Post-Cold War Realities: Israel’s Strategy in Azerbaijan and Central Asia

The rapidly shifting balances of the 1990s and new developments stemming from the acceleration of economic globalization have forced Israel to reevaluate and reshape its foreign-policy strategy. The tactical phases of Israel's new strategy are as follows: 1) to solve its border conflicts and to form a security belt within the peace process; 2) to conclude the process of integration and recognition as a legitimate and equal state in its region in this security belt; 3) to gain diplomatic flexibility in manipulating the interstate conflicts of the Middle Eastern countries; 4) to exploit the resources of the region and introduce multi-country projects with the support of international Jewish communities; 5) after gaining legitimacy in the region, to open up Asia and then to develop its diplomatic and economic relations with the more southern countries; 6) to use the opportunities created by the complex web of relations mentioned above to reach an influential position in the formation of global strategies and to escape from the confines of the Middle East to establish a greater global presence.1

 

This is not Israel's first attempt to create a sphere of influence in the Greater Middle East region. In the 1950s, Israeli leader David Ben-Gurion sought to generate a non-Arab Middle Eastern alliance which would have consisted of Turkey, Ethiopia, Iran and Israel. This attempt, called a "periphery strategy," ultimately failed because of the fall of the Iranian shah in the late 1970s.2 Since then, however, Israel has sought to develop ties to any "moderate" Muslim country willing to assist in the effort to undercut its anti­-Muslim image, or the perception that all Muslim countries are allied against it. After the lessons learned from earlier attempts, Israel has introduced a more comprehensive vision as part of its new strategy to gain greater influence in the region, with special emphasis on the new republics of Central Asia.

 

 

 

THE SOURCE OF MUTUAL INTERESTS

 

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, several new republics became a part of the Middle East due to their status as Muslim countries. These Central Asian states appeared on the agenda of the Israeli administration even before they had won their independence from Moscow. Israel's surprisingly early contacts and developing relations with these republics are evidence of the importance attached to this region.

 

One goal of these early attempts has been to set a barrier against the expansion of Arab and Iranian influence in the new republics. The main aim has been to preempt the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. Early attempts by some Arab countries to draw Central Asian states into the Arab­ Israeli conflict worried Israel,3 which has tried to counter the inherent advantages of the Arab states and Iran stemming from their cultural and religious closeness to the people of Central Asia. Even if such a scenario were possible, the dominant tendency in Central Asian states has been to avoid involvement in the struggles of the Middle East.4

 

The Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) diplomatic push in the Central Asian republics to mobilize support for the Palestinian cause has exaggerated the situation in the eyes of the Israeli administration. Arafat's visit to Kazakhstan in January 1992 led to its recognition of the Palestinian State. The two sides agreed on the highest level of representation, stimulating Israel to take measures in response. Former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir wrote letters to 23 members of the U.S. Congress urging them to use their influence to convince Kazakhstan to diminish the closeness of its relations with the Palestinians. At the same time, the Israeli government attempted to push then-U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III to warn Kazakhstan to reconsider its relations with the PLO.5 Despite these moves, the PLO maintained its presence in the new Central Asian states. In February 1992, Arafat's visit to Uzbekistan was announced, and in March, Tajikistan extended diplomatic relations to the PLO.6

 

In April 1992, an Uzbek delegate visited Saudi Arabia and participated in a conference which called for the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and a just solution to the Palestinian question. After this event, a conference on the Dagestan-Israel Friendship Society was canceled due to possible Muslim reaction which might have injured relations with some Middle Eastern states.7

 

However, thanks to certain advantages possessed by Israel, these attempts have not prevented its penetration of Central Asia. Israel's powerful image promises much to these countries, which perceive it as a model state: small but politically and economically strong, and both democratic and secular.8 Despite the general rule that the Central Asian republics have strong leaders and weak democracies, they have almost uniformly given special weight to developing relations with democratic countries. Israel follows a pragmatic approach in establishing relationships with Muslim regimes whether democratic or authoritarian. In this respect, the governments of the new Central Asian states all agree that Israel, with its technological skills and democratic example, may ease the integration of these new republics into the modern world system. In addition, Israel is perceived in many countries as a gateway to the Western world in general, and to the United States in particular.9

 

The last advantage of Israel, mostly overlooked in academic circles, carries important implications. The new Central Asian states are so poor economically that they are willing to accept financial assistance from any state which extends it, in the form of investment or direct aid. The Central Asian states have thus welcomed Israeli assistance, and the consequent rapidly developing relations have become clear evidence of Israel's increasingly extensive ties in the enlarged Middle East.10

 

 

 

RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., TURKEY AND RUSSIA

 

Three important political maneuvers were required for Israel's new strategy with respect to the emerging Central Asian republics. First, Israel has been forced to reshape its policy towards the United States. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the strategic environment that led the United States to place a priority on relations with Israel has changed dramatically. The role Israel had assumed in the Middle East vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is no longer valid. Thus Israel has been prompted to attempt to carve out a new security niche; it has focused its sights on the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus.11 The Israeli plan seems to be to take advantage of U.S. support for its steps in the Central Asian republics.

