Now that it is unlikely a two-state arrangement will be the "solution" to the conflict in Israel/Palestine, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is talking it up. And the Arab League has helpfully offered to adjust its 2002 peace proposal to allow for flexibility on the 1967 boundaries.
Stephen M. Walt, Philip Weiss, Henry Siegman
STEPHEN M. WALT, professor of International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
In November 2010, I spent a long and fascinating evening with a dozen veteran settlers from the ideological core of the movement previously known as Gush Emunim. I was in their settlement to discuss ha-matzav (the situation) with these Jews, who were living the political consequences of their ideology every day. At the end of a long evening, I asked them a question I've asked almost every Israeli I have met for the last 15 years: Can you describe a future for the country that you like and that you think is possible?
Mark N. Katz
Russia has played little or no active role in the Arab uprisings that began in 2011, with one notable exception: Syria. In this one case, Moscow has provided the regime with important diplomatic and military support ever since the start of the uprising against it.
Many reasons have been cited as to why Moscow has backed the Assad regime so determinedly:
George Abu Ahmad
My pseudonymous friend Musa al-Gharbi argued in these pages that without perfect knowledge of the definitive demographics of the deaths and politics of the Syrian rebellion, well-intentioned outsiders should give the benefit of the doubt to the Assad regime and err on the side of passivity and the status quo.1 A war-weary American public, realizing a decade too late the error of the Iraq war, needs little encouragement to "see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil." But the United States, as a fully vested Middle Eastern power, does not have that intellectual distance; the longer
This study examines the relationship between U.S. democracy promotion (DP) and democratization in the Arab world. DP has been an important U.S. policy in the Arab Middle East for two decades, and hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent on it. During most of that time, only minor changes have taken place in most of the Arab countries. Executive branches are still powerful and not subject to real accountability, security-service intimidation is still rampant, and many popular social movements and groups are banned.
Nabeel A. Khoury
Starting in 2011, a series of uprisings triggered domestic changes in several countries in the Arab world that affected regional and international politics.
The effort to find a solution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey is nothing new. It has been continuing ever since the Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, or Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) — formally founded on November 27, 1978 — began its violent uprising on August 15, 1984.1 Over the years, PKK goals have evolved from initial plans to establish an independent Marxist state to current ones for the recognition of Kurdish political, social and cultural rights within a decentralized Turkey.
Kawa Jabary and Anil Hira
The controversy surrounding the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 will continue for years to come, not only over its justification but also over its outcomes. The idealistic hope emanating from the "Arab Spring" is just one more page added to the story. But one chapter has surprisingly received short shrift thus far: the successful development of a strong Kurdish region. Though U.S.
Kilic Bugra Kanat
In his studies on alliances, Stephen Walt provided a list of variables that can lead to the endurance or collapse of alliances in the international system. Walt's variables provide an almost accurate explanation of the persistence and demise of the Turkish-Israeli partnership in the 1990s. As Walt underscored, factors such as domestic politics and elite manipulation as well as a common threat perception and shared identities among the founders of the alliance played significant roles in the development and continuation of the partnership until the late 1990s.
Ozlem Arpac Arconian
The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF, or the Fund) underline the "temporary" nature of its financial assistance to its members. Nevertheless, repeat lending became a salient feature of IMF operations in the 1980s and 1990s. In 2001, loans to repeat users accounted for half of all IMF lending.
No sooner had the ancien régime fallen in Iran in 1979, than cracks began to appear in the revolutionary unity that had brought it down. Questions over the ideological content of the new regime and its economic and cultural path, as well as its foreign-policy course, deeply divided factions that had joined forces against the shah under the charismatic leadership of the Ayatollah Khomeini. The interregnum between the fall of the shah in February 1979 and June 1981, when the radical clergy overcame internal opposition, was marked by divided government and fierce factionalism.
Ten years after co-editing his first book on the Gülen movement, Hakan Yavuz, a leading scholar on Turkish society, brings his academic prowess and careful observations to bear on this dynamic phenomenon in Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: The Gülen Movement.1 This well-timed
October 7, 2001, marks the beginning of a seemingly endless war of attrition between U.S. forces and the Afghan Taliban.
With Osama bin Laden's death in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May 2011, al-Qaeda lost not only its figurehead and once-useful recruiting tool, but also a sense of direction born of impotence.
During the administration of George W. Bush, Elliott Abrams served as deputy national security advisor and as the National Security Council (NSC) staff member handling Israeli-Palestinian issues daily.