From Syria's independence in 1946 until the 1998 bilateral crisis, Turkish-Syrian relations were characterized by hostility and mistrust. Not least in their uncooperative border interactions. In the 1950s, Turkey was concerned about the illegal transfer of goods across its Syrian border. In the 1980s and 1990s, preventing PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party) activities became Turkish policy makers' top security priority. Ankara even went so far as to plant landmines along the Syrian border.
After Syria ousted PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan from its territory in 1998, Turkish-Syrian relations improved significantly; cross-border cooperation took precedence over security. Since 2011, however, Turkey has faced multifaceted security challenges in parallel with the deepening conflict in Syria. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) have acquired territories in northern Syria, along the Turkish border. As a result of the current dynamics of the Syrian conflict, preventing cross-border attacks and eliminating the territorial presence of ISIS and the YPG in northern Syria have become Turkey's top priorities.
BACKGROUND
The 1923 Lausanne Treaty confirmed the Turkish-Syrian border that had been determined under the Turkish-French Treaty of 1921. The district of Alexandretta (later named Hatay1) remained outside Turkey's borders and, until 1936, was ruled under the French mandate. After France signed a treaty with Syria in 1936 to end its mandatory rule,2 Turkey advocated for the independence of Alexandretta, appealing to the League of Nations on the matter. The League granted Alexandretta autonomy in its internal affairs. Worried about a possible Turkish alliance with Nazi Germany, however, France agreed to relinquish Alexandretta. After a brief autonomous period (1938-39), the Republic of Hatay joined Turkey through a plebiscite and became a province of the Turkish Republic in 1939.3
After Syria gained independence in 1946, the Hatay issue continued to be a point of confrontation between the two states. Syria did not recognize the integration of Hatay into Turkey, arguing that France had relinquished Alexandretta without the approval of the Syrian parliament.4 In order to underscore its sovereignty over Hatay, Turkey began to construct fortifications along the border in 1947. Syria responded with frontier forts and posts,5 and even by showing Hatay within its territory in official maps and schoolbooks.
The Turkish-Syrian border was demarcated in 1956, during which privately owned farmlands located on the Turkish side were nationalized.6 Turkey also started to plant landmines that year along the Syrian border in order to prevent smuggling activities.7 The mining continued until 1969, though smuggling became a widespread activity along the border.8
In addition to the Hatay and smuggling issues, disagreement over the distribution of the downflow of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers strained bilateral relations.9 Syria's concern grew as Turkey built dams (Keban, Karakaya and Ataturk) on the Euphrates in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.10 Syria showed its frustration by providing sanctuary to PKK militants, including their leader, Öcalan, who fled Turkey following the coup of September 12, 1980.11 In 1983, Turkey officially denounced Syria's support for these "anti-Turkish elements."12 Syria, for its part, was suspicious of Turkey's close links with Muslim Brotherhood leaders who had escaped from Syria in the 1980s.13
In 1987, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal visited Syria, insisting that it cease supporting the PKK. Syria demanded that a treaty be signed with respect to the sharing of the waters of the Euphrates. Consequently, through a protocol, Turkey agreed to release 500 cubic meters of water per second to Syria. The two sides also signed a security protocol, with the objectives of preventing terrorist operations within their borders and extraditing terrorist suspects.14
The increase in PKK attacks on Turkish soil shattered Turkish-Syrian relations. Turkey accused Syria of giving support to PKK militants, and, even though Öcalan was known to be in Syria, Damascus denied this claim.15 Turkey's diplomatic efforts to end Syrian support to the PKK were futile; Syria continued to shelter Öcalan, despite the 1987 security protocol. Nevertheless, Turkey and Syria were on the U.S. side in the Gulf War of 1991. Common regional-security concerns provided a promising environment for bilateral cooperation, and in 1992, an agreement was signed to intensify common efforts against terrorism. Syria also officially recognized the PKK as an illegal organization, though PKK militants continued to launch attacks on Turkey from Syria.16
