Dr. Storm is the Leverhulme Fellow in Comparative Politics, Department of Politics, University of Exeter.<sup>1</sup>
The argument put forward in this article is that while the radicalization of Islamists is undoubtedly taking place in North Africa, it is not possible to devise a formula that enables us to predict why people become radicalized or who these people are.2 Of course, it is feasible to identify a number of radicalized and sometimes violent Isla-mist groupings, but their emergence, membership base and modus operandi do not conform to a particular pattern. In short, the radicalization of Islamists is a highly complex phenomenon. With regard to violent radicalization, one