 

In August 1992, the United States and Israel introduced a joint project in these republics, with the United States putting up the required financing and Israel providing technology transfer and expertise in certain other areas. Israel has tried to substitute the threat of Islamic fundamentalism for the previous Red peril.12 In this respect, the trumpeting of an Islamic fundamentalist threat in Central Asia seems targeted at the Western, particularly the U.S., audience. As is well known, Western regimes are heavily partial to secular societies. The power vacuum in Central Asia has encouraged Israel's attempt to promote Western styles of government in this region.13

 

Israel's second political maneuver has been to form an alliance with Turkey. The collapse of the USSR has created as much of a window of opportunity for the Turkish administration as for the Israeli. The emergence of new states in Central Asia has caused a radical shift in the foreign policy of Turkey and has triggered a search for means of tactical political-economic penetration into the new Central Asian republics.14 Turkey's efforts have been motivated by the desire to spread the Turkish model: parliamentary democracy, a relatively free-market economy, and secularism in an Islamic society. The resurgence of the Turkic world has provided Turkey with the opportunity to regain its earlier geostrategic significance.

 

Turkey and Israel are not the only Middle Eastern actors involved in the establishment of spheres of influence in the Central Asian and Caucasus region.15 Iran and Saudi Arabia have also moved to improve their relations with the countries in the area, a development which has paved the way to implicit cooperation between Israel and Turkey as a result of their shared secularist stance. In the words of an Israeli foreign-policy expert,

 

The perception in Washington of an anti-American Islamic threat in the Middle East and Central Asia has produced another marketing formula for Israel. With Turkey, which like Israel appears to have lost its strategic value to the West as a result of the end of the Cold War, trying to sell itself as a new pro-American 'pillar' against Islamic fundamentalism, the idea of an Israeli-Turkish alliance has been integrated into the Israeli post-cold-war strategy vis-a-vis Washington.16

 

Turkey has always been well-aware of Israel's strong support in the United States, and Israel has been sympathetic toward Turkey due to the historically tolerant attitude of the Ottoman Empire towards the Jews. And, of course, they are both non-­Arab states on the periphery of the Arab world.

 

It should be added that the prospect of cooperation between Israel and Turkey with respect to the new republics has been limited to setting up barriers to the spread of fundamentalism, making joint investments in agriculture and related sectors, and mutually contributing to the construction of some training facilities. Both countries know that they cannot offer a panacea for all the political and economic ills of Central Asia.

 

What cooperation has occurred, however, is significant from the perspectives of both countries. From Israel's point of view, cooperation with Turkey may neutralize some problems in its attempts to penetrate into the markets of the former Soviet republics. In addition, Turkey is a natural ally in Israel's struggle against Iran. Then-Prime Minister Tansu Çiller's visit to Israel in Autumn 1994 was indicative of the perceived importance of Israel to Turkey's interests. One of the main subjects on the negotiating table was investment in the Central Asian states. Moscow radio pointed out that Ankara and Tel Aviv aim to make joint investments in the former Soviet republics ranging from agriculture to environmental protection and further stated that "these projects promise much to all sides."17 In December 1996, representatives of 30 Israeli and 100 Turkish firms came together and discussed joint projects in the Central Asian republics.18

 

Perhaps the best evidence of the irreversibility of the improved relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv is the fact that the former neoconservative and Islamist Erbakan government of Turkey, which had previously adopted a hard line, declared that it was not against close relations and signed several agreements with Israel in 1996 despite Arab resistance.19 In the first half of 1997, a series of agreements - most related to. military cooperation - were added to the prior ones.20 According to press reports, Turkish military circles are in favor of closer relations with Israel, and several high-ranking military staff members visited Israel in the first months of 1997.²¹ The deputy chief of the Turkish General Staff, Cevik Bir, argued that "Turkey and Israel are the two democratic countries in the region, and we must show the region that democracies can work together.”²² Turkish President Suleyman Demirel also underlined the importance of Israeli­Turkish cooperation for the security and stability of the Middle East in an interview published recently in Al­-Wasat.23

 

It is obvious that the dynamics of the post-Soviet era in the Middle East have drawn Israel, Turkey and the United States under the same interest umbrella.24 Further illustrative of this conjuncture is the fact that on October 31, 1994, these three countries inaugurated a new agriculture project in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. 25 At the time, this enterprise was endorsed by Marc Grossman, the U.S. ambassador to Ankara, who declared that "there is a great potential in the U.S.­ Turkish-Israeli assistance program in Central Asia."26  Israel clearly aims to maintain American support while planning to diversify its own foreign-policy prerogatives at a time when the Arab nations are preoccupied with peace negotiations with Israel.

 

Russia is a third force that has represented a potential obstacle to expanded Israeli presence in the new republics of Central Asia. The former superpower borders on the new republics and has traditionally played a paramount role in the politics and economics of the region. During the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries of Eurasia took on a position of primary importance for Russian foreign-policy objectives. Therefore, not surprisingly, the Russian far right has strongly opposed Israel's involvement in Central Asia: "Among the advocates of this position was the clearly anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli Vladimir Zhrinovsky, who had placed third in the presidential elections of June 1991."27 Israel has been aware that Russia could make much mischief, and so has not been willing to go too far to provoke Moscow. It has been careful not to join forces with any power that might be perceived as a threat to Moscow's core interests in its own backyard.