The antagonism between Turkey and Syria had implications for each state's relationship with other countries in the region. During the 1990s, Syria developed formidable ties with Turkey's rivals in the region, such as Greece, Iran and Armenia.17 This was followed by a Turkish-Israeli agreement in 1996 on military modernization and the arms trade. In that same year, the two countries also agreed to cooperate on intelligence gathering and counterterrorism.18 Syria looked at this rapprochement with suspicion, considering it an anti-Syrian coalition. Overall, the Hatay issue, the water question and Turkish-Israeli cooperation gave Syria enough incentive to intensify its support for the PKK.19
In 1996, Turkey issued a memorandum accusing Syria of supporting the PKK and claiming the right to employ self-defense measures under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Stressing that the normalization of bilateral relations required Syria's withdrawal of support from the PKK, Ankara also demanded that Syria hand over Öcalan and other high-level PKK militants to Turkish authorities.20 A similar demand was made to a visiting Syrian envoy in an official "good-will letter" in 1998.21 The failure of diplomatic efforts (coupled with the rise of anti-Syrian sentiments in Turkish society and Russia's diminished role in the Middle East) provided a conducive environment for Turkey's moves.22
In 1998, Turkey increased its pressure on Syria by threatening to intervene militarily if it continued to provide support to the PKK. Accordingly, it stationed 10,000 troops along the border.23 Syria responded by installing Scud-C missiles approximately 55 kilometers from the border. Turkey's threats and its increase in border security stoked fear in the Arab world that a Turkish-Syrian crisis could trigger a conflict with the whole Arab world.24 In order to ease the tension, Egyptian and Jordanian authorities played a mediating role.25 Under the resulting Adana Protocol, Syria expelled Öcalan, recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization and agreed not to support it.26 In 1999, the PKK announced a unilateral ceasefire which lasted until 2004.27
From 1998 onwards, Turkish-Syrian relations significantly improved. Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer attended President Hafiz al-Assad's funeral in 2000. Upon his return to Turkey, Sezer stressed both countries' willingness to make efforts to improve their relations.28 After Bashar al-Assad came to power that year, frequent high-level visits29 led to an agreement in 2001 to curb illegal immigration. This was followed a year later by a military-cooperation accord.30
Bilateral relations continued to improve after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, in line with the AKP's pro-active "zero problems with the neighbours" policy. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 gave Turkey and Syria further incentives to cooperate on their common security. After Saddam Hussein was toppled, Turkey and Syria became concerned about the creation of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Moreover, the Bush administration's labeling of Syria as part of the "axis of evil" incentivized Damascus to develop closer ties with Ankara.31
In order to prevent PKK activities, Turkey — which had planted landmines on more than half of the border in the 1990s — installed approximately 20,000 more. It finally ceased after ratifying the 2003 Ottawa Treaty outlawing the use of anti-personnel mines.32 The improvement in Turkish-Syrian relations after 1998 had incentivized Turkey to clear the mines, and the two countries signed a de-mining agreement.33
Between 2003 and 2007, Syrian-Turkish relations continued to improve, particularly with the delivery of 73 PKK militants to Turkey. 34 During his 2004 visit to Syria, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan indicated that Syria could benefit from more water from the Tigris,35 and in 2005, for the first time in history, Syria denounced a PKK attack in Turkey. Furthermore, in 2007, Turkey and Syria organized a joint operation on Syrian soil against PKK militants. In that same year, Syria supported a Turkish operation in northern Iraq against PKK militants.36
In 2007, a free-trade agreement between Turkey and Syria came into force. Two years later, they conducted their second joint land operation and signed a political declaration paving the way for the establishment of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC). That same year, the HLSCC met, first at the ministerial level and later at the prime ministerial level. At a subsequent meeting that year, 50 agreements and memorandums of understanding were signed in the areas of politics, security, water, trade, culture, health, transportation and the environment. During this meeting, Turkey and Syria also agreed to establish a visa-free regime.37
