Dr. Mattair ([email protected]) is an independent author and consultant.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are concerned about threats from several quarters: terrorism, Iraq, Iran and U.S. policy in the region. The Sunni Arab GCC regimes are concerned that Sunni Arab extremist followers of al-Qaeda pose a threat to their rule. The threat was obvious in the pronouncements of Osama bin Laden in the 1990s and in the bombing of the Saudi Arabian National Guard facility in Riyadh in 1995. It became more obvious with the attacks on New York City and Washington on September 11, 2001. Indeed, the level of cooperation that GCC states gave to the United States in the fields of intelligence, law enforcement and financial regulations after these attacks illustrated their level of concern. The bombings in Riyadh on May 12, 2003, also brought this threat home and have led to greater efforts to dismantle these networks.
GCC states are also dismayed that the Iraqi bulwark against Shia Iran has been removed by the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s predominantly Sunni Baath regime in Iraq, and the civil war and growing Iranian influence in Iraq that have followed this regime change. They have been concerned that Sunni Arabs have been marginalized in the new Iraq, that Iran exercises too much influence over the Shia Arab parties that dominate the new government there, that Iranians in Iraq may engage in subversive activities against them, and that the civil war may actually spill over into their own states.
GCC states are uneasy that Iranian influence is growing in a “Shia crescent” across the region, particularly in the Levant, and particularly because of the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflicts. They have been concerned about Iran’s conventional military acquisitions and exercises in the Gulf; its insistence on occupying the strategic islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs, which lie along the critical shipping lanes of the Gulf; its past efforts to subvert GCC regimes; and rumors that Iran has increased its contacts with the Shia populations in GCC states. They are worried that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would make it more assertive in the Gulf and throughout the region. But their relations with Iran are complex, involving considerable trade and the possibility of cooperation in many areas, and there has been a thaw in recent years. As they said at a GCC meeting in May 2006 — and as they say in private — they want problems with Iran resolved through diplomacy rather than force.
They fear they otherwise would be targets of Iranian retaliation.
In addition, GCC states have been disappointed that the United States is not battling extremism in the region by addressing effectively some of the most serious grievances that foster extremism, such as the plight of the Palestinians. Moreover, they recall that the United States ignored their advice in 2002 and 2003, when they said that Arab public opinion did not support U.S. military action against Saddam Hussein’s regime and that the United States would not be able to control the aftermath of the war. They think the U.S. military presence itself is one reason for insurgency and civil war, yet fear the United States will withdraw from Iraq in a way that results in fragmentation, partition and wide- spread ethnic cleansing. They want the United States to withdraw gradually and to be replaced by other forces, including Muslim forces, after stability and Sunni Arab rights have been established. Furthermore, they are very concerned that the United States will undertake military action against Iran that will “blow back” on them. They also fear that, in the event of
U.S. strikes against Iran, the United States would withdraw without restoring order.
WHAT HAS BEEN DONE?
In November 2006, the Bush administration asked the GCC states to put pressure on Iraqi Sunni Arab insurgents to lay down their arms. Administration officials also asked GCC leaders to encourage Iraqi Sunnis to support Prime Minister Maliki of the Shia al- Dawa party so that he could take on Shia militias supported by Iran. The former Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki bin Faisal, seemed to endorse this when he called for support for the Maliki government in October. This message may have been conveyed to Harith al-Dhari of the Muslim Scholars Association, which has ties to Sunni insurgents, when he was received by Saudi officials in October. But on that occasion he also may have been assured of Saudi support in the event of a premature U.S. withdrawal and/or worsening civil war. Indeed, Saudi King Abdullah reportedly told Vice President Cheney in November that the Saudis would have to support Iraqi Sunnis if the United States withdrew from Iraq and left chaos behind.1
The GCC foreign ministers expressed general support, at a mid-January 2007 meeting, for the Bush administration’s effort to stabilize Iraq, subdue sectarian violence, promote national reconciliation and prevent Iranian interference — an effort that entailed a “surge” of U.S. forces and did not at that time include U.S. talks with Iran.2 But this official position masks their uneasiness. GCC states should encourage Iraq’s Sunni Arab moderates to accept compromises that protect Sunni Arab interests and provide realistic limits on Iraqi Shia Arab power, if in fact they can be obtained. Perhaps some of the tentative efforts to bring former Baath party officials back into government, and the initial success in passing a draft of a new national oil law that would allocate revenue equitably to the Sunni Arabs, signal some movement in this direction. If so, this would make it easier for the GCC states to act against any continuing Sunni insurgency in Iraq. But if the U.S. hopes for Iraqi national reconciliation are unattainable in light of the forces unleashed as a result of the U.S. invasion, that leaves the GCC states in a quandary.
