During the past three decades, the Middle East has witnessed a remarkable resurgence of Islamic identity. From Algeria to Yemen, traditional institutions, long supplanted by ideological imports from the West, have risen to reclaim the society from failed secular leaders. Increasingly, the disillusioned public is resting its faith on the most encompassing of all universal religions. Islam, with its holistic ideals, offers the politically disaffected masses a revolutionary vision and a vocabulary of dissent.
Although long viewed as the least susceptible of all North African rulers to an Islamist challenge, Muamar Qadhafi's revolution appears to be rapidly disintegrating. Libya's economic ossification has led to the rise of an Islamic opposition movement claiming that only a return to religious values can fulfill the masses' demands for economic and political regeneration. As everything around them is collapsing, Libyans are turning to a belief system that promises solace, but, more important, offers a path to defiance. Increasingly, the Islamists are forging a pragmatic alliance with the one institution that still holds the key to Libya's evolving future: the armed forces. An alliance between the Islamists and the military will spell the end of Qadhafi's 30-year reign.
ISLAM AND LIBYA'S POLITICAL EVOLUTION
In 1969, Qadhafi overthrew the government of King Idris, whose power derived from the religious legitimacy of the Sanusi order. The Algerian activist Sayyid Muhammad bin Ali al-Sanusi founded the order in the nineteenth century with the aim of purifying and reinvigorating Islam in the face of European penetration of the Arab realm. Evicted from Egypt and unable to return to Algeria during the French occupation, Sanusi settled in Libya.1
Libya proved to be an ideal location for Sanusi Islam, as its relative isolation from imperial machinations and lack of Ottoman scrutiny allowed the order to flourish. By the late nineteenth century, the Sanusi order acquired paramount political influence as it provided cohesion to the once amorphous tribal structure in Libya. Islam, filtered through. Sanusi holy men, mediated intertribal disputes and fostered a degree of political integration among disparate provinces. Once the Italian colonizers arrived in 1911, it was inevitable that Libya's resistance would be spearheaded by the Sanusi national network, further enhancing the role of Islam as the prevailing political ideology. 2
The prolonged European occupation served to buttress the traditional sectors, as the Italians hoping to resettle Libya did not develop a local elite. Consequently, the judicial and educational spheres remained the domain of religious leaders. By the end of World War II, Libya's college-educated population was estimated to be less than ten people. Thus, the evolving concept of secular Arab nationalism based on European models of integration, which was being debated in the Arab east, had a more limited impact on Libya. Religion continued to define Libya's political culture.3
Given its legitimization through Islam, its pre-colonial political influence and its critical role in resisting colonialism, the Sanusi order had a strong claim to the leadership of independent Libya. The new monarchy of King Idris relied on religious symbols for its legitimacy and a loose federal structure for the administration of the state. Ironically, the discovery of oil created tensions and aspirations that could not be contained in the Sanusi framework. The emerging urban middle class was simply not integrated into the political process, as Libya did not develop democratic institutions. Moreover, the absence of a coherent development program, tolerance of official corruption, and failure to equitably distribute the oil wealth compounded the monarchy's difficulties. Although its legitimacy was based on Islam, the monarchy's mismanagement of resources undermined its authority. By 1969, the Idris monarchy collapsed under the weight of its own stagnation.4
This brief historical sketch reveals some of Libya's unique characteristics. First, the relationship between religion and politics is extremely intimate, as most forms of political activity have been authenticated through an Islamic appeal. Second, the long colonial struggle affected Libya differently than Algeria since a strong nationalist movement similar to the National Liberation Front (FLN) did not develop. Libya's traditional sectors spearheaded the anticolonial struggle and survived the Italian challenge. Finally, despite the postwar development of a parliament and constitution, Libya did not foster strong political parties or national institutions. Islam kept the otherwise fragmented tribal society intact. The state that Colonel Qadhafi inherited was predicated on a religious foundation and featured Islam as its central political ideology.
THE QURAN AND THE GREEN BOOK
The new regime confronted a precarious situation, as it had overthrown a monarchy that had a legitimate claim on Islam. Qadhafi appreciated that if the revolution was going to survive, much less flourish, he required a conservative base. In forging an alliance with the ulama (Islamic clergy), Qadhafi was drawing on Libya's tradition. Above all, Islam offered the colonel, who did not have the social prestige of the previous elite, a vocabulary for connecting with his new, skeptical constituency.
