Dennis Jett
Ambassador Jett, a retired U.S. Foreign Service Officer, is a professor of international affairs at the School of International Affairs, Pennsylvania State University.
In Washington, the road from legislative intent to policy implementation is paved with politics. As a result, where that road leads often has little to do with where it was meant to go. Take the Export Administration Act, for example. One of its provisions requires the secretary of state to maintain a list of countries that are state sponsors of terrorism so that sanctions can be applied to them. State sponsors are defined as those countries that have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.1 This sounds straightforward, but the way the requirement has been implemented has left countries on the list that should be off and others off that should be on. And in every case it seems politics is the determining factor.
There are three laws that attempt to diminish support for terrorism by imposing sanctions on those countries that encourage it: Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA), Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. Application of these three laws results in sanctions that place restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, a ban on defense exports and sales, certain controls over exports of dual-use items, and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.2 Congress made the intent of this legislation clear when it passed the EAA in 1979:
It is the policy of the United States to use export controls to encourage other countries to take immediate steps to prevent the use of their territories or resources to aid, encourage, or give sanctuary to those persons involved in directing, supporting, or participating in acts of international terrorism. To achieve this objective, the President shall make every reasonable effort to secure the removal or reduction of such assistance to international terrorists through international cooperation and agreement before resorting to the imposition of export controls.3
This statement of policy by Congress illustrates the arguments for and against export controls. Proponents of sanctions want to use them to force the countries being sanctioned to change their behavior. Opponents question their effectiveness and argue that the economic costs to the United States do not justify their use.
There is no shortage of evidence to support the view of those who question whether sanctions work. A November 2001 study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics concluded, "unilateral US sanctions, by themselves, have not deterred countries from engaging in terrorist activities."4 More recently, when additional sanctions were placed on Syria, White House spokesman Jay Carney said, "What we have seen is that sanctions can put pressure on governments and regimes to change their behavior." Glenn Kessler, who writes a column on fact checking for The Washington Post, disagreed. He rated that statement at One Pinocchio on his scale of lack of truthfulness. This meant no outright falsehoods but some shading of the facts, as well as omissions and exaggerations.5
It should be obvious that unilateral sanctions do not work, as there is little the United States provides that cannot be purchased elsewhere, though it may be more expensive. The real point of unilateral sanctions is therefore to demonstrate American displeasure, inflict some pain on the countries that sponsor terrorism, and ensure that American aid and military hardware do not go to those countries.
Only certain countries are given that treatment, however, as the EAA sanctions are applied very selectively. This article will argue that the main reason for this is politics, especially domestic politics. There are other reasons, including strategic considerations and the problem of defining what constitutes terrorism and support for it, but politics is never hard to discern, though it is rarely acknowledged.
Another legal requirement placed on the State Department is to issue a full and complete report on terrorism each year, including a section on state sponsors of terrorism. The latest version of this publication, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, uses the following statutory definitions:
Section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the United States Code defines certain key terms used in Section 2656f(a) as follows:
(1) the term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country;
(2) the term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents; and
(3) the term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.6
The difficulty of defining terrorism is acknowledged in the report, as it notes,
Terrorist acts are part of a larger phenomenon of violence inspired by a cause, and at times the line between the two can become difficult to draw. This report includes some discretionary information in an effort to relate terrorist events to the larger context in which they occur, and to give a feel for the conflicts that spawn violence. Thus, this report will discuss terrorist acts as well as other violent incidents that are not necessarily "international terrorism" and therefore are not subject to the statutory reporting requirement.
But that is really just an excuse for padding the report's section on some countries while ignoring the same problem in others.
There has never been an agreed-upon international definition of what constitutes terrorism, despite repeated efforts to come up with one. Agreement could never be reached among enough countries about what are legitimate acts carried out in the name of national liberation and what are acts of terrorism. The rockets fired randomly into Israel by Palestinian forces from Gaza are interpreted either way, depending on the point of view of the observer.
Another academic and legal debate is whether a state can commit acts of terrorism or can just encourage them through the use of subnational groups. For purposes of this article, the State Department definitions for terrorism will be used, and it will be assumed that states cannot commit terrorism, but they can sponsor acts. This sponsorship can be defined as assistance to a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). The State Department has 59 organizations on its FTO list and another 10 that were on the list but have been removed. An organization has to have three characteristics to be considered an FTO:
• It must be a foreign organization.
• It must engage in terrorist activity or at least retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.
• Its terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations or the economic interests) of the United States.7
Like the definition of terrorism and sponsorship, the characteristics of an FTO are open to interpretation. The third requirement is particularly subjective, as U.S. nationals and national interests can be found in any part of the globe and are, therefore, potentially under threat from any group that uses violence. Among the FTOs that seem a stretch to include on the list are ETA, the Basque separatist organization in Spain; Boko Haram, an organization operating in central Africa; and various offshoots of the Irish Republican Army. The Continuity IRA (CIRA) became active in 1994 but did not get added to the list until 2004, making it seem more like a reward to the British government for its support for the invasion of Iraq than a response to any newly discovered threat to American interests by the CIRA. Whether an organization belongs on the list or not, one definition of a state sponsor of terrorism is a government that provides support to an FTO.