The amelioration of Turkish-Syrian relations reached an apex with the conduct of a joint military exercise in 2009. Nevertheless, despite Erdogan's attempts, Syria could not be persuaded to recognize Hatay as a Turkish province,38 though cooperation between the two continued. In 2010, at HLSCC meetings, 13 more agreements were signed, on trade, investment and tourism. The two sides also agreed to manage their water resources jointly, signing a memorandum of understanding to construct a "friendship dam" on the Orontes River in Hatay.39 Also in 2010, Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon established a Quadripartite High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (QHLSCC) to create a zone of free movement of goods and persons among these states.40
Then came the Arab Spring, disrupting Turkish-Syrian relations and complicating Turkey's border security. When the uprising spilled over into Syria in March 2011, Turkey tried to persuade Assad to institute political reforms, but the Syrian army continued gross human-rights violations. Turkey imposed sanctions on Syria, froze its business assets, and cut off its relationship with the Syrian Central Bank. Turkey also played an important role in establishing the Free Syrian Army (FSA).41
The two states came to the brink of war in 2012 after a Turkish jet, flying over the border, was shot down by Syrian security forces. Following this incident, Turkey declared that it would consider any military entity approaching (within five km) the Turkish-Syrian border as a threat.42 After the border town of Akcakale was shelled from the Syrian side, Turkey fired at military targets in northern Syria.43
THE WAR
After the Syrian conflict became a war, millions of refugees sought shelter in Turkey or transited through it to reach Europe. Turkey maintained an open-border policy. Calling the Syrians brothers, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stated that closing the border was not an option.44 At the beginning, Syrian border authorities started to shoot civilians trying to escape.45 Soon afterwards, Turkey started to advocate for the creation of a buffer zone in Syria in order to ease the humanitarian disaster and stem the flow of refugees.
The new power vacuum in Syria created favorable conditions for jihadist organizations. ISIS, which grew out of al-Qaeda in Iraq, captured the Syrian city of Raqqa in 2013, and declared it its capital in 2014. Propounding a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, ISIS received the support of radical Sunni groups.46 Turkey declared it a terrorist organization in September 201347 and joined the anti-ISIS coalition formed by the United States at the September 2014 NATO Summit, along with the UK, France, Australia, Germany, Canada, Italy, Poland and Denmark.48
Even though military operations weakened the power of ISIS in Iraq,49 the group continued to acquire territory in Syria. In 2015, under the "train and equip" program, the United States aimed to stand up 5,000 moderate Syrian fighters a year for a three-year period to counter ISIS and the Assad regime. The $500 million program was abandoned later that year, after most of the small number of fighters deployed during the initial stage died in the conflict.50
In addition to ISIS, the Kurds have also played an active role in the Syrian conflict. Before the war, they made up 10 percent of Syria's population of 23 million, mostly concentrated in the northeast along the Turkish border and in big cities such as Aleppo and Damascus.51 The Democratic Union Party (PYD), established in 2003, has advocated for Kurdish rights in Syria.52 Interestingly, prior to 1998, Syria was actively involved in Turkey's Kurdish question — while, at the same time, harboring a significant number of Kurds without citizenship status. In 1962, the Syrian government stripped approximately 120,000 Kurds of citizenship by claiming that they had illegally migrated from Turkey. Consequently, most Syrian Kurds lacked the right to travel abroad, to vote or to own property.53
For the first time in Syrian history, in 2004, the Kurds organized massive anti-government demonstrations following a fight between Arab and Kurdish football fans in Qamishli. The government suppressed these demonstrations violently, causing the deaths of 36 people. The 2004 demonstrations incentivized the Kurds to demand further rights and more autonomy in Syria, though the government maintained its repression, banning the Kurds' political and cultural meetings.54 A law passed in 2008 further restricted land ownership.55 As a consequence, the Kurds remained politically invisible.
