/>
Ms. Mahle is a former Central Intelligence Agency officer from the Directorate of Operations and author of Denial and Deception: An Insider’s View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9/11 (Avalon Publishing Group, 2004).
With President Bush’s June 2002 speech, the United States announced to the world that it was in agreement with Israel that Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat was no longer a viable negotiating partner. President Bush called for the formation of a new Palestinian leadership and renewed security efforts to lay the groundwork for an interim Palestinian state. In the months that followed, the administration presented a Roadmap delineating three phases meant to guide the parties from the current bloody conflict to a final peace agreement. With Arafat’s death in November 2004, a new Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), has been chosen through a democratic process. Finally, the key elements seem to be in place that will transform the environment and lead to peace. Hope is in the air.
The key question is whether 2005 will be any different from 1996 or 2000 – the years in which the Oslo accords were the guide rails to peace. It is tempting to declare that the renewal of hope fundamentally alters the environment. However, analysis built on the assumption of hope is wobbly at best. A more sound method is to examine a broader range of facts and relationships. If done, one comes to the conclusion that the Roadmap leads right back to the roundabout of violence and destructive unilateral political actions.
In drafting the Roadmap, the Bush administration adopted the key assumption of the Clinton strategy, an assumption that is to its core wrong. The Roadmap, like the Oslo accords, assumes that a stable security situation will lead to an environment conducive to a peace process that, in turn, will lead to a peace agreement. It will not. Intuitively, when one looks at the suicide bombings, the roadside shootings and the targeted killings, it is understandable that a consensus has formed that the roadblock to peace is security. Death, destruction and terror are the lethal sideshows, however. The roadblock is the process. The central issues are political, i.e., the terms of the peace.
The Oslo process is a good example of a failed experiment, with plenty of lessons that should be studied and applied to future peacemaking initiatives. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. The U.S. government has once again embarked upon a path that places security before real political engagement, process before substance, rather than marrying security and political steps on the ground. This path is doomed to failure, as was the Oslo process.
A detailed examination of events as they transpired on the ground, as opposed to that presented in the spin wars of the Palestinian, Israeli and American leadership, is revealing. Oslo did not fail on September 28, 2000, the date of the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada, because of a breakdown in security. Oslo had a long and tortuous death marked by broken political agreements, missed deadlines and the systematic undermining of good faith between the political leadership of the Israelis and the Palestinians, as both sides became bogged down in the peace process at the expense of taking peace-building measures. The United States helped undermine the Oslo accords by trying to bridge political disputes with security solutions and by using the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and security issues to create illusions of political progress in the Middle East peace process (MEPP).
The cost to the United States in allowing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to persist on its current downward spiral is the growth of anti-American sentiment throughout the Middle East and Southeast Asia, increasing support for extremists and their militant ideologies. As long as the United States does not aggressively deal with the underlying causes responsible for creating and feeding anti-American sentiment, U.S. citizens will be at risk in their homes and abroad.
The following is an overview of what transpired in the MEPP, 1996-2000, from a political-security optic. It examines the political and security assumptions and intentions as well as the “ground truth.” Looking forward, the article explores challenges to the Bush approach and weighs the costs of continuing or resolving the conflict, and the implications for America.
The Death of Oslo
The Clinton Strategy
During the period between 1996 and 2000, the United States expended its resources disproportionately, building security rather than keeping the political process moving in a forward direction in the MEPP. The Clinton administration assumed a stable security situation would create an environment conducive to political progress. Specifically, negotiations between the two parties would lead to a mutually agreed upon settlement and negate the need for U.S. arbitration. This approach suited Israeli interests well, as the Israelis placed primacy on security, with a secondary goal of progress on the political front; as the occupying power, they held more capabilities when it came to imposing political agendas. The Palestinian Authority (PA), vastly weaker in political clout and military might, gambled that the land-for-peace agreement with a security-first approach would ultimately result in the attainment of Palestinian national aspirations and improve the daily lives of Palestinians.
Off to a Shaky Start
The horrific bombing spree of 1995-96 that culminated with the Dizengoff Center bombing on March 4, 1996, threatened an early death to the land-for-peace agreement signed at Oslo. Responding aggressively, the United States and the international community convened a conference to discuss the security problem and hammered out security-assistance agreements with Israel and the PA. At the Sharm al=Shaykh anti-terrorism summit on March 13,1996, the United States pledged to provide resources to professionalize the PA security services to help them fight against terror emanating from inside the territories controlled by the PA, and to provide additional intelligence and technical assistance to the Israelis. The CIA put together a massive covert-action program that included training, technical assistance and infrastructure development. As the program evolved, the CIA also played the role of a facilitator, restarting Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation and keeping it going, acting as a monitor to evaluate compliance. The Israeli government agreed and approved of this program as part of a greater security-cooperation program with the United States.1
In March 1996, the PA security services began a massive roundup of militants from Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), detaining 400-plus suspected activists. The PA justified its actions by declaring continued military resistance to be counter to the interests of the PA. The crackdown was immediately effective in calming the security situation. In 1995, there were four bombings, killing 37 individuals. In the first half of 1996, there were four suicide bombings, killing 59 Israelis. There were no successful suicide bombings in the second half of 1996. The PA began interrogating the militants and uncovering the military and support networks. The impact of the crackdown had a lasting effect. Key leaders were arrested or killed and networks disrupted. For PIJ and Hamas, the existing bomb-making infrastructure was severely crippled. Bombing attacks became less frequent, less sophisticated and less lethal, indicating degraded capabilities on the part of the extremist groups.