Below is a chart that shows who has been on the list over time, when they were added, and when they were removed. There are only four countries that are currently on the list: Cuba, Syria, Iran and Sudan. It is open to question whether two of them still belong on it.
Countries on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List
YEAR | Syria | Libya | Iraq | South | Cuba | Iran | North | Sudan |
1979 | X | X | X | X | ||||
1980 | X | X | X | X | ||||
1981 | X | X | X | X | ||||
1982 | X | X | X | X | X | |||
1983 | X | X | X | X | ||||
1984 | X | X | X | X | X | |||
1985 | X | X | X | X | X | |||
1986 | X | X | X | X | X | |||
1987 | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||
1988 | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||
1989 | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||
1990 | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
1991 | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||
1992 | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||
1993 | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
1994 | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
1995 | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
1996 | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
1997 | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
1998 | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
1999 | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
2000 | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
2001 | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
2002 | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
2003 | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
2004 | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||
2005 | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||
2006 | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||
2007 | X | X | X | X | X | |||
2008 | X | X | X | X | X | |||
2009 | X | X | X | X | ||||
2010 | X | X | X | X | ||||
2011 | X | X | X | X | ||||
2012 | X | X | X | X | ||||
2013 | X | X | X | X | ||||
2014 | X | X | X | X |
Iran clearly merits being retained on the list. It has supported both Hezbollah and Hamas for many years. Iranian backing for Hamas had diminished significantly in the past three years, according to U.S. and Israeli officials, because it was divided over supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in his civil war. Iran had even shifted its funding to Palestinian Islamic Jihad, another FTO, but the recent fighting in Gaza has revived that support. Two senior Iranian officials, in an interview with an Arabic-language television station, claimed that Iran was providing weapons and missile technology to Hamas to improve its military capability against Israel.8
Syria is the only country that has been on the list continuously since it was created in 1979. While it ceased to be actively engaged in terrorist operations in 1986, it still provides support to FTOs and serves as a conduit for Iranian arms that are shipped to Hezbollah.9
The case for keeping the other two countries on the list is thin to nonexistent. The State Department report's section on Sudan reads more like an argument for why it should not be on the list than why it should be. The report is mostly laudatory, noting that Sudan
• Has remained a generally cooperative counterterrorism partner and continued to take action to address threats to U.S. interests and personnel in Sudan;
• Has taken steps to limit the activities of "elements of al-Qaida (AQ)-inspired terrorist groups" and has worked to disrupt foreign fighters' use of Sudan as a logistics base and transit point;
• Has made some progress in opposing terrorist financing, although members of Hamas are permitted to travel, live and conduct fundraising in Sudan;
• Has been generally responsive to international-community concerns about counterterrorism efforts and hosted a regional workshop on counterterrorism initiatives.
The report did criticize Sudan because some terrorist groups continued to operate there, and there were reports of Sudanese nationals participating in terrorist organizations. It also noted reports that the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is likely operating in an area claimed by Sudan and South Sudan, even though the LRA has not been designated an FTO.
The criticisms do not amount to much of an indictment, and similar charges could be lodged against a number of countries. So why does Sudan remain on the list? One reason is that there is no mechanism for removing a country from it. But more to the point, despite all the cooperation the State Department report mentions, there is nothing the Sudanese government has been able to do to deserve the carrot of being de-listed. So they continue to suffer the stick of remaining on the list. As will be seen in the cases of those countries that were removed, getting off the list has little to do with terrorism.
One country that will remain on the list, even though there is no justification for keeping it there, is Cuba. The writers of the Cuba section of the report have basically given up trying to justify its inclusion. It is simply noted that a few members of ETA and the FARC — the Basque and Colombian terrorist organizations, respectively — are allowed to live there. Also included is the fact that some fugitives wanted for crimes in the United States also are allowed to reside there.
Mention of the fugitives is a particularly lame excuse. There are many nations that "harbor" people wanted for crimes committed in the United States. Countries can refuse to return a wanted person because of the lack of an extradition treaty, because of a difference in the definitions of the crime, or because the country does not have capital punishment and does not want to return a person to American soil to suffer that fate.
Cuba remains on the list quite simply because of domestic politics. It will take one of two things to get Cuba removed. Both Fidel and Raul Castro will have to die, and the government of Cuba would have to then become democratic. Or Florida's electoral votes would have to cease to be important in American presidential elections. The former will happen some day; but in the meantime, the latter will ensure Cuba stays on the list.
Each year when the terrorism report comes out, the journalists at the noon press briefing at the State Department ask the spokesperson why Cuba is still included. And each year the official provides an explanation that no one believes. After the latest report was issued, the best that Marie Harf, the deputy spokesperson, could come up with was this:
Well, it's a good question that I know comes up a lot. The State Department has no current plans to remove Cuba from the list. As you may or may not know, there's not a routine process by which you re-evaluate the state sponsors like there are, for example, with our terrorist designations for terrorist groups. So you can't get into the process any more behind the scenes, but at this point, again, no plans to remove them.