The war resurrected Syria's dormant Kurdish problem. Sidelined by various Syrian governments for years, the Kurds had finally found the opportunity to play a political role in Syria. Even though Bashar al-Assad granted citizenship to several thousand Kurds immediately after the uprising, this did not prevent Kurds from mobilizing.56 They were unwilling to join the Syrian National Council (SNC), established with the initiative of Turkey in 2011 — the only exception being the Kurdish Future Movement Party (KFMP). However, the KFMP was displeased with the Council's final declaration, as it did not recognize the Kurdish presence in Syria. Furthermore, KFMP leader Mashall Tammo was soon assassinated.57
Most Syrian Kurds were brought into the Kurdish National Council (KNC) in 2011 and supported a federal state within Syria. As the SNC remained ineffective, opposition groups gathered under the umbrella of the National Council for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSRO), established in Doha in 2012. While the KNC was supported by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Kurdish Democratic Party (the KDP), the PYD and its armed wing, the YPG, have an ideological position similar to the PKK's. Soon after the Syrian conflict broke out, PYD leader Salih Muslim returned to Syria from the PKK camps in northern Iraq and began to mobilize the Syrian Kurds.58
In 2012, Syrian government forces withdrew from the northeast region, mostly populated by Kurds, in order to focus on the FSA in Damascus. Subsequently, the Kurds took control of Afrin, Jazira, Kobane, Derik and Jindires. In the same year, the Kurds started to fight with the FSA.59 Worried about these developments, Erdoğan threatened to intervene in Syria if the PKK established camps there.60
The war caused Turkey to become more protective of the Syrian border, taking action to prevent spillover of the conflict into Turkey. After Afrin, Kobane and Jazira were captured by Kurdish YPG forces in 2012, Turkey sealed its border gates to these towns.61 Furthermore, following the Cilvegözü border-gate attacks (which resulted in 14 deaths), Turkey deployed NATO Patriot-missile batteries in its southeastern provinces to deter possible violence from Syria.62
After terrorists operating out of Syria killed 51 Turkish citizens with twin car bombs in Hatay in 2013, Turkey closed Hatay's Yayladağı customs gate for a month.63 It also hardened its Syrian border with air and ground military equipment.64 In March 2015, worried about possible terrorist attacks, Turkey closed the Öncüpınar and Cilvegözü gates.65 In July 2015, ISIS killed 32 young activists in a bomb blast in the border town of Suruc.66Also in July, Turkey allowed the United States to use its Incirlik air base against ISIS and, for the first time, launched a military operation against ISIS targets in Syria.67
Since the Syrian conflict spilled over into Turkey, strengthening the border has become a top priority. As Turkish authorities watched warily, the gaining of territory in northern Syria by ISIS and the YPG incentivized Turkey to bolster security along its border.68 In 2014, it increased the number of security personnel there and began to strengthen coordination among its land forces, the Gendarmerie and other military institutions.69
In 2015, Turkey started to build a wall along its southeastern border with Syria.70 In addition, the Turkish Armed Forces increased border security by deploying drones and reconnaissance aircraft.71As of February 2017, a 290 km wall had been completed along the Sanliurfa, Gaziantep, Kilis, Hatay, Mardin and Sirnak provinces. It will be 511 km long at completion.72
Strikingly, the developments in northern Syria revealed that protecting the border per se was not sufficient to safeguard Turkey's national security; that would require cross-border operations. In August 2016, therefore, Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Syria. Ankara stipulated that the operation be conducted in order to protect the border, target ISIS, and prevent the PKK and the PYD/YPG from establishing an autonomous entity in northern Syria. Turkey justified this operation by invoking the right of self-defense articulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter.73
Operation Euphrates started in Jarablus.74 Concerned about Turkey's plans to establish a safe-zone in Syria, ISIS militants had planted mines in the area — which would also prevent the flow of civilians into Turkey.75 After the Turkish-backed FSA freed the city from ISIS in January 2016, Turkey cleared the border area with a mine sweeper.76 In August, it shelled ISIS positions.77 After Dabiq and al-Bab were recaptured from ISIS, the operation was ended in March 2017.
