In January 1976 Ethiopia's revolutionary military government distributed a memorandum to African heads of state meeting in Addis Ababa that was ominously entitled "War Clouds on the Horn of Africa." The memorandum charged that Somalia, whose irredentist ambitions in the Horn were well known, was planning to go to war against Ethiopia. War eventually did erupt in the summer of 1977 when the Somali army invaded Ethiopia's Somali-inhabited Ogaden region. The Ogaden War ultimately ended in a devastating defeat for Somalia, owing to a massive infusion of Soviet arms and thousands of Cuban troops on the side of Ethiopia. Despite the Soviet/Cuban intervention, the United States refused to support Somalia militarily during or immediately after this war. Two years later, however, events in Iran and Afghanistan moved the Carter administration to complete the Cold War realignment in the Horn of Africa by negotiating an arms-for-access agreement with Somalia. By the end of the 1980s, the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict was in a state of suspension and the Cold War had come to an end. In April 1988, Somalia's Siad Barre and Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam signed what amounted to a peace treaty by agreeing to terminate support for each other's armed dissidents. Mogadishu's withdrawal of support for the Ogaden-based Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) provided little relief for Addis Ababa, however, as the wars in Eritrea and Tigre continued unabated. Addis Ababa's expulsion of the Somali National Movement (SNM) led to the outbreak of full-scale civil war in the north of Somalia. Three years later both Siad and Mengistu had been forced from power, Eritrea had won its independence, and Somalia was disintegrating politically.
In the post-Cold War Horn of Africa, state collapse and the erosion of government authority from below (owing to ethnicity/clan-based problems) and above (the movement toward regional federation) have overshadowed a new international conflict that is polarizing the region. The post-Cold War clouds gathering over the Horn of Africa today have blown in from the Middle East and North Africa. Lying at the root of increasing international tensions in the Horn is the secularist-Islamist conflict. Adding fuel to the fire are Middle Eastern powers who, owing to their long-term geopolitical interests in the area, have taken sides in the Horn's secularist-Islamist conflict. Western powers, such as the United States and France, are also tending to their respective interests and, in somewhat more subtle ways, are intervening in this conflict. Thus, the East-West Cold War and the Ethiopia-Somalia dispute have been replaced by a new cold war in the Horn of Africa between secularist and Islamist governments and political movements, currently featuring Eritrea and Sudan. Alarmingly, this regional cold war has the potential of erupting into a hot war and causing political disruption in the Horn of Africa and perhaps beyond.
FLASHPOINT IN THE HORN: THE ERITREAN-SUDANESE CRISIS
Conflict between Eritrea and Sudan seemed a highly unlikely scenario when the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) triumphed in its war of secession against Ethiopia in May 199 J. During Eritrea's 30- year struggle for independence (1961-91), Khartoum was the most important regional ally for the Eritrean resistance. Sudan served as a valuable staging base and conduit for arms and aid. Khartoum also provided refuge for hundreds of thousands of Eritreans fleeing the war zone.
A political rift developed between Asmara and Khartoum, however, less than a year after the EPLF had liberated Eritrea. In January 1992, EPLF forces fought fierce battles against armed rebels calling themselves the [Eritrean] Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM). Although the National Islamic Front (NIF)-backed government in Khartoum initially cooperated with Asmara by handing over three captured Eritrean members of the EIJM, the Eritreans were suspicious of Sudan owing to NIF links to the EIJM. According to Asmara, the EIJM was created by the NIF following the June 1989 military coup in Khartoum that brought Gen. Omar al-Bashir and the NIF to power.
Throughout 1992 and 1993 Asmara tried to resolve its simmering dispute with Khartoum through quiet diplomacy. At the end of 1992, a high-level Eritrean delegation went to Sudan to discuss what Asmara viewed as Khartoum's violation of a defense and security cooperation agreement signed between the two parties on August 23, 1991. Consequently, a joint Security Committee was created to ensure strict observance of this agreement. But after the EPLF declared Eritrea's independence in May 1993-a celebration which General Bashir attended-the NIF allegedly intensified aid to the EIJM. Asmara now charged that EIJM "terrorists" were being trained in military camps located near the Eritrean border, along with members of Sudan's Popular Defense Force (PDF) militias.
The growing friction between Asmara and Khartoum was brought to the attention of the international community following a December 16, 1993, battle between Eritrean government forces and the EIJM. Twenty members of the EIJM who had crossed over the border from Sudan were killed; among the dead were two Moroccans. In the aftermath of this clash, Eritrea's President Issayas Afererki declared that "war" was being waged by Sudan and others against Eritrea. Subsequently, Asmara lodged a protest against Sudan with the U.N. Security Council. Issayas also issued an ominous warning to Khartoum, reminding the NIF that the Eritreans, too, "know how to play with fire."1
Despite its mounting frustration with Sudan, Eritrea still sought to defuse the situation through bilateral diplomatic channels. Another high-level Eritrean delegation traveled to Khartoum in early 1994 to discuss the matter. The following August a Sudanese delegation, led by Sudan's foreign minister, visited Asmara. Khartoum blamed the "accidental crisis" on foreign forces seeking to cause dissension between Eritrea and Sudan. Despite these protestations of innocence, Eritrean officials remained skeptical that Khartoum intended to take action against the EIJM. These meetings produced only a temporary cessation of Sudanese support to the EIJM, which intensified again that autumn.
In mid-November 1994, the Eritrean Foreign Ministry issued a two-page Aide Memoire summarizing Asmara's complaints against Khartoum.2 The report was critical also of the U.N. Security Council for failing to take appropriate action to "deter these subversive acts" and defuse the situation. It warned that "the Government of Eritrea will not be responsible for the consequences of these acts of subversion." The first major consequence occurred on December 5 when Eritrea broke off diplomatic relations with Sudan. Issayas again warned Sudan to stop playing with fire: "I don't want to fight a war... but sometimes it is necessary; people need to learn the hard way.... We have a saying in our tradition You advise someone; if he refuses to listen to logic, then trouble will teach him to."3
Shortly following this action the Eritrean Foreign Ministry distributed another memorandum denouncing the NIF's "current bad neighbor policy."4 Sudan's "dangerous and irresponsible acts" were deemed "responsible for not only the deterioration of relations between the two fraternal countries but also for insecurity and instability in the whole region." While the goal of the EIJM-to establish an Islamist government in Eritrea-seemed only worrisome to Asmara, Eritrean officials argued that Eritrea's internal security problem should be of special concern to the entire international community because of its broader regional and global implications. EIJM activities in Eritrea, according to Asmara, were just part of Khartoum's larger design of establishing Islamist governments across Africa from the Red Sea to the Atlantic Ocean.