When pressed, Harf essentially repeated the same nonsensical answer:
Again, I don't have any more details in terms of the reasoning that goes into that. Again, there's no regular process for re-evaluating this. If there's a policy reason to do so based on the conditions on the ground, I know folks will. But at this point, no plans [exist] to remove them from the list.
So, what constitutes a "policy reason" important enough to get a country off the list? The countries that have been removed demonstrate that the policy reasons have little to do with terrorism.
South Yemen is the only exception, as it came off because the country ceased to exist when it unified with North Yemen. Iraq was an original member of the list when it was created in 1979 because of its ties to Palestinian groups. It was removed by the Reagan administration in 1982, not because it ended those relationships, but because it was faring badly in its war with Iran. Once Iraq was de-listed, Washington was able to provide enormous financial, intelligence and military support to Saddam Hussein, and it signaled to other countries that they were also free to do business with his regime.10
Reagan even dispatched a special envoy to meet personally with Hussein. The presidential envoy, seeking to avoid any topic that might make the conversation difficult, made no mention to the Iraqi dictator of his use of chemical weapons on his own people as well as on Iranian forces. The envoy apparently succeeded in his mission, as he would go on to other important government jobs in the future. His name was Donald Rumsfeld.11
Iraq did not stay off the list for long. It was placed back on in 1990, but again it had nothing to do with terrorism. It was in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. That was not the end of the story. It was taken off the list again in 2003 in order to demonstrate the success of the American invasion of Iraq.
In 1982, when Iraq was removed from the list, it was done without any apparent consultations with Congress.12 Because of that, the EAA was amended and now stipulates that before the determination that a country is a state sponsor of terrorism can be rescinded, the secretary of state has to provide Congress a report certifying the following:
• There has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the government of the country concerned.
• That government is not supporting acts of international terrorism.
• That government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.
Alternatively, a report can be provided to Congress 45 days before the proposed rescission would take place certifying two things:
• The government concerned has not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period.
• The government concerned has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.
Six months without supporting terrorism and a promise not to do it again is a very low threshold for being delisted. But, as Cuba and Sudan both demonstrate, the real bar can be kept very high by the United States for whatever reason it chooses, with no explanations required or offered.
Two other countries besides Iraq that made it over that bar and were removed from the list by the George W. Bush administration were Libya and North Korea. In both cases, the de-listing had little to do with terrorism and really was prompted by the situation in Iraq.
In May 2003, Bush used the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln in a photo op that was supposed to signal military victory in Iraq. Strategically placed behind the podium as Bush spoke to the ship's crew was a large banner that read "Mission Accomplished." The White House claimed the banner was the Navy's idea, but staff aides for Bush had it made and brought it along on the trip.13 That banner, like Bush's declaration of victory, was premature. The man put in charge of overseeing Iraq's return to self-governance, L. Paul Bremer, ordered the disbanding of the Iraqi army and removal of all Baath party members from government jobs. These former regime loyalists were thereby unemployed and without a stake in the stability or political future of the country. Mostly Sunni Muslims who had oppressed the Shiite majority and the Kurds when in power, they decided to indicate their displeasure by starting a civil war.
The situation rapidly deteriorated until some measure of order was restored by the "surge" of 2007, when an additional 30,000 American troops were dispatched to help. Some administration supporters credited the troops as well as the strategy to General David Petraeus. The reality is that 25,000 of the additional troops never left Baghdad. Security improved because the Sunni insurgents were put on the payroll; the most extreme of them had alienated many of those who had supported them.
This was the same General Petraeus who wrote in an op-ed in The Washington Post that "Iraq's security forces are developing steadily and they are in the fight. Momentum has gathered in recent months. With strong Iraqi leaders out front and with continued coalition — and now NATO — support, this trend will continue."14 That optimistic article was published less than six weeks before Bush presented himself for reelection in 2004. Whether he believed it or not, the general told his boss what he wanted to hear and helped the president get reelected. It is ironic, as well as tragic, that in 2014 some of the same Sunni insurgents control large parts of Iraq and have posed such a threat that American warplanes are engaging in combat operations there once again.
The Iraqi government is as responsible for the creation of the renewed civil war in 2014 as L. Paul Bremer was in 2004. But don't expect the architects of the Iraqi disaster to admit their role in creating the chaos that has now swept over the region. In October 2013, Petraeus wrote a 7,600-word article for the journal Foreign Policy: "How We Won in Iraq."15 He credits the "victory" to the additional American troops and mentions in passing that putting 100,000 Sunni insurgents on the payroll might have had something to do with it. He spends most of the article praising some of those who worked with him, as well as himself, devoting three sentences to describing how to regain the "victory" and suggesting all that is required is a "surge of ideas."