 

As seen in discussions concerning NATO's expansion, Russia has not been ready to accept a Western alliance that would come right up to its borders, a prospect it perceives as a threat.28 Israel and Turkey both fear that NATO's expansion may provoke Russia to act more aggressively in its "near abroad" and to exceed the limits established by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.29 In this delicate atmosphere, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu paid a visit to Moscow on March 1, 1997. He discussed bilateral relations and the Middle East peace process with President Yeltsin, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov. Netanyahu expressed concern regarding Russia's escalating technical and military cooperation with Iran and Syria, arguing that it threatened regional stability.30

 

According to Sergei Arutiunov, a prominent Russian political scientist, at this point the negative consequences of a joint Israeli-Turkish move in Central Asia may greatly outweigh the potentially limited positive results. He argues further that

 

a Turco-Israeli close cooperation is a positive fact from the world-wide point of view. But generally it would worsen Russian-Turkish and Russian-Israeli relations. It also may provoke the re­ emerging anti-Semitism in Russia. It will evoke much anxiety in Armenia, too. First, a mutually acceptable solution about Karabagh must be found and only then a Turkish-Israeli cooperation may start to be realized in the Near East and the former USSR states. Otherwise it may trigger Russian-Iraqi, Russian-Iranian, Armenian­Iranian rapprochements, push Armenian extremists in the world to a cooperation with Palestinian extremists.31

 

 

 

ISRAEL AND CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

 

Initially, the Israeli administration gave priority to diplomacy and trade over utilizing domestic Jewish influence in the new republics of Central Asia, despite the fact that some of these countries have substantial Jewish populations.32 Thus by the end of 1992, Israel had granted official recognition to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Finally, Israel established diplomatic relations with Turkmenistan in 1993.

 

However, since the independence of Azerbaijan and other former-Soviet republics, Jewish friendship societies have accelerated Israeli penetration of the region. In the 1990s, due to increased migration, relations between Soviet Jews and Israelis have grown stronger, and different Israeli organizations have intensified their activities in post-Soviet Central Asia. For example, in March 1992·, the Jewish Agency prepared a conference on the Israeli economic experience in Tashkent. In June, an Azerbaijan-Israel friendship society convened a meeting in Haifa and called for support for the Azerbaijani administration in its struggle against Armenia. The same foundation later organized activities during an important Jewish religious festival. In September of the same year, the Jewish Agency organized a summer camp for children from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.³³ In the meantime, Israel has appointed an ambassador to Uzbekistan, its first to any Central Asian republic.

 

 

 

Azerbaijan

 

As discussed above, Israel established diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan early on, causing much consternation in some countries. Indeed, the Iranian media often criticize Turkey for helping Israel establish diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan.34 Since then, Israel has attempted to play an active role in the affairs of Azerbaijan, both economically and militarily.³⁵  For example, it took a decisive stance on the Azerbaijani side in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict. According to some sources, both Israel and Turkey have supplied arms and military equipment to Azerbaijan.36 Although the purchase of stinger missiles was denied by the Azerbaijan Defense Ministry, speculations on arms transfer continue.

 

As an analytical review by the Turan News Agency argued, "Israel is always perceived in Azerbaijan as a potential strategic partner, and at times a sense of bewilderment has been expressed that their cooperation is developing too slowly."³⁷ As Sule Kut points out, Azerbaijani officials attach special importance to Israel. The number of Israeli businessmen in Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries has reached several hundred. She further argues that "according to Azerbaijani officials, Israel as a secular, democratic and militarily powerful western country may be a threat to the Middle Eastern states. But it is an opportunity for Azerbaijan."38 The Azeri government also pursues good relations with Jews living in Azerbaijan. President Heidar Aliyev visits the Tats' (as many Azerbaijani Jews call themselves) synagogue, and his portrait hangs in its office.39

 

In March 1992, direct charter flights between Azerbaijan and Israel became regular. The first official Azeri visit to Israel took place in September 1992. During official talks, mutual cooperation on politics, economy, science and culture was on the table.40 Israel opened an embassy in Baku in February 1993.

 

According to the Iranian News Agency, an Israeli intelligence delegation arrived in Baku in August 1995. IRNA (Iran News Agency) described the visit as a secret mission to train Azerbaijani security agents.41 The Azerbaijani National Security Ministry denied these allegations and noted that it was prepared to openly develop cooperation with the special services of many other countries.⁴² Israeli health minister Efraim Sene suggested that "Israel has a strategic interest in developing ties with Azerbaijan, which is equally interested in such ties because they can help stem the onset of Islamic fundamentalism emanating from Iran."43 Lowell Bezanis agrees with this point and further argues that "Azerbaijan's interest in Israel, and vice versa, stems from their mutual fear of Iran. In cultivating ties with Israel, Azerbaijan also wishes to win plaudits from the United States."44  This cooperation may also be regarded as an effort to hold off Russian pressure and to counter Iran's growing ties to Armenia and Georgia. In this line of thinking, Eliezer Yotvat, Israel's first ambassador to Azerbaijan, said that he has succeeded in raising Israeli-Azerbaijani relations "from zero ... to a high level.”⁴⁵ In the first four months of 1996, Israeli exports to Azerbaijan amounted to roughly $3.5 million.46

 

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, on his way back to Israel from his visit to Japan and South Korea, stopped briefly in Baku and met with the president of Azerbaijan, Heidar Aliyev, on August 29, 1997. Netanyahu noted how much these two states have in common as follows:

 