In the months following Eritrea's diplomatic break with Sudan, relations between Asmara and Khartoum worsened. An attempt by Yemen at the end of December 1994 to mediate the dispute ended in failure. Eritrea terminated the Sanaas negotiations on the grounds that Sudan refused to cease support for or publicly disassociate itself from the EIJM. In late December, Asmara charged that Sudanese PDF militias were participating in EIJM attacks inside Eritrea. Then at the beginning of January 1995, Eritrea's president wrote to the U.N. secretary-general to protest Sudanese harassment of Eritrean refugees in Sudan, among whom the EIJM was seeking to attract new recruits.
The Eritrea-Sudan crisis was among the major topics of discussion between Issayas and top-ranking U.S. officials during the Eritrean president's three-week visit to the United States in January-February 1995. In meetings with President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher, Defense Secretary Perry and top-ranking State Department and National Security Council officials, Issayas pressed the theme that Khartoum's support for the EIJM was part of "a global strategy of lslamization in the Horn of Africa."5 On the eve of his meeting with President Clinton, Issayas gave an interview in which he foresaw the possibility of war with Sudan. Just the previous week Asmara claimed to have identified six PDF/EIJM training camps only 30 kilometers from the Eritrean border, raising the possibility of an Eritrean counter-strike at these camps.6
By the spring of 1995, amid reports of Sudanese military incursions into Eritrea and Uganda, international tensions in the Horn of Africa had boiled to the point that regional war seemed imminent. Despite Khartoum's acceptance at the beginning of April of a temporary cease-fire in the Sudanese civil war, Bashir and the NIF remained committed to a military solution in the south. Tensions between Uganda and Sudan intensified as both governments accused each other of supporting rebel forces which led to a tit-for-tat expulsion of diplomats in early April. Then, on April 23, Kampala announced that it was breaking off diplomatic relations with Khartoum and closing Uganda's border with Sudan. Although Kampala agreed in June to a "gradual" restoration of relations with Khartoum, Uganda had clearly aligned itself with Eritrea in confronting Sudan.7 Moreover, reports were now circulating that Eritrea was providing training for recruits from the Beja tribes of eastern Sudan, who in early May reportedly signed a military cooperation agreement with the Sudanese National Forces (SNF), a military-based northern Sudanese opposition movement.8
The war of words between Asmara and Khartoum had by this time become even more incendiary. On March 30, Eritrea issued a communique charging Sudanese security forces with telling young Eritrean refugees that they either had to volunteer for the Sudanese army or leave the country. It so happened that this communique was released at the very time that the NIF's leader, Hassan al-Turabi, had convened the third session (March 30-April 2) of his Popular Arab and Islamic Congress (PAIC) in Khartoum. At the end of this conference, which was attended by some 300 Islamic organizations including representatives of Eritrean Muslims (presumably members of the EIJM), a communique was adopted stating the organization's support for "oppressed Islamic communities" throughout the world. Specific mention was made of the Eritrean Muslims. What caught Asmara's attention and that of Western intelligence, however, was a report that the leadership of PAIC had agreed to establish a liaison office in Mogadishu to coordinate the activities of Islamist groups in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia.9
With the Eritrea-Sudan crisis seemingly escalating out of control, various outside parties finally took an interest in attempting to mediate between the two sides. In early April, Norway, a member of the "Friends of IGADD" group (along with the Netherlands, Canada, Great Britain and the United States), offered to mediate in the Sudanese civil war and help Khartoum restore relations with Asmara. The Norwegian foreign minister cautioned, however, that it would be "...unrealistic to expect that Norway can play a role comparable to what we did in the Middle East peace process."10 On April 11, OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim proposed to mediate a summit meeting between General Bashir and President lssayas. Unfortunately, these efforts have thus far proven fruitless. Sudan and Eritrea did manage to avoid airing their differences at the East African Heads of State meeting held in Addis Ababa in mid-April long enough to issue a declaration to strengthen regional ties. The positive ending to this meeting, however, was not enough to cause Khartoum to abandon the EUM or dissuade Asmara from increasing its political and military support for the Sudanese opposition.
ERITREA: NOT ANOTHER LEBANON
Eritrea may indeed be the victim of a Sudanese-sponsored destabilization campaign that is part of a larger design to establish Islamic regimes across Africa from the Red Sea to the Atlantic Ocean. If this is the case, Eritrea seems the least vulnerable domino militarily. The EIJM currently poses no serious military threat to Asmara, which possesses one of the best-trained and battle-hardened military establishments in sub-Saharan Africa. As of early 1995, the EIJM was estimated to have 400 members and another 300 recruits undergoing training in eastern Sudan. EIJM activities have been limited to the border region and have largely involved isolated attacks and the laying of land mines.
What most concerns Asmara, however, is the potentially disruptive political impact of Khartoum's Islamist message being spread in this country of 3.5 million people, almost evenly divided between Muslims and Christians, and among the estimated 500,000 Eritrean refugees still living in Sudan. Asmara has sought to persuade Khartoum of the futility and, more seriously, the irresponsibility of supporting the EIJM given the delicate religious and ethnic makeup of Eritrea. Although Eritrean officials tend to paint a serene picture of religious harmony between Christians and Muslims, the reality is quite different. Politically motivated sectarian violence occurred during the transition from Italian colonial rule in the 1940s and early 1950s.11 Religious differences, though secondary to political disputes, also surfaced in the split within the Eritrean liberation movement that led to a bitter fratricidal war between the politically more conservative, Muslim dominated Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the leftist-oriented, Christian-dominated EPLF in the 1970s. Thus, some Horn analysts judged that an independent Eritrea would become another Lebanon.
Not surprisingly, the Christian-dominated Eritrean government is keenly sensitive to any action that might disrupt Christian-Muslim or ethnic relations. At the EPLF's Third Party Congress held in February 1994-at which time the EPLF shed its insurgent name and became a political movement, the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ)-the government outlined an ambitious plan to establish a multiparty democratic political system by 1996. The congress, however, opposed the creation of political parties along religious or ethnic lines. Political Islamism, in particular, is depicted by the government as a foreign ideology that has no place in Eritrea and is being used by Sudan to destabilize the region. Perhaps to discredit a major political opponent, Asmara has also claimed that former members of the ELF-the EPLF's main political rival during the liberation struggle and in the post-independence period-belong to the EIJM.