During the first few years of the revolution, the regime went beyond rhetorical gestures and initiated substantive Islamic reforms. Qadhafi often spoke in mosques and consulted the clerics regarding public-policy initiatives. The ulama were given prominent positions in the legal and educational spheres and oversaw the National Guidance Council, designed to reform Libya's legal system along Islamic lines. It appeared that in Libya, Qadhafi was seeking to construct a socioeconomic and political system rooted firmly in Sharia (Islamic law). Far from propagating a new vision of Islam, Qadhafi conformed to that defined by the orthodox Muslim establishment, and sought to legitimize the revolution by associating it with traditional Libyan values. All this began to change once Qadhafi sensed the need to reconfigure Libyan society along new ideological lines.5
By 1973, the regime had consolidated its power and was ready to embark on the reconstruction of the society. Qadhafi's Third Universal Theory, elaborated in the three volumes of his Green Book, proclaimed egalitarianism, socialism, Arabism and anti-imperialism as the pillars of the new Libyan state.6 The colonel sought to eradicate the influence of the traditional institutions that could prevent the imposition of the new revolutionary creed. Ominously, during this period Qadhafi embraced the Chinese Cultural Revolution as a model and the Maoist view that legal safeguards and civil liberties could only obstruct revolutionary progress.
The Third Universal Theory came under sustained criticism from the clerical establishment. Given Libya's conservative cultural milieu, Qadhafi stressed that his ideas were inspired by Islam and continued to seek Islamic approbation for his evolving ideological posture.7 The ulama refuted this claim, critically evaluating the content of the Green Book and declaring it to be incompatible with Islamic law. The Green Book's socialist prescriptions conflicted particularly with Islamic legal principles dealing with commerce and property rights. Qadhafi's vision simply defied the limits and restraints of traditional Islam.8
Having been rebuffed by the clerics, Qadhafi undertook a precarious assault on the religious establishment. The colonel declared that the "Green Book is the gospel. The new gospel. The gospel of the new era, the era of the masses."9 Qadhafi went beyond exploiting religious symbols and sought to reformulate Islamic tenets as a component of his new radical ideology. Populism, Arab nationalism and socialism were all presented as deriving from a progressive reinterpretation of Islam.10 The dichotomy between state and religion would end as the state sought to expropriate the religious sphere. Under the banner of a cultural revolution, popular committees were ordered to assault the mosques and "purify" them of the influence of retrogressive clerics while the state expropriated the religious endowments (awajq).11 To further erode the influence of the clerical estate, Qadhafi declared that Islam did not recognize a priestly class and that the relationship between God and man required no intermediaries.12 The colonel even challenged the foundation of Islam as he dismissed the hadiths (pronouncements attributed to Prophet Muhammad) as clerical innovations designed to sustain their social influence.13 This was a concerted attempt to undermined the authority of the ulama as a corporate body by negating the sources they needed for perpetuating their influence. In Qahdafi's Libya, the state denied the ulama a political role and sought to usurp their religious monopoly.
The launching of the cultural revolution and the publication of the Green Book reflected Qadhafi' s risky strategy of liberating his vision from the restrictions of the religious establishment. The problem for the colonel was that traditional Islam had a more durable foundation than the eccentric Green Book and its manipulation of Islamic principles. The Libyan populace found Qadhafi' s mistreatment of the respected clerical class and the idiosyncratic reevaluation of Islam disturbing. Thus, in essence, Qadhafi forfeited the legitimacy of Islam, ensuring that religion would be the ideology of the opposition.
At the core, for Qadhafi' s political experiment to succeed, the Libyans had to discard their existing norms and mores and embrace the new revolutionary identity. However, the obdurate traditionalism spearheaded by Islam survived, and the best that the colonel could obtain from the population was an economically purchased passivity. Qadhafi simply failed to institutionalize his revolution or create a social base that could perpetuate his vision. Increasingly, the only justification that the colonel could provide for his absolute control of power was the economic balance sheet of the revolution.