We are two ancient peoples who have achieved independence in the last decades and now the task for us as independent nations is to continue to develop our countries.... I also find great hope in the fact that we have relationships as we do with Turkey, with Jordan, with Egypt, between the Jewish state and predominantly Muslim states.... This gives us hope that all the children of Abraham can find peace and friendship under the same sun that rises over the Caspian sea and sets over Mediterranean.47

 

Aliyev said Azerbaijan wanted to tap Israeli technological expertise. Netanyahu reiterated his concern about possible sales of nuclear technology to his country's arch foe, Iran, which shares a long land and sea border with Azerbaijan.48 Furthermore, Netanyahu described Azerbaijan as a potential supplier of oil to Israel and emphasized a pipeline project that would enable Azerbaijan to move its crude oil across neighboring Georgia and Turkey to the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean Sea and a prospective underwater extension to Israel. Netanyahu said: "We are involved in this project.... It will enable us to buy oil at a much lower price."49

 

Netanyahu evidently discussed the feasibility of three-sided cooperation between Israel, Turkey and Azerbaijan in stemming the tide of Islamic fanaticism emanating from Iran. Iran's state radio the next day blasted Azerbaijan for hosting the Israeli prime minister, saying: "Baku has been playing a dangerous game by receiving the Zionist regime's expansionist prime minister. By doing this it has destabilized its own ties with Islamic states in the region and the world."50 Armenian Foreign Minister Alexander Arzumanyan also considered the close cooperation between Turkey and Israel to be extremely dangerous for the region, saying that it was even more dangerous for Azerbaijan to join them. He underlined the importance of Tehran-Yerevan ties at a time when regional cooperation was rapidly expanding.51 It seems particularly important for Israel to firm up its partnership along the axis of Turkey and Azerbaijan to compensate Baku. Economic assistance is not enough in this regard. Azerbaijan's main expectation is Israeli assistance along the lines of political lobbying.

 

 

 

Tajikistan

 

Like Azerbaijan, Tajikistan has attracted the attention of many investors with its rich raw materials and plentiful human resources. While this country once seemed attractive to Israel as a target for investment, interest waned with the outbreak of civil war in Tajikistan at the end of the 1992. However, Israel has still maintained active diplomatic ties, and there has been some activity on the economic front. Israel's ambassador to Russia was given responsibility for Tajikistan. In February 1992, an Israeli delegate traveled to Tajikistan and signed an agreement for the transfer of Israeli expertise in agriculture and the exploitation of Tajik crude oil.

 

Islamic elements claim to play an important role in politics in Tajikistan and even briefly attained control of the government. However, the Muslim authority there, Akbar Turajanzade, has said that he would not oppose Israeli-Tajik diplomatic relations. Despite this claim, the banners "Death to the U.S.! Death to Israel!" were in evidence during demonstrations in April 1992.52  In response, a number of Israeli business delegates visited Tajikistan to impress upon the government that there is nothing to fear from the Israeli state.53 In August, Ambassador Arya Levin was welcomed in Dushanbe by President Nabiyev. The Tajik president has invited Israeli business people to his country.54

 

 

 

Uzbekistan

 

Israel has had a more substantial relationship with Uzbekistan, the dissemination of irrigation technology forming its core. In September 1992, Israel's Beta Shita company signed an agreement for the construction of a high­ technology irrigation scheme in the Andezhan region. The same company has also invested in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.55 The Akkurgan demonstration farm is another promising project. It is one of the agricultural demonstration activities established under the special cooperation program developed in the Central Asian Republics by MASHAV, the Center for International Cooperation of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The MASHAV­USAID program aims to address key agricultural issues and promote economic endeavors as well as international cooperation. It reflects Israel's commitment to share with others appropriate technologies, know-how, human-resource training and practical experience gained in agricultural and rural development.56 Training activities were conducted in both Israel and Uzbekistan.

 

Israel also has been exporting its expertise in cotton production to Uzbekistan. According to a Financial Times report in May of 1992, the Israeli projects in Uzbekistan have increased cotton output by 30 percent while reducing water consumption by two-thirds.57 The foreign trade relations minister of Uzbekistan, Sadik Safayev, notes that a total of four Israeli companies deal regularly with Uzbekistan.58

 

 

 

Turkmenistan

 

Israel and Turkmenistan have had diplomatic relations since 1993. This late recognition, however, did not prevent the development of economic relations prior to that date. In the summer of 1992, an Israeli business delegation visited Turkmenistan to offer a number of projects in agricultural technology and rural development.59 However, the cost of irrigation and desalination prospects alone were expected to exceed $10 billion, and as it would be difficult for the Turkmen government to raise this amount, it has not yet agreed to the project. The most convenient solution would be a barter agreement.