The PA had sufficient support from Palestinians for its security efforts from late 1996 to 1998. Support for Islamic and secular military groups was dropping because of growing support for the PA and its policy of a negotiated peace. An additional reason was the economic and human costs to Palestinian civilians as a result of Israeli responses to the suicide bombing campaign of 1995-96. Many Palestinians blamed the opposition forces, not Israel, for the difficulties they faced after armed attacks. According to polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in February 1995, 46 percent of Palestinians supported armed attacks against Israelis. Support for armed attacks dropped to 21 percent in March 1996.
Support for Hamas dropped to 6 percent in March 1996, compared to 14.4 percent in February 1995. In March 1996, 59 percent of Palestinians supported the PA security crackdown on the opposition forces. As the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) redeployed from Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Qalqiliya, Ramallah and Bethlehem, Palestinian support for negotiations swelled to 78.8 percent by March 1996.2
The Bibi Years: A New Political Reality
The assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the election of the Likud candidate Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu created a new political reality that proved poisonous to the peace process. Public-opinion polls in Israel indicated the Israelis felt the peace process was like a train out of control, what with the Hamas suicide-bombing campaign and the assassination of Rabin by an extremist Israeli citizen opposed to the peace process made the public question whether the Interim Agreement would bring them security.
Responding to popular concerns, Netanyahu slowed down the peace process, and security became the watchword of his government. In a speech to the Knesset on the Hebron Protocol on January 16, 1997, Netanyahu clearly articulated his future policy for dealing with the PA, saying his government would conduct negotiations with “the time, the ability and the freedom for political maneuver.” He would proceed with the Palestinians, “insisting on reciprocity and security.”3
Perceived ill-intentions by both sides had an important impact on the political process. Palestinians were immediately wary of Netanyahu and the intentions of his government because Netanyahu had openly criticized the Oslo accords and was against the formation of an independent Palestinian state. Palestinians interpreted Netanyahu’s actions in an anti-peace framework. In this context, Netanyahu’s support for expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was seen as a tactic to establish “facts on the ground” that would frustrate or obviate the establishment of a Palestinian state inclusive of these areas. The opening of the Hasmonean tunnel in the Old City of Jerusalem and the development of new Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem were viewed as Israeli attempts to destroy the Haram al-Sharif and to delegitimize Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem and the Old City. Palestinians reacted to Netanyahu’s policies through street protests and confrontations with settlers.
Netanyahu and his supporters viewed the Palestinian reactions in an anti-peace framework as well. Israel accused Arafat of giving a “green light” to terrorism and courting a collaborative relationship with Hamas and PIJ. The Netanyahu government accused Arafat of a devious game of secretly telling Hamas he would turn a blind eye to military operations and would release Hamas security detainees, but then deny responsibility for the attacks by attributing them to opposition elements operating in the territories. Arafat’s use of the “Hamas card” as a negotiating tool with Israel – presenting the PA’s negotiating positions as moderate compared to Hamas – was seen by the Israelis as further proof of Arafat’s double dealing.
Both views are supported by elements of truth. The Israeli government under Netanyahu was effective at imposing its political agenda, with tangible costs to the Palestinians. Settlement activities expanded significantly in the years Netanyahu was prime minister. According to Israeli statistics, the settler population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (excluding East Jerusalem) had an average annual growth of 7.92 percent from 1992 to1998 and a cumulative growth of 52.96 percent between December 1993 and June 1996. The average annual growth rate for Jews and Arabs in Green Line Israel was 2.5 percent per year.4 Netanyahu pursued an aggressive policy in Jerusalem. Administrative demolitions of Palestinian homes increased. He continued the process of expanding Jerusalem’s borders, announcing a plan to include, in the municipal borders of Jerusalem, the West Bank settlement of Ma’ale Adumim. Furthermore, Netanyahu authorized the establishment of Jewish neighborhoods on Har Homa (Jabal Abu Ghunaym) and Ras al-Amud.
Looking at the other side of the coin, Arafat’s policy towards Hamas and PIJ, and violence in general, was neither transparent nor consistent. While publicly condemning military operations and declaring the Islamic opposition the enemy to peace, he would privately build bridges to these organizations by making concessions to co-opt them. Arafat maintained a continuous dialogue with the Islamic opposition, permitting Hamas to hold mass rallies and publish the official Hamas weekly al-Risala. He appointed a Hamas leader as minister of youth and sports. PA security efforts against terrorism were inconsistent. After massive public arrest campaigns, there would be quiet releases, to include known members of military cells and military-wing leaders. Those who remained in prison were given special privileges, including furloughs during the daylight hours. Finally, Arafat’s rhetoric, and that of other PA leaders, frequently reminded the Israeli public and its security officials that violence against Israel remained a future possibility.
The spin doctors worked overtime as both sides rallied for support in the international court of public opinion. Regardless of who was “more wrong” or “more right,” the atmosphere became bleak, with both sides believing the worst. Time and developments on the ground only reinforced the accusations of bad intentions.
Improved Security in Israel; Increased Conflict in the Territories
In comparative terms, the security situation in Green Line Israel and Jerusalem was gradually improving. In 1997, there were 20 people killed in three bombing incidents; in 1998, there were two bombing attacks and one grenade attack, none resulting in fatalities. In 1999, two bombing attacks produced no fatalities. Certainly, other attacks were foiled, but this is evidence the security services were becoming effective. Within Green Line Israel, life began to improve, and the process of normalization got underway.