THE FAILURE OF QADHAFl'S ECONOMICS
The economic policies are even more disappointing than the political experiment of Qadhafi's revolution. The colonel's monopoly of oil revenues implies that the operation of the state does not rely on domestic production and taxation.14 The political ramifications of this economy are profound: the regime could develop its economic policies without obtaining popular endorsement. In the absence of political restrictions, Qadhafi embarked on a quixotic crusade of proscribing "exploitation" and ensuring financial equity for all citizens. This led to the elimination of retail trade, wages and rents, the seizure of bank accounts and the destruction of the commercial bourgeoisie. The private sector was effectively nationalized, with worker self-management committees overseeing the operation of the economy. The effects of these initiatives have been predictably disastrous, as inefficiency and mismanagement have led to a massive waste of precious resources. A close examination of the agricultural and industrial sectors will illuminate the structural deficiencies of Qadhafi's economic approach.
The agricultural sector has absorbed approximately $35 billion in government expenditures since 1970. One of the first problems that all Libyan rulers encounter is natural limits: rainfall in 90 percent of the country is not sufficient to sustain agriculture. Qadhafi’s regime compounded this problem by concentrating on ostentatious projects in resource-poor provinces to demonstrate the ability of the revolutionary elite to transcend the elements. The regime's most ambitious effort has been the ongoing $27-billion Man-Made River, designed to use a network of underground pumps to transport water for 4,000 miles. The project's cost outweighs any potential benefit it could yield. Most Libyan cities now lack water; rations have been imposed even in the hot summer months. The quest to make the desert bloom through costly irrigation projects and subsidization of unprofitable state farms has raised prices of basic foodstuffs dramatically. A better course would have been to concentrate agricultural investment on eastern Libya, which enjoys relatively sufficient precipitation. After more than a quarter of a century of planning and investment, Libya today is capable of meeting less than half its food requirements.15
A similar misplacement of priorities and expenditures is evident in the industrial sector. The revolutionary regime was determined to develop an industrial infrastructure with particular emphasis on capital-intensive heavy industry. With ample wealth at his disposal, Qadhafi purchased every type of factory, along with international experts. Libya has lacked the technologically-trained indigenous work force that is the basis of any successful import-substitution program. The regime's suppression of the industrial elite and its purging of the small technocratic class for political unreliability eroded the long-term prospects of the industrial sector. Accordingly, a lack of maintenance, a paucity of spare parts and a high degree of revolutionary chaos have left the many petrochemical and steel factories underutilized. Libya has many industrial plants, yet every commodity is in short supply.16
For a long time, Qadhafi deflected criticism of his economic mismanagement by distributing petrodollars and crafting a generous welfare state. The policy of purchasing the population's acquiescence has reached its limit, given the virtual collapse of the petroleum market since the late 1980s. The changes in world consumption patterns and the lack of solidarity among petroleum-producing countries suggest that oil prices are unlikely to rise significantly over the long term. This is a particularly ominous development for a regime that lacks ideological legitimacy and maintains its survival by buying popular consent.
Recognizing the political problems that can accompany a crumbling economy, Qadhafi has been trying since the early 1990s to Iiberalize.17 As part of the new program there have been drastic reductions in the size and expenditures of the state. The regime's 1999 austerity budget reduced spending on investment projects by 80 percent, even instituting drastic cuts in the health and education sectors.18 Agricultural policy has undergone revision, with some land-redistribution schemes being reversed. The industrial sphere has also been affected, as the policy of vesting managerial decisions in workers committees has been selectively rescinded. The state has also accepted the partial reemergence of retail trade and private banks and has attempted to lure foreign investment, particularly in those areas requiring advanced technology.
Both institutional and political factors have obstructed the attempt to liberalize the economy. In any liberalization drive there is an effort to move from a state dominated to a market economy. However, since 1969 Libya's internal markets have been proscribed; the state absorbed all economic functions and dismantled the institutions needed for the successful resurrection of a private economy. A market-oriented economy can only operate if the state provides consistent regulation and reliable data, while enforcing clearly defined legal procedures and contract rights. The Green Book's eradication of civil society, the constantly changing legal system, and the chaos induced by the popular committees have deprived Libya of the administrative structure and institutional framework necessary for the implementation of reforms.
There are also several political factors that hamper viable liberalization measures. The creation of large public enterprises directed by regime loyalists has led to the growing importance of a narrow circle of elites. A determined liberalization plan would disrupt the complacent and stagnant public sector, causing the demise of the regime's clients, who are accustomed to risk-free, lucrative lives. A program that would alienate Qadhafi’s remaining supporters is increasingly unacceptable to the politically beleaguered regime.