 

Since official recognition in 1993, economic cooperation has increased. In 1994, Turkmenistan's deputy prime minister visited Jerusalem and Shimon Peres visited Ashkhabad. Numerous cooperation accords have been signed. The U.S.-Israel joint project on education and technology transfer in agriculture can be taken as an important sign of development.60  The volume of trade between Turkmenistan and Israel exceeded $40 million in 1995.61 In addition, in March 1995, Turkmenistan and Israel signed an agreement on cooperation in health care, under which Israel will provide assistance to Turkmenistan in child and maternity care, medical insurance, organization of ambulance services and the supply of medical equipment.62 The Israeli firm Ben Shanar Associates currently extends financial services in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.63

 

On May 25, 1995, Turkmen leader Turkmenbashi Niyazov traveled to Israel, where he met with his Israeli counterpart, Ezer Weizman, as well as with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres for talks focusing on bilateral economic relations. Israel is involved in a $100-million irrigation project in Turkmenistan and a scheme to build a gas pipeline to Turkey from that country, which has some of the world's largest gas reserves.64 Executives at Merhav, an Israeli company invested in Turkmenistan, believe it is possible for the pipeline to be extended to Israel.65

 

Merhav also signed a $500-million contract to upgrade the Turkmenbashi refinery in Turkmenistan in August 1996. The project is aimed at improving two units, a Continuous Catalytic Reformer and a Fluid Catalytic Cracker, and financing a third new unit for processing lubricating oil. 66 The representative of Merhav, Yosej A. Maiman, was seen frequently on Turkmen television with Turkmenbashi, and Turkmen media pay special attention to the activities of Maiman's company.67

 

 

 

Kazakhstan

 

Israel enjoys widespread influence in Kazakhstan. At first, its roughly one million German-origin population worried Israel, but any difficulties were soon overcome with diplomatic and economic maneuvers. Israel, like other countries, first offered agriculture-related projects. The most active Israeli companies to date have been Beta Shita, Netafim and Merhav.68  In February 1992, four different projects were signed targeting tomato and cotton production, and these have reportedly multiplied tomato yields six fold.69

 

Then, in October 1992, an additional series of agreements was accepted by the two countries,70 following which Israel's Lachist firm made significant investments. Its Davy Foundation project is the largest known initiative in agriculture and animal husbandry to date. In a short time, this project has increased milk production by 60 percent while reducing costs considerably.71 Besides agriculture, Israel has invested in other sectors, from banking to supermarkets.

 

Kazakhstan has welcomed the positive developments in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. The Kazakh foreign ministry issued a statement:

 

Positive changes in the Middle East leading to peaceful settlement of the Arab­ Israeli conflict should become irreversible in the interests of establishing mutual confidence, developing broad economic cooperation in the region and creating an integral security system in Asia.72

 

Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbayev visited Israel in December 1995. During talks held with Israeli Foreign Minister Ehud Barak, he said that they "share Israel's stand on the Iranian issue and work to prevent Iranian influence in Kazakhstan."73

 

Israel plans to build Kazakhstan's telecommunication network. Israel is the only country in the Middle East with a comparative advantage in telecommunication equipment. The two states have already agreed on a project that includes technology transfers in telephone, telex and telegraph. Israel has also established direct satellite and telegraph connection to Uzbekistan. Since the visit of Kazakh Prime Minister Terescenko to Israel, direct flights between the countries have become regular.

 

 

 

Kyrgyzstan

 

The final country in this discussion is the Kyrgyz Republic. President Asker Akayev recognized Israel during a visit in January 1993. Despite the protests of some Muslim countries, Akayev moved further and opened an embassy in Jerusalem. In this respect, Kyrgyzstan's apparently positive relations with Israel have disturbed Iran and some other countries. Despite this disapproval, relations continue between the two countries. The Israeli and Kyrgyz governments have agreed to cooperate on a wide range of areas including media, science, technology, cultural activities and joint-venture investments. Additionally, Israel has already supplied an important part of the debt requirement of the public and private sectors in Kyrgyzstan.74

 

 

 

THE ROLES OF IRAN AND TURKEY

 

It is clear that Israeli attempts to enter into the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan should not be disregarded. Israel's efforts to date seem to be the most advantageous formula for a country that aims to create for itself a sphere of influence in Central Asia. It appears that Israel is the only country in the region with the necessary expertise to offer these new states. Israeli involvement in improving the telecommunications sectors of the Central Asian states shows its seriousness.

 

This is not to ignore the fact that Arab states and Iran have also offered financial aid and investment in certain areas, in addition to their cultural activities. The role of Iran in the region in particular is sure to be a significant one over time, as it is difficult to imagine a stable and secure Middle East without Iran. But the role of Iran is an evolving one. Indeed, there have been increasing signs that a change is taking place between Israel and Iran.

 

A short time after the recent Israeli elections, Tehran discerned a moderation in Israeli declarations towards Iran and Islam. In his early speeches, Netanyahu claimed that Israel has no dispute with Islam. He has relaxed the political pressure against Iran, and in November 1996 he used German Chancellor Helmut Kohl as a conduit to ask President Hashemi Rafsanjani to prevent terrorist attacks in Israel.75

 

Turkey also can assist Iran in improving its relations with the Western world.76 Turkey's developing relations with Israel should increase its leverage both in regard to Israel and with respect to Turkey's adversaries. What is more, in this intense competition in the so-called "new Great Game," Israel and Turkey should play exemplary roles in cooperating to improve democracy and economic performance in the enlarged Middle East.77

 

The existence of nuclear weapons and technology in Central Asia worries Israel and increases the strategic importance of the region. Israel's fear stems from the possibility of the transfer of nuclear weapons and technology to Iran. According to a report prepared in France, the Mossad and the CIA keep a close eye on the nuclear-energy experts of the Central Asian states.78 Moscow's own readiness to sell two nuclear reactors to Iran while insisting that they would not be used for military purposes worries the Israelis.