Even after Operation Euphrates Shield ended, Turkey continued its military strikes, targeting the YPG in Syria and the PKK in northern Iraq in April 2017.78 The strikes triggered cross-border clashes, and the YPG retaliated by firing rockets at a Turkish army command post in the southeastern province (no casualties were reported). The army struck back, killing 11 YPG fighters in April 2017.79 In order to prevent further attacks by the YPG, preparations began for the stationing of armored vehicles along the border.80
In October 2017, a Turkish military delegation entered Idlib to enforce the de-escalation zones agreed by Turkey, Russia and Iran in Astana, Kazakhstan, in September 2017. Turkey's operation in Idlib aimed at providing safety for civilians against attacks by the Hayet Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the militants of al-Nusra Front, and preventing a potential refugee influx and the spillover of the conflict into Turkey.81 During this period, Turkey also indicated concern about the growing presence of the YPG in Afrin.82
In January 2018, the United States announced plans to establish a new border force of 30,000, with the participation of YPG militants, to operate along the Turkish-Syrian frontier. Reacting fiercely, President Erdogan stated, "A country we call an ally is insisting on forming a terror army on our border….What can that terror army target but Turkey? Our mission is to strangle it before it's even born."83 On January 20, 2008, Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch to clear Afrin of YPG forces, and, on March 18, the Turkish military took the city center.84
CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to shed light on the implications of Turkish-Syrian relations and the Syrian conflict for Turkey's border security. In the 1950s and 1960s, Turkey perceived smuggling from Syria as a threat and consequently mined the border. Furthermore, Turkey and Syria were locked into a water-sharing dispute over cross-border river flows and a territorial dispute over Hatay. In the 1980s, Turkey's bloody conflict with the PKK claimed the lives of thousands of civilians. Syria's blatant support for the PKK deepened the distrust between the two states. In order to thwart the flow of PKK militants across the border, Turkey planted more landmines along the border in the 1990s. The ousting of Abdullah Öcalan by Syrian authorities following Turkey's military pressure on Syria ushered in a new era in bilateral relations from 1998 to 2011. This was reflected at the border through the agreements over joint management of water resources and de-mining efforts.
Nevertheless, after Syria resisted Turkey's calls to stop human-rights violations and stepped up its oppression of civilians in 2011, Turkish-Syrian relations lumbered from crisis to crisis. Following the "jet" and "Akcakale" incidents, the two states came to the brink of war. The Syrian conflict has not only devastated Turkish-Syrian relations, but multiplied Turkey's border-security problems. The withdrawal of Syrian forces loyal to Assad in northern Syria allowed ISIS and the PYD to take root in the region. In addition to the spillover effects of the advance of ISIS and the PYD in northern Syria, Turkish authorities have also been worried about the PKK/YPG links as Turkey's fight with the PKK intensified, especially after 2015.
In sum, the success of the YPG in northern Syria has given a boost to Kurdish nationalism in Turkey and encouraged the PKK to increase its attacks.85 Currently, preventing cross-border violence and eliminating the territorial presence of ISIS and the YPG have become Turkey's major priorities with Syria. In order to prevent the attacks by ISIS and the YPG against its territory, Turkey took a number of actions along the border — closing it; increasing the number of security forces; deploying NATO missile batteries, air weapons and military equipment; and building a wall. Despite these measures, ISIS and the YPG have continued to pose a national-security threat. Consequently, in addition to defending the border, Turkey organized border-securing operations (Euphrates Shield, Idlib and Olive Branch) to prevent spillover from the Syrian conflict. All in all, as Syria has become more fragmented, Turkey has had to take measures beyond its border to provide for its own security. 86
1 France annexed Alexandretta, an Ottoman territory, at the end of the World War I.
2 The signatories agreed that the treaty would come into force in 1939, but due to the start of World War II in that year, Syria gained its independence in 1946. Melek Firat and Omer Kurkcuoglu, Sancak (Hatay Sorunu) Baskin Oran (ed.), Turk Dis Politikasi: Kurtulus Savasindan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar I: 1919-1980, Iletisim (Istanbul, 2011), 283.
