Hailed by many as the elections of the millennium, Egypt’s longest parliamentary season ever was held in three stages for the first time) from October 18 to November 14, 2000. This year’s event, in which Egyptians voted out some ruling party stalwarts and the Muslim Brotherhood scored its largest victory since 1987, marked a distinct improvement over the flawed 1995 contest. However, the governing elite’s desire to control and manage social forces contrasted with the president’s stated commitment to democracy, with the result that the governing National Democratic party (NDP) has maintained its dominance of the lower house of parliament, although not as easily as in the past.
Since the mid-1970s, Egypt’s governing system has shifted from one-party authoritarian rule to limited democratization permitting the relatively open expression of views on domestic and international issues. Political forces range across a wide spectrum, from left and liberal to Islamist. Nonetheless, power remains tightly held by the executive, which utilizes the dominant political party, the ramified bureaucracy and passive security organs to implement and enforce its policies. Egypt’s electoral democracy was based on rules contained in three sets of legal documents: the Constitution of 1971, the Parties law of 1977 and the Electoral law of 1983. Elements within the opposition as well as several independent thinkers have made strenuous efforts since the first elections under Mubarak in 1984 to place the conduct of the elections under the control of the judiciary rather than the Ministry of Interior, but the government had until recently refused. However, early in July 2000, Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) issued a ruling requiring total judiciary supervision of elections. Furthermore, the president issued directives that elections take place over three consecutive stages. The total number of candidates was 4,116. Official response to the SCC ruling, which declared the People’s Assemblies elected in 1990 and 1995 invalid due to lack of judicial supervision, was swift and efficient. An extraordinary parliamentary session was convened (parliament was on summer recess), and amendments introduced by a presidential decree were passed, establishing full judiciary supervision for all future parliamentary elections. In the wake of parliamentary response, the opposition press heralded the triumph of the rule of law and praised President Mubarak for working within the constitution.
No doubt this development constituted a major step forward, as the NDP was to face a more level electoral playing field than they had in decades. And though the party still held a massive logistical advantage over its opponents through state control of most newspapers and all broadcast news outlets, independent-minded judiciary supervision was bound to make the ballot-box stuffing that has been an Egyptian standard for generations a lot harder this time around.
PARTY PERFORMANCE
The National Democratic Party
The biggest surprise in the first phase of the elections was the noticeable retreat of the ruling NDP, which experienced its poorest showing in years. Just 175 of its 444 candidates won and only 52 of those without a runoff. The party’s secretary general had earlier on announced that “new faces” made up 42 percent of the names on the list, compared with 35 percent in the 1995 elections. This meant that approximately 260 members of the outgoing assembly were on the list while 180 others were excluded. Overall, between 2,500 and 3,000 NDP members who wanted to contest the elections had their applications turned down. Many of them ran as independents disregarding the initial NDP threat to expel them from party ranks. The list also included 11 women candidates (compared with 7 in 1995), 3 Copts (as opposed to none in 1995), 11 businessmen and several public figures.
However, full judicial supervision of polling, while opening the door to increased competition and eliminating some of the most outrageous varieties of fraud, has not exactly leveled the playing field. As always, government candidates relied upon state resources – bussed-in public-sector employees, for example – to tip the vote in their favor. Nor did the NDP shy away from exploiting sectarian policies. In Shubra, for example, where the ruling party’s nominee was the Christian minister of the economy, observers spotted voters in Islamist garb being turned away from the polling stations. In the nearby district of alWayli, where the Wafd had nominated a Coptic businessman, the NDP candidate distributed leaflets warning people not to vote for a Christian.
Moreover, the government’s domination of television, radio and most of the daily press enabled the NDP candidates and platforms to receive disproportionate attention. The president, his cabinet and the NDP made full use of the electronic media throughout the campaign.
