Erdoğan’s Decaying Political Machine

A journal article analyzes the conditions that lead to Turkish President Erdoğan and his party’s defeat in the 2024 local elections.

In March, Turkey’s opposition dealt a potentially debilitating blow to the longstanding ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). The primary opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) successfully won Istanbul and Ankara and 15 other major cities across the country.  

Upon the AKP’s defeat, popular mayor of Istanbul, and likely presidential candidate, Ekren İmamoğlu contended that opposition wins “marked a clear indication that voters had rejected the president’s tightening grip on Turkish state institutions.”  

But his criticism was unsuccessful in changing government behavior. In November, the nation’s highest appeals court filed a criminal complaint against Supreme Court judges over their decision to release a jailed opposition parliamentarian on the grounds that his rights “to be elected” and “to have personal freedom and security” had been breached. The appeal—supported by Erdoğan—was in violation of the constitution’s protection of Supreme Court decisions. The chair of the CHP spoke to the Turkish Grand National Assembly stating that “this is a point where law has vanished, we are faced with a judiciary coup, loud and clear.” 

Years of increasingly authoritarian ruling patterns have not only harmed the AKP, but also Turkey’s future. In a November report on Turkey’s long stalled EU membership bid, the European Commission noted “serious backsliding” on democratic standards, the rule of law, human rights, and judicial independence. 

Despite the country’s continuing issues, the opposition’s success could mark a turning point for Turkey. Some analysts feel that the local election outcomes could signal the beginning of the end for Erdoğan’s regime and “offer Turkey a path forward.” 

In a recent Middle East Policy article, M. Hakan Yavuz and Rasim Koç argue that, ultimately, the outcome of the election was less a show of support for the opposition than a demonstration of how disillusioned the Turkish public has become with their once popular government. Their analysis of the recent elections demonstrates not only the failures and shortcomings of Erdoğan and the AKP, but also the successes of the opposition. 

In the 2023 election buildup, Erdoğan spent significant state resources to garner votes by manipulating economic conditions, offering resources to supporters, expanding bureaucracy, and offering early retirement options. The move initially appealed to voters, but sparked a rise in inflation and decline in the currency that has left the country in economic straits. 

Voters also increasingly distrust the government after continued destruction of checks and balances, particularly as the government has politicized and corrupted the judiciary. These factors impacted an already eroding political base. The AKP has increasingly lost the popularity it once enjoyed as voters feel it has become stale and deeply corrupt. 

Yavuz, a professor at the University of Utah, and Koç, a historian of modern Turkey, argue that “the crisis of the AKP’s making is not merely one of leadership or strategy but of identity and purpose… it struggles to articulate a coherent vision for the future.”  

Meanwhile, the strength of the opposition has grown. The CHP—who has come to represent the opposition—saw critical gains across the country through its identity and strong candidates. For many years, the CHP has emphasized dialogue with marginalized communities alongside justice and inclusivity, a stark contrast to the AKP’s rhetoric of division. Paired with two popular potential presidential contenders in Ekren İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş, the party has demonstrated its capacity to challenge the existing order. CHP head Özgür Özel recognized that “the results should be seen not simply as a win for his party but for the broad array of anti-Erdoğan opposition groups.” 

The combination of Erdoğan’s failures and the opposition’s contrasting successes could spell the end of the longstanding president’s regime, the scholars contend. Voters have made it clear that their interest in the president is waning and have applied further pressure as economic conditions worsen.  

While Erdoğan declared there would be no election until 2028, Yavuz and Koç bring up the possibility of an earlier vote. For the opposition to move forward, they argue, it must continue to embrace inclusivity and bold initiatives toward unity—which is no longer “not merely an idealistic dream.” 

Among the major takeaways readers can find M. Hakan Yavuz and Rasim Koç’s Middle East Policy article, “Do Turkey’s 2024 Local Elections Signal the End of Erdoğan’s Reign?”: 

• The local elections held in March resulted in the greatest blow to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in more than two decades, as his long-ruling AKP was dealt resounding losses just 10 months after Erdoğan narrowly won the presidency. 

• Analysts argue that the losses were more the result of protest against the AKP and Erdoğan than support for the opposition. 

• • The elections saw a high rate of nonparticipation and an increase in invalid or blank votes.  

• In the 2023 election, Erdoğan used an excess of state resources to try to secure votes, offering direct and indirect economic incentives to draw supporters. 

• • A significant suppression of interest rates briefly sparked support, but caused inflation to rise to almost 70 percent and a decline in the lira’s value. 

• • The fallout has also significantly hurt older voters, who were once a primary supporter base, and further demolished the middle class. 

• Throughout AKP rule, the judiciary has been politicized, corrupted, and used to silence criticism and criminalize the opposition, per reports by the Turkish intelligence. A lack of transparency has further fueled public distrust. 

• Existing party leaders, including Erdoğan, increasingly lack political flexibility and charm, and supporters are frustrated by nepotism and meritocracy in the government. 

• • Voters are also put off by the lack of alternatives and the prevalent feeling that they cannot bring about meaningful change. 

• • The centralized power of the presidential system has also weakened Erdoğan’s control as he has become tethered to a large network of competing allies. 

• The opposition has become based in the CHP, the increasingly recognized primary alternative to the AKP, who has offered far more attractive candidates. 

• • Former CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu’s legacy of fostering dialogue with marginalized voices and emphasis on inclusivity were vital to party success. The politics of equality effectively opposed the AKP’s divisiveness. 

• • However, the party recognized that the 2024 votes for them were not solely for their party, but for opposition parties overall. 

• Larger identities have also been more successfully catered to under the CHP and other opposition groups than the AKP. 

• • Turkey’s large Kurdish minority has faced increased oppression by Erdoğan’s government, and voters and the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party turned to support the CHP candidates. 

• Erdoğan’s transformation of Turkey into an AKP party state, consolidation of power, and Islamization of the military have caused large-scale institutional collapse. 

• Worsening economic conditions and opposition gains could force an election before 2028. 

• As Turkey moves forward, the authors argue that officials, parties, and elites must embrace inclusivity to unite the country’s diverse population. 

You can read “Do Turkey’s 2024 Local Elections Signal the End of Erdoğan’s Reign?” by M. Hakan Yavuz and Rasim Koc in the Summer 2024 issue of Middle East Policy.