3 Gideon Biger, "Turkey-Syria," in Border Disputes: A Global Encyclopedia, Volume I (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2015), 439; Mustafa Kibaroglu and Aysegul Kibaroglu, Global Security Watch: Turkey: A Reference Handbook (London: Praeger Security International, 2009), 30.
4 Biger, "Turkey-Syria," 439.
5 Avedis K. Sanjian, "The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay): Its Impact on Turkish-Syrian Relations (1939-1956)," Middle East Journal 10, no. 4 (1956): 379-394.
6 Ali M. Koknar, "Turkey Moves Forward to Demine Upper Mesopotamia," Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 8, no. 2 (2004), https://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/8.2/notes/koknar.htm.
7 Ibid.
8 Michael B. Bishku, "Turkish-Syrian Relations: A Checkered History," Middle East Policy 19, no. 3 (2012): 42.
9 Ibid., 43.
10 Robert Olson, "Turkey-Syria Relations since the Gulf War: Kurds and Water," Middle East Policy 5, no. 2 (1997): 169.
11 Ibid., 170.
12 Ali Carkoglu and Mine Eder, "Domestic Concerns and the Water Conflict over the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin," Middle Eastern Studies 37, no. 1 (2001): 60.
13 Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, "From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations," Security Dialogue 37, no. 2 (2006): 232.
14 Ibid., 232-33.
15 Soner Cagaptay, "Syria and Turkey: The PKK Dimension," Washington Institute of Near East Policy, April 5, 2012, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syria-and-turke….
16 Olson, "Turkey-Syria Relations since the Gulf War: Kurds and Water," 171.
17 Malik Mufti, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy," Middle East Journal 52, no. 1 (1998): 34-35.
18 Kilic Bugra Kanat, "Continuity of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy under the JDP Government: The Cases of Bilateral Relations with Israel and Syria," Arab Studies Quarterly 34, no. 4 (2012): 237.
19 Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat, "From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey's Relations with Syria and Iran," Security Dialogue 39, no. 5 (2008): 511.
20 Mahmut Ali Aykan, "The Turkish-Syrian Crisis of October 1998: A Turkish View," Middle East Policy 6, no. 4 (1999): 176.
21 Ibid., 179.
22 Yuksel Sezgin, "The October 1998 Crisis in Turkish–Syrian Relations: A Prospect Theory Approach," Turkish Studies 3, no. 2 (2002): 44–68; Aykan, "The Turkish-Syrian crisis of October 1998," 179.
23 Altunışık and Tür, "From Distant Neighbors to Partners?," 238.
24 Aykan, "The Turkish-Syrian crisis of October 1998," 177.
25 Aras and Polat, "From Conflict to Cooperation," 509.
26 Cağaptay, "Syria and Turkey."
27 Bishku, "Turkish-Syrian Relations," 46.
28 "Suriye'nin merhum Cumhurbaşkanı Hafız Esad," in Cenaze Töreninden Dönüşlerinde Yaptıkları Açıklama hk., TCBB, June 13, 2000, http://www.tccb.gov.tr/basin-aciklamalari-ahmet-necdet-sezer/1720/4202/….
29 MFA, "Relations between Turkey–Syria," http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey–syria.en.mfa.
30 Nuri Yesilyurt, "Ortadogu'yla Iliskiler," in Turk Dis Politikasi, ed. Baskin Oran, 402.
31 Kanat, "Continuity of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy under the JDP Government," 242-243.
32 Koknar, "Turkey Moves Forward to Demine Upper Mesopotamia."
33 Human Rights Watch, Land Monitor Report 2002: Toward a Mine-Free World (2002), 759.
34 Yesilyurt, "Ortadoğu'yla Iliskiler," 414.
35 Bülent Aras, "After the Threats, Syria and Turkey Are Fast Friends," Daily Star, January 4, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb//Opinion/Commentary/2005/Jan-04/96794-after….