The NDP party slate experienced its worst setback since its inception in 1978. But it was not just the party’s inability to put numbers up on the board that hurt; its losses were qualitative as well. Some of its highest-ranking veteran members could not repeat past glories. Some NDP losers had a parliamentary record that spanned 35 years.1
There was no clear pattern though to NDP losses and victories. Some top NDP members were soundly defeated while they managed to keep their most prominent big names such as ministers, former ministers and leading NDP figures.2 This might indicate that the voters were “punishing” those candidates seen as out of touch with their constituents rather than rejecting the entire ruling party. However, the NDP appears more internally fragmented than ever after the results of the elections, particularly as NDP leaders had always claimed broad support. Moreover, political analysts and commentators have since been calling for a restructuring of the party. Senior NDP officials are described as the “old guard” and “cardboard leaders who did everything possible and impossible to cling to their seats for decades at the expense of promoting the party with the people.” These often-heard criticisms have sharpened internal tensions within the party.
One of the strongest reactions to the NDP failures came from Gamal Mubarak, the president’s son and a member of the party’s general secretariat. Addressing an NDP rally, he said: “Following the elections, the time will be ripe for introducing a radical change to NDP ranks. The true weight and popularity of the NDP with the masses will be clearly assessed. We will be able to identify where the weaknesses are and we will prepare a long-term plan to address them. The results of the elections to date indicate that the central leadership of the party had nearly lost contact with its officers in villages and towns.”
The New Wafd
The retreat of the NDP did not produce equivalent gains by Egypt’s opposition parties, which surprised observers with their “modest” performance at the polls. The greatest losses came from the liberal Wafd. It had presented itself throughout the campaign period as the true competitor to the NDP, and Wafd president Noaman Gomaa was quoted more than once as saying that he expected the party to come away with 100 of the total 444 elected seats. Yet of the 72 Wafd candidates who participated in the first stage, none won a seat, although two Wafdists stood in runoffs.
No doubt, the dismal performance of the Wafd party (notwithstanding its revival on the eve of elections) took many observers by surprise, particularly as it could certainly not complain of government intervention in the polls. By all rights the Wafd should have been – next to the NDP – the party of choice in the kind of two party political system that best exemplifies the liberal ideal. The Wafd had everything going for it: over a decade of privatization, structural adjustment and free market economic policies; a discredited ruling party in the midst of economic crisis; liberal and upper-class credentials and connections; a new “youthful” and aggressive leadership with populist aspirations3 and a fairly free poll. It has fewer seats in parliament (7) than the combined leftists represented by the Tagammu, the Nasserites and a handful of independents. This will leave it in the uncomfortable position of having to join with the NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood, mainly on economic issues. Why did the Wafd finish so dismally, and to what extent does this reflect the future of the party?
It is clear that the party leadership heavily overestimated their capabilities, forecasting results that had never been seen, even in elections when the Wafd was stronger. When the Wafd allied itself with the outlawed Muslim Brothers in 1984, the party came away with only 57 seats. After splitting from the Brothers, it took 36 seats in the elections of 1987. Having boycotted the 1990 elections, along with most opposition parties, the Wafd came back in 1995 to take only 6 seats. As the numbers clearly show, the party has been on a downhill slide for the last 15 years. Even before the death at 90 of its famed leader, Fouad Serageddin, in August, no change had taken place in the internal composition of the Wafd for some time. Indeed, since 1995, the party has been virtually frozen, its activities limited to the issuance of occasional statements and the publication of its daily paper, which has itself been going steadily downhill.
The increasingly limited distribution of Al Wafd (60,000 from 250,000 in 1983) is a reflection of the decline in the party’s popularity. As Emergency Law limits party activity, it is the paper which is responsible for espousing the party platform and gaining new adherents. With its hardline stance against the government when it first appeared in 1983, Al Wafd was very successful in this respect. The eventual appearance however of several papers more vocal in their opposition to the government has chipped away at the Wafd’s popular support. Al Wafd proved unable to cover the electoral campaigns of its candidates in a balanced way, leading to several strong disagreements between candidates and the paper’s editorial board. Moreover, the Wafd maintained its belief that the history of the party and its name were enough to ensure the success of any candidate.