The GCC states have called for renewed U.S. involvement in Arab-Israeli diplomacy and have revived the 2002 Arab League initiative, which offers normal relations with Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and a “fair and agreed” resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem. They have calculated that this is a way of reducing Iran’s influence over Islamic Jihad, Hamas and Hezbollah as well as being instrumental in taking a recruiting tool away from al-Qaeda. Saudi National Security Adviser Prince Bandar bin Sultan met in September with Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and discussed Arab-Israeli negotiations for a Palestinian state.3 Qatar’s foreign minister, Shaikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabir Al-Thani, attempted to bring Fatah and Hamas into a national-unity government. He hoped that such a government could become a partner in negotiations by accepting a two-state solution and thus implicitly accepting Israel. He did not succeed. The emir of Qatar, Shaikh Hamad, also met with Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres in Qatar in January 2007. In February, Saudi King Abdullah’s efforts led to a Fatah-Hamas national-unity government, but it was unacceptable to Israel and the United States because it only promised to “respect” previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements and did not meet the other two demands of Israel and the Quartet to recognize Israel and renounce violence.
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is appealing to an Arab Quartet of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Jordan to “reach out to Israel;” but, by continuing a boycott of the Palestinian Authority’s national-unity government, by failing to persuade Israel to even discuss the terms of a final agreement with the Palestinians, and by expecting revisions in the 2002 Arab League initiative that would essentially give up a Palestinian “right of return,” the Bush administration undercuts GCC efforts.
Saudi Arabia, other GCC states and the United States as well as Europe pledged billions of dollars in economic aid to Lebanon at a January 2007 conference in an effort to bolster Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s Sunni-Christian-Druze government and counter Iranian aid to Hezbollah. Saudi King Abdullah also held talks with leaders of Hezbollah in Jeddah in January. If Saudi Arabia is supporting covert U.S. and Israeli efforts to counter Hezbollah and Syrian challenges to Siniora’s government, he presumably warned Hezbollah leaders of this.
GCC involvement in fostering agreements in Iraq and the Levant could bolster the legitimacy of these Gulf regimes with their populations. The latter are increasingly op- posed to U.S. policy in the region and increasingly critical of their governments for being identified with it. This would ideally help them confront the general challenge from al- Qaeda and the concrete possibility of al-Qaeda forces leaving Iraq and going to GCC states to attack these regimes and the U.S. military presence in these states. Given the impact of U.S. policy, however, it is not clear how successful GCC states can be. More- over, if the Saudis and Americans are actually funding Sunni groups inspired by al-Qaeda in Lebanon and Syria in order to counter the influence of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, this clearly has the potential to backfire.4
BAD OPTIONS
There are rumors that certain GCC states may consent to U.S. contingency plans to launch attacks against Iran from GCC territory. It has been reported that Prince Bandar supports this and has assured Vice President Cheney’s staff that Saudi Arabia will not oppose, and may even support, this. It has also been reported that Prince Turki’s resignation was based in part on his opposition to this option.5 One Saudi official has denied rumors that Saudi Arabia has consented to U.S. military action.6 Qatar’s foreign minister has said that Qatar, which hosts the U.S. Central Command, would not participate in any attack launched from Qatar but declined to speculate on whether Qatar could stop the United States.7 UAE President Shaikh Khalifa bin Zayed has said the UAE will not permit its territory to be used in an attack against Iran.8 For the most part, any GCC acquiescence to this option would only follow U.S. pressure and be accompanied by reluctance, anxiety, and resentment. Some of these states that opposed U.S. military action against Saddam’s Iraq in 2003 reluctantly let the U.S. military use their territories then and can see that the outcome is not in their interest now.9 And Iran has signaled the GCC that, if the United States attacks Iran from bases in the GCC states, Iran will retaliate against those states.10 This could explain why advanced Patriot anti-ballistic missiles are being sold to GCC states. Even so, these countries are not highly confident about the effectiveness of Patriot missile batteries.11
This is not the place to discuss in detail the U.S. weapons systems and the Iranian targets that could be involved in an attack. But in the debate about war, Iran’s retaliatory capabilities against U.S. and British forces in Iraq and against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan and against Israel certainly play a big part.