 

In addition, the possibility of the installation of Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles in Greek Cyprus could-endanger not only Turkey but also Israel's freedom of action in the eastern Mediterranean.79 According to press reports, as tension over the possible transfer of Russian S-300 missiles to Greek Cyprus escalates, the United States, Israel and Azerbaijan are contacting Turkey to provide intelligence concerning which methods might be used for the transportation of missiles.80 This situation forces Israel and Turkey to develop new security initiatives. Neither country should ignore that "any hand overplayed by Turkey and Israel, together with the United States, could encourage Moscow to attempt to revive its fortunes as a great power by again playing patron to the more radical states in the region."⁸¹

 

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

In sum, Israel is now an integral part of the new and enlarged Middle East. It is trying to develop a new, coherent and innovative foreign policy towards the area through its focus on the Central Asian republics. It has succeeded in reconciling its short-term political maneuvers with its long-term strategy. It seems to have reached its main aspiration of the Cold War era: an economic hinterland. Aware of the need to avoid upsetting crucial strategic balances, Israel has attempted to direct its Central Asian policy in cooperation with its most powerful allies, the United States and Turkey.

 

 

* Dr. Aras would like to thank to Sergei Arutiunov, Cigdem Balirn, Lowell Bezanis, George Foster, Kemal Kirisci, Mubeccel Okay, Orhan Okay, Barry Rubin, Mehmet Tuma, Abdulkerim Uregen, and Reha Yilmaz for their help in different stages of this study.

 

1 Ahmet Davutoglu, "Yahudi Meselesinin Tarihi Donusumu ve Israil'in Yeni Stratejisi" (The Historical Transformation of the Jewish Question and the New Israeli Strategy), Avrasya Dosyasi, Vol. l, No. 3 (Fall 1994), pp. 66-67.

 

2 Philip Robins, "The Middle East and Central Asia," The New Central Asia and Its Neighbours, Peter Ferdinand, ed. (London: Royal Institute, I 994), p. 66.

 

3 Anoushiravan Ehtesharni and Emma C. Murphy, "The Non-Arab Middle East States and the Caucasian/Central Asian Republics: Iran and Israel," International Relations, Vol. 12, No. I (April 1994), p. 96.

 

4 Olcott opposes this view and argues that Central Asian states accept the premise that relations with Israel must remain hostile for the sake of obtaining assistance from rich Arabian states. See Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia's New States (Washington: USIP Press, 1996), pp. 32-33.

 

5 Leon T. Hadar, "The Last Days of Likud: The American-Israeli Big Chill," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 21, No. 4 {Summer 1992), pp. 87-88.

 

6 Personal interview with officials in the Embassy of Palestine in Turkey, March 17, 1997.

 

7 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "New Frontiers: Iran, the GCC, and the CCARs," From the Gulf to Central Asia: Players in the New Great Game, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ed. (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1994), p. 96; Reha Yilmaz, director of the Daghestan Research Center, argues that the Jewish population in Daghestan continues to migrate to Israel and that friendship societies try to accelerate this process (personal correspondence).

 

8 Ehteshami and Murphy, 'The Non-Arab Middle East," p. 96.

 

9 Raphael Israeli, "Return to the Source: The Republics of Central Asia and the Return of the Middle East," Central Asia Survey, Vol. 13, No. I (1994), p. 29.

 

10 Anthony Hyman, "Central Asia and the Middle East: The Emerging Links," Central Asia and the Caucasus, Mohiaddin Mesbahi, ed. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994).

 

11 Hadar, "The Last Days of Likud," p. 67.

 

12 For a similar view, see "Kissenger mevfid ila es-Sark el-Avsat Ii tenfizi garari taksiyimi Filistin" (Kissinger's Partition Plan of the Middle East Put Into Practice), al-Wasat, February 13, 1997, p. 17.

 

13 Warren Christopher, "The Strategic Priorities of American Foreign Policy," Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 47 (1993), p. 797.

 

14 For detailed information on the new trends in Turkish foreign policy, see Kemal Kirisci, "New Patterns of Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior," Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s, Cigdem Balim et al., eds. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995).

 

15 For an Arab view that regards Israel as a potential threat to both Arabs and Iranians, see "el-edau' el­ musteriku li-Israil yefki li-giyami tehal Ufi Arabiyyi-Iraniyyi" (Israeli activities are enough to provoke tensions between Arabs and Iranians), al-Aalem, February 22, 1997, p. 27. For a Western perspective on the same discussion, see Moura Nairn, "L'attitude d'Israel et des Etats-Unis Suscite un Rapprochement entre les Pays Arabes et Iran" (The attitude of the U.S. and Israel is Leading to Rapprochement between Iran and the Arab countries), Le Monde, March 30-31, 1997, p. 2.

 

16 Hadar, “The Last Days of Likud," p. 68.

 

17 Anatoli Korinsky, "Basbakan Çiller Basarili Orta Dogu Gezisi Sona Erdi" (Prime Minister's Çiiller's Successful Middle East Trip Came to an End), Moscow Radio, November 8, 1994. Released by the Turkish General Directorate of Press.

 

18 DEIK (Dis Ekonomik Iliskiler Komisyonulfurkish Foreign Economic Relations Board), Turk ve Israil 'Ii Firmalar Arasinda Orta Asya Cumhuriyetlerinde Isbirligi lmkanlari Konulu Top/anti Notu (Summary Notes of the conference on possible cooperation among Turkish-Israeli firms in the Central Asian republics), (Istanbul: December 10, 1996).