Finally, the broader problem with liberalization and the dislocations that it would cause is the reaction of the populace. In a distributive economy, the primary source of the state's legitimacy is its commitment to the allocation of wealth and its ability to carry it out. Social-welfare provisions are the basis of Qadhafi’s connection with the populace, a connection unmediated by political parties. Accordingly, wages and prices have been subsidized heavily to ensure an artificially high standard of living. A dependency syndrome has evolved, with every citizen expecting the state to provide for his needs. As the size and resources of the state shrink, its legitimacy will diminish proportionally. Paradoxically, widespread reforms are critical to the survival of the regime but remain on hold, for both political and institutional reasons. The state continues to establish agricultural production quotas. Industrial reforms have concentrated on light manufacturing, with the more significant heavy industry remaining under central control. The liberalization of trade has been similarly qualified, as the crucial foreign-trade sector is still the domain of the state. Move over, the stable banking and credit system necessary for sustained growth is missing.
Qadhafi's limited liberalization drive did not lead to the anticipated economic revival. The reduction of state subsidies and a weakened currency have produced an estimated 30-percent unemployment rate and a SO-percent inflation rate, further eviscerating the average Libyan's already meager purchasing power.19 The relaxation of state controls has led to the emergence of a significant black market often guided by corrupt high-ranking officials. In the meantime, the regime's austerity program has resulted in reductions and delay of salaries, forcing many to take second jobs to maintain basic subsistence.20 The long-term prospects for reviving the economy seem quite slim, as the population explosion continues to outpace state resources (70 percent of Libyans are under the age of 20).21 The inability of the regime to accommodate the aspirations of its youth and integrate them into a growing economy presents an explosive political problem.
Libya's economic disarray finally propelled Qadhafi to seek a resolution to the Lockerbie impasse. The colonel and his senior advisers seem to perceive that the removal of international sanctions may rekindle investors' confidence in Libya and rejuvenate the economy. It is important to note that Libya's economic decline predated the imposition of the Lockerbie sanctions. Although the suspension of the sanctions could lead to further development of the oil and gas industry, it is unlikely to ameliorate Libya's structural economic problems.
Twenty-nine years after coming to power pledging a new dawn in Libya's history, Qadhafi's political and economic experiments have been less than a stellar success. The colonel's failure to institutionalize his ideology and seeming inability to end the prolonged recession plaguing Libya have eroded his legitimacy. In the absence of viable alternatives, Qadhafi has come to rely on coercion to perpetuate his rule. Although violence has always been part of Qadhafi's arsenal, it is now his sole instrument of self-preservation. A political leader cannot survive long without a broad-based constituency, a convincing ideology and economic prosperity.
OPPOSITION AND THE NATURE OF THE POST-QADHAFI STATE
In the 1990s, there has been an upsurge of opposition to Qadhafi. The disenfranchised members of the middle class, disaffected revolutionaries and, most significantly, a new generation of Libyans born since the revolution have joined the ranks of those who question the efficacy of Qadhafi's policies. Despite the wide range of opposition, the post-Qadhafi period is likely to be defined by an alliance between the Islamists and the military. The noted historian Carl Brown once stated that "as a symbol of unity and identity, Islam is to North Africa what Arab nationalism is to the Arab East."22 While most Middle Eastern rulers have professed various types of secular nationalism, Libyan leaders have largely relied on Islam. Libya's resistance to colonialism, the Idris monarchy and even the initial stages of Qadhafi's revolution have all relied on traditional Islam. Religion has defined Libya's political culture, inspiring collective action and legitimating governmental authority. The power of Islam as a source of temporal activism reflects the historical development of a nation that has thwarted the development of alternative secular philosophies.
To be sure, the Islamic opposition is fragmented and has suffered at the hands of the regime's security organs. Nevertheless, certain Islamic entities are appealing to an ever-expanding audience. The ulama have always been disturbed by Qadhafi's quest to revise Islamic principles along radical lines and have been among the most vociferous critics of the Green Book. Steeped in the Islamic revivalist tradition of North Africa, the clerics are hardly the fossilized creatures that Qadhafi contends, as they are actively seeking Islamic solutions to the problems of a modern state. Despite the regime's sanctions, the mosque remains what it has been throughout history- a venue for social and political commentary. The power of the clerical establishment largely derives from the attraction it holds for the young, who increasingly reject Qadhafi's revolution and its diminishing economic foundation.