Those involved in the debate have unwisely dismissed Iran’s ability to retaliate against the U.S. military and its GCC partners in the Arab/Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman, the route through which tankers carry one-fifth of the world’s daily oil supplies and much of its liquid natural-gas supplies. Many U.S. analysts argue that the
U.S. military can easily deal with “obsolete” Iranian conventional military forces, and that Iran cannot close the Strait of Hormuz to shipping.12 However, Iran has in the past acquired and/or developed some impressive war matêriel: Russian-made Sukhoi fighter jets; Shahab medium-range ballistic missiles; Chinese-made C-801 and C-802 and C-701 anti-ship cruise missiles that can be launched from air, land or sea; Chinese-made Houdong-class fast attack naval craft equipped with these modern anti-ship missiles; torpedo-firing and mine-laying diesel-electric-powered submarines; other mine-laying vessels; midget submarines and submersible swimmer delivery vehicles that can carry divers and explosives to targets throughout the Gulf; amphibious landing craft; and sur- face-to-air defensive missiles. Iran also has many types of small craft such as Boghammers and Boston Whalers, that along with fast-attack craft, could harass shipping and even aircraft carriers by “swarming” from many directions. Every economic and military target in the Gulf, in the Strait of Hormuz and in the GCC states falls within Iran’s range, and this includes military facilities used by U.S. forces.13
If the United States attacks Iranian nuclear installations and air defenses, and particularly if the U.S. military relies upon logistical support from reluctant GCC states, Iran could rationally deduce that U.S. targets could also include many other government and conventional military sites in order to cripple Iran’s retaliatory capabilities. The Iranian government might fear that the American government aims to induce regime change, even if the United States told Iran otherwise. Iran could therefore engage U.S. bombers and fighters and naval vessels and strike GCC airfields, ports, off-shore oil and gas fields, oil tankers and cities — perhaps even land marines and special forces on the GCC shore.
Casualties would certainly ensue and might be significant. Oil and gas tankers would be crippled and corporate owners would refuse to enter the Gulf as insurance rates skyrocketed. Oil and gas prices would rise significantly. Bahrain’s defense minister has noted that the GCC states have the military capabilities to defend themselves.14 But U.S. and GCC military forces would not likely be able to put an end to the conflict before considerable damage had been done, even if Iranian conventional military assets were on the U.S. list of initial targets. Iran could anticipate this and be prepared to wreak havoc in the Gulf at the first sign of strikes. Iran could continue costly covert acts of sabotage even after most of its military assets had been destroyed, and in the GCC states it could employ Iranian Shia elements living there for these purposes.
The civilian casualties and economic damage caused by war with Iran, particularly if nuclear bunker-busting weapons were used, would increase anti-Americanism to a level that would severely undermine U.S. power and influence throughout the region and could actually undercut GCC security and prosperity. Iran’s most celebrated activists in the fields of human rights and democracy believe that U.S. military strikes against Iran would subvert their efforts and bolster the clerical regime. And since these strikes will not destroy Iran’s nuclear programs but only set them back a few years, GCC states will have to contend with an aggrieved Iran re-building its nuclear program.15 Even if Iran’s regime fell, some members of Iran’s regular and Revolutionary Guard forces as well as intelligence agencies would survive to play some role in Iran, just as members of Saddam’s regime and military do in Iraq.
Those who prefer that Israel carry out strikes against Iran should consider that Iran would likely retaliate not only against Israel, but against its principal defender’s interests
as well. Iran would likely think the United States had colluded, even if Washington publicly deplored the Israeli strikes. It would be harder for Iran to justify overt, attributable attacks against U.S. interests in the GCC states, but clandestine retaliation such as the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing would not require public justification.
The GCC states have better alternatives to war if Iran acquires nuclear weapons.