 

19 Some Arab circles are willing to see Erbakan take sides with the anti-Israeli camp, and they provide support to him bearing this position in mind. For further information, see "el-mafyave'l ahzab el-Almaniyye tetehalefu li-muhavelati Iskati hiikOmet er-Refah" (Germany and the Mafia behave contradictorily for the failure of the Refah government), al-Mujtama'a, February 3, 1997, p. 38; "Erbakan Yutalibu 'Israel' et­ Tahalli an Tecavuzatiha," (Erbakan demanded Israeli withdrawal from occupied lands), Al-Aalem, April 19, 1997, p. 4.

 

20 For further information see John M. Nomikos, Looking Back to See Forwards: Israel-Turkey Defense Relations, RIES Research Paper, No. 39 (July 1997): See also M. Hakan Yavuz, "Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Autumn 1997).

 

21Sami Kohen, "Israil ile Stratejik Diyalog" (Strategic Dialogue with Israel), Milliyet, May 7, 1997, p. 5. For the historical background of Turkish-Israeli relations within the context of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, see Bulent Aras, "The Impact of the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process on Turkish Foreign Policy," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Winter 1997).

 

22 John Pomfret, "Some Neighborly Advice-Turkey Strengthens Its Ties to Israel," The Washington Post, National Weekly Edition, June 10-16, 1997, pp. 16-17.

 

23 Alakatuna mea Israil Hedefuha Istikrar el-Mintika" (Target of our relations with Israel is to achieve peace in the region), a/-Wasat, June 23, 1997, pp. 20-21.

 

24 Adam Garfinkle, "U.S.-Israeli Relations After the Cold War," Orbis, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Autumn 1996), p. 569; also see Bulent Aras, "U.S.-Central Asian Relations: A View From Turkey," MERIA Journal, Vol. I, No. I, [http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC!besa/meria/aras.html], 1996.

 

25 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, TICA Eurasian File, No. 20, 1994.

 

26 George E. Gruen, "Dynamic Progress in Turkish-Israeli Relations," Israel Affairs, Vol. I, No. 4 (1995), p. 66.

 

27 Robert O. Freedman, "Israeli-Russian Relations Since the Collapse of the Soviet Union," Middle East Journal, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995), p. 237.

 

28 ORT (Obsestvennoye Rosiakoye Televidinya), Vremya (Time) News Bulletin, May 7, 1997; Rossiiskiye Vesti, February 2 I, I 997; Pravda, February 22, 1997.

 

29 For a recent analysis of possible Russian foreign-policy shifts, see Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 8, 1997. In addition, Russian foreign-policy makers seek alternative partners from the East like China and South Korea. See "Vi Rassiaya" (From Russia), Dagestanskaya Pravda, March 27, 1997, and Pravda, May 10, 1997.

 

30 Scott Parrish, "Israeli Prime Minister in Moscow," OMRI Daily Digest [http://www.omri.cz], March 12, 1997.

 

31 Sergei Arutiunov, chairman of the Department of Caucasian Studies at the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology (personal correspondence).

 

32 Abdulkerim Uregen, chairman of the Department of Political Science at the Qafqaz University of Baku (personal correspondence). He provided the data that the size of the Jewish community in Azerbaijan is about 38,000, 18,000 of whom live in the Kuba district. During the Lenin era, the Soviet Jewish population had been transferred east and settled in Transcaucasia. In the late 1970s, the Jewish national movement attempted to increase ethnic consciousness among the Jewish community of Azerbaijan, but these attempts only led to the migration of a limited number of Jews to Israel.

 

33 Ehteshami and Murphy, "The Non-Arab Middle East," p. 97.

 

34 Henri J. Barkey, "Iran and Turkey," Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey and Iran, Alvin Z. Rubenstein and Oles M. Smolansky, eds. (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 155.

 

35 Azerbaycan Zaman (Baku), August 29, I 996; Azerbaycan Gazetesi (Baku), August 30, 1996.

 

36 Jane Hunter, "Israel and Turkey: Arms for Azerbaijan?" Middle East International, October 23, 1992, p. 12.

 

37 "Israeli Premier Visits Azerbaijan," Turan Analytical Review, Turan News Agency, No. 357, September I, 1997 [[email protected]].

 

38 Sule Kut, "Yeni Turk Cumhuriyetlerinin Dis Politikalari" (Foreign policies of the New Turkic Republics), Bagimsizligin Ilk Yillari (First Years of Independence), Busra Ersanli Behar, ed. (Ankara: Ministry of Culture Pub., 1994), pp. 253-254. See also Yilmaz Bingo!, Turkey's Policy toward Post-Soviet Central Asia, RIES Research Paper, forthcoming.

 

39 The Philadelphia Inquirer, July 21, 1997.

 

40 Ehteshami and Murphy, "The Non-Arab Middle East," pp. 99-100.

 

41 BBC, Summary of World Broadcast (hereafter SWB), August 31, 1995, SU/2396, p. F/7.

 

42 SWB, September 5, 1997, SU/2400, p. F/3.

 

43 SWB, August 3 I, I 995, SU/2396, p. F/7.

 

44 Lowell Bezanis, foreign policy analyst at the Open Media Research Institute (personal correspondence).

 

45 SWB, August 24, I 996, SU/2699, p. F/6.

 

46 Turk Sanayici ve Isadamlari Beynelhalk Cemiyeti (International Society of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen), lsadamlari lcin Azerbayt;an El Rehberi '96 (Azerbaijan Handbook for Businessmen '96) (Baku: Caglayan, 1996), p. 28.