The Islamic Liberation party and the Muslim Brotherhood are among the other important organizations causing anxiety for the regime. The Islamic Liberation party's platform criticizes the paralysis and corruption of the state and advocates a progressive agenda of equitable redistribution of wealth. The party's endorsement of armed resistance and its successful recruitment of students from the universities and military academies makes it an important source of opposition. Although long prosecuted by the regime, the Muslim Brotherhood has been experiencing a revival. Through the establishment of extensive social-welfare projects, the Brotherhood is creating social cohesion in urban centers fragmented by economic distress and demographic pressure.
The Islamic Martyrs' Movement and the Libyan Islamic Group are two recent arrivals on the political scene. Although both organizations are shrouded in mystery, it appears that their memberships largely consist of Libyan veterans of the Afghan war who are disenchanted with their limited economic prospects. Both organizations are committed and proficient practitioners of violence.
The level of Islamist violence has reached a new degree of ferocity in the last few years, particularly in central and eastern Libya where there are reports of daily clashes between the regime's security forces and the Islamists. The Islamists' activities are not limited to the countryside; urban centers, particularly Benghazi, have witnessed intense confrontations between the fundamentalists and the police. Given Qadhafi' s centrality to the survival of the regime, he is the obvious target of assassination. In June 1996, an attempt was made on the colonel's life resulting in the killing one of his bodyguards. An even more spectacular attempt is reported to have taken place during June1998, when the members of the Islamic Martyrs' Movement assaulted Qadhafi' s convoy near Benghazi. The colonel himself was reported to have been injured, forcing him to cancel a rally and a planned visit to Egypt. Given the crumbling nature of Libya's economy and mass disillusionment with an oppressive, inefficient state, the level of violence is likely to grow.23
Despite the emergence of significant Islamist organizations, the military remains the one institution that can determine the future of Qadhafi's revolution. This is hardly reassuring for the colonel, since the disloyalty of the armed forces has been manifested through numerous coup attempts.24 Qadhafi's foreign adventurism has always exposed the military to risks that are difficult to bear in an era of budget reductions and salary delays. The officer corps has long blamed the progenitor of the Green Book for the disastrous and humiliating defeat in Chad. Qadhafi's attempt to end the military's monopoly on coercive power by building up alternative popular militias and staffing key security posts with expatriate East Germans and Cubans has further estranged the armed forces. Moreover, most enlisted men and young officers are recent rural migrants to the many impoverished and peripheral urban neighborhoods that have proven fertile ground for the Islamists' message. The efficiency of the regime's security forces has not prevented attempted coups, the most recent of which took place in September and November 1996.25
Although the military has the power to end Qadhafi's reign, it lacks an ideology that would legitimize its rule. By contrast, the Islamists lack sufficient strength to ensure the colonel's demise but do possess an ideology and the promise of cultural authenticity. An alliance between these two groups implies an association between power and a viable ideological vision confronting a state that seemingly lacks both. Any military planner seeking to oust the colonel will require the legitimacy that only Islam can ordain.
Recent events in Libya testify to the evolution of such an alliance. The purges that followed the 1993 rebellion of military units in Misrate indicate that the armed forces are heavily infiltrated by the Islamists. Both the September and November 1996, military coups similarly suggest much contact between the Islamists and the disaffected members of the military, particularly the ground forces. The most recent assassination attempt against Qadhafi could not have taken place in the absence of complicity by influential military personnel. The attackers' knowledge of the route of the colonel's convoy and the car he would be in reflects the Islamists penetration of the core of the regime. As Libya's economic recession continues unabated, there are likely to be further attempts to end Qadhafi's life and his political experiment.26
Colonel Qadhafi has remained in power by dispensing petrodollars and destabilizing the society to prevent the emergence of independent centers of power. After three decades of mismanagement and declining oil revenues, the efficacy of this strategy is at a low ebb. The regime can neither satisfy the demands of the society nor provide a cohesive blueprint for the uncertain future. There is a discernable shift in the mood of the population from reticence to opposition, from passivity to resistance. If Qadhafi is to be replaced, it will be the armed forces that cause the colonel's eccentric political experiment to disappear. The long-term beneficiaries of Qadhafi's demise will be the Islamists, who are the guardians of a dynamic ideology and have survived the regime's repression. Post-Qadhafi Libya is likely to be a state governed by military officers who retain a close association with the orthodox Islamic establishment.