People were no longer afraid to frequent restaurants, shopping malls and places of entertainment. Bus travel again became a regular mode of transportation. Nightlife flourished. The economy prospered.
Palestinian Green Line “border towns” catered to growing crowds of visiting Israeli shoppers. Israelis visited Jordan by the thousands.5
The above bombing statistics do not reflect the ongoing violence in the Occupied Territories, however. Confrontations between Palestinians, the IDF and settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were frequent, despite the decrease in fatalities during the Netanyahu years (see Table 1). Most confrontations were localized, spontaneous reactions to specific local developments such as land confiscations, settlement expansion and construction, stone throwing, tree uprooting and ID Fimposed closures. The confrontations were at friction points in the Occupied Territories, i.e., IDF roadblocks and installations and settler areas. The overwhelming majority of these confrontations were viewed by the United States as acts of political and social violence, not as terrorism.
These confrontations, practically a daily occurrence, became the backdrop for business as usual in the Occupied Territories. Only particularly intense and large confrontations would make the international press, such as the so-called “miniintifada” in Jerusalem and Hebron in September-October 1996 after the Hasmonean tunnel crisis and the missed redeployment deadline, or the July 1997 clashes, also in Hebron, in reaction to posters that settlers displayed showing the Prophet Muhammad as a pig. Not all clashes were spontaneous.
Various Palestinian organizations, including the PA, planned and coordinated protests in the West Bank against settlement policies and occupation. Military cells of Hamas and PIJ remained active in the Occupied Territories and conducted planned operations against settlers. While there were relatively few bombing attacks (three during 1997-99), there was an increase in shootings. It is notable that the majority of the violence was in the Hebron and Nablus areas, where “ideological” settlers and Palestinians resided in close proximity.
Bilateral Security Relationship: Different Visions on Security
Despite the improving security environment inside Israel, the Israeli government was dissatisfied with the level of security cooperation from the PA. The Israelis had high expectations and pushed the PA to arrest and prosecute all Palestinians who were involved in resisting the occupation, whether in the distant past or the present. Shin Bet, the Israeli internal security service with primary intelligence-gathering responsibility in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, would pass to the PA lists of names of Palestinians whom Shin Bet considered terrorists. The Israeli security-services were reluctant to provide background as to why the individuals were suspects, because Shin Bet wished to protect its sources and methods. Shin Bet had little confidence in the PA security services and suspected the PA would focus instead on Shin Bet sources, rather than security investigations of suspected Palestinian militants. During the first intifada, about 1,000 Palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israel were killed by fellow Palestinians. After the establishment of the PA, Palestinian security services continued to target suspected collaborators by rounding them up and interrogating them. Shin Bet was concerned that the terrorist support infrastructure remained undisturbed in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This infrastructure would allow Hamas and PIJ to regroup and rebuild. They believed the only way to destroy the terrorist capability was to arrest, investigate and prosecute all known activists. Shin Bet wanted the PA to take more proactive measures.7
Palestinian security services, for their part, felt Shin Bet was dictating to them and trying to make the Palestinian services surrogates of Shin Bet. They accused Shin Bet of making unsupported accusations.
An Israeli statement that so-and-so was a Hamas activist was not sufficiently compelling evidence to warrant the arrest and interrogation of the individual. There was another underlying, but equally important, phenomenon.
There was sympathy for those actively opposing the Israeli occupation. Struggling against occupation was considered a legitimate activity by the PA security officials. The PA wanted to stop the military attacks but not to punish the perpetrators by criminalizing the struggle against Israel. Jabril Rajub, the head of the West Bank Preventive Security Organization (PSO), stated in a press interview, “I don’t agree with the Israelis that we should fight Hamas. We will fight the phenomenon of violence.”8 According to the PSO Gaza commander, Muhammad Dahlan, “The presence of Hamas in the Palestinian territory is very important for the building of a Palestinian homeland. The homeland does not belong to Fatah alone. Hamas also had many victims on the road to establishing the homeland.”9
The Palestinian strategy was to win over the hearts and minds of these militants and reintegrate them into mainstream Palestinian society. The PA security services saw their role in terms of state building, not simply policing. Regional Palestinian security leaders would maintain contacts with the local Hamas and PIJ leadership, to keep lines of communication open and to put down “red lines” the opposition groups were told not to cross. Transgressions would result in detention by the PA and the shutting down of local chapters of their organization. These dialogues mirrored the dialogues between senior PA leadership (Arafat and others) and the senior leadership of these organizations. The structural weakness of the PA judicial system enabled the security organization to marginalize the courts on security cases. The Israelis were very uncomfortable with the PA’s dialogue with Hamas and PIJ. They did not believe the PA could co-opt the opposition groups; they had evidence militants remained secretly active while “under the control” of the PA security services.10
Because of this fundamental difference of approach, bilateral security meetings between the Palestinian security services and Shin Bet became increasingly contentious and ineffective.
Political Fallout and Security Band-Aids
When Netanyahu announced the planned development of Har Homa (Jabal Abu Ghunaym) in mid-March 1997, a crisis erupted between the Palestinians and Israelis, provoking the Palestinians to break off negotiations. While it was considered a crisis at the time, the real significance of the issue was not fully understood. Talks were already strained by the approval of the Jerusalem District Planning commission on December 8 for construction of a new Jewish neighborhood in Ras al-Amud, located in the heart of Arab East Jerusalem. Former U.S. ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk aptly summed up the situation to an Israeli audience in mid-December 1996, saying construction at Ras al-Amud would bring Israeli-Palestinian relations to the verge of an explosion.11 Rather than being deterred by the gentle warnings from the U.S. government, Netanyahu proceeded apace, declaring that the battle for Jerusalem had begun.