He mentions Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki seven times, but never critically. He even praises al-Maliki for being "willing to undertake the vast majority of the necessary changes," when it is clear that al-Maliki's corruption, incompetence and relentless sectarian exclusionism have made Iraq what it is today.
In mid-2006, however, only one thing was clear: the civil war in Iraq was spinning out of control. With the mid-term congressional elections approaching, the Bush administration desperately needed some good news on the foreign-policy front. So on May 15, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice sent a report to Congress certifying that Libya had not engaged in acts of terrorism in the previous six months and had promised not to support terrorists in the future. She also announced the renewal of full diplomatic relations with Gaddafi's regime.16
Libya had actually agreed to give up its weapons-of-mass-destruction program in late 2003 and had opened up its facilities to inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency. In 2004, American planes were dispatched to Libya to pick up the remnants of the Libyan nuclear program and bring them back to Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. Bush flew down on July 12 for another photo op, this time standing in front of various pipes, tubes and industrial parts. Administration officials used the occasion to claim the administration's aggressive foreign policy had won a great victory in forcing Gaddafi to give up his WMD programs. The nuclear program was at a relatively modest level, however, and although Gaddafi had pledged to get rid of his chemical weapons, undeclared stockpiles of them were discovered after he was overthrown in 2011.17
Libya is not the only country to be rewarded with removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism because of its nuclear program. North Korea was dropped for the same reason. Initially, the Bush administration tried a combination of saber rattling and ignoring the country. When administration officials met in December 2003 to discuss possible direct negotiations, Vice President Cheney showed up at the meeting and declared, "We don't negotiate with evil; we defeat it." That attitude, plus Cheney's insistence on conditions that were unacceptable to the North Koreans, ended the talks.18
The North Koreans continued to make advances in their nuclear program, and in 2006 they conducted a test explosion of a nuclear advice. Since the situation in Iraq was in the process of falling apart, and Afghanistan not fully under control either, more threats against North Korea were not an option.19 Having to make good on those threats would have been one war too many, even for those who defeat evil rather than negotiate with it. Talks were resumed and a deal was struck. It proved fragile, however. When it seemed as if it were about to collapse, thus depriving the administration of a much-needed foreign-policy victory, the Bush administration announced that North Korea was no longer considered a state sponsor of terrorism.
Actually North Korea had not engaged in terrorism for some years, but since removal from the list has little to do with terrorism, that was a moot point. The de-listing of North Korea was roundly criticized by hardliners like Senator John McCain, in the midst of his presidential campaign and apparently satisfied with the previous approach that accomplished nothing. North Korea produced enough plutonium for at least six nuclear weapons.20
The most hawkish administrations in recent history, those of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, have been the only ones to remove a country from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. They did so for reasons that had nothing to do with terrorism and everything to do with trying to salvage the appearance of success from their foreign-policy fiascos.
Democratic administrations, on the other hand, always fear the accusation of weakness when it comes to foreign policy. That, plus domestic politics, keeps countries like Cuba and Sudan on the list long after they should have been taken off. Administrations from both parties have ignored the actions of allies when they sponsor terrorism because, well, they are allies, and the list seems reserved only for countries we don't like. Here are some of the countries that should have been added:
Afghanistan: In 1999, the State Department described Afghanistan as "the primary safe haven for terrorists." Obviously, after 9/11, the country was invaded because it provided al-Qaeda a return address for the attacks on that day. Yet the country was never designated a state sponsor of terrorism. Reportedly, that did not happen because the State Department was concerned it would in effect recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.21 But adding a country to the list does not confer any legitimacy on its government, and it was beyond denial that the Taliban was firmly in control. The real reason is that to get Soviet troops out of Afghanistan, the United States provided billions of dollars of weapons to the insurgents there and subsequently largely ignored the country. Those insurgents went on to become leaders in al-Qaeda and the Taliban. To recognize Afghanistan as a state sponsor of terrorism would be to acknowledge the blowback from a policy started by the Carter administration and greatly expanded during Reagan's time in office.
Pakistan: There is no doubt that Pakistan has been an active supporter of terrorism and probably continues to be one. In 2009, Pakistani President Asif Zardari admitted that his country had created terrorist groups as a matter of policy.22 These actions were taken often as a way to damage India, Pakistan's main rival, and to have greater influence in Afghanistan or other countries. The Pakistani intelligence service, the Directorate for Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), orchestrated the attacks in Mumbai in 2008 by Lashkari-Taiba that killed 166 Indians and other nationals. In a meeting in 2011 with the chief of Pakistan's armed forces, a senior American official asked that the terrorist leader, who had been arrested for the Mumbai murders, be more restricted in his access to the outside world. The terrorist was using his cell phone to direct the activities of his organization from prison. The Pakistani general refused the request.23
Turkey, Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia: All four countries provide financing to terrorist organizations and, in some cases, safe havens to their members. Qatar and Turkey are providing funds to Hamas, and leaders of the organization live openly in both countries. Qatar is widely regarded as the most important source of funds for Hamas; the emir pledged on a visit to Gaza to provide $400 million in aid.24
The insurgents now controlling large parts of Iraq and Syria are from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The beheading of American journalist James Foley and a growing list of other atrocities left no doubt that they deserved to be designated an FTO. Financial support from wealthy individuals in the Persian Gulf have gone to ISIS and other Islamic terrorist organizations; the donors see it as their obligation to assist other Sunnis in their fight to overthrow the Assad regime in Syria.25 A report published by the Brookings Institution found that Kuwait had become a hub for channeling such funding to a wide range of Sunni militias.26 Steps have been taken by the Kuwaiti government to limit such financial flows, but it seems unlikely they will be effective.