The demise of Qadhafi's regime is likely to have important ramifications for the international community. The colonel's Islamist successors are likely to be a more formidable influence on the Maghreb's Islamist groups than the idiosyncratic and isolated Qadhafi. However, while Qadhafi' s crusade against "American imperialism" has led him to support anti-Western movements wherever they appeared, his successors will remain focused on internal and regional challenges.
1Nicola Ziadeh, Sanusiyah: A Study of a Revivalist Movement in Islam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1958); B.G. Martin. Muslim Brotherhoods in Nineteenth-Century Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
2 Enzo Santarelli, Giorgio Rochat, Romain Rainero and Luigi Goglia, Omar al-Mukhtar: The Italian Reconquest of Libya Translated by John Gilbert (London: Darf Publishers, 1986); E.E. Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949); Geoff Simons, Libya: The Struggle for Survival (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 110-137; Jonathan Berman, Qadhafi’s Libya (London: Zed Books, 1986), pp. 10-16.
3 Lisa Anderson, "Religion and State in Libya: The Politics of Identity," The Annals of American Academy of Politics and Social Sciences 483 (January 1986), p. 67; The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 179-203.
4 Ruth First, Libya: The Elusive Revolution (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1974), pp. 31-87; John Wright, Libya. A Modern History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 60-132; Omar El Fathaly and Monte Palmer, Political Development and Social Change in Libya (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980), pp. 15-37.
5 Ann Elizabeth Meyer, "Le droit musulman a l'age du livre Vert," Maghreb Machrek, No. 93, (July 1981): p. 197; Borham Attallah, "Le droit penal musulman ressucite," Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord (1975), p. 227; Raymond Habiby, "Qadhafi's Thoughts on True Democracy," Middle East Review(Summer 1978) and "Mu'ammar Qadhafi's New Islamic Scientific Socialist Society," Middle East Review (Summer 1979).
6 Mu'ammar Al-Qaddafi, The Green Book (Tripoli: The Green Book World Center, 1980); The Libyan Arab Republic, Ministry of Information and Culture, The Fundamentals of the Third Universal International Theory, 1973; Sarni Hajjar, "'The Jamahiriya Experiment in Libya: Qadhafi and Rousseau," Journal of Modern African Studies 18 (1980); and "Qadhafi's Social Theory as the Basis of the Third Universal Theory," Journal of Asian and African Studies, 17, 3-4 (1982); John Davis, "Qadhafi’s Theory and Practice of Non-Representative Government," Government and Opposition 17 (1982), pp. 61-66.
7 Francois Burgat, "Qadhafi's Ideological Framework," in Dirk Vandewalle, ed. Qadhafi’s Libya, 1969-1994 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Reports- Middle East and Africa (FBIS-MEA), July 2, 1984; Simons, Libya: The Struggle for Survival, p. 244; Josef Muzikar Praha, "Islam and the Ideology of Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi's Green Book," Part I and II, Archiv Orientalni, 50-5 l (1982).
8 Berman, Qadhafi’s Libya, p. 162.
9 Qriana Fallaci, "An Interview with Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya," New York Times Magazine, (December 16, 1979).
10 Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi, The Green Book Part Ill: The Social Base of the Third Universal Theory (Tripoli: Green Book World Center, 1980): A.A. Mezoughi, Majhum al-Idara ash-sha'biya (Tripoli: Green Book World Center, 1984); FBIS MEA, July 2, 1984, Q1.
11 Mu'ammar al-Qaddhafi, As-Siji/ al-qawmi bayanat wa ahadith al-aqid Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhaji, Vol. VI, 1974-1975 (Tripoli: Green Book World Center, 1975), p. 469; John Davis, Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 56-57; Ronald Bruce St. John, "The Ideology of Mu'ammar Al-Qadhdhafi: Theory and Practice," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 15 (1983), p. 477.