Saudi Arabia could acquire nuclear weapons, probably by purchasing them from Pakistan, given the difficulty of setting up a nuclear program out of view of the American government. The smaller GCC states, particularly Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, rather than rely on any guarantee of protection from Saudi Arabia, with which they have their own disputes, might acquire nuclear arsenals for themselves. For the time being, the GCC governments have stated that they will pursue peaceful nuclear technology in a cooperative endeavor, but this is a signal to Tehran that they might acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent to the Iranian nuclear program. In addition, it is noteworthy that Qatar, with a rotating seat on the UN Security Council, has voted in favor of the two recent resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran for not suspending its uranium-enrichment program. This reflects a GCC assessment that, even if efforts to avoid war are critical, the matter of possible Iranian proliferation should be pursued vigorously.
TALKING VS. BOMBING
The GCC country that can bring the most weight to talks with Iran is Saudi Arabia.
And it appears that Riyadh wants to do so. In January 2007, Iran’s top nuclear negotiator,Ali Larijani, delivered a letter from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to King Abdullah asking him to ease U.S.-Iranian tensions.16 King Abdullah then said that Saudi Arabia had urged Iran to act with restraint in order to avert war in the Gulf.17 This advice probably recommended Iranian restraint in Iraq and the Levant as well as in its nuclear programs and in relations with Saudi Shiites. Bandar has reportedly discussed the nuclear issue with senior Iranian officials and has told the Bush administration that the Iranian overture to Saudi Arabia was based on Iran’s concern over U.S. displays of military strength in the region, UN Security Council sanctions, and the possibility of expanding Sunni-Shiite tensions in the region.18
Bandar also met with Larijani to try to coordinate a Saudi and Iranian effort to prevent civil war in Lebanon, and Iran reportedly then pressured Hezbollah to act with restraint. Bandar sought Iran’s agreement to a Lebanese deal that would increase Hezbollah’s representation in the government and authorize a UN tribunal to try those suspected of involvement in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. This attempt to drive a wedge between Iran and Syria did not succeed.19 Arab League calls for the return of the Golan Heights to Syria may be an effort to woo Syria away from Hezbollah and Iran. Hezbollah’s leader Shaikh Nasrallah has said, however, that his organization is not serving Saudi and Iranian interests.20
In early March, Ahmadinejad traveled to Saudi Arabia for meetings with King Abdullah and other Saudi officials. They discussed ways of curbing the conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli arena and are assumed to have discussed ways of avoiding U.S.-Iranian conflict. This would presumably include the Iranian nuclear program, but no specific agreements were announced. The Saudi Press Agency reported that Ahmadinejad expressed support for Abdullah’s 2002 Arab-Israeli initiative, but an Iranian Foreign Ministry official denied that the initiative had been discussed.21
King Abdullah and Prince Bandar and some other GCC leaders are uneasy about potential U.S. talks with Iran, fearing that the price of these talks would be U.S. recognition of Iran’s dominant role in the Persian Gulf.22 But there is a limit to what Saudi- Iranian talks can achieve on Iraq, the Arab-Israeli conflict, nuclear weapons and even Gulf issues. This is also true of talks such as those between Ahmadinejad and UAE President Khalifa in mid-May 2007. The real potential to produce agreements lies in U.S.- Iranian talks. Only the United States can offer Iran the security assurances and the lifting of sanctions that Iran has repeatedly sought in its various proposals on nuclear issues. And there is little chance of persuading Iran to moderate its behavior in the Gulf or on any other matter if Washington and Tehran do not reach a compromise. Iran continues to feel threatened by U.S. military forces in the Gulf and U.S. security partnerships with GCC states. Iran has long sought the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Gulf and the abrogation of U.S. security pacts with the GCC states. While GCC governments should be assured that Iran will not obtain these concessions, U.S. security guarantees and Iranian restraint ought to permit some reduction of U.S. forces in the Gulf and their deployment “over the horizon.” GCC states do recognize Iran’s need for a military capability sufficient for its own self-defense.