At the same time, the Israeli cabinet approved the first “further redeployment” (FRD). Once transferred, less than 10 percent of the West Bank would be under the full control of the PA. Palestinian positive reactions were immediately squelched by the Israeli cabinet’s vote the following day to limit the second FRD to 9 percent of the West Bank (2 percent of Area C and 7 percent of Area B).
Netanyahu presented a map to the cabinet showing his plan to limit the transfer of less than 40 percent of the West Bank to Palestinian control during permanent-status negotiations. The map showed the West Bank divided into sections, or cantons, by transit corridors controlled by Israel; the Palestinian sections were not contiguous. On March 17, 1997, the Palestinians broke off negotiations and security cooperation.
The rhetoric was fiery. Israel accused Arafat of heating up the Occupied Territories in a controlled escalation of disturbances and shooting attacks to break the political stalemate. Furthermore, Arafat was accused of encouraging Hamas, in a March 9 meeting with Hamas and PIJ leaders, to undertake terrorist attacks and of releasing military-wing members to allow them to do so. Arafat, in a press interview, stated that Hamas was a patriotic movement, not a terrorist organization, and that anything, including armed struggle, was possible.12 PA official Ahmed Abd-al-Rahman declared that, if Israel continued with Har Homa and other settlement activities, “Palestinians have no option but to stand up and offer their blood and souls in defense of their land, which is being expropriated and on which settlements are being built.”13 PSO commander Rajub on March 25, 1997, stated to the press, “there is no separation between political and security coordination. Palestinian security cooperation was buried with the first bulldozer that went up on Jabal Abu Ghunaym. There will not be any security coordination as long as there is no political coordination.”14 The United States tried to calm the situation, but its efforts were meek at best. On March 3,1997, President Clinton “wished” the decision to develop Har Homa had not been taken. Two weeks later, the U.S. government “did not think this decision ought to be taken.”
On March 21, 1997, the suicide bombing at the Apropos Café in Tel Aviv permitted the Israelis to shift the issue away from settlements to security. The Israelis accused Arafat of giving a “green light” to violence. The Israeli cabinet declared that for talks to resume, the PA must tighten its cooperation with Israel on security, prevent incitement of violence, fight terrorist organizations effectively and destroy terrorist infrastructure. The deadline for the first FRD was allowed to slip by, and the United States elected to use quiet diplomacy on the settlement issue.
Public and private pressure was placed on the Palestinians regarding security. This established a pattern of engagement for the United States: a piecemeal approach with security being the biggest piece.
In May 1997, Washington bullied the Palestinians into resuming security cooperation. On May 9, Palestinian and Israeli security chiefs and deputies attended the first trilateral security meeting at the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv, hosted by the CIA. Meetings do not directly correlate to cooperation on the ground, but at least a forum was begun for the mediated discussion of issues. Through the trilateral meeting system, the United States hoped to preempt some of the heated disputes caused by rival interpretations of Israeli-Palestinian exchanges in which no third party was present. This forum continued intermittently and informally through 1997 to October 1998. The CIA’s goal was to promote sharing of information in an attempt to stop further violence. Going beyond facilitation, the CIA began vetting prisoner releases and arrests and clarifying what was actually happening on the ground. The CIA’s role in the trilateral meetings effectively made the CIA a referee of disputes and an arbiter on whether the PA was doing enough to fight terror.15 CIA Director George Tenet, who was personally involved in negotiating security-related agreements with the PA and Israel since the Sharm al-Shaykh antiterrorism summit, declared at the time,
There is a single ray of light on the background of the terrorist attacks in the past two years in Israel, and that is the contribution by the U.S. to the work of the sides in facilitating the dialogue and security cooperation, especially in that it caused the Palestinians to fulfill their obligations.16
Security cooperation had its ups and downs. For example, in the West Bank, security efforts were focused on wrapping up the Hamas military wing, run by the Awadallah brothers. This extensive network of military and support cells was responsible for many of the Hamas operations in Green Line Israel and the West Bank from 1994 to 1999, including the bus bombing campaign. The PA declared the network leaders to be fugitives and undertook investigations in coordination with Israel and the CIA to locate and arrest them. In mid-1997, West Bank PSO arrested members of a Hamas cell who were operating out of the Surif area of the West Bank and were connected to the Apropos Café bombing.17
This positive security action was undermined by the Israeli abduction of two of the cell members from PSO custom while they were being transferred to a different jail in November 1997. As PSO commander Rajub had coordinated the transfer with his Israeli counterparts, he considered the act duplicitous and an attempt by the Israeli government to undermine his personal standing with Palestinians. Rajub broke off security cooperation between his service and the Israelis, while the other PA security chiefs elected to continue their relationships. Given that the most pressing security issues were in the West Bank, and that the PSO was arguably the predominant security organization in the West Bank, security cooperation suffered overall. Despite the holes in cooperation, counterterrorism successes continued. For example, in January 1998, Palestinian and Israeli security services worked together in an important operation based in Nablus, including the raid on a Hamas bombmaking laboratory and the seizure and destruction of 300 kg of explosives.18
Wye Damage Control