The Wafd’s mistakes were not limited to these. It has failed to develop grass-roots structures; therefore, its candidates had little tangible to offer voters, as there is no continuity in constituency services between election campaigns. Unless the Wafd manages a thorough overhaul of its structure and updates its party program and political discourse to appeal to current issues and perspectives, it will never generate the support necessary to turn it into a viable alternative to the ruling party.
THE ISLAMIST TREND
The Muslim Brotherhood
As in the past, this year’s 75 Muslim Brotherhood candidates ran as independents, since the organization is illegal. Despite a harsh crackdown that began in summer and continued through the elections, 17 of their candidates managed to win their seats.
One of their most intense election battles took place in the Doqqi-Agouza constituency between the ruling NDP candidate, a former minister of social affairs, and Muslim Brotherhood veteran spokesman, Maamoun el Hodeibi. Every time the latter went on a tour of his constituency, he had what to many seemed like the whole of the Interior Ministry for company! Wherever he went, the police hounded him and harassed his supporters and tried to keep voters out of the polling stations. The intervention was due to several factors. First, the ruling party, having seen an enormous number of their veteran candidates lose in the first two rounds of voting, could tolerate no more embarrassing losses. Second, the authorities could not accept that the Muslim Brotherhood, which they hoped had lost much of its support base after five years of lying low, should demonstrate that it still retained considerable grass-roots popularity.
The 1995 military trials that sent many of its best members to prison, coupled with that year’s rigged parliamentary elections that resulted in only one Brother winning a seat, convinced the leadership that their best strategy for the time being was to avoid drawing the government’s attention. However, they continued to engage in grass-roots work, particularly in poor districts and provincial towns.
One of their successful tactics was the careful selection of candidates. Because of the recent spate of arrests, the Brotherhood fielded candidates who were not prominent figures with a strong presence in the press and, therefore, managed to escape the filters of the security authorities. In addition, they are extremely well organized. They have been particularly effective in mobilizing supporters and articulating the interests of the poorest sections of the population4 by reformulating Nasser’s social contract, offering a version that promises social justice within the Muslim religious community.
Most of the Muslim Brothers who won seats won them in provincial towns, where the appeal of religion is a winning card. In Cairo, however, where the electorate is more politically aware, the results were quite different. Their prominent leaders failed to garner a seat despite the enormous amount of money spent.5 Their strong showing in stage one (6 seats) was not anticipated, but the government had decided not to interfere. In the first two stages, their victories were due to the fact that Brotherhood candidates were best poised to benefit from the widespread anger about the Palestinian intifada, which raged as the elections opened.6 It may also be attributed to the fact that the government “allowed” them to gain these seats partly as a safety valve for frustration at the government’s failure to take a harder line against Israel.7 Furthermore, with only second-tier Brothers elected, their effectiveness within parliament is bound to be limited. According to the Brotherhood’s spokesperson, their electoral gains were attributed to the integrity of the judges supervising the ballot.
The Islamists
Unlike the banned Muslim Brotherhood, whose candidates contested the elections individually, 3 embryonic “parties” (who were refused licenses) did not contest the elections: Al Wassat (Center), a breakaway faction from the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Sharia and al Islah (Reform) which represent both centrist Islamists and former members of al Jihad and al Gamaa al-Islamiyya.
The last two years had proven crucial in the transformation of the militant groups, which had previously resorted to violence against the state. These groups made a strategic decision, described by many as a fundamental shift in their ideology. The declaration of the cessation of acts of violence against the state was followed almost immediately by movement towards non-violent demands for the establishment of political parties. The state, however, continued to uphold its rejection of religion-based political parties.
It was said that one of the reasons the Islamists refrained from participating in elections may have been because they were following the fatwa of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, who had ordered his followers to refrain from participating in any political activity. This attitude exposes an unpublicized rift within the Islamists’ ranks, with some willing to be part of the system and others determined to shun the current political order. According to some analysts, the decision of these groups not to contest elections represents a symbolic victory by the government: The repressive policies against them in the 1990s have produced a generation that seeks to avoid any confrontation with the state.8
THE LEFTIST TREND
The Nationalist Unionist Progressive Grouping (Tagammu)
From its inception in 1976, the Tagammu was a coalition of Marxists, Nasserites and Arab nationalists. This state of affairs resulted in what could be described as “organizational disputes,” which plagued the party for the major part of its history, as Nasserites, being the majority, always felt that they should lead the party. Also in the mix were the illegal communist parties, particularly the Egyptian Communist party (ECP), whose members participated in establishing the Tagammu.