Iranian concerns about military action and economic sanctions have led Khamenei to want talks with the United States.23 The more vocal Ahmadinejad may or may not be a challenge to the supreme leader, but even he claims to want talks, and he does not have the power to determine what Iran’s positions in those talks will be. The president has suffered stinging rebukes at the polls and from the Majles. Newspapers associated with Khamenei and Larijani in late 2006 attacked him. It is well known now that Iran proposed a “grand bargain” to the Bush administration on May 4, 2003, and that this proposal to negotiate on Iran’s nuclear programs, the Arab League initiative of 2002, and regional security issues such as Iraq was presented as having been approved by Khamenei, then- President Khatami, and then-Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi. The Bush administration did not take up the offer.
It could be very advantageous for GCC states to encourage the Bush administration to talk to Iran about these issues. However, in order to reach an agreement, the administration would have to give up any lingering neoconservative dreams of quick regime change and work instead for gradual political evolution in Iran. This may be the best way to boost the prospects of pragmatists and reformists in Iran, a country whose young population wants normal ties with the United States and more freedoms at home. Indeed, a grand bargain is the best way for the United States to reverse the growing trend of anti- Americanism among both Shiites and Sunnis in the Middle East and the broader Islamic world. Such a grand bargain would serve well the security partnerships between GCC states and the United States.
GCC states must, however, consider one conundrum: No U.S. administration is likely to offer Iran the security guarantees and economic incentives it seeks as long as Iran supports Islamic Jihad, Hamas and Hezbollah in their resistance to Israel — and Iran is not likely to withdraw this support unless a Palestinian state emerges. Whatever GCC governments can do to elicit Israeli and U.S. agreement to the creation of a Palestinian state should be done. At the Arab League summit in late March 2007, the criticism of
U.S. policy in Iraq, the calls for an end to the U.S. boycott of the Palestinian national-unity government, and the resistance to U.S. requests for revision of the 2002 Arab League initiative seem to be efforts to tell Israel and the Bush administration that they have to embrace a different policy.24 It is a hard sell in Washington, but the GCC states have little choice but to keep trying to be heard.
1 Seymour M. Hersh, “The Redirection,” The New Yorker, March 3, 2007. Nawaf Obaid suggested in an op-ed late in 2006 that Saudi Arabia would have to support Sunnis with money and arms if the civil war degenerated into ethnic cleansing, but the Saudi government argued that this was not an official view and Obaid was removed from his position as a consultant to the government.
2 The New York Times, January 17, 2007.
3 This meeting was reported in the press in September and then confirmed by a former Israeli ambassador to the United States, Danny Ayalon, in an article by Barbara Slavin in USA Today on February 11, 2007. Prince Bandar reportedly also met with Jewish American leaders.
4 Hersh, op. cit..
5 Steve Clemons blog. http://www.washingtonnote.com
6 Author’s discussion with an official from Saudi Arabia’s Embassy in Washington, DC, November 2006.
7 Financial Times, March 15, 2007.
8 Gulf News, March 28, 2007.
9 Officials from various GCC countries express opposition to U.S. military strikes against Iran in private conversations with visiting academics.
10 Trita Parsi, “Bush’s Iraq Strategy: Goad Iran into War,” Inter Press Service, January 12, 2007.
11 Frederic Wehrey cited this finding from a Rand Corporation study at a Stimson Center event on “Under- standing GCC Perceptionss of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” on September 8, 2006, in Washington DC.
12 Kenneth Katzman, Barry Posen, and Dennis Ross have made this argument.
13 Thomas R. Mattair, The Three Occupied UAE Islands: the Tunbs and Abu Musa, Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2005.
14 Agence France Press, March 19, 2007.
15 Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry explore this in Plan B for Iran: What If Nuclear Diplomacy Fails? A Report Based on a Workshop Hosted by the Preventive Defense Project of Harvard and Stanford Universities.
16 The Star Online, January 16, 2007.
17 Al-Siyasa, January 27, 2007.
18 The Washington Post, February 19, 2007.
19 The Washington Post, February 19, 2007.
20 The New York Times, January 30, 2007.
21 The New York Times, March 5, 2007.
22 The New York Times, January 17, 2007. Moreover, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal strongly objected to a proposed visit by the French foreign minister to Iran to solicit Iran's cooperation in curbing Hezbollah and establishing an international tribunal to try the assassins of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri, a visit that was canceled.
23 Author’s discussion with former Iranian Foreign Ministry official, March 2006.
24 The New York Times, March 28, 2007.
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