Meanwhile, the political process remained stalled, though not due to a lack of attention. Between March 1997 and October 1998, U.S. Middle East envoy Dennis Ross shuttled to the region at least seven times. The U.S. secretary of state visited Israel and the PA three times and met with senior Israeli and PA advisors elsewhere at least six times. President Clinton held two summits with Netanyahu and an equal number with Arafat. U.S. officials maintained daily contact with senior Israeli and Palestinians officials. Lower-level Palestinian-Israeli contacts continued intermittently. Notably, the two principals met only twice during the period. Everybody was talking to everybody, except the two decision makers. The issues were many, but settlements and security were the show stoppers. The deadline for the second FRD came and went. Interim Agreement discussions on the airport, the seaport and safe passage went nowhere. The political discussions were stuck. Yaacov Peri, former head of Shin Bet, summed up the situation well when he said, “It’s a vicious circle we’re trapped in. The Palestinians say they can’t guarantee security without movement in the peace process, and we say we can’t move the process without security.”19
With the process stalled, the United States decided to convene another summit and present another security fix: the Wye River memorandum. There was nothing really new about Wye, except for the revised timetable. There was press play about the new role of the CIA in the peace process; in reality, it was just more of the same. Now, however, the role was formalized into a written agreement. On security, the Palestinians committed to do what they had already committed to do in previously signed agreements, i.e., combat terrorism. A mechanism to better assess Palestinian efforts was agreed to through the development of a Palestinian counterterrorism work plan. This work plan became the yardstick by which the CIA assessed Palestinian compliance. The memorandum called for the establishment of bilateral U.S.-Palestinian committees to meet biweekly (in addition to bilateral Israeli-Palestinian security-cooperation meetings) to create a working-level forum for the Palestinian security services to update the CIA on their counterterrorism activities. Again, this article of Wye only put on paper something that was already happening. Wye also formalized the trilateral U.S.-Israeli-Palestinian senior level security meetings and stipulated regular meetings.20
What is notable about the Wye memorandum is the complete absence of the words “Israeli settlements” in the text of the document. Whatever was discussed at Wye failed to make it into print. Instead, there was a one-sentence paragraph about neither side taking unilateral actions that would change the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in accordance with the Interim Agreements. There were “understandings” about “no significant expansion,” but nothing concrete and verifiable, unlike the security clauses.
It is not surprising that the implementation of Wye bogged down quickly. The negotiators were barely off the plane before new land confiscations for settlements were announced, and violence in the Occupied Territories broke out. More Israelis and Palestinians were killed in suicide attacks. The rhetoric was intense, and there was enough incitement by both sides that neither party could claim the high moral ground. Against this backdrop, it is amazing that any obligation under Wye was implemented. Nonetheless, some were.
The Palestinians began by rounding up the usual suspects. The Palestinian security services completed their work plans, and the United States certified the PA to have met its obligation. The Israeli government carried out the first stage of the three-part FRD, released prisoners and permitted the opening of the Gaza airport. By December 3, 1998, the Israeli cabinet froze its Wye commitments, suspending redeployments, citing continuing violence in the Occupied Territories. In the next five months, many things happened, but nothing changed. The process was again stuck.
The Barak Approach: Take It or Leave It
Barak was a “security-ist” who came to the office of prime minister in July 1999 acting as a general, not a diplomat. He saw concessions as a sign of weakness and considered confidence-building measures concessions. Barak had been trained not to project weakness. Barak articulated “red lines” before assuming office. These red lines were not unfamiliar, but he stated them with such conviction and consistency that he left the impression they were nonnegotiable. He was on the record for having opposed the Oslo II accords because he thought the security provisions too lax. On the ground, as prime minister, he opted to renegotiate the terms of Wye, and he permitted settlement-expansion activities to proceed and, indeed, increase.
The Palestinians were losing hope in the peace process. Increasingly, they viewed Oslo as an ineffective means of achieving Palestinian national aspirations. The lengthy process had resulted in more territorial seizures, more settlements, more IDF intrusions into their lives, more humiliation, less freedom of movement, less personal security and a reduced standard of living. Barak’s rhetoric and actions were widely interpreted by the Palestinians to mean the peace process under Barak would be no better for them than it was under Netanyahu. Arafat was losing important constituencies he needed to have behind him in order to make new concessions in final-status negotiations. Arafat’s core supporters – Fatah Tanzim, the Palestinian intelligentsia and lawmakers – had become nonbelievers. This reduced his room to maneuver.
The language of Palestinians increasingly reverted to terms of confrontation. There was increased discussion of a “new intifada” and “struggle against occupation.” These discussions were not just among the politicians or for public consumption, but at the grass-roots level and within the Palestinian security ser vices. In July 2000, Palestinian polls showed 52 percent of Palestinians supported violence against Israelis.21 Despite this, the rate of bombing attacks in Green Line Israel from January 1999 to September 2000 had dropped to three – with no Israeli fatalities – showing continued stabilization of the security situation. Clashes in the Occupied Territories continued unabated.
The Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum, yet another quick security fix, revised the Wye timetable, reaffirmed what had been affirmed (and contravened) in the past, and then was selectively implemented. Barak, the general, understood this as just one more skirmish that wasted the resources of the Israeli government. He decided it was time for a major engagement, the battle to end all battles: Camp David.