For Asmara, the roles of "victim" and "aggressor" in the current crisis in the Horn of Africa are quite clear. In the past, Somali irredentism was viewed as the primary threat to international peace and security in the Horn, threatening not only Ethiopia but Kenya and Djibouti as well. Today, the Eritreans speak openly of the threat posed by Sudanese "Islamic imperialism." Moreover, Sudan's apparent attempt to export its ideology threatens not only Eritrea, but also the Christian-led, secular government in Ethiopia-a country whose population is more than half Muslim.
In the past, Somalia sought to justify its irredentist foreign policy on the principle of self-determination and to blame European and Ethiopian imperialism as the root causes of the contemporary political problems in the Horn of Africa. While there is considerable merit to (and room to debate) the Somali argument, Khartoum's contention that "foreign forces" (i.e., Western imperialism and Israeli military activities in the region) are at work attempting to drive a wedge between Eritrea and Sudan does not bear up under close scrutiny. First, the EIJM was created at a time when the United States and Israel opposed Eritrean independence, and several years before Washington had granted recognition to Eritrea or Asmara had agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. Second, Israeli operations in support of the SPLA began before the war in Eritrea had ended and were largely conducted through Uganda. Finally, Asmara's embrace of the northern and southern Sudanese opposition movements was in response to Khartoum's support of the EIJM.
Unlike the Islamist movements in Egypt, for example, the EIJM can hardly be classified as an indigenous movement that has built grass-roots support inside of Eritrea. Although the EIJM's membership is largely Eritrean, non-Eritrean nationals belong as well. The EIJM probably enjoys some popularity among Eritrean Muslims. But after almost five years of existence this level of support has not been large enough to allow the EIJM to establish a base inside of Eritrea. Asmara, therefore, can rightly claim, at least for the time being, that the EIJM's ideology has been overwhelmingly rejected by the Muslims of Eritrea.
To take Asmara's argument a step further, the EIJM would not exist except for the support of the NIF in Khartoum. If Khartoum were to terminate support for the EIJM, this group would essentially cease to exist. In brief, the Eritrean-Sudanese crisis was caused by the actions of Khartoum. Whether or not Asmara has overreacted, however, is another matter.
SUDAN AND IRAN: AN ISLAMIST CONSPIRACY IN THE HORN?
Even before Asmara broke diplomatic ties with Khartoum, Sudan's domestic and foreign policies had severely strained relations with two important Red Sea states. Sudan's brand of Islamism and support of Saddam Hussein during the 1990-91 Kuwait crisis and war has alienated Saudi Arabia. For several years now, Cairo has accused Khartoum of providing logistical support for radical Islamist movements seeking to overthrow Egypt's secular government. Largely in response to Egyptian concerns, in August 1993 the U.S. Department of State had placed Sudan on its "terrorist list." More recently Egypt has claimed there was Sudanese involvement in the June 26 attempt on President Mubarak's life in Ethiopia by the Egyptian Islamic organization known as the Islamic Group. Thus, among the Red Sea states only Yemen and Djibouti currently maintain friendly relations with Sudan.12
Sudan's diplomatic record in East and Central Africa is not much better. On the positive side, Kenya terminated its support for the SPLA in an effort to improve relations with Khartoum. Nairobi also is chair and host to the special committee established by the seven-member Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) to mediate between the two warring sides in the Sudanese civil war. But the spillover effect of the Sudanese civil war has strained relations with the Central African Republic, Zaire and Uganda. Chadian rebels seeking to overthrow the government of Idriss Deby have also been sighted in Sudan. Despite generally good relations between Addis Ababa and Khartoum, in early 1994, Ethiopia warned Sudan not to spread its ideology beyond its own borders or to support religious groups among Ethiopia's Oromo Muslim population.
Geopolitics have thus combined with the NIF's Islamist ideology to produce much apprehension and speculation in the region as to Khartoum's real intentions. Is Sudan actively seeking to export the Islamic revolution? Hassan al-Turabi, the "moderate" voice of the NIP, makes no secret about his belief in the "course of history" and the inevitability that Islamist governments will eventually come to power in Muslim states.13 Turabi has reportedly spoken of a scenario in which Ethiopia fragments further, leading to the establishment of an Islamic Oromo state and resulting in a chain of Islamic polities extending from Sudan to the Indian Ocean.14 Links between Turabi's NIF and Abbasi Madani's Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria and Islamist groups in Egypt and Tunisia suggest that an "Atlantic to the Indian Ocean" scenario is Khartoum's ultimate objective. A key question is whether Khartoum is seeking to accelerate the "course of history" by force or subversion or, as Turabi claims, lead by example and watch history happen.
Fueling such speculation are the close ties that have developed between Sudan and Iran since the 1989 NIF-backed military coup in Khartoum. The Sudanese-Iranian relationship was formally consummated in December 1991 when Iran's President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani visited Sudan and signed a number of economic and commercial deals with Khartoum. More alarmingly, Iran agreed to finance Sudan's purchase of an estimated $300 million worth of weapons from China, including jet fighters, tanks, armored personnel carriers, rocket launchers and artillery. This latter agreement, in particular, provided more ammunition to critics who believe that Sudan is acting as the springboard for Iran to extend its influence into North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.15 Turabi, on the other hand, contends that "...[Sudan's] relationship with Iran doesn't amount to a great deal."16
But self-interest, not only Islamic ideology, underlies this relationship. For Iran, Sudan can help "share the burden" of spreading the Islamist message and take some of the political heat off Tehran.17 Economically, Iran's political isolation has resulted in the loss of a number of lucrative Western markets for its exports. Iran has sought to compensate for this loss by developing new trade relationships in sub-Saharan Africa. While at the present time Iran exports oil to Sudan, looking to the future, Iran may hope to profit by helping Sudan develop its oil industry. An estimated 545 million barrels of oil are located in Sudan, but unfortunately lie in the middle of the war zone.