36 Yesilyurt, "Ortadogu'yla Iliskiler," 414.
37 Syria implemented visa restrictions towards Turkish citizens in 2015. Turkey implemented visa restrictions towards Syrian citizens (except asylum seekers) in 2016. "Syria Terminates Agreement on Visa-free Regime with Turkey — Foreign Ministry," December 17, 2015, Tass, http://tass.com/world/845091; "Turkey"s New Visa Law for Syrians Enters into Force," Hurriyet Daily News, April 7, 2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-new-visa-law-for-syrians-enter….
38 Bishku, "Turkish-Syrian Relations," 47-48.
39 "Turkey, Syria to Build a Friendship Dam," Hürriyet Daily News, February 14, 2010, www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-syria-to-build-a-friendship-da….
40 MFA, "Relations between Turkey–Syria," http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey–syria.en.mfa; Unal Unsal, "Suriye Politikasi," in Turk Dis Politikası, ed. Baskin Oran, 157.
41 Ibid., 159.
42 "Angajman kuralları değişti askeri hareketlilik arttı," Haberturk, June 28, 2012, http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/754647-angajman-kurallari-degisti….
43 "Türkiye'den Suriye'ye misilleme," Al Jazeera, October 4, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/turkiyeden-suriyeye-misilleme.
44 Directorate General of Press and Information (BYEGM), Monthly Bulletin, April 30, 2011.
45 "Syrian Security Forces Adopt Shoot-on-Sight Policy," Telegraph, August 17, 2011 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8707101/Syri….
46 Turan Keskin, "The Impact of the Arab Uprisings on the Kurds," in Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Before and After the Arab Uprisings, ed. Julide Karakoc (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015): 141.
47 Murat Yesiltas, "Neighboring Civil War: Turkey's Border Security with Syria," SETA, no. 17 (2015): 7.
48 Denver Nicks, "U.S. Forms Anti-ISIS Coalition at NATO Summit," TIME, September 5, 2014, http://time.com/3273185/isis-us-nato/.
49 Karakoc, "Introduction," 3.
50 Michael Pizzi, "U.S. abandons failed $500M program to train and equip Syrian rebels," Al Jazeera, October 9, 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/10/9/us-to-abandon-failed-sy….
51 International Crisis Group, "Syria's Kurds: A Struggle within a Struggle," Middle East Report, no.136 (January 22, 2013): 6, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterran….
52 Karakoc, "Introduction," 3.
53 International Crisis Group, "Syria's Kurds," 6.
54 Human Rights Watch, "Group Denial, Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights in Syria," November 26, 2009, https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/11/26/group-denial/repression-kurdish-p….
55 International Crisis Group, "Syria's Kurds," 7.
56 Ibid., 8.
57 Keskin, The Impact of the Arab Uprisings on the Kurds, 142.
58 International Crisis Group, "Syria's Kurds," 2; and Keskin, The Impact of the Arab Uprisings on the Kurds, 141.
59 International Crisis Group, "Syria's Kurds," 3.
60 Ibid.
61 Aaron Stein, "The Origins of Turkey's Buffer Zone in Syria," War on the Rocks (December 11, 2014), https://warontherocks.com/2014/12/the-origins-of-turkeys-buffer-zone-in….
62 "Turkey Blames Syria for Border Gate Attack," Hurriyet Daily News, March 11, 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-blames-syria-for-border-gate-at….
63 "Turkey Closes Syria Border Gate after Reyhanlı Bombings," Hürriyet Daily News, May 21, 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-closes-syria-border-gate-after-….
64 "Turkey Sends Military Reinforcements to Syrian Border after Blast," Cihan, May 11, 2013, https://www.cihan.com.tr/tr/turkey-sends-military-reinforcements-to-syr….