There has been a lot of debate about what happened at Camp David, why it failed and whose fault the failure was. There was enough fault to go around. The United States created undue pressure to reach an agreement in a limited amount of time because Clinton’s term in office was coming to an end. Arafat and his team were not prepared for the summit and had few counterproposals to make. Thus, they seemed (and were) inflexible. Barak’s all-or-nothing approach created an unnecessary (and unhelpful) brinksmanship atmosphere. Very significant developments on final-status issues took place, with real discussions on potential solutions, which up until that point had been taboo. Because all parties were afraid to leave Camp David appearing weak, Camp David became an ending point, rather than a step along the way in final-status discussions. The United States made a critical error in allowing Camp David to be perceived as the endgame, despite the knowledge that failure would have disastrous repercussions. At Camp David, Clinton sensed the magnitude of the situation when he said in anger and despair to Arafat, “These things have consequences; failure will mean the end of the peace process . . . . Let’s let hell break loose and live with the consequences.”22 Given the option of taking or leaving it, and assessing the impact of both options on the aspirations of the Palestinian people, Arafat opted to leave it.
In the political vacuum created by the failure of Camp David, the Palestinian street finally boiled over. While it was not pre-planned, as the Israeli government asserted, it was inevitable and had long been predicted. It is no coincidence that the spark that lit the fire was Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Haram al-Sharif, the third-holiest Muslim religious site. Indeed, it took something of this magnitude to unite the Palestinians to take mass action.
Netanyahu declared the “Battle for Jerusalem” began with the construction of Har Homa. The Palestinian reaction at the time was a war of words. History proved the response ineffective. The Palestinians were not going to repeat the mistake and lose what they value most in their political struggle, the Haram al-Sharif. This time, they brought their sticks and stones to the battle. The Israelis brought their rubber bullets, live ammunition and overwhelming force. And so began the al-Aqsa intifada, which took its name from one of the mosques of the Haram al-Sharif. The vicious circle of violence perpetuated by Palestinian suicide bombings and Israeli military reprisals has subsequently destroyed the remnants of the political and security progress achieved in the previous nine years.
Hard Lessons from a Failed U.S. Policy
Through inconsistent actions, the United States permitted Oslo to become irrelevant. When the crisis of confidence was caused by security issues, Washington responded forcefully with security solutions. When the crisis was caused by political disagreements, the United States responded with more security solutions and political platitudes. On settlements, the
U.S. response was, at best, feeble. The language became increasingly stronger as time passed, but there was never any action to back up the U.S. words. Settlement construction and expansion was one of the factors most responsible for destroying Palestinian commitment to the MEPP. The Clinton administration clung to fuzzy concepts of natural growth and no significant expansion, which were meaningless in stopping Israel from taking unilateral actions to prejudice a final-status solution. Another factor was the failure of Israel to implement its FRD obligations. The United States would make guarantees for implementation, but at the moment action was required, Washington would shy away.
The Israeli government was quick to realize there were no consequences to not heeding U.S. “advice.”
On the other hand, the Palestinians refused to delegitimize resistance to occupation tactics in the West Bank and Gaza Strip – land confiscations, home demolitions and intrusive checkpoint searches – which the United States frequently overlooked when they fell below the definitional threshold of terrorism. The Clinton administration lost track of the big picture and permitted final status to become a casualty of the interim squabbles. Camp David was an ill-conceived and desperate attempt to revive a dying patient. Oslo died at Camp David; its wake began on September 29, 2000.
Why did the United States continue to pursue this ineffectual policy? Because it was easy. Why did the United States repeatedly apply the CIA security fix during the period of the Netanyahu and Barak governments? Because it was easy and doable. Because it had the outward appearance of doing something to move the peace process forward.
Why did the U.S. government not forcefully address the political disagreements that stymied progress, namely settlement expansion, FRD implementation and final-status agreement? Because it was hard, domestically hard.
The Bush Approach: Déja Vu
The Bush administration has chosen to distance itself from direct involvement in political negotiations with the Palestinians and Israelis and has called upon the Palestinians to change their ways. As outlined in his June 2002 speech, Bush identified the obstacles to Middle East peace as Arafat and security. The assumptions are that the removal of Arafat and the restructuring of the Palestinian security services will stop suicide bombings and allow the two parties to return to meaningful negotiations leading to a Palestinian state and peace. U.S. policy, as articulated in the Roadmap, presses for Palestinian political and security reform and an end to terror. Arafat’s timely death has freed the pathway for a new Palestinian leadership to emerge; indeed, Palestinians elected Mahmoud Abbas on January 9, 2005, by a solid majority.
Meanwhile, the United States has embraced Israeli Prime Minister Sharon’s plan for unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip. Efforts to link unilateral disengagement to a larger political process– namely the Roadmap – remain caught in the sphere of rhetoric and have yet to be translated into policy or planning. Conceptually, there is significant disagreement among the parties over how Gaza disengagement can be integrated into the Roadmap. The Palestinians prefer to jump to Phase II or III, while the Israelis demand Palestinian implementation of Phase I, ending terror.
A more fundamental issue, however, is the Roadmap itself. As originally presented, Phase I requires the Palestinians to undertake an unconditional cessation of violence; to implement the Tenet Plan to end violence, terrorism and incitement through restructured and effective Palestinian security services; and to undertake comprehensive political reform. Israel is required to withdraw to the September 28, 2000, lines, dismantle settlement outposts erected since March 2001, and freeze all settlement activity, including “natural growth.” The Roadmap explicitly states that both parties are expected to perform their obligations in parallel unless otherwise indicated. However, this obligation ended when the Bush administration agreed to take into account fourteen Israeli reservations, several of which stipulate that the Palestinians must meet their security obligations in Phase I before Israel is obligated to implement their commitments.