 

47 Rafael Husainov, "Netanyahu/Azerbaijan," Voice of America, August 29, 1997, Correspondent Report No. 2-219 I 47, via Habarlar-L, Azerbaijan News Distribution List [[email protected]].

 

48 "Netanyahu Shops For Oil During Azeri Stopover," Reuters News Agency, August 29, 1997.

 

49 Jay Bushinsky, "PM Discusses Oil Pipeline in Baku," Jerusalem Post, August 31, 1997.

 

50 "Iran Radio Slams Azerbaijan for Hosting Israeli PM," Reuters News Agency, August 30, 1997.

 

51 "Armenian Foreign Minister: Turco-Israeli Cooperation Perilous for Region," IRNA, September I 0, 1997.

 

52  Robert O. Freedman, "Israel and Central Asia: A Preliminary Analysis," Central Asia Monitor, No. 2 (1993), p. 17. As Freedman argues, it is difficult to determine Iran's role in this attitude towards Israel.

 

53 Al-Aalem, September 7, 1993.

 

54 Carol R. Savietz, "Central Asia: Emerging Relations with the Arab States and Israel," Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, Hafeez. Malik, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 319.

 

55 The Christian Science Monitor, September 25, 1992.

 

56 ”Dairy Cattle Husbandry Demonstration Project in Uzbekistan," via web page of Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs [http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il].

 

57 Financial Times, May 6, 1992.

 

58 Ehteshami and Murphy, "The Non-Arab Middle East," p. 101.

 

59 The Christian Science Monitor, September 25, 1992.

 

60 ''Fact Sheets: Central Asian Republics," Dispatch, Vol. 5, No. 19, 1994, p. 294; Askabat Aksami (Askhabat), February 7, 1994; Ahal Durmusu (Askhabat), July 21, 1994.

 

61 Turkmenistan (Askhabat), March 27, 1996.

 

62SWB, March 13, 1995, SU 2250, p. G/17; Askabat Aksami, June l, 1995.

 

63DEIK, Turk ve Israil'Ii, p. 3.

 

64 Lowell Bezanis, "Niyazov in Egypt, Israel," OMRJ Daily Digest [http://www.omri.cz], May 26, 1995; Turkmenistan, April I, 1995.

 

65 David Harris, "Sharon, Russians to Discuss Gas Deal," Jerusalem Post [http://www.jpost.cz], March 14, 1997.

 

66 David Harris, "Merhav Wins $500m. Refinery Upgrade Deal in Turkmenistan," Jerusalem Post [http://www.jpost.com], August 26, 1996; Turkmenistan, October 8, 1996.

 

67 Interview with Mehmet Tuma, Department of International Relations, Turkmenbashi University, Askhabat, April 30, 1997, Istanbul.

 

68 Yosef A. Maiman, "Turk Cumhuriyetlerinde Yatirim," p. 73.

 

69 Gruen, "Dynamic Progress," p. 56.

 

70 Financial Times, January 28, 1993.

 

71DEIK, Turk ve Israil 'Ii, p. 6.

 

72 SWB,October 4, 1995, SU 2425, p. G/5.

 

73 Ibid; despite this statement, Kazakhstan also seeks to develop ties with Iran, see "Velayeti ti-Kazakhstan li­ Te'kit-it-Teavun" (Velayati is in Kazakhstan to consolidate cooperation), Al-Aalem, April 26, 1997, p. 4.

 

74 "Fact Sheets," p. 288.

 

75 Aluf Ben, "A Change in Israeli-Iranian Relations," Ha'aretz, November I 0, 1996, quoted on the home page of the Foreign Ministry of Israel on the Internet. For the Iranian perspective on Turkish activities in the former Soviet South see Firouzeh Nahavandi, "Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan: The Historic Origins of Iranian Foreign Policy," Contested Borders in the Caucasus, Bruno Coppietres, ed. (Brussels, VUB University Press, 1996).

 

76 For a likely argument, see Kemal Kirisci et al., Political and Economic Cooperation and Integration in the Middle East: An Analysis a/Turkey's Mid-to Long-Term Regional Policy (Istanbul: TESEV, 1997).

 

77 Any reversal in the peace process, however, has the potential to threaten the emergence of this peaceful Middle East environment. For information on the current state of the peace process, see Patrice Claude, "Un Inquietant Silence est Tombe sur la Poudriere de Gaza" (A worrisome silence has fallen over the powderkeg of Gaza), Le Monde, April 15, 1997, p. 4, and Alexandre Buccianti, "La Ligue Arabe Reprend une Attitude Hostile a l'Etat Hebreu" (The Arab League is again taking a hostile attitude towards the Jewish state), Le Monde, April 2, 1997, p. 2.

 

78 Ehtesham i and Murphy, "The Non-Arab Middle East," p. 103.

 

79 Jay Bushinsky, "Russia's Role," Jerusalem Post [http://www.jpost.com], February 2, 1997.

 

80 Turkish Daily News, September 4, 1997.

 

81 Lowell Bezanis, 'Turco-Israeli Accord Aggravates Regional Tensions," OMRI Analytical Brief [http://www.omri.cz], April 18, 1996.