The Islamic State group established a presence in North Africa following its successes in the Middle East. Shortly after the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) changed its name to the Islamic State (IS) and declared a caliphate spanning eastern Syria and western Iraq in late June 2014, pledges of allegiance rolled in from groups in North Africa to the declared leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. IS was subsequently able to establish a significant presence in Libya, where a "capital" conceived along the lines of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria was established in the coastal city of Sirte. IS has also gained a foothold in Egypt and, albeit to a lesser degree, in Algeria and Tunisia. The many pledges of fealty, or bayaa, appeared to signal that IS was expanding rapidly in North Africa and eroding the position of al-Qaeda as the foremost transnational jihadi organization in the region. However, the fortunes of IS have been changing of late. The loss of Sirte in December 2016 to militias loyal to Libya's UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), assisted by U.S. airstrikes, represented a major setback to the group's ambitions in North Africa and further draws attention to the group's overstretch. With its weaknesses becoming more apparent, will IS be able to remain and expand in North Africa as its slogan asserts?

There is little doubt that IS will survive in North Africa, having managed to carve out a place in the jihadi landscape, making gains at al-Qaeda's expense. Moreover, as long as Libya remains at risk of a renewed civil war and its governance continues to be inadequate, the possibility that IS will regroup and retake small pockets of territory cannot be excluded. IS may also be able to make additional gains in Libya and Tunisia, in particular, as a result of the defection of some younger members of al-Qaeda-linked groups, such as Ansar al-Sharia in Libya and Tunisia, that may want to break away from the old guard. However, the IS expansion in North Africa over the longer term is far from certain. In order to compete with al-Qaeda, which is much more firmly embedded in the region, IS would need to adopt a similar strategy. This would mean not only morphing into a more traditional terrorist organization, with a long-term approach to the project of building an Islamic state, but also supporting local jihadi groups and inserting itself into local narratives to be less conspicuous. Internal disputes within IS affiliates about their groups' future direction, defections from the groups, and the formation of splinter groups should be expected. The jihadi landscape in the region, therefore, runs the risk of becoming even more fragmented.

To further undercut the momentum behind the growth of IS in North Africa, pressure on IS in Libya, as well as in Syria and Iraq, should be maintained; this will lay bare the vulnerabilities of its strategy and undermine the appeal of its brand. Yet, this needs to be accompanied by sustained efforts to achieve an inclusive and durable political settlement to the Libyan conflict, as well as international assistance to improve governance in the country. Tunisia's lack of experience in countering violent extremism, its governance deficiencies and the fragility of its political consensus also leave it especially vulnerable. Security assistance and broader support for the political transition in the country should, therefore, be a priority. Further fragmentation of the jihadi landscape in North Africa, perhaps accompanied by spectacular attacks as groups assert themselves, will also mean that counterterrorism efforts in the broader region may need additional support, as will initiatives to enhance regional security cooperation.