Eritrea: The country has long been accused of supporting al-Shabaab and other Islamic extremist groups in Africa as part of a proxy war with Ethiopia. It has been under UN Security Council sanctions since 2009, when UNSCR 1907 was passed imposing an arms embargo on the country, a travel ban on some of its leaders and a freeze on their assets. The resolution called on Eritrea to "cease arming, training and equipping armed groups and their members, including al-Shabaab, that aim to destabilize the region." Two years later, when Eritrea failed to change its policies, UNSCR 2023 was adopted, which strengthened the provisions of the earlier resolution.27 In addition, Eritrea was said to have been involved in plots to stage a massive car-bomb attack at an African Union summit meeting28 and in the launching of a dozen suicide bombers to carry out attacks in the United States, including at President Obama's first inauguration.29
In response to these many links to terrorism, all the United States did was to re-certify in 2012 that Eritrea was "not cooperating fully" with U.S. counterterrorism efforts under Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act. The State Department's 2012 country reports on terrorism hinted at what may be one of the reasons for the inaction.30 While the report noted there had been limited dialogue with Eritrea regarding terrorism, it had cooperated in providing overflight clearance to U.S. military aircraft engaged in regional security missions. Eritrea lies just to the north of Djibouti, which has provided bases for counterterrorism operations and drone flights in the region.31 So in order to improve its antiterrorist military capabilities, the United States may refuse to sanction a state sponsor of terrorism.
Venezuela and possibly Argentina: In Latin America, there are two candidates for inclusion on the state sponsors of terrorism list. Venezuela has a history of relations with the FARC and the ELN, two Colombian FTOs. The United States has imposed financial sanctions on seven current or former Venezuelan government and military officials for providing support to the FARC, but not on the country as a whole. In addition, Argentina and Venezuela have close relations with Iran. Venezuela has even discussed nuclear cooperation with Iran, which would involve the transfer of Iranian technology to Venezuela, violating multiple UN Security Council resolutions in the process.32
Israel: One country that could be considered for inclusion on the list of state sponsors of terrorism is Israel. This would never happen, for domestic political reasons, but whether it could qualify for being added is open to debate. Israel sees Iran, particularly Iran's nuclear program, as a dire threat to its national security. In recent years, at least five Iranian scientists have been murdered, usually by bombs placed on their cars as they drove to work. Israel has not categorically denied having a role in the assassinations, and Iranian authorities wasted no time in holding Israel and United States responsible for them.33
Israel has a long history of having carried out such operations. After the massacre of its athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972 by Black September terrorists, Israel responded by adopting the tactic of targeted killings. Called the Wrath of God, the operation was designed to eliminate those responsible. It was carried out over the course of the next two decades, targeting a range of people believed to be involved in Palestinian terrorism.34 More recently, a team apparently comprised of Israeli agents assassinated a Hamas official in a hotel in Dubai in 2010. Hotel security cameras caught a great deal of the team's actions on tape.35
Government agents carried out these operations, however, and they therefore may not meet the definition of terrorism. A government committing such acts in its own defense may be guilty of a crime, but not terrorism. When it uses a non-state group to commit acts of terrorism on its behalf, it is then a sponsor of terrorism.
In March 2014, CBS News reported that President Obama intended to urge Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to have Israel stop killing Iranian nuclear scientists.36 In 2012, NBC News had put out a story claiming that Israel had used the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) for the attacks.37 The MEK is a cult-like Iranian dissident group that worked to overthrow the shah. After he fell, the MEK engaged in a fight for political power with Ayatollah Khomeini and other clerics. When it lost that struggle, the group moved to Iraq and began collaborating with Saddam Hussein in attacking the Iranian regime. Its acts of terrorism included killing at least six Americans. In justifying the American invasion, one of the arguments offered by the Bush administration was that Iraq was a sponsor of international terrorism because it was sheltering the MEK.