12 Al-Fajr al-Jadid, February 21. 1978, p. 4; Al-Mustaqbil, July 22, 1978, pp. 17-18; Marius Deeb, "Islam and Arab National ism in Al-Qaddhafi’s Ideology," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. II, No. 2 (Winter, 1978), p. 16; Bruce St. John, "The Ideology of Mu'ammar Al-Qadhdafi: Theory and Practice," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, p. 476.
13 Al-Fajar al-Jadid, February 20, 1978, p. 3.
14 Dirk Vandewalle, 'The Libyan Revolution After Twenty Years, Part I: Evaluating the Jamahiriyah," Universities Fi,,/d Staff International, Africa/Middle East no. 2 (1990-199 I) and "The Libyan Jamahiriyya since 1969," in Dirk Vandewalle (ed.) Qadhaji's Libya, 1969-1994 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), pp. 20-41.
15 Al-Zahaf Al-Akhdar 255 (March 9, 1984), pp. 11-12; Dirk Vandewalle, "The Libyan Jamahiriyya since 1969," in Dirk Vandewalle, Qadhafi’s Libya, 1969-1994 (New York: St. Martin, 1995), p. 29.
16 Congressional Research Service Issue Brief Libya, September 10, 1998, p. 13-14; "Gadaffi's Purification Committees' Wreak Havoc," The Middle East (November 1996), p. 11-12; Economist Intelligence Unit, Libya. Quarterly Report (1981-1996).
17 Dirk Vandewalle, "Qadhafi's 'Perestroika:' Economic and Political Liberalization in Libya," Middle East Journal 45 (Spring, 199 I) and "The Libyan Revolution After Twenty Years, Part II: A Libyan 'Perestroika?' Universities Field Staff International Middle East/North Africa no. 8 ( 1990-1991 ); "Qadhafi's Failed Economic Reforms: Markets, Institutions and Development in a Rentier State," in Dirk Vandewalle (ed.) North Africa: Development and Reform in a Changing Global Economy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Meliha Altunisik, "A Rentier State's Response to Oil Crisis: Economic Reform Policies in Libya," Arab Studies Quarterly 18 (Fall 1996);FBIS-NES, March 24, 1993, pp. 11-12; FBIS-NES, February 2, 1994, p. 21.
18 "Libya's Congress Passes 4.9 Billion Dinars Budget," Reuters December 16, 1998.
19 Middle East International, December 6, 1996, p. 14; ''Qadhafi Acknowledges the Deepening Economic Crisis," FBIS-NES, December 12, 1994, p. 25.
20 Francois Burgat, "Qadhafi's Ideological Framework," in Dirk Vandewalle, ed. Qadhafi’s Libya, 1969-1994 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 59. Middle East international, December 6, 1996, p. 14; "Mystery of the Vanishing Oil Money," Economist February 7, 1998, p. 48.
21 Lisa Anderson, "Qadhafi’s Legacy: An Evaluation of a Political Experiment," in Dirk Vandewalle, ed., Qadhafi’s Libya, /969-/994 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 228; Dennis Sammut, "Libya and the Islamic Challenge," World Today 50 (October, 1994), p. 200.
22 L. Carl Brown, "Islam's Role in North Africa," in William Zartman ed., Man, State and Society in Contemporary North Africa (New York: Prager, 1973), p. 32.
23 Middle East International, October 6, 1995, p. 10; Middle East International, July 19, 1996, pp. 12-13; Middle East International, May 16, 1997, p. 21; Middle East International, July 3, 1998, p. 12; "Rumors and Secrecy Cloud Issues: Is Qaddafi O.K.?" New York Times, October 18, 1998; According to State Department sources during June, 1988, there was a second assassination attempt against Qadhafi, Author's conversation with a State Department official.
24 Francois Burgat, "Qadhafi’s Ideological Framework," in Dirk Vandewalle, ed. Qadhafi's Libya, 1969-1994, p. 60.
25 Al-Watan al-Arabi, December 1, 1986, p. 28; Al-Watan al-Arabi, May 30, 1986, p. 40; Al-Zahf al-Akhdar, December 24, 1982, p. 5.
26 Middle East International, May 16, 1997, p. 21; Deborah Pugh, "Qadhafi's Call for Brutal Campaign Against Opposition," Christian Science Monitor, January 6, 1994; "Gaddafy Dismisses Reports of Uprising," The Guardian, October 30, 1993, p. 14.
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