For Khartoum the importance of the Iranian connection stems in large part from the NIF's resolve to prosecute the war in the south. At the time of Rafsanjani's 1991 visit, Sudan was politically isolated, engaged in waging a debilitating civil war, facing economic disaster and in need of a new source for arms and energy.18 The Iranian connection offered an alternative energy source as well as the financial support to purchase arms from China. Tehran also served as a political link for Sudan to buy weapons from South Africa. This arms pipeline was reportedly closed down in August 1994, however, after President Nelson Mandela was criticized for allowing government arms sales to trouble spots like Rwanda and Sudan. The Sudan-Iran relationship also represents the coming together of two isolated governments who see themselves under siege by the West. Washington is seen as trying to shape the post-Cold War order to its own liking and to the detriment of Islamist states and movements. Not surprisingly, both Sudan and Iran denounced the U.S. military intervention in Somalia. Iran charged that the U.S. intervention was part of an anti-Islamic scheme designed to install a "puppet regime" in Mogadishu and create an "anti-Islamic, anti-Iranian axis from the Gulf to the Red Sea... and break the backbone of Islamic movements by isolating Iran."19 Sudan accused the United States of seeking to reestablish a strategic position in Somalia. Washington's hidden agenda, they claimed, was to destroy fundamentalist Islam in Somalia. Thus, arguably as a defensive measure, Sudan and Iran sought to affect the outcome of the civil war in Somalia between Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid's Somali National Alliance (SNA) and Ali Mahdi's Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA). Iran and Sudan supported and encouraged Aidid, especially after he emerged as the arch-nemesis of the U.S. and U.N. operation in Somalia.
Aidid's relationship with Sudan and Iran apparently began in January 1992 following the outbreak of civil war in Mogadishu between the rival Mahdi and Aidid factions of the United Somali Congress (USC). Following a visit by Aidid to Iran in the fall of 1992, the al-ltahad al-Islami (Islamic Unity)-a member of Turabi's Popular Arab and Islamic Congress-allied itself with Aidid's SNA. This alliance apparently established Aidid's Islamist credentials in the eyes of Khartoum and Tehran. In November 1993, a month following the battle in Mogadishu between Aidid's forces and U.S. troops, a Somali delegation led by Aidid's assistant traveled to Iran and reportedly requested military and financial aid. Iranian political and security officials supposedly expressed an interest in providing Aidid with such aid via a third party-the third party being Sudan.20
But by the end of 1994, Aidid had shown himself to be more of an opportunist than an Islamist.21 Following the U.S. military withdrawal from Somalia at the end of March 1994, Aidid began to distance himself from the Islamists and drew closer to Eritrea and Ethiopia in order to be brought back into the U.N.-sponsored reconciliation process. Interestingly, in early 1995, supporters of Aidid staged a rally calling for him to impose Sharia in the areas of Somalia he controlled as a way to combat lawlessness-a policy already implemented by his rival, Ali Mahdi. That spring a representative of Aidid's SNA and Ali Mahdi himself turned up in Khartoum and spoke before the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress, requesting Muslim aid in rebuilding and restoring stability in Somalia. Apparently both Aidid and Mahdi are playing the Islamic card to gain political advantage over each other. Khartoum, in tum, perhaps has learned a hard lesson about the primacy of Somali clan politics and the political opportunism that it sometimes involves.
In response to Sudan's increasing regional isolation, Khartoum hardened its stance. In January 1995 Sudan demanded that Eritrea and Uganda be expelled from the IGADD mediation committee. Khartoum charged that Asmara was no longer an impartial party to the conflict and that Eritrea and Uganda were in alliance against Sudan. While allegations of Ugandan support for the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) were not new, Khartoum now claimed that training camps for 300 Sudanese opposition fighters had been established in Eritrea-an allegation that Asmara denied at the time. In a move apparently reflecting a hard-line policy shift, in early February 1995 Sudanese Foreign Minister Suleiman Abu Salih, who had been trying to mend relations with Egypt, was replaced by the ultra-hard-liner deputy leader of the NIF and projected future leader of Sudan, Ali Osman Mohamed Taha. In contrast to Turabi, the urbane Western-trained lawyer who presents a moderate Islamist face to the West and is perceived as a pragmatic voice of reason within the NIF, Ali Taha is an extremist who in the past has clashed with Turabi over policy.22
It seems doubtful, however, that a hardline shift in Khartoum will produce much windfall in the way of increased support from Iran. Even if Tehran's objective is to use Sudan as a springboard to help Islamist movements come to power in the Horn, North Africa and West Africa, Iran's capabilities are limited by geography and economics. First, Tehran does not possess any significant power projection capabilities that would allow it to afford protection to Khartoum should Sudan become embroiled in war with one of its neighbors. Second, Iran's current economic crisis also limits the amount of aid that Tehran can provide to Khartoum. Sudan, for instance, must now buy Iranian oil at world market prices.
In assessing the threat posed by Iranian involvement in the Horn of Africa, it is worth recalling the 1950s and 1960s when France, Great Britain and the conservative Arab monarchies suffered from the "Nasser syndrome."23 Egypt's Gama! Abdel Nasser was seen as the source of all subversion and terror in the region, while the internal reasons for these problems were largely ignored. The French so grossly over-exaggerated Nasser's role in supporting the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) that they became involved in the Suez debacle, believing that a strike against Egypt would solve their problems in Algeria. Secularist opponents of the Islamists may be suffering from a 1990s version of the "Nasser syndrome" the "Tehran syndrome."24
If so, their fears are misplaced. The Sudanese government may be making a nuisance of itself, but Iran is doing far less for Sudan than Washington and Moscow did for their clients in the Horn during the Cold War. In the end, the superpowers had little to show for their vast military expenditures and geopolitical posturing-international (the end of the Cold War) and regional (the fall of Numeiri, Siad and Mengistu) developments saw to that. Given the murky and uncertain post-Cold War political situation in the Horn, Iran seems to be wisely limiting its financial investment in Sudan. Nonetheless, given the anti-Iranian fever gripping Washington, which led the Clinton administration to implement a total trade embargo against Iran at the end of May 1995, anti-Iranian/Islamist rhetoric by regional clients receives a favorable hearing in Washington.
ERITREA'S POLICY OF CONTAINMENT
In contrast to Khartoum's diplomatic isolation in the region, Asmara maintains friendly ties with all governments in the area except for Sudan. Eritrean-Ethiopian ties are particularly warm, cemented by a close personal relationship between their two presidents. Uganda and Eritrea have been drawn together by their mutual concern about Khartoum's apparent attempt to export its Islamist ideology. Asmara also enjoys good relations with Djibouti, Kenya and Yemen. More critically, Eritrea's policy of isolating and containing Sudan is favored by three regional powers who stand opposed to Iranian involvement in the Horn of Africa and the NIP government in Khartoum-Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel.