In 1997, the MEK was added to the list of FTOs, making the providing of material support to the group a felony. It recently waged a campaign to get that designation rescinded, going about it in typical Washington fashion. It got out its checkbook and quickly found no shortage of prominent people willing to lend it material support. The roster of those who spoke on behalf of the MEK for money reads like a Who's Who of Washington has-beens. The Democrats included Howard Dean, Ed Rendell, Bill Richardson and Lee Hamilton. Among the Republicans were Rudy Giuliani, Fran Townsend, Tom Ridge, Michael Mukasey, John Bolton and Andrew Card. Speakers for the terrorist organization also included former government officials such as CIA chiefs James Woolsey, Porter Goss and Michael Hayden, FBI director Louis Freeh, State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley and retired generals Peter Pace, Wesley Clark, James Jones, Anthony Zinni and James Conway. Government experience was not required; Alan Dershowitz and Elie Wiesel were also enlisted, as well as journalists Carl Bernstein and Clarence Page.38
A State Department official explained to The Christian Science Monitor how these transactions worked: "Your speech agent calls and says you get $20,000 to speak for 20 minutes. They will send a private jet, you get $25,000 more when you are done, and they will send a team to brief you on what to say."39 According to The New York Times, many but not all of these MEK cheerleaders accepted fees between $15,000 and $30,000 to give speeches to the group plus travel expenses to their meetings in Paris. Some made multiple appearances, such as former Pennsylvania governor Rendell, who made at least $150,000.40 Not bad work, if you can get it, especially since it was not very taxing. Some of the MEK supporters claimed their enthusiasm was based on having a good feeling about the group after having dinner with them. Three lobbying firms were also employed on behalf of the MEK, and among their efforts was a resolution signed by 99 politicians urging the group be delisted.41
A little over seven months after the NBC News story claiming that Israel had used the MEK in the killing of the Iranian scientists, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton removed them from the FTO list.42 While from a legal standpoint that action may have ended the debate about whether the MEK's many paid supporters were committing a felony by providing material support for an FTO, it does not answer the question as to whether Israel has employed them to commit what many would consider acts of terrorism.
United States: Israel is not the only country that has an MEK problem. The United States should be considered for addition to the list of state sponsors of terrorism because of its links to the organization. In April 2012, The New Yorker published an article by Seymour Hersh that described how Joint Special Operations Command personnel had provided training to MEK members at a remote base in Nevada 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. The courses, which began in 2005, were said to involve communications, small-unit tactics and weaponry, as well as "ad-hoc training." The training ended sometime before President Obama took office.43
Would it be crazy for the United States to use a terrorist organization to carry out terrorist acts against Iran, at the very moment when defeating terrorism was supposedly the highest priority for American policy? The distance between rhetoric and reality can be vast in Washington. In his memoirs, George Shultz wrote that American policy with regard to the war between Iran and Iraq was to attempt to bring it to an end by working to dry up the sources of weaponry for both countries. To do otherwise would have been inhumane and unwise, according to Shultz, because the horrors of the war fell mainly on ordinary people and not their leaders.44
But while Shultz was wringing hands over the plight of ordinary Iranians and Iraqis, Rumsfeld was hobnobbing with Saddam Hussein and making sure he had enough money and military intelligence to continue killing Iranians. And, as the Iran-Contra scandal revealed, at the same time Oliver North was selling weapons to Iran to fund the Contras in Central America. North, now a Fox News commentator, thought it a "neat idea" to illegally sell arms to a country on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. North was convicted on three felony counts, but these verdicts were later overturned, not because he was innocent, but because his congressional testimony may have affected his trial. One of the others convicted of crimes arising from the scandal was Elliot Abrams, a State Department official at the time. Abrams went on to serve on the NSC of George W. Bush, dealing with the Middle East.
The Contras provide another reason the United States ought to be considered for inclusion on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Former CIA officer Duane Clarridge wrote in his memoirs about visiting Buenos Aires in 1981 to call on General Leopoldo Galtieri, the third military president since a coup d'état overthrew Isabel Peron in 1976. Clarridge boasts that he was treated like a visiting head of state as he swilled whiskey with the general and convinced him to take tens of millions of dollars from the CIA to have Argentine military officers train the Contras. Clarridge describes the Argentine military as knowing a lot about urban guerrilla warfare because of their "successful and professional" operations against terrorists in their country. He also claims the Contras would be instructed to respect the civilian population and avoid hitting any economic targets.45
Argentina did face a grave threat from leftist terrorists in the mid-1970s. The inability of Mrs. Peron's government to do anything about it was the reason there was little surprise or regret when she was ousted. The counterterrorism strategy of the Argentine military was simple. They arrested anyone who looked like a leftist, tortured many of them and threw their bodies into the ocean from an airplane. The commonly cited figure of 30,000 such murders is undoubtedly an overestimate. Attempts to construct a list of the victims yielded only 9,000 to 12,000 names. The magnitude of the repression and level of human-rights abuse is staggering nonetheless, and Argentina today is still trying to deal with the effects of its past.
Yet these were the people the Reagan administration chose to provide millions of dollars to instruct the Contras and teach respect for civilians. Because of the cozy relationship between the military government and the CIA, the Argentines expected the United States not to object when they invaded the Falklands the next year.
