Oil and gas resources and their transit routes are key sources of international power and tools of foreign policy, used not only to develop relations with other countries but to maintain regional peace and stability. However, the United States seeks to weaken energy-rich countries through sanctions to achieve economic and political goals. Hence, the need has arisen to establish competitive plans to secure energy supplies and provide security to industrialized importers during oil shocks. The main goal is to ensure a sustainable energy supply for industrialized nations and regulate international affairs.

THE SHALE REVOLUTION

One of the important requirements of the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) regarding the boycott of Iranian oil exports is that the U.S. president ensure that there is a sufficient supply of oil on the world market. A leading concern of U.S. policy makers in 2012, when the law was passed, was the surplus demand for oil on the world market and the consequent rise in prices. After imposing new sanctions on Iran, the United States took a series of actions: requiring oil-exporting countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to increase supply, imposing restrictions on Iran’s oil-importing customers, and investing in oil shale.¹ Iran’s fall into the trap of U.S. oil exemptions, seen as a sign of “retreat” and “American failure” in Iran’s zero-sum policy, has played a major role in the event. As a result, since May 1998, following the U.S. announcement that enforcement of its policy of zero-oil purchases from Iran was essential, even before the coronavirus pandemic erupted, Iran’s oil exports were declining as a result of secondary U.S. sanctions. Global oversupply amid a drastic drop in consumer demand, caused by the virus and its economic effects, will likely continue to depress Iranian exports for months to come. Because of sanctions, Iran has lost the important Indian market, and it appears difficult for it to return to its previous status. The share of security and persuasion strategies for the continuation of oil exports has become more pronounced in the Iranian authorities’ literature than the economic ones (oil supply and demand balance in the world market).²

Because it uses new and advanced technology, U.S.-produced shale gas is an unconventional source of energy. It has enabled the United States to meet not only its own need for gas, but also to export it. The United States can now compete with other fossil-fuel producers. In turn, this has reduced the relatively high price of oil and, to some extent, that of gas at the global level. After it invaded Iraq in 2003, the United States was once again perceptually threatened by Iran and its regional allies; it became concerned about a third-level power in an area that is normally of marginal interest. This is not because Washington wants to “preserve” energy supplies for its own industries, but because it wants to keep the price and supply under control for foreign-policy purposes.³ Studies report that the United States spends $81 billion per year protecting oil supplies, mostly those in the Persian Gulf. However, even when American oil imports were at a peak in 2005, the share from the Middle East was relatively small: the United States imported 14 percent of its oil from Saudi Arabia, 5 percent from Iraq and less than 2 percent from Kuwait. Since 2005, the shale boom has led to a dramatic drop in U.S. oil imports, though the United States remains profoundly linked to global energy markets.⁴ Any disruption to supply will affect the price of gasoline and slow down economic growth. Hence, it is in the interest of Washington to maintain the stability of the global markets. This issue is much more apparent in the United States than in other parts of the world.⁵