The Bush approach of placing security first, in parallel with political issues, will reach the same dead end that Oslo reached. This approach not only ignores the lessons of the Oslo process, but repeats many of the same mistakes. It should be no surprise to anyone involved with Oslo that the Tenet Plan for a ceasefire has never taken hold. From the Palestinian and Israeli perspectives, they have “been there, done that,” to no tangible benefit. Even Tenet was pessimistic about a ceasefire.23 The situation is beyond the fix of another CIA Band-Aid.
The Bush administration’s call to reform the PA security services by consolidating the thirteen-odd services into two or three organizations has little to do with improving security capabilities. While it is true there is tremendous overlap in the current structure, and the organizations are highly competitive and reluctant to cooperate, the Palestinian security services were reasonably effective when they chose to be, as indicated by the reduced number of bombing attacks in Green Line Israel from mid-1996 to October 2000. They used the shotgun approach of mass arrests, which exposed them (rightfully) to allegations of human-rights abuse, but in the process, they rolled up terror cells. Their investigation and interrogation practices were effective. The PA security services, through their extensive community contacts, had a good idea of what was going on in the Palestinian communities. This is not to say that they knew everything.
There were intelligence failures. The effectiveness of the PA security services was less a function of training and organization than it was of their political agenda.
The backbone of the PA security services was Fatah Shabiba and Fatah Tanzim. Shabiba and the Tanzim are grass-roots organizations of Palestinian activists who came of age in the first intifada and who supported the secular Fatah platform. They are highly politicized and share formative experiences in the struggle against the Israeli occupation.
They are Fatah members first and security officers second. They are the young guard, the so-called “insiders,” who cast their lot with Arafat during the first intifada in an uneasy relationship binding the “insiders” to the “outsiders.” They became the street enforcers for the policies of Arafat and the PA. This relationship to Arafat and the old guard began to unravel in 1998, as issues of official PA corruption, succession and paralysis in the peace process converged. During this period, inter-Fatah rivalries increased as part of the succession battle in the post-Arafat age. Fatah’s popularity decreased as the population became disenchanted with the performance of the PA and the Oslo process. Good governance, or lack thereof, became a significant internal Palestinian issue.
The al-Aqsa intifada has all but severed this relationship. Rejecting Arafat’s fence-sitting, significant elements of the Tanzim embraced a different strategy: armed struggle to force a unilateral Israeli withdrawal, with or without negotiations. Changing the outward structure, and even the official leadership of the security services, will not fundamentally alter what is happening on the ground, since the political agenda of the vast majority of the members of the security services is no longer guided by the Fatah old guard, whether led by Arafat or Abbas.
Abbas faces the same conundrum Arafat faced: how to pursue a policy seeking a negotiated settlement with an end to the armed uprising, but not a declaration that resistance to occupation tactics is illegal. It is politically untenable for Abbas or any Palestinian leader to tell the Palestinians to quietly accept continued land confiscations, home demolitions, tree uprootings and humiliating treatment at checkpoints by the IDF and settlers. The Israeli government, conversely, will not accept anything less than the criminalization of resistance in all forms. For this reason, it is highly likely Abbas will come to be considered “soft” on terrorism by Israel and the United States in the “security first” context.
The Cost to America
In formulating a foreign policy for the Middle East, the United States needs to be guided by its core national-security interests in the region. These interests are a politically and economically stable region that allows the United States access to strategic oil supplies and productive relationships with key Middle Eastern governments that will support U.S. initiatives worldwide (read Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia).
The rise of anti-Americanism and terrorism threatens both of these national-security interests. It is incumbent upon the United States to stamp out terrorism because it threatens our strategic interests and our domestic security. The war in Afghanistan cut off a deadly hand of terrorism, but the body will persist and flourish as long as those elements that nourish the body persist. These elements are the political, social and economic despair of those embroiled in political conflict who see the United States as partly or wholly responsible for their predicament. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a significant progenitor of anti-Americanism and terrorism in the Middle East. Solving that dispute will not bring an end to anti-Americanism in the Muslim world; however, it will make a major dent in it.
Time is not on America’s side. Currently, the majority of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank support a secular political system. However, as the economic and social systems of the Palestinians have imploded under punitive Israeli sanctions, more Palestinians find themselves seeking the only social safety net present in the Occupied Territories – one provided by Hamas. Political support for Hamas is growing at an alarming rate. For the first time ever, support for Islamic and opposition groups has a combined percentage higher than that of Fatah and its allies. The more powerful Hamas is, the greater the challenge will be to find a solution that meets the needs of the Palestinians, the Israelis and the United States. While Fatah has accepted the two-state solution, Hamas has not; the policy of Hamas is liberation of all Palestinian lands, not just the lands occupied in 1967.
The conflict is solvable. Solving it in a way that serves the national-security interests of the United States will require the breaking of some U.S. domestic political taboos. Specifically, the United States would need to set a clear policy to require Israel do something it does not want to do: relinquish most of the lands it occupied in 1967, including settlements, and support the formation of an independent Palestinian state. For any peace to be lasting, that state must have contiguous territory with no intrusive Israeli sovereign presence. Such a settlement will meet the political aspirations of the majority of the Palestinian people and remove points of conflict that spark daily clashes in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and breed hatred between two peoples and two cultures.