Saudi Arabia's involvement in the Horn of Africa is driven by a combination of economic, political and strategic interests. As a result of the disruption caused by the Iran Iraq War, the Red Sea has grown in importance as an alternative outlet for Gulf oil. Politically, Riyadh seeks to spread its "moderate" version of Islam throughout the region. To this end, millions of dollars in Saudi aid to Eritrea have been earmarked to build new mosques. Strategically, Riyadh is concerned by Tehran's diplomatic leap over the Arabian Peninsula into Sudan, outflanking the Saudis, and placing Iran in Egypt and Saudi Arabia's backyard.25
The Eritrean-Saudi relationship, however, rests on somewhat shaky ground. Although Saudi Arabia is currently the largest bilateral aid donor to Eritrea, Asmara harbors a certain distrust toward Riyadh, owing to past and current Saudi support for the rival Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) and other Islamic groups in Eritrea. Moreover, Saudi links to the al-Itahad al-Islami movement, which is active in Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as Saudi financial and political backing for the Muslim World League headquartered in Djibouti, suggests that Riyadh intends to spread its Islamic message throughout the Horn. Riyadh recently used its aid strings to "encourage" the government of Djibouti to adopt a more conservative social policy. Whereas, Saudi Arabia is an ally in the strategic sense because of its opposition to the Islamism and foreign-policy orientation of Khartoum, Riyadh's political vision is quite different from that of Asmara.
Riyadh would ultimately like to see the establishment of a "moderate" Islamist government in Sudan. In November 1994, Saudi Islamists hosted a meeting involving members of Sudan's religious-based Umma party and the Democratic Unionist party (DUP). Representatives of these two groups signed a Declaration of Principle calling for the establishment of a new Sudanese government based on Islamic law. Asmara would no doubt welcome almost any change in government so as to be rid of the NIF. But Eritrea's unease about Saudi attempts to export through aid their brand of Islam suggests that, in the final analysis, Riyadh and Asmara are not the most natural of allies.
For Egypt, the Horn of Africa is of critical strategic importance because it forms Egypt's southern flank and controls the headwaters of the Nile. For this latter reason in particular, Egypt is viewed with considerable suspicion in the Horn. The fear persists that, owing to the water politics of the Nile, Cairo wishes to dominate the region. Egypt's strategic obsession with ensuring access to the Nile waters caused a diplomatic breach with the EPLF in the spring of 1988 when Ethiopia and Egypt, after a decade of hostility, agreed to normalize relations. Subsequently, Cairo began to distance itself from the EPLF struggle in Eritrea. President Mubarak went so far as to declare that Egypt would never recognize Eritrea's right to self-determination. Despite these past differences, relations between Cairo and Asmara are basically friendly and are being encouraged by Washington.
Because Sudan and Ethiopia are strategically more important to Egypt than Eritrea, Asmara must carefully gauge how far or aggressively to pursue its policy of containment against Sudan. The renewal of the Sudanese civil war in 1983 was of particular concern to Egypt because of the possibility of southern secession and the threat that might pose to the Nile. While Cairo is hostile toward the NIF government in Khartoum, Egypt opposes secession and prefers that Sudan remain unified.26 Eritrea's move toward waging proxy war against Sudan and supporting the southern opposition thus risks antagonizing Cairo.27 This past June, Egypt refused to allow the Sudanese opposition to hold a strategy meeting in Cairo. In light of the suspected Sudanese link in the attempted assassination of Mubarak a week after this meeting was held in Asmara, however Cairo may now encourage Eritrea to step up the pressure against Khartoum.
Israel, in particular, has assumed a very active, some might say adventurous, role in supporting Eritrea's containment policy in the Horn of Africa. Israeli interest and involvement in the Horn dates back several decades. In the mid-1960s, the Horn began to figure quite prominently in Israeli strategic planning in the Red Sea region, especially in the aftermath of the June 1967 War. Israeli defense planners became obsessed with the notion that the Red Sea might become an "Arab lake" and threaten Israel's access to the Indian Ocean. Consequently, Israel actively opposed the Eritrean rebellion. Tel Aviv supported Addis Ababa in its counterinsurgency war through the end of the 1970s and again following Moscow's military disengagement from Ethiopia in 1988.
Following the fall of the Mengistu regime in May 1991, however, Israel recognized that Eritrean independence was a foregone conclusion and quickly adjusted its policy to account for the new political realities in the Horn. By the end of 1991, Israel had established a consulate in Asmara. When Eritrea celebrated its independence in May 1993, an Israeli delegation was present along with delegations from Arab states. The extent to which close ties between these two states have developed is highlighted by a 1994 report that Israel had signed new agreements with the foreign intelligence services with which it cooperates, including Eritrea, to provide information on Iranian-linked groups.28 The Israelis are also reported to have sent arms and military advisers to Eritrea.
Asmara's relationship with Tel Aviv is based on the premise that Eritrea has more in common with Israel (and Ethiopia) than with Arab/Muslim states. 29 Although Eritrea did join the Arab League in 1994, Israel is seen as a natural Red Sea ally, as well as a model for economic development. Moreover, close relations with Israel might also pay dividends in Washington in the struggle for increased U.S. aid. Israel, in turn, has been very willing to cooperate with Eritrea to prevent the Red Sea from now becoming an "Islamist lake."
Asmara's policy of containment also drew Eritrea into Somalia, where there is today a significant Eritrean presence. The presidents of Eritrea and Ethiopia played key roles in weaning General Aidid away from Sudan and Iran by convincing the United Nations that reconciliation with the "outlaw" general was necessary if order was ever to be restored in Somalia. President Issayas, who had initially supported the U.N. and U.S. intervention, came to see it as a negative for political and strategic . reasons. Until Somalia had a strong government, the country would remain vulnerable to the Islamists.30 Bad government was better than no government, and only Aidid could set one up.