Despite internal tensions, the party has been held together by a common leftist spirit: sympathy with the 1952 anti-monarchy Free Officers Revolution, strong opposition to imperialism and Zionism, support for Arab unity and the Palestinian cause and defense of a national independence that included democracy and freedom of expression. Tagammu candidates emerged losers in parliamentary elections of 1984 and 1987, due to pressure from the government on the party at that time. This drove members to reconsider their tactics. Change came most clearly on two fronts: the relationship of Tagammu with the illegal communist parties and the content of AlAhali (their newspaper). The change came after it became clear that the government was nervous about the party’s being a front for communists. As for the newspaper’s hardline policy, it was changed from “mobilization” to “relative moderation,” a line that has prevailed until now. The party quietly dropped the socialist slogan from its platform during the 1995 elections after local and international developments threw leftist activists into a state of disarray and focused instead on democracy and “independent” development. Some senior party officials argue, however, that the gap between the party’s ideology and practice has been widening, causing internal tensions.
Perhaps the most poignant example of discord in the past decade came during the 1999 nationwide referendum on nominating the president for a fourth term in office. In previous referenda, Tagammu had voted against another term. In 1999, the party decided to abstain, causing many to think that the party was moving into the arms of the government. Moreover, with the rise of Islamist militants, the party leadership revised its list of enemies, deciding that the “fascism” of these groups was a worse threat than that of the government. Accordingly, priority was given to fighting the militants.
In the 2000 elections, Tagammu was the first party to come out with a platform entitled Popular Participation is the Road to Change. The 20-page electoral platform is an abstract of the 1998 party program calling for “a proper mix between planning and market forces” as a recipe for economic development, social justice and democratic reform.
Tagammu was the only opposition party to win a seat in the first round of elections, going to parliamentarian Al Badri Farghali in Port Said. They subsequently managed to garner 6 seats out of 42 fielded candidates.
The Nasserite Party
The Nasserite party did not fare much better than the Wafd. Nine of its candidates lost outright, the most prominent being Sameh Ashour,9 the only Nasserist representative in the outgoing parliament. In the second round they garnered only 1 seat, while 4 independent Nasserists won. They are in conflict with the party’s leader, Diaa el Din Daoud, who was defeated. This is bound to increase the credibility of these independent Nasserists and will lessen the party leader’s control, forcing him to introduce important changes.10 They have 2 seats in the present parliament.
OUTLOOK
Egypt appears at first glance to have a robust multiparty system. For the past 25 years, parties have competed for seats through the People’s Assembly, and there are currently 15 legal political parties (only 8 of which fielded candidates). Behind that image however, the picture emerges of a largely “contrived multiparty system.”11
The new parliament’s 444 elected seats (10 more seats are allotted to presidential appointees) are distributed as follows: the NDP will control 388 seats, 175 won by official NDP candidates and 213 by “independents,” who switched to the NDP upon victory; Islamist MPs, including 17 Muslim Brotherhood affiliates, will hold 19 seats; the Wafd will hold 7; the Tagammu 6; the Democratic Nasserist party 2; members of breakaway Nasserist factions 5; the Liberal party (right) 1; as yet unaffiliated independents 14; the Copts 3; women 11. In short, the government looks set to control 400 seats as opposed to 388 in the outgoing parliament.