This is not a zero-sum game. The United States does not need to choose among Israel’s security, a viable Palestinian state and U.S. strategic interests. The above policy recommendation is heresy in the halls of the U.S. government because it appears to suggest imperiling the security of one of our most important allies. Those who think this accept uncritically the Israeli assertion that a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders is an existential threat to the state of Israel, i.e., that this is a zero-sum game. The Oslo experiment showed that when the PA assessed it was in its political interest, it could create a stable security environment for Israel; the PA did this for Green Line Israel from mid-1996 to September 2000. Conversely, if it was not deemed to be in the PA political interest, the PA could ensure that the environment remained unstable; this has occurred in the Occupied Territories during the same period and in both areas since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada. Therefore, the issue is the political will of the parties. If a settlement is placed on the table that meets Palestinian political aspirations, they will have the political will to meet the security needs of the Israeli people. If the security needs of the Israeli government are met, the Israeli people will not be afraid of normalization.
The next challenge is sustaining security and normalization for the long term. The United States is in a position to guarantee the long-term territorial integrity and security of the Israeli and Palestinian states. In fact, the U.S. government put together a draft U.S.-Israeli defense partnership plan as part of the Camp David discussions.24 The defense partnership will formalize this strategic pact and codify the enduring relationship. In order to promote future stability, the United States would need to create a Marshall Plan for the new Palestinian state. Development of democratic institutions within a sound economic system should be the focus of the program. While internal-security organizations are required, the United States should not err by “growing a security state.” The Palestinians have an autocratic history that needs to be left behind. The United States should also assist real normalization between Israel and neighboring Arab states. By helping the Palestinians and Israelis forge economically, politically and socially secure states, despair and anger will be largely dissipated. This will fundamentally alter the dynamics in the region and remove a major source of hatred that is feeding anti-Americanism and terrorism in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.
Such an initiative would come with a tremendous price tag. However, the cost to America of not undertaking a new approach, both to this conflict and to the growth of anti-Americanism and global Islamic terrorism, is higher.
2 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Poll 15, February 1995, and Poll 22, March 1996, www.pepsr.org/survey/cprspolls.
3 Benjamin Netanyahu, “Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the Protocol Concerning Redeployment in Hebron,” Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/ go.asp?MFAH00t60.
4 Peace Now statistics, as of September 2002, www.peacenow.org; and “The Myth of Natural Growth, Who Are They Fooling?” Monitoring Israeli Colonizing Activities in the Palestinian West Bank & Gaza (April 2001), Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem. Statistics based on Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.
5 “Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel since the Declaration of Principles (September 1993),” www.israel.org. (The statistics do not appear to include suicide bombers or Palestinian civilian collateral deaths.)
6 Btselem statistics, as of September 2002, www.btselem.org.
7 Jeffrey Goldberg, “From Peace Process to Police Process,” The New York Times Magazine, September 14, 1997; and “This Is How the CIA Operates in Israel and in the Territories,” Kol ha-ir, November 24, 2000.
8 Jeffrey Goldberg, op. cit.
9 “Muhammad Dahlan: We Erred with Our Harsh and Discriminatory Attitude towards Hamas,” Ha’aretz, June 15, 1997.
10 Avi Segal and Haled Abu-Taomeh, “Justice for Show: This Is How the Judicial System Works in the Territories,” Yerushalayim, Supplement, August 22, 1997; and Steve Rodan, “Arafat’s Balancing Act with Terror,” Jerusalem Post, September 12, 1997.
11 Geoffrey Aronson, “Clinton Administration Sharpens Focus on Settlements,” Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories, Foundation for Middle East Peace, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1997.
12 Ron Ben-Yishai, “Arafat’s Last Resort,” Yediot Ahronot, June 15, 1997; and Yoel Marcus, “Arafat Is Playing with Fire,” Ha’aretz, March 25, 1997.
13 Interview, London-based MBC-TV, February 15, 1997.
14 “The Political Scene,” Middle East Economic Survey, Vol. 40, No. 13, March 31, 1997.
15 Elaine Sciolino, “Violence Thwarts CIA Director’s Unusual Diplomatic Role in Middle Eastern Peacemaking,” The New York Times, November 13, 2000; and Douglas Jehl, “Israelis and Palestinians Agree to U.S. Role in Attack Inquiry,” The New York Times, August 13, 1997.
16 “This Is How the CIA Operates in Israel and in the Territories,” op. cit.
17 Jay Bushinsky and Jon Immanuel, “Ross Pushes for Joint Security,” Jerusalem Post, August 12, 1997; and Steve Rodan, “Officials: We Knew Central Jerusalem Was Next Target,” Jerusalem Post, September 5, 1997.
18 Margot Dudkevitch and Mohammed Najib, “CIA, PA Security Officials to Meet Tonight,” Jerusalem Post, September 8, 1998; and Jeffrey Goldberg, op. cit.
19 Jeffrey Goldberg, op. cit.
20 Jonathan S. Landay, “CIA’s New Mideast Role: Referee,” Christian Science Monitor, October 27, 1998; George J. Tenet, “What ‘New’ Role for the CIA?” The New York Times, October 27, 1998; and Elaine Sciolino, “Violence Thwarts CIA Director’s Unusual Diplomatic Role in Middle Eastern Peacemaking,” The New York Times, November 13, 2000.
21 Graham Usher, “The Washington Process,” Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, December 31, 1998, January 6, 1999, No. 410.
22 Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, “Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors,” The New York Review of Books, August 9, 2001.
23 Todd S. Purdum, “CIA Chief Skeptical about a New Palestinian Security Force,” The New York Times, August 13, 2002.
24 Bruce Reidel, “Camp David – The US-Israeli Bargain,” Bitter Lemons, No. 26, July 15, 2002.
Middle East Policy is fully accessible through the Wiley Online Library
Click below to subscribe to the online or print edition of Middle East Policy and gain access to all journal content.