65 "Turkey Closes Two Border Crossings with Syria amid Fears of Terrorist Attack," Telegraph, March 30, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/11503524/Turkey….
66 The activists were preparing to go to Kobane to help reconstruct the town. "Suruc Massacre: At Least 30 killed in Turkey Border Blast," BBC News, July 20, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33593615.
67 Ceylan Yeginsu, "Turkey Strengthens Rights of Syrian Refugees," New York Times, December 29, 2014 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/30/world/europe/turkey-strengthens-right… .
68 Yesiltas, "Neighboring Civil War," 16.
69 Ibid., 27.
70 "Turkey Builds Wall in Token Effort to Secure Border with Syria," Huffington Post, August 14, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/turkey-wall-syria-border_us_55ce0de….
71 "Turkey Reinforces Border with Syria in Wake of Suspected Suicide Attack," The Guardian, July 23, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/23/turkey-syria-border-reinf….
72 "Half of Turkey-Syria Border Wall Completed," Middle East Monitor, February 26, 2017, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170226-half-of-turkey-syria-border-…; and Fariba Nawa, "Border Wall Helps Secure Turkish City Protecting Syrian Refugees," Washington Times, March 9, 2017, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/9/turkey-border-wall-helps….
73 Can Kasapoğlu, "Operation Euphrates Shield: Progress and Scope," Al Jazeera, February 3, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/02/operation-euphrates-sh…-.
74 Ibid.
75 "Turkish Military Strikes ISIL in Northern Syria," Al Jazeera, August 23, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/turkish-military-strikes-ypg-isil….
76 "Turkey Clearing ISIS Mines along Syria Border," Now, January 19, 2016, https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/566505-turkey-clearing-isis-min….
77 "Turkish Military Strikes ISIL in Northern Syria", Al Jazeera, August 23, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/turkish-military-strikes-ypg-isil….
78 "Turkey Targets Kurdish Fighters in Iraq and Syria," Al Jazeera, April 28, 2017 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/turkey-targets-kurdish-fighters-i….
79 "Turkey Says 11 Syrian Kurds Killed in Border Clash," Al Jazeera, April 28, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/turkey-11-syrian-kurds-killed-bor….
80 "Suriye sınırında askeri hareketlilik! Zırhlı araçlar için mevziler kazıldı," Milliyet, May 1, 2017, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/son-dakika-suriye-sinirinda-gundem-2442462/.
81 Zena Tehhan, "Rebels: Turkey Operation in Idlib Likely to Go Smoothly," Al Jazeera, October 9, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/rebels-turkey-operation-idlib-smo…; and Fehim Taştekin, "7 soruda İdlib: Türkiye ne yapıyor, neyi amaçlıyor?," BBC Turkce, October 8, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-41542725.
82 "Operation in Idlib, "Syria Largely Completed: Turkey," AA, October 24, 2017, https://aa.com.tr/en/politics/operation-in-idlib-syria-largely-complete….
83 Patrick Wintour, "Erdoğan Accuses U.S. of Planning to Form ‘Terror Army' in Syria," The Guardian, January 15, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/15/turkey-condemns-us-plan-f….
84 "Turkey Claims Afrin City Centre Is under ‘Total' Control," The Guardian, March 18, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/18/turkey-claims-afrin-city-….
85 Aaron Stein and Michelle Foley, "The YPG-PKK Connection," Atlantic Council, January 26, 2016, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-ypg-pkk-connection.
86 Except the period between 1998 and 2011, the Turkish-Syrian border constitutes a typical example of a passive border with its restrictiveness, the absence of cross-border communication, and solidarity. For a detailed discussion on active and passive borders, see Karel B. Müller " Active Borders and Transnationalization of the Public Sphere in Europe: Examining Territorial and Symbolic Borders as a Source of Democratic Integration, Positive Identity, and Civic Learning," Alternatives: Global, Local, Political (2019): 12, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0304375418822894.
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