Independents
With some 3,000 NDP members running as independents and the ruling party fielding a full ticket of 444 official candidates, the Arabic-language press dubbed the current campaign one in which “the NDP is running against the NDP.”12 It was basically a repeat of the 1995 elections, except for the fact that even more NDP members were running against their party’s official list this time. In fact, the 213 winning independents, 80 percent of whom were NDP members rejected from the party slate and whose platforms were largely indiscernible from that of the NDP, were the true story of the election. Their victories created an impression of weakening ruling party control, but in fact were the key to ultimate NDP dominance. Immediately after winning, thanks to solid local connections, they rejoined the ruling party, which, having lost many of its previously held seats, was only too willing to reintegrate them. However, 14 “true”13 independents have decided to keep their status and refused to join any political group.
Copts
Although the Coptic community comprises about 10 percent of the population,14 Copts spread their votes among several parties, and their candidates are rarely elected. They usually rely on the president to select approximately 4 to 5 among the 10 MPs that he is authorized to appoint to the Assembly. Some Copts resent this, as it means that these MPs do not represent the people’s will but serve at the government’s pleasure.
For the first time since the 1952 Revolution, 3 Copts have garnered seats through election. Although the number is quite modest compared to the 75 candidates, it nevertheless reflects a growing tendency on the part of Copts to shun their traditional apathy and get more involved in the political process. During the 1995 parliamentary elections, there were only 57 Coptic candidates, none of whom were nominated by the ruling NDP. This time around, amidst much talk about the need for Copts to become more politically engaged, the NDP has fielded 3 Coptic candidates. Only one NDP Coptic candidate won: Minister of Economy Youssef Boutros Ghali. Copts have fared better on the lists of opposition parties. The Wafd, for instance, fielded 12 Coptic candidates. More surprisingly, the Islamist-oriented (and currently suspended) Labor party had 9 Coptic candidates, all running as independents. The leftist Tagammu had 4, the Green party 3, and Al Wifak and al Takaful 2 each. Most of them ran as independents; those representing political parties accounted for a mere 21. The majority were businessmen.
The Coptic Orthodox Church does not openly give its support to Coptic candidates, in order not to arouse the ire of their opponents. Its assistance is confined to encouraging Copts to vote. The most prominent Coptic Wafd party candidate was Mounir Abdel Nour in Cairo’s Al Wayli district. Although he faced strong competition from the NDP opponent who defeated him in the 1995 parliamentary elections, his success was warmly hailed by both Muslims and Copts.15 The other Christian to be elected was independent businessman Ramy Lakah.
Women
Since Egyptian women gained the right to vote in 1956, only 64 women have served in parliament. Their number has traditionally ranged between 2 and 3 percent. The only exception came in the 1979 and 1984 parliaments, when the figure jumped to 8.9 and 7.86 percent respectively. Not coincidentally, a law instituted in 1979 designated specific seats for women (30). In 1986 the procedure was annulled on the grounds that it was discriminatory, but because the electoral system was based on proportional representation, women managed to garner 6.6 percent of the seats in the 1987 elections.
The number of women candidates increased this year. Out of 120 (87 in 1995), political parties fielded 25 (21 in 1995). This means that the majority are independents who lack the support of parties. To explain – if not excuse – the blatant dismissal by political parties of the other half of the electorate, the same tired chicken-and-egg logic was used. The argument is that women are a liability on a party list. Opposition parties feel that if their men stand little chance of winning, women stand even less. To risk naming a woman is to effectively give up a potential seat on an already limited list. But why is this so? The traditional answer is that “politics is a man’s business” and hence voters prefer men, as society has not yet acknowledged women’s capabilities as decision makers and legislators.
Traditionally, the majority of both men and women elected were NDP members. The NDP did sustain a lead this time, but there was a noticeable shift in favor of women independents – even at the expense of some icons of the ruling party.16 The star of the elections was Nariman al Daramalli, an independent who ran in the Upper Egyptian constituency of Tema in the governorate of Sohag. Ignoring the popular belief that the Egyptian countryside, the South in particular, is politically conservative and hence less inclined to vote for women, she managed to garner a comfortable 25,000-vote majority,17 15,000 more than her NDP opponent, placing her among the highest vote-getters in the 222 electoral constituencies.