Asmara has also shown that it is not adverse to supporting the political opponents of the NIF.31 On December 27, 1994, a Declaration of Political Agreement was signed in Eritrea by high-ranking members of the NIF's northern and southern political opposition-John Garang's SPLA-Mainstream faction, the Umma party, the Democratic Unionist party and the Legitimate Command (the armed forces opposition movement based in Egypt). Although these opposition groups avoided divisive political issues such as whether Sudan should remain unified or implement a secular constitution, they all agreed to increase pressure on the NIF government. President Issayas gave his blessings to the agreement. Then in mid-June 1995, amid much favorable media fanfare, the Sudanese opposition met in Asmar and discussed options ranging from negotiating with the NIF to armed invasion.32 Among the Sudanese opposition movements, Asmara currently seems to favor the more activist-oriented breakaway faction of the Legitimate Command-the Sudanese National Forces (SNF), headed by Brig. Gen. Khalid Abd-al-Aziz Osman.33
Besides increasing the risk of war with Sudan, Eritrea's containment policy poses political risks as well. Becau.se of their close association with Washington, the three regional powers (Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia) backing Eritrea appear to be acting as the post-Cold War "keepers of U.S. interests" in the Horn, thereby providing a convenient rallying point for Islamist opponents.34 Moreover, Riyadh, Cairo and Tel Aviv do not always operate on the same political and strategic wavelengths. Increased friction between Egypt and Israel over the Middle East peace process, nuclear arms control and regional water issues has prompted speculation in Cairo that Israeli support for the SPLA is designed to provide a point of leverage (via the threat of a separate southern state controlling the upper reaches of the Nile) to be used against Egypt.35 Currently, the political-strategic interests of Eritrea and these three regional powers converge in the Horn with respect to containing the "radical" Islam1st threat. But Saudi Islamism, the water politics of the Nile and Israeli support for the SPLA are points of divergence and political conflict. Eritrea risks getting caught in the political crossfire.
THE WEST'S DILEMMA: CONFRONTATION OR CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT?
For several years, Western powers have debated whether to confront or constructively engage Islamist governments and political movements. Current U.S. policy is one of confrontation with the "militants" and constructive engagement with the "moderates." Just who is a "militant" and who is a "moderate" and who decides this matter-the Western powers or the local government under siege-is a critical point since Western aid may be linked to local policies. While U.S. policymakers claim they are "capable of making distinctions between Islamic groups," the Reagan administration's experience with Iran in the mid-l 980s suggests otherwise.
In the case of Sudan, U.S. policymakers seem to be of two minds. On the one hand, Washington views the Sudanese government as "beyond the pale" and as a center for radical Islamist and terrorist activity in the region. Nonetheless, diplomatic relations, although strained, have continued uninterrupted. Last December Washington had urged Asmara not to sever diplomatic relations with Khartoum. During the PAIC congress held in Sudan this past spring, U.S. intelligence agents were reportedly allowed to move freely about Khartoum in order to track a leading member of the Lebanese Hezbollah thought to be behind the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marines' barracks in Beirut and the 1985 skyjacking of a TWA airliner.36 The attempt to kidnap him in Jeddah was foiled by the Saudis who refused to cooperate for fear of antagonizing Iran.37 Thus, a thaw in U.S.-Sudanese relations, even under the NIF, is not beyond the realm of possibility.
The State Department sees a power struggle going on in Khartoum between "moderates" and "extremists."38 Until it is resolved, the United States has sought to refrain from taking actions which might bolster the "extremists" or permanently alienate Khartoum, such as arming the SPLA or publicly egging on the Eritreans. This policy is reminiscent of the "wait-and-see" approach the United States adopted toward Addis Ababa following the 1974 Ethiopian revolution and the "don't burn your bridges" policy implemented after Ethiopia realigned with the Soviet Union in 1977. But, by supporting Eritrea and Uganda, the United States is at least indirectly encouraging the Sudanese opposition.
Thus, there is an element of confrontation in U.S. policy in the Horn. Through development aid and food aid, Washington has been shoring up the secularist governments in Eritrea and Ethiopia as bulwarks against Islamism in the Horn. In early 1995 the Clinton administration launched the "Greater Horn of Africa Initiative" to provide for long-term "food security" in the region.39 Of the $22 million in aid the United States was to give to Eritrea during FY 1995, over half was food aid and emergency food relief. For FY 1996, the Clinton administration is proposing a total aid package of $15.15 million for Eritrea of which $14.9 million will be in Development Assistance, PL-480 Food Aid and for the Peace Corps.40
While Washington's current emphasis is on providing for "food security" in the Horn of Africa, military assistance still factors into the U.S. security equation. Washington is seeking to strengthen "on the cheap" the military capacity of Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as Uganda as part of an anti-Sudanese coalition in the area.41 Over the past few years, Ethiopia and Eritrea have both received several hundred thousand dollars annually in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds. For FY1996, the Clinton administration has proposed IMET funding in the amount of $250,000 for Eritrea, $300,000 for Ethiopia, $350,000 for Kenya, $150,000 for Djibouti and $200,000 for Uganda.42 Although the administration has not requested Foreign Military Financing (FMF) credits for any of these countries, Addis Ababa has been provided with dozens of trucks and excess military equipment.43
Washington has thus far avoided emphasizing military aid and has focused almost exclusively on providing economic aid to Eritrea despite President Issayas's attempt to acquire increased military aid by playing the anti-Islamist card during his l 995 visit to the United States. While he did sign agreements which call upon the United States to transform the Eritrean armed forces into a regular army and to train Eritrean military personnel at U.S. military training bases, the Clinton administration's subsequent military aid requests for Eritrea and the region remained modest. Future U.S. security assistance to Eritrea will likely remain limited given the absence of what Washington perceives as a major external security threat and so long as the EIJM poses only a very low-level internal security threat to Eritrea. But, Washington also appears willing (as it has done in the case of Israeli support for the SPLA) to turn a blind eye to Eritrean support for Sudan's internal opposition and to countenance military support to Asmara from other "friendly" powers.
Washington's blend of "wait-and-see" and muted confrontation stands in sharp contrast with France's policy of constructive engagement with Sudan. The budding relationship between Sudan and France was highlighted by the "capture" of Illich Ramirez Sanchez (Carlos "The Jackal") by French security forces in Khartoum on August 14, 1994. Sudan's cooperation with French intelligence in the Carlos affair reaped political and military dividends for Khartoum. Subsequently, Paris helped to prevent Sudan's expulsion from the IMF. France, reportedly, also provided Sudan with satellite photos of SPLA positions and granted permission for the Sudanese army to use the Central African Republic to attack SPLA forces.
