Hamas or Fatah: Factionalism in Palestine’s National Cause

  • Middle East Policy

    Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.

This article explores data collected from Palestinian university students to analyze political and social sentiments around political parties, unity, and sovereignty in the Occupied Territories. 


As the war in Gaza continues, dozens of potential solutions have been theorized and proposed. Among the most popular has been the widely US-backed idea that the Palestinian Authority (PA) should take control of governance in the Gaza Strip after an Israeli withdrawal of its forces. 

Fatah, the ruling party in the PA, is already governing the West Bank and has faced financial and legitimacy struggles as a result of the war, but has also maintained a level of support to Gaza despite its rivalry with the territory-governing Hamas. 

Despite this support, Palestinians have become increasingly disillusioned over the years with the PA and its behavior. For many, the organization’s cooperation with Israel has been a major concern and sometimes viewed as a betrayal of the national cause. Meanwhile, Hamas, in their militant opposition to the state, enjoyed relatively high levels of support in the wake of October 7th that have since declined to pre-war levels. 

As both governments face significant popularity crises, many Palestinians are put in a dire position where they feel there is no governing body capable of successfully ending the conflict, much less managing the territories or achieving sovereignty. The rivalry between Hamas and Fatah has only grown, as has the lack of trust that Palestinians have in both. 

This divide is exhibited in an article in Middle East Policy’s new Summer 2024 issue. A team of researchers and writers collected survey responses from students at Palestinian universities that reveal the prevalence of cynical feelings in the young people of today’s Palestine. Many said that they feel discouraged about the state of their political and social environment, particularly due to the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas and its impact on the national cause. 

Indeed, “the study findings show that differences in ideology and vision between Fatah and Hamas are the main causes of social division and political contention in Palestine.” 

The major division between the two key political parties has been more than a traditional political rivalry, extending beyond competing government structures and into media wars and even armed encounters. Even as the war in Gaza rages, the groups continue to engage: Fatah’s Mahmoud Abbas, president of the PA, has taken rhetorical shots at Hamas for giving Israel “pretexts and justifications” to attack, while Hamas continues to oppose the PA’s total takeover of Gaza and maintains accusations of cooperation with Israel. 

The authors argue that such divisive discourse has significantly undermined the social cohesion that they argue is needed to successfully address Palestine’s major issues: the lack of sovereignty, poor public services, socioeconomic inequality, and democratic rights.  

The survey results show that divisive rhetoric “tends to lessen engagement in political debate, reduce focus on the national cause, and decrease optimism over the struggle for statehood.” 

“The increasing rifts have contributed to feelings of intolerance, distrust, and insecurity,” the authors explain. “More important, the political conflict has diverted attention away from the struggles against occupation and for statehood, and toward a hateful, internal struggle for power and the realization of narrowly partisan goals.” 

The ongoing “us versus them” mentality has eroded the Palestinian identity that strove for independence in the first place. For the territories to reach their major goals, the team argues that “Palestinians must oppose exclusionary systems and not allow nationalist, Islamist, or any other version of supremacy to take root.” The war may create a new point to center Palestinian identity around, but “collective consciousness will likely require more than just shifts in conditions but changes in discourse, as well.” 

Among the major takeaways readers can find in Muther Saeedi, Oqab Jabali, Muath Ishtaiyeh, Abed Alkhaleq Esa, and Mohammad Dabous’ Middle East Policy article, “The Impact of Factional Discourse On the Palestinian National Cause”: 

  • In a recent study—completed prior to the ongoing Gaza war—researchers found that university students are experiencing high degrees of cynicism due to the divisive discourse between Fatah, ruling party in the Palestinian National Authority (PA), and Hamas. 
  • Polarizing rhetoric serves to undermine social cohesion and strength in international politics as Palestine fights for statehood. 
    • It also diverts attention from significant social issues, including the Israeli occupation, socioeconomic inequality, access to service, and democratic rights. 
  • The primary sources of divisive rhetoric are Fatah and Hamas, who often accuse each other of antinationalist behavior. 
    • Fatah’s aim is to free Palestine from Israeli occupation and form a sovereign state through peaceful and diplomatic methods. 
    • Hamas is an Islamist movement that takes a much more combative stance against Israel, but also against the secular-nationalist PA. 
  • Polarization reaches all levels of society, primarily through the press and party-affiliated media; division is visible not only in the political sphere, but also in interpersonal relationships. 
  • The use of “uncivil discourse” has created a political culture that uses emotionality to create an “us vs. them” mentality between the parties and their supporters. 
    • Such discourse has undermined Palestinians’ trust in government, replaced reasoned dialogue, and forced stringent viewpoints. 
      • The reduced trust in both parties erodes the belief that either side can end the occupation, address key needs, or form a Palestinian state. 
    • Those who are exposed to such intense discourse and sloganeering may also become frustrated and insecure. 
  • In the 2023 Gaza war, there is evidence of the continued competition between groups. 
    • The PA has portrayed Hamas as extremely violent and accused them of putting Palestinians at risk of conflict to reduce the group’s legitimacy. 
    • Hamas has in turn accused the PA of cooperating with Israel and the US. 
  • The authors’ survey of university students reveals several key points: 
    • Students believe that discourse in Palestine is eroding collective consciousness and is more for show than it is credible 
    • Polarization tends to lessen engagement in political debate, reduce focus on the national cause, and decrease optimism over the struggle for statehood 
    • Students see the discourse as affecting leaders and institutions, creating political alienation, and stoking feelings that “rivals are really enemies,” even between families, friends, and neighbors. 
  • Responses indicate, however, that there is still moderate strength of national identity, and that rhetoric is not necessarily making them concerned solely with their self-interest. 
  • Data from the students surveyed in Gaza demonstrated that the effects of discourse related to political divisions are higher there than in the West Bank, which is subject to more restrictions on freedom of expression and experiences a different government structure. 
  • Recent evidence since the war indicates that Hamas has experienced an increase in support, as the PA is being rejected by more than 90 percent of Palestinians, but the authors argue that shifts in conditions will not be sufficient for the development of collective consciousness. 
  • The authors argue that Palestinians must oppose exclusionary systems and not allow nationalist, Islamist, or any other version of supremacy to take root. 

You can read “The Impact of Factional Discourse On the Palestinian National Cause” by Muther Saeedi, Oqab Jabali, Muath Ishtaiyeh, Abed Alkhaleq Esa, and Mohammad Dabous in the early look at the Summer 2024 issue of Middle East Policy. 

 

 

(Banner image: Thaer GHANEM / PPO / AFP)

  • Middle East Policy

    Middle East Policy has been one of the world’s most cited publications on the region since its inception in 1982, and our Breaking Analysis series makes high-quality, diverse analysis available to a broader audience.

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