Barbara Leaf, the US assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs, was among the first international visitors to the capital, just a few weeks after Assad’s ouster. To be sure, reversing the US listing of HTS as a terrorist organization is contingent on the actions that follow the pragmatic speeches out of Damascus.
Regime change in Syria, given the obvious blow it represents for Assad’s regional alliances, is seen as a potential win for the United States and Israel. Arab Gulf states, taking a cue from the American position, have quickly welcomed the new regime. Hence, the Qatari foreign minister’s visit to Damascus was quickly followed by the new Syrian foreign minister’s trip to Riyadh. However, even with support from the Gulf and the West, Syria faces serious obstacles.
Syria’s economy has been shattered by years of war and dismemberment. Stability will be key for any reconstruction to occur. Opponents of the new regime exist both inside Syria and in the surrounding region. Alawites, Shia, and Kurds could resent the success of these Sunni fundamentalists in capturing Damascus, especially if they act against them or restrict their liberties. The choice facing these groups is to collaborate with the regime in building a state where all parts of society are treated equally—or ally with likeminded regional forces and fight.
Yemen’s Houthis (Ansar Allah) also moved to support the Palestinians after October 7, 2023, choosing to bomb international shipping in the Red Sea to disrupt cargo shipments to Israel. They followed with long-range missile attacks, though they fired only a fraction of those launched by Hezbollah. Israel, the United States, and Great Britain responded with attacks on Hudaydah Port, Sanaa International Airport, and other targets they deemed part of the Houthi military infrastructure. From a cost-benefit analysis it is difficult to judge which side has suffered the most. The Houthis have incurred less damage and fewer casualties than either Hamas or Hezbollah, and they have vowed to continue confronting Israel. However, they have not achieved their goal of seriously disrupting traffic to Israel or causing enough harm to cause Tel Aviv to stop its bombardment of Gaza. The Netanyahu government has threatened more punishing strikes against Yemen.
Yemeni opponents of Ansar Allah have a choice to make: Take advantage of Israeli and Western anger to revive their own military attacks on Sanaa, or press once again for a diplomatic solution and national reconciliation. Rhetoric from the various sides does not indicate that cooler heads are prevailing.
Trump’s return to Washington will encourage Israel’s right wing to consolidate the military gains and formally annex more Arab territory. However, for each of these cases, there is a choice to be made. The axis of resistance has fallen on hard times, which could induce its domestic opponents to take advantage and assist Israel and the United States. These actors could change the balance of power in the Middle East or throw the region into prolonged turmoil—or they could forge a more flexible resistance front that can be drawn into reconciliation to seek new national harmony.