Four decades after the Islamic revolution in Iran, when countries across the globe are grappling with the Covid-19 pandemic, analyzing Iran’s Middle East policy may seem eccentric. However, in the lead-up to the U.S. presidential election and the end of Donald Trump’s first term, the Middle East is drenched in chaos, instability and upheaval. The Israel-Palestine conflict continues, and the Israeli government has declared it intends to annex part of the West Bank. Trump has formally recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights. Tehran no longer commits to the limits set by the nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),* as long as the Trump administration pursues maximum pressure on Iran and a “No War, No Peace” strategy in the Middle East. In Iraq, tensions have escalated between the United States and Iran, fueling conflict while Baghdad lacks a strong and functional central government. Iran fired missiles in retaliation for the U.S. strike that killed General Qasem Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s Quds Force, the external affairs branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The war in Yemen is not over and there is no sign of peace. In addition, the civil war in Syria makes the future of the country ambiguous. With no prospect of an end within sight, the war in areas like Idlib will continue. In 2019, oil tankers were attacked several times in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Saudi Aramco’s oil facilities were hit by drones and missiles, and Iran shot down an American drone that had entered its territorial waters. In Lebanon, demonstrators took to the streets, angry at widespread corruption, mismanagement, unemployment and poor public services — even before the devastating explosion.

As analysts observe these developments, they also ponder the controversial topics of post-revolutionary Iran’s foreign policy and grand strategy in the Middle East. In such a region, economic development cannot be the strategic priority, and guns are generally sexier than butter. Therefore, it would be important to understand Iran’s regional strategy, especially after the assassination of Soleimani. While some scholars believe Iran’s foreign policy is based on offense, others view it as defensive. We argue that Iran’s grand strategy is a mixture of both, moving gradually from defense to offense. Tehran intervenes wherever the United States and its allies try to impose their military-political-security dominance through regime change and influence, as Iran knows that American domination over bordering countries is the first step toward domination over Iran. It also has offensive aspects, as Iran tries to keep the United States and its allies away from its borders, countering their hegemony and striving to expel U.S. forces from the Middle East.

The most salient factors driving Iran’s strategy in the region are influence and balance. Iran, like the United States, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, strengthens its relations where governments are considered allies, such as Syria, and institutionalizes its influence through politicians, parties and resistance groups in countries with which it has social and cultural affinities, such as Iraq and Lebanon. The Islamic Republic encounters rivals and enemies through the internal and external balance of power in association with superpowers like China and Russia. It prioritizes internal balancing as much as possible, and where it cannot, it depends on external balancing. This trend has gradually evolved over the past four decades and will continue as long as the U.S.-Iran conflict lasts.