As for not attacking economic targets, that statement was as accurate as Clarridge's assessment of the Argentine military. In mid-1987, Morris Busby, a senior official in the State Department's Latin American bureau, was briefing Secretary Schultz on a weekly basis concerning the activities of the Contras. Busby's talking points on June 2 noted that the Contras "continued to strike lightly defended infrastructure targets, blowing up electrical towers"; on June 30, he pointed out that the Contras' "tactics of striking at economic and infrastructure targets have worsened Nicaragua's economic situation."46
The State Department's terrorism report never fails to mention that fugitives wanted in the United States are allowed to reside in Cuba. In 1989, the Justice Department tried to deport a man one associate attorney general described as "a terrorist, unfettered by laws or human decency, threatening and inflicting violence without regard to the identity of his victims."47 In 2011, a man believed to have masterminded the blowing up of an airliner that killed 73 people and who admitted to plotting attacks on tourist spots that killed an Italian visitor in 1997 was tried for violating immigration law and obstructing justice. Both were Cuban exiles. The deportation order of the first, Orlando Bosch, was overruled by President George H.W. Bush. The second, Luis Posada Carriles, was acquitted of the charges against him. Both were allowed to stay in the United States despite various extradition requests from Cuba and Venezuela.
The implementation of the Export Administration Act provides ample evidence that a double standard is being applied. When the United States or its allies sponsor terrorism, it is acceptable and no reason for including them on the list of state sponsors. But a country that long ago gave up supporting terrorism is still on the list because removing it might affect the outcome of presidential elections. If winning the war on terrorism does not require any degree of consistency or much integrity, then the United States may be able to roll out the Mission Accomplished banner once more.
1 "State Sponsors of Terrorism — 2014 Counterterrorism Calendar," National Counterterrorism Center, http://www.nctc.gov/site/other/state.html.
2 "State Sponsors of Terrorism," U.S. State Department, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm.
3 "United States Code: Title 50a, 2402. Congressional Declaration of Policy," Cornell University Law School, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50a/usc_sec_50a_00002402----000-.html.
4 Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott and Barbara Oegg, "Using Sanctions to Fight Terrorism," Institute for International Economics, November 2001.
5 Glenn Keesler, "How Effective Are Sanctions in 'Changing Behavior'?" Washington Post, April 27, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/how-effective-are-sanctions-in-changing-behavior/2011/04/26/AFCwRktE_blog.html.
6 "Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, Chapter 7. Legislative Requirements and Key Terms," U.S. State Department, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224830.htm.
7 "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," U.S. State Department, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
8 Carol J. Williams, "Iranian Officials Say They Have Armed Hamas for Fight with Israel," Los Angeles Times, August 4, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-israel-gaza-hamas-iran-20140804-story.html, accessed August 19, 2014.
9 Holly Fletcher, "Background-State Sponsor: Syria," Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/syria/state-sponsor-syria/p9368, accessed August 19, 2014.
10 Steven Hurst, The United States and Iraq since 1979: Hegemony, Oil and War (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 43.
11 The National Security Archive has a whole section on its website devoted to this sorry chapter in American diplomacy: "Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, Edited by Joyce Battle, February 25, 2003, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/, accessed August 20, 2014.
12 Milt Freudenheim, "The World in Summary: Readjustments in the Mideast," New York Times, February 28, 1982.
13 Dana Bash, "White House Pressed on 'Mission Accomplished' Sign," CNN, Washington Bureau, October 29, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/10/28/mission.accomplished/, accessed August 21, 2014.
14 David H. Petraeus, "Battling for Iraq," Washington Post, September 26, 2004.
15 The article can be found on foreignpolicy.com here: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/29/david_petraeus_how_we_won_the_surge_in_iraq.
16 Kelsey Davenport, "Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States, Arms Control Association," https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronology, accessed August 21, 2014.
17 Greg Myre, "Lessons from Libya on How to Destroy Chemical Weapons," NPR, September 11, 2013, http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/09/11/221337548/lessons-from-libya-on-how-to-destroy-chemical-weapons, accessed August 19, 2014.
18 Glenn Kessler, "Impact from the Shadows—Cheney Wields Power with Few Fingerprints," Washington Post, October 5, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7036-2004Oct4.html, accessed August 2014.
19 Steve Benen, "Campaign Confusion on Korea," Washington Monthly, October 13, 2008, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2008_10/015165.php, accessed August 19, 2014.
20 Helene Cooper, "U.S. Declares North Korea Off Terror List," New York Times, October 13, 2008.
21 Hufbauer, op. cit.
22 Dean Nelson, "Pakistani President Asif Zardari Admits Creating Terrorist Groups," London Telegraph, July 8, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/5779916/Pakistani-president-Asif-Zardari-admits-creating-terrorist-groups.html, accessed August 2014.
23 Sebastian Rotella of ProPublica has reported extensively on this story, including the role of an American citizen, David Coleman Headly, in the Mumbai attacks; and it was the subject of a Frontline PBS television special. Extensive documentation can be found under "The American behind India's 9/11—And How U.S. Botched Chances to Stop Him," on ProPublic's website: http://www.propublica.org/article/david-headley-homegrown-terrorist.