Despite the disappointment expressed by many across the political spectrum18 that only 23 women were nominated in official party lists, this increase and the institutional support provided by the newly formed National Council for Women (NCW) as well as a general political movement in favor of inclusiveness, all helped to ensure that 7 women won seats, up from 5 in the 1995 elections.19 Interestingly, the majority of the 7 women winners came from outside the metropolis, which suggests that the determining factor in voting is not necessarily political affiliation or gender, but more particularly a candidate’s ability to engage in grass-roots work.
While this increase is far from huge, it represents the highest number of women MPs to have won election to the People’s Assembly since the abrogation of the 1979 law designating a specific number (30) of parliamentary seats for women. The change, significant enough, is the caliber of the new female candidates, who broke new ground by running in constituencies generally perceived as “tough” and therefore requiring male candidates.20
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Almost a quarter of a century after the multiparty system was adopted in 1976, opposition parties remain “parties without followers for people without parties.”21 The fact that the electorate chose to vote for individuals and not parties reflects a lack of trust in all political parties. This is somewhat due to the opposition parties’ dismal performance in the outgoing parliament, where they gave the impression of having been tamed by the government and hence not seen as fundamental agents of political change and modernization. On the other hand, the judiciary has replaced the opposition in many of the tasks it should have undertaken to enhance democratization and political participation. A historic court ruling that forced the government to place the elections under full judicial supervision is a case in point. The opposition’s struggle for the same objective yielded no such results.
There is no doubt that the recent elections were freer and produced a larger turn out than any over the last decade. Judicial supervision extended for the first time to subsidiary polling stations has renewed voters’ confidence in the worth of their ballots. They have gone after the NDP, and that seemed to be the extent of what the level of political development in the country would allow – for the time being. Punishing the ruling party by a “punitive vote” has been the one identifying feature of the 2000 elections. People voted for NDP “independents,” the Muslim Brotherhood and some unlikely opposition candidates; they avoided, as much as possible, voting for the official ruling-party ticket.
Political life is the main loser this time around. Village loyalties prevailed over all other considerations. One theory holds that the election results reflect the widespread distrust of politicians (rather than politics) in Egypt as a result of the state’s 50-year struggle (since 1952) against free and independent political expression. The emergence of an apolitical society is thus seen as the legacy of a specific brand of benevolent authoritarianism. Hence, the election of candidates was not the result of political preferences, and, on the whole, the campaign was marked by a striking lack of political debate beyond the Palestinian issue. In fact, the contraction of politics in the elections, in parliament and in the country as a whole has corresponded to a growing scramble over parliamentary seats, expressed both in the number of candidates contesting the elections and the fierceness of the competition. This suggests that in this age of economic liberalization, parliament is increasingly becoming a site of business rather than politics, with electoral contests becoming an extension of market-place competition. This bland campaign environment may be the precursor of an especially depoliticized era in which an MP’s main role is to provide constituents with patronage rather than to mobilize support for any broader program.
Patronage relationships and “tribal” loyalties have overwhelmingly determined voter behavior – in a highly class-stratified society where actual tribes are virtually non-existent. According to many observers, the greatest problem seems to lie with the failure of political regimes to accommodate civil-society organizations that would provide an alternative to tribalism. Moreover, restrictions on the foundation of civil and political groups have disproportionately hampered secular liberal movements while leaving loopholes for religious groups, which have a distinct advantage through their access to mosques and their strong engagement in grass-roots work. Furthermore, restriction on the establishment of civil associations in itself prevents a pluralistic political culture from evolving.
Looking at the democratic process as it unfolds does not yield much evidence that opposition parties are agents for democratic change or that there is more active participation of the citizens. This is not to say that opposition politics is meaningless, but the unpleasant working conditions and cramped maneuvering space conceded to them by the ruling party and the government are counterproductive to a national democratization process. Moreover, without access to power patronage at the grass-roots level, opposition parties have little prospect of developing broad-based movements to challenge NDP control. Even though they field candidates and publish newspapers, they have not managed to gain a popular following.
On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood – outlawed, battered and hounded to the very doors of the polling stations proved that they remain the country’s only real political “party.” Their success has prompted calls for the government to resolve the paradox of an illegal group’s winning the second-largest number of votes after the ruling party despite a security clampdown.