France's constructive engagement with Sudan is based upon three considerations: oil, Central Africa and Algeria.44 In July 1994, Sudanese officials were in Paris, reportedly, to discuss the renewal of the French oil company TOTAL's concession in the south and the possibility of TOTAL taking over the U.S.-based Chevron oil company's concession. France also hopes that closer ties between Paris and Khartoum will contribute to the stability of French allies in Central Africa and deter Sudan from playing a destabilizing role in times of crisis as it allegedly has done in Somalia, Eritrea and Yemen. Finally, because of NIF ties to the FIS, Paris believes that Turabi may be able to act as a mediator between the Islamists and the government in Algeria. France is essentially doing what Turabi has been urging the West to do for the past few years-recognize the inevitable and deal with the Islamists.
For the Western powers, the Horn of Africa is of marginal strategic importance. For the West, the Islamist threat in the Horn is essentially a sideshow to the real danger which lies in North Africa and the Middle East.45 To the extent that Khartoum might be encouraged to play a moderating role in the region, then various degrees of constructive engagement with the "moderates" in Khartoum seems warranted. Given Sudan's limited resources and continuing internal problems, coupled with the fact that Iran has done comparatively little to help Khartoum militarily, there is no reason for Washington to make security assistance a major component of U.S. aid to Eritrea. Just as U.S. security assistance to Somalia, Sudan and Kenya was a direct function of Soviet support for Ethiopia during the Cold War, U.S. security assistance to Eritrea and other states in the region will likely be a direct function of Iranian military support for Sudan.
CONCLUSION: WAR, PROXY WAR OR RESOLUTION?
One walks on thin ice judging the current political-security situation in the Horn of Africa. First, the political situation in the Horn is very murky. In the case of Somalia, for example, Islam may offer a viable alternative political system to the clan politics which have destroyed the country. Second, most sources of information are politically biased. It is difficult to distinguish fact from fiction from wishful thinking. The Horn of Africa might more aptly be known as the Horn of rumors, exaggerations, distortions, accusations and denials.
What there is no doubt about, however, is that an international crisis is the last thing the Horn of Africa needs given the internal conflicts already disrupting the region and the enormous economic and development problems facing these governments. Unfortunately, since the end of 1994, war by proxy or full-scale war between Eritrea and Sudan has become a very real possibility. Moreover, the Eritrea-Sudan crisis is not an "accidental crisis." It is an unnecessary crisis brought about by Sudanese actions. For its part, Asmara might be accused of over-reaction. Then again, in the early 1960s, the Eritrean insurgents were dismissed as shiftas by Haile Selassie.
The intensity of this crisis is compounded by outside agitation. Whereas the war in Eritrea and, to a lesser extent, the Ethiopia-Somalia dispute were seen during the 1960s and 1970s as southerly extensions of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Eritrea-Sudan crisis is being promoted by outsiders and local parties as a southerly extension of the Middle East's secularist-Islamist conflict of the 1990s. On the positive side, little in the way of heavy weaponry has been supplied by outside powers. Unfortunately, low-intensity conflicts of the sort being waged by the EIJM against Asmara and the SPLA in Sudan survive through the small-arms trade.
The escalation of the Eritrea-Sudan crisis parallels in some ways the war by proxy waged between Ethiopia and Somalia during the 1980s. Mogadishu initiated that proxy war prior to the 1977-78 Ogaden War by supporting the WSLF insurgents. Addis Ababa reciprocated after the Ogaden War by supporting the anti-Siad opposition. One of these groups, the Somali National Movement (SNM), launched an attack in the north of Somalia in mid-1988 that propelled Somalia into full-scale civil war. This war in the north eventually cost Mogadishu the support of the United States and ultimately led to the overthrow of Siad Barre and the disintegration of the Somali state. With or without Eritrean agitation, a similar fate may await the NIF and Sudan.
There is one fundamental difference, however, which distinguishes these two regional crises. The Ethiopian-Somali conflict was a zero-sum territorial dispute about international borders. Either Ethiopia had to agree to a change in the international border or Somalia had to renounce its irredentist claim on the Ogaden for this conflict to be permanently resolved. The secularist-Islamist ideological conflict underlying the Eritrea-Sudan crisis is not such a zero-sum game. Peaceful coexistence between Asmara and Khartoum is possible. But if the export by force or subversion of Islamist ideology is and remains the policy and raison d'etre of the NIF, then proxy war, if not full-scale war, between Eritrea and Sudan is a certainty.
1 "[Eritrea) President Says 'War' Being Waged by Sudan, Others," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Sub-Saharan Africa (FBIS), January 3, 1994, p. 5; and "Islamic Jihad in Clash with [Eritrea] Government Forces," FBIS, November 12, 1993, p.4.
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The State of Eritrea, Aide Memoire, November 16, 1994.
3 Gerrard Williams, "Eritrea Warns Sudan 'Don't Play with Fire,"' Reuters World Service, December 13, 1994.
4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The State of Eritrea, Aide Memoire, December 1994.
5 "Eritrea: Petrol and Politics Go Stateside," Indian Ocean Newsletter, no. 657, February 4, 1995.
6 "Eritrea/Sudan: Countdown to Conflict," Indian Ocean Newsletter, no. 655, January 21, 1995.
7 Gill Lusk, "Sudan: Opposition's Last Chance?" Middle East International (MEI), 503, June 23, 1995, p. 14.
9 "Riyadh Plays Teheran Off U.S.," Intelligence Newsletter, 263, April 27, 1995.
10 "Sudan Asks Norway to Mediate Civil War," Deutsche Presse-Agentur; April 4, 1995.
11 See Gerald K.N. Trevaskis, Eritrea, A Colony in Transition: 1941-1952 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1960), pp. 46-80; and Tom Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm, 2nd revised edition (New York: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 1979), pp. 25-39.
12 Strangely, although three of the nine members of the Islamic Group hit squad (two were killed in the shootout) were arrested by Ethiopian security within two days of the attempted assassination, more than five weeks passed before Addis Ababa "announced" that they had been arrested. (The New York Times, August 3, 1995, p. A5, "Ethiopia Charges Three in Attack on Mubarak")
13 See Hassan Turabi, "Islam, Democracy, the State and the West," Middle East Policy, vol. 1, no. 3, 1992, pp. 55-7; and Judith Miller, "Faces of Fundamentalism," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 6, November/December, 1994, pp. 123-42.
14 "The Horn of Africa: Recasting the Nation State," Africa Confidential (AC), 34, 1, January 8, 1993, pp. 4-6; and Abd al-Salam Sidahmed, "Iran, Sudan and Algeria-A Set-back or the Grand Plan?" Middle East International (MEI), 421. March 20, 1992, pp. 17-8.
15 See Abd al-Salam Sidahmed, "Sudan: The Pros and Cons for Intervention," MEI, 448, April 16, 1993, pp. 17-8; and Abd al-Salam Sidahmed, "Teheran Khartoum: A New Axis or a Warning Shot?" MEI, 418, February 7, 1992, pp. 18-9.
16 Torabi, "Islam, Democracy, the State and the West," p. 56.
17 Abd al-Salam Sidahmed, "Teheran-Khartoum," pp. 18-9.
18 Maria Kielmas, "Oil and Arms: The Sudan/South Africa/Iran Triangle," MEI, 419, February 21, 1992, pp. 18-9.
19 Safa Haeri, "Iran and Somalia: Condemnation," MEI, 440, December 18, 1992, pp. 7-8.
20 See"'Sources' Say Aidid Assistant Secretly Visiting Teheran," FBIS, November 4, 1993, pp. 5- 6; "Aidid Aides Reportedly Carry Messages to Iran Leadership," FBIS, November 17, 1993, pp. 1-2; and "U.S. Says Aidid May Be Getting Arms via Sudan, Iran," Reuters (Financial Report), October 6, 1993.
21 "Somalia: Aidid's Dilemma," AC, 36, 1, January 6, 1995, pp. 6-7. As part of the arrangement to bring about the U.S. military withdrawal from Somalia, Washington reportedly pressured Aidid not to deal with Islamist movements or to invite them into the political process. See "U.S. Said to Trade 'Honorable' Pullout for Aidid Pledges," FBIS, December 8, 1993, p. 6.
22 Gill Lusk, "Pressure Mounts on Khartoum's Islamists," The Guardian, February 11, 1995.
23 See Anthony Parsons. "Iraq, Iran and the West's Policy of Demonization," MEI, 452, June 11, 1993, pp. 16-7.
25 Abd al-Salam Sidahmed, ''Teheran-Khartoum," pp. 18-9.
26 "Owing to Egypt's concern about southern secession, Cairo reportedly informed Khartoum of a secret U.S. operation code-named "Heavy (Plentiful) Rain" calling for the establishment of military bases in neighboring African states from which to attack Sudanese forces in the south and help the SPLA. Mideast Mirror, December 9, 1994.
27 Thus, Eritrea has seemingly favored John Garang's SPLA, which favors some form of confederation with the north, as opposed to Riek Machar's Southern Sudanese Independence Movement (SSIM), which favors secession.
28 "Israel: Intelligence Shake-up?" Intelligence Newsletter. August 25, 1994.
29 See Stephen Hubbell, "Eritrea: Towards an Uncertain Future," MEI, 449, April 30, 1993, pp. 10-1; David Styan, "Israel, Eritrea and Ethiopia: A Convoluted Relationship," MEI, 456, August 6, 1993, pp. 18-9; and Jane Hunter, "Israeli Foreign Policy: Grasping New Opportunities," MEI, 465, December 17, 1993, pp. 17-8. Eritrea's President Issayas stated: "I believe that after the solution of the Palestinian question, all the problems about dealing with the Jewish state will disappear," FBIS, April 12, 1994, p. 18.
30 Telephone interview with an official at the Eritrean Embassy in Washington, DC, March 9, 1995.
31 See "Eritrea/Sudan: Squeeze," AC, 35, 25, December l 6, 1994, p. 8: "Sudan: Pincer Movement," AC, 36, 3, February 3, 1995, p. 8; and "Sudan: Movement in the Minefield," AC, 36, 5, March 3, 1995, pp. 1-3.
32 Gill Lusk, "Sudan: Opposition's Last Chance?" MEI, 503, June 23, 1995, p. 14.
34 "Israel's African Scramble," Moneyclips, July 8, 1993.
35 Mideast Mirror, December 9, 1994.
36 See "Riyadh Plays Tehran Off U.S.," Intelligence Newsletter, 263, April 27, 1995. This situation was somewhat similar to the cooperation provided by Khartoum to French intelligence which led to the French apprehension (kidnapping) of Carlos "The Jackal" in Sudan in August 1994.
37 Ibid. Riyadh apparently hoped that in return Tehran would ease up support for the Saudi Islamist opposition.
38 Telephone interview with State Department official, March 9, 1995.
39 Issayas discussed this initiative with U.S. AID administrator Brian Atwood in January 1995. See "Eritrea: Petrol and Politics Go Stateside," Indian Ocean Newsletter, 657, February 4, 1995.
40 U.S. economic and military aid for Africa, which is drawn from the U.S. Department of State, Congressional Presentation on Security Assistance for Foreign Operations, FY1996, is cited in Africa Policy Report, 2, May 31, 1995, pp. 2-4.
41 According to one U.S. official, "The old military assistance days are over." Another commented, "We've got a very weak administration; we've very little time for foreign affairs, so everything has to be cheap or quick-or out of sight." Quoted in "Sudan: Movement in the Minefield," AC, 36, 5, March 3, 1995, pp. 1-3. The following information was provided in a telephone interview with a State Department official, March 9, I 995.
42 See Africa Policy Report, 2, May 31, 1995, pp. 2-4.
43 Telephone interview with State Department official, March 9, 1995.
44 See Abd al-Salam. Sidahmed, "Sudan, France and the Carlos Affair," MEI, 484, September 23, 1994, pp. 19-20; "North-East Africa: Paying the Price of War," AC, 35, 15, July 29, 1994, pp. 1-3; "Sudan: Inside the Jackal's Lair," AC, 35, 17, August 26, 1994, pp. 1-2; "North Africa: Fear of the Dominoes," AC, 35, 10, May 20, 1994, pp. 6-7; Robert Swann, "The Carlos Affair: Parisian Soap Opera," MEI, 482, August 26, I 994, pp. 10-2; and "Sudan: French Game, American Trump," Intelligence Newsletter, September 8, 1994.
45 John King, "A 'Clash of Civilizations': Pentagon Rhetoric on the 'Islamic Threat,"' MEI, 495, March 3, 1995, p. 16.