24 Jonathan Schanzer, "Hamas's BFFs," foreignpolicy.com, August 4, 2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/08/04/hamas_s_bffs_turkey_qatar_israel_gaza, accessed August 19, 2014.
25 Josh Rogin, "America's Allies Are Funding ISIS," Daily Beast, June 14, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/14/america-s-allies-are-funding-isis.html, accessed August 19, 2014.
26 Elizabeth Dickinson, "Playing with Fire: Why Private Gulf Financing for Syria's Extremist Rebels Risks Igniting Sectarian Conflict at Home," Brookings Institution, Saban Center Analysis Paper Number 16, December 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/12/06-private-gulf-financing-syria-extremist-rebels-sectarian-conflict-dickinson, accessed August 2014.
27 United Nation Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2023, December 5, 2011, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%20RES%202023.pdf .
28 Xan Rice, "Eritrea Planned Massive Bomb Attack on African Union Summit, UN Says," Guardian, July 28 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/28/eritrea-planned-ethopia-bomb-attack accessed August 2014.
29 Damien McElroy, "U.S. Threatens Eritrea over Support for al-Qaeda-Linked Terrorists," Guardian, April 17, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/eritrea/5173129/US-threatens-Eritrea-over-support-for-al-Qaeda-linked-terrorists.html, accessed August 2014.
30 "Country Reports on Terrorism 2012," U.S. State Department, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rt/2012/209979.htm, accessed August 19, 2014.
31 Craig Whitlock and Greg Miller, "U.S. Moves Drone Fleet from Camp Lemonnier to Ease Djibouti's Safety Concerns," Washington Post, September 24, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/drone-safety-concerns-force-us-to-move-large-fleet-from-camp-lemonnier-in-djibouti/2013/09/24/955518c4-213c-11e3-a03d-abbedc3a047c_story.html, accessed August 2014.
32 Mark Sullivan and June Beittel, "Latin America: Terrorism Issues," Congressional Research Service, August 15, 2014, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf, accessed August 22, 2014.
33 Rick Gladstone, "Iran Signals Revenge over Killing of Scientist," New York Times, January 12, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/13/world/middleeast/iran-outrage-over-scientist-killing-deepens-as-it-signals-revenge.html, accessed August 2014.
34 Simon Reeve, "Olympics Massacre: Munich—The Real Story," Independent, January 22, 2006, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/olympics-massacre-munich--the-real-story-524011.html, accessed August 2014.
35 Paul Lewis, Julian Borger and Rory McCarthy, "Dubai Murder: Fake Identities Disguised Faces and a Clinical Assassination," Independent, February 16, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/16/dubai-murder-fake-identities-hamas, accessed August 2014.
36 Dan Ravi, "U.S. Pushing Israel to Stop Assassinating Iranian Nuclear Scientists," CBS News, March 1, 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-pushing-israel-to-stop-assassinating-iranian-nuclear-scientists/, accessed August 2014.
37 Richard Engel and Robert Windrem, "Israel Teams with Terror Group to Kill Iran's Nuclear Scientists, U.S. Officials Tell NBC News," NBC News website, February 9, 2012, http://rockcenter.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/02/08/10354553-israel-teams-with-terror-group-to-kill-irans-nuclear-scientists-us-officials-tell-nbc-news, accessed August 22, 2014.
38 Glenn Greenwald, "Five Lessons from the De-listing of MEK as a Terrorist Group," Guardian, September 23, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/sep/23/iran-usa; and Scott Peterson, "Iranian Group's Big-Money Push to Get Off U.S. Terrorist List," Christian Science Monitor, August 8, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0808/Iranian-group-s-big-money-push-to-get-off-US-terrorist-list, accessed August 2014.
39 Peterson, op. cit.
40 Scott Shane, "Iranian Dissidents Convince U.S. to Drop Terror Label," New York Times, September 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/world/middleeast/iranian-opposition-group-mek-wins-removal-from-us-terrorist-list.html.
41 Elizabeth Flock, "Iranian Terrorist Group M.E.K. Pays Big to Make History Go Away," U.S. News, July 6, 2012, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/07/06/iranian-terrorist-group-mek-pays-big-to-make-history-go-away-iranian-group-mek-lobbies-hard-pledges-peace-as-it-pleads-case-to-be-delisted-dc-listening-terror-group-pays-to-make-history-go-awayseries.
42 Jonathan Masters, "Backgrounder: Mujahadeen-e-Khalq," Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/iran/mujahadeen-e-khalq-mek/p9158.
43 Seymour M. Hersh, "Our Men in Iran?," New Yorker, April 5, 2012, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/our-men-in-iran.
44 George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (London: Macmillan, 2003), 236.
45 Duane R. Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons (New York City: Scribner, 1997).
46 Redacted versions of the talking points were made public as part of a Freedom of Information Act request and can be found at http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0001101511.pdf and http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1150052/statedepartmentmemo.pdf.
47 Tim Weiner, "Cuban Exile Could Test U.S. Definition of Terrorist," New York Times, May 9, 2006.
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