The Brotherhood’s performance, though impressive, should not be blown out of proportion, however. They enjoy good organizational capabilities, but their success should not lead us to think that they have heavy political leverage with the masses. In his study of the 1995 political elections, the prominent sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim estimated that in an ideal situation, the Islamists would garner 15 percent of the votes, i.e., 68 seats out of the 444 contested seats. The fact that people voted for them does not at all indicate a transformation in the electorate’s sympathies, but rather a rejection of the current parties.
Relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime will be the most important dynamic to watch. It is highly unlikely that a shift in favor of the Brotherhood will take place in its relationship with the state. Evidence, however, suggests that the Brotherhood will pursue their quest to establish a political party. Hence, two possible scenarios: (1) arbitrary arrests of Brotherhood members will continue, and a siege will be imposed on all their activities; (2) the government will accept the legality gained by the Brotherhood through the ballot and allow them to act through legal channels because they are part of the legislative body. Unfortunately this will not happen as long as the authorities remain skeptical of the organization’s denunciation of violence. More likely, toleration of the parliamentary presence will be coupled with continuing moves to contain the organization’s influence in civil society, perceived as a more dangerous sphere. 22
Although the NDP, as in the past, has managed to receive more than three quarters of the seats, guaranteeing itself the two-thirds needed to select the speaker, dominate committees, pass vital legislation and nominate the president, its current share of 87 percent masks a substantial decline from previous years. This means that the party will not have the same control it had in previous parliaments, which enabled it to spring legislation upon the Assembly and pass what it wanted without taking into consideration the opposition parties’ views. It is true that the opposition will find it difficult to stop controversial laws, but they can still use their limited members23 to some effect by interpolating government officials and ministers and raising sensitive issues such as the trial of civilians before military courts, political reform and corruption. Judging by the composition of the opposition, debates in the forthcoming parliament promise to be more exciting than they have been for many years. Even though the House’s fundamental nature is not about to change, something new is afoot. The public is demanding significant reform.
The NDP’s heavy defeats have embarrassed the regime, but they do not signal the imminent demise of the party. These losses may in fact offer a convenient opportunity to undertake the “housecleaning” that the younger generation of party leaders, specifically President Mubarak’s son Gamal, has called for.24
It is clear that people have not yet grown accustomed to judicial control and integrity. Indeed, the fairness of the elections has surprised everyone, most of all politicized, independent-thinking candidates and potential candidates. In fact, some analysts have argued that these elections have led to the emergence of voters as the only political protagonist capable of putting reform on a fast track. It seems safe to predict that people will go through a learning process and act consequently. The current election is bound to change the voting pattern eventually. Learning through the democratic process is a key to democratization and not the other way around. People can bring about democracy through practice. Perhaps one day the NDP will be able to recruit members who take an interest in their constituencies. In the meantime, unless there is a thorough purge of the “old guard,” mostly responsible for the heavy losses, in favor of new blood, and a thorough house cleaning, the prediction of the Supreme Guide, Moustapha Mashour on the eve of the elections that “in 30 years, the Brotherhood will come to power,” 25 might very well prove to be true.
1 Among the most prominent NDP losers are Mohamed Abdellah, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Abul Nasr, chairman of the Budget Committee, and El Tarouty, chairman of the Tourism and Culture committee.
2 Al Hayat, November 16, 2000.
3 Serageddin was replaced by Noaman Gomaa (65), a former dean of the faculty of law, Cairo University.
4 Particularly in the south, the poorest part of the country with the weakest social services and least economic development. The most potent militant movement is embodied in the Islamic Group Gamaa al Islamiya.
5 Prominent among them was Maamoun el Hodeiby and Seif el Islam Hassan el Banna, son of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan el Banna, in addition to Islamist Labor party activist Magdi Hussein, who directed a fierce electoral campaign from prison. He had been sentenced to jail in April for libeling the minister of agriculture.
6 The Palestinian intifada did provide a backdrop to Egypt’s 2000 parliamentary elections, and there is no doubt that in some instances voter behavior was directly affected by feelings of solidarity it triggered among the Egyptian public. A leading NDP member could only garner 300 votes, thanks largely to his opponent’s having widely distributed a photo showing him engaged in an enthusiastic handshake with Ehud Barak! (Roz al Youssef, November 25-December 1, 2000).
7 Mubarak subsequently responded to the public outcry by recalling the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv.
8 Abul Ela Madi broke ranks with the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood at the end of 1995 to establish his own political party, Al Wassat. His application, first made in 1996, was denied twice by the Political Parties Committee. Madi was on the Brotherhood’s list of candidates for the 1995 parliamentary elections. His break and attempt to establish his own party drew fire from the Brotherhood. In April of the same year, Madi was arrested for what was described as an attempt to establish an illegal party. He was released two months later. Despite the committee’s refusal to grant him a license, a breakthrough was made in early 2000, when the Ministry of Social Affairs allowed him and a group of other Islamists to establish an NGO called Misr for Dialogue and Culture. Many believe that the ministry’s approval was intended to encourage Madi and the Wassat group to stay away from overt political activity.
9 He has just won the Lawyers’ Syndicate elections.
10 Al Hayat, November 6, 2000.
11 Mona Makram-Ebeid, “Political Opposition in Egypt: Democratic Myth or Reality?” Middle East Journal, Vol. 43, No. 3, Summer 1989; See also Ann Lesch, chapter on Egypt in Comparative Politics Today.
12 See Al Mussawir, October 2000.
13 One of the most prominent “true” independents was businessman Rami Lakah (36). Capitalizing on his prominent profile and well known wealth, he attempted to garner political weight through an established party. Both the Green party and the Nasserists, equally in dire need of funds, were courted by Lakah, but negotiations proved fruitless. He later rallied the support of more than 20 independent deputies to form a bloc capable of acting as the largest opposition group in the Assembly. (Wafdist Ayman Nour, who is not on good terms with his party chairman, has been said to sympathize with such a formation). Lakah’s eligibility to run in parliamentary elections had earlier been contested on the grounds that he holds both French and Egyptian citizenship. Although he lost his counter appeal in court, it proved irrelevant since the ruling came after he had been sworn into parliament.
14 Nearly 90 percent of the population are Muslim by religion, a gradual process of conversion from Christianity having taken place since the seventh century CE. Copts comprise most of the Christian community.
15 See Mohamed Sid Ahmed in Al Hayat, November, 2000.
16 Both Thoraya Labna and Galila Awad, who had served several terms as NDP MPs, lost.
17 The speaker of the House won his seat by a mere 6,000 votes.
18 See Al Hayat, November 17, 2000. The NDP nominated 11, the Wafd 8, Tagammu 4, the Green party 3, the Liberal party (which froze its activities in 1997) 7. One of the surprises of these elections was the candidacy of a woman belonging to the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood: Jihan el Halafawy, the wife of a leading Brotherhood figure.
19 The president has appointed 4 more women, bringing the total number to 11.
20 See Rose al Youssef, September 2-8, 2000.
21 Quoted from Al Hayat, November 19, 2000.
22 Ten out of 19 Brotherhood members have joined the Committee of Education, where they mainly plan to confront the state. Furthermore, they have mounted a campaign inside parliament against the minister of culture for having allowed the publication of three novels said to contain obscene material. The minister removed from office a number of major intellectuals heading the Ministry’s general organization for cultural palaces. The move caused an uproar among the Egyptian intelligentsia, who estimated that the move was a major concession to religious fundamentalism. Targeting intellectuals was seen as another way of attacking the political system without really clashing with the government, implicitly suggesting a new alliance between Islamists and the government (Sawt el Omma, January 17, 2001).
23 Apart from the 17 Brotherhood members, there are 2 independent Islamists, 16 opposition party members in addition to 5 independent Nasserists and 14 “true” independents who refused to join the NDP. Al Hayat, November 16, 2000.
24 See Rose al Youssef, 2001.
25 See Al Hayat, November 19, 2000.
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