Illiberal Populism and Authoritarianism in Turkey: The Impact of Protest and Violence

  • Middle East Policy

    Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.

A new article in Middle East Policys Fall 2024 issue examines the effects of years of protest on Erdoğan’s regime and Turkey’s democracy as a whole.


The start of the summer brought about a new wave of protests in Turkey that echoed the transformative ones of 2013. On May Day, more than 200 protesters were arrested in Istanbul’s iconic Taksim Square, a majority of whom were members of major labor unions or the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the main opposition political party.  

Only a week earlier, in anticipation of the protests, Erdoğan’s government unlawfully banned people’s right to assembly and peaceful protest within the square, directly contradicting a recent ruling by Turkey’s Constitutional Court that upheld the right to peaceful assembly during May Day celebrations.  

The police’s violent crackdown on protests, the violation of labor unions’ right to assembly, and direct opposition to the Constitutional Court are all major signs of the regime’s anxiety about its own precarious hold on power. After a narrow loss in the 2023 presidential contest, opposition parties triumphed in the 2024 local elections, signaling a potential window of opportunity for the creation of a post-Erdoğan party system. 

At the same time, this is not the first time that D’s regime has been challenged. These recent protests must be placed within the context of a more long-term crisis of Turkey’s democracy that began in 2013. In a new article in Middle East Policy, Stephen Deets analyzes the impact of the turbulent period of 2013-2019, when protest and violence undermined Erdoğan’s regime. Deets, a professor of politics at Babson College, asserts that these movements may have strengthened the illiberal populist regime initially, but weakened it in the long term.  

He argues that Erdoğan has built up an illiberal populist regime that relies upon the creation of tightly-knit vertical networks of supporters. For people feeling alienated by an increasingly globalized and individualistic society, populists are attractive because they “echo traditional cultural norms, create personalistic ties that make them feel heard and valued, provide clear and compelling narratives around policy issues, and establish special economic benefits.” 

Democratic opposition groups can counter populist regimes by creating common identities that “empower citizens as citizens, rather than regime supporters.” A common method of creating a shared identity is through political mobilization, specifically through protests, though these can often have sudden unexpected effects.  

In the short term, protests and violence are often unpopular and can be wielded by the regime’s securitization narratives. Erdoğan often employed this strategy by dismissing opposition protests as “anti-democratic attempts by the minority to impose its will” on the nation. This strategy could be seen in the build-up to the May Day protests, as the interior minister argued that Taksim Square should be off-limits to protesters to stop “terrorist organizations” using it for “propaganda.”  

 On the other hand, in the long run, protests provide activists with essential skills that allow for the organization of more effective and large-scale events, and promote the creation of shared mindsets, memories, and narratives that critique the regime and can be used to mobilize opposition movements in the future.  

 One of the most important contemporary protest movements in Turkey were the Gezi Park Protests. In 2013, demonstrations broke out in response to the planned demolition of Gezi Park that was supposed to be replaced by a large shopping mall. The construction company in charge of the project had close ties to Erdoğan, which, in combination with public outcry against the park’s demolition, positioned the protests as a display of dissent against the regime. 

While in the immediate aftermath of the protests it seemed as though they had inadvertently strengthened Erdoğan’s authoritarian hold on power, recent developments have shown otherwise. The 2024 May Day protests, that echoed those of 2013, are reflective of a growing opposition movement against the regime.  

 The rise of a consolidated democratic opposition within the CHP is best evidenced by their major electoral victories in 2019. One reason the 2019 local elections were seen as so important was structural. Since most contracting and welfare provisions are done by local governments, by focusing on local elections, the opposition weakened the AKP’s links with local voters and the business community. 

Deets contends that the opposition’s strategy of building inclusive horizontal networks, many of them through the protest movements from 2013 onwards, may provide a path for future democratic consolidation in Turkey. Despite the strength of Erdoğan’s “vertical networks of patronage and clientelism to supporters,” his policies often harmed other potential voters.  

The long-term effect of protests and opposition mobilization was the strengthening of Turkey’s democratic forces through unity and coalition-building. The nascent vigor of these parties, while young, may have set the stage for “a post-Erdoğan party system rooted in normal democratic politics [to come] into view.” 

Among the major takeaways readers can find in Stephen Deets’s Middle East Policy article, “Protest, Violence, and Illiberal Populism In Turkey, 2013–2019: A Network Perspective”: 

  • Between 2013 and 2019, protest and violence both strengthened and weakened Turkey’s authoritarian regime under President Erdoğan. 
    • While initially reinforcing Erdoğan’s illiberal populism, they allowed opposition networks to gain power, culminating in the opposition’s victory in Istanbul’s 2019 mayoral election  
  • Populist regimes often win by taking advantage of both the alienation from civil society and increasing inequality produced by neoliberalism. 
    • Populism can be defined as “a thin ideology that views society as divided between a corrupt elite and an authentic people, and that conceives of politics as an expression of the general will.” 
    • Erdoğan built an illiberal populist regime by depicting his supporters as a new religious-nationalist community that embodies “the people.” 
      • He further built up his base by appealing to the Kurdish minority, emphasizing their Muslim identity, and distancing them from the more secular pro-Kurdish left-wing parties. 
  • Democratic opposition groups can counter populist regimes by creating common identities that “empower citizens as citizens, rather than regime supporters.” 
    • A common method of creating a shared identity is through political mobilization, specifically through protests. 
    • A main challenge for protests is that disruptions are often unpopular and can be instrumentalized by the regime’s securitization narratives. 
    • Erdoğan has been dismissive of opposition protests as anti-democratic attempts by the minority to impose its will, arguing that the only proper time for preferences to be expressed is on election day. 
  • The 2013 Gezi Park protests in Istanbul revealed the hypocrisy of the regime by publicizing how its nativist and anti-elite narratives are ultimately in service of enriching business elites. 
  • The attempted coup in 2016 further marginalized the AKP by forcing Erdoğan to shrink his support network and adopt greater securitization policies. 
    • In the past, the Gulen movement, headed by exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen, was a major source of support for the regime. 
    • The support ended after Erdoğan blamed the movement for a corruption investigation into his administration. 
    • After the coup, more than 100,000 people were accused of being Gulenists, HDP supporters, and others viewed as unfriendly to the AKP.  
  • Activists saw the 2019 local elections as an opportunity to dent the AKP’s power by taking advantage of the party’s growing isolation and forming a pluralistic, decentralized coalition.  
    • This coalition was able to secure major electoral victories, including in Istanbul, signaling a shift in the political landscape. 
    • Opposition candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu leveraged the wide variety of regime opponents to build a coalition that won the mayoral elections in Istanbul. 
  • While Erdoğan’s regime was initially bolstered by populism and violence, the longer-term effect of protests and opposition mobilization was the strengthening of Turkey’s democratic forces.  
    • The opposition’s strategy of building inclusive networks may provide a path for future democratic consolidation in Turkey. 

 You can read “Protest, Violence, and Illiberal Populism In Turkey, 2013–2019: A Network Perspective” by Stephen Deets in the Fall 2024 issue of Middle East Policy. 

  • Middle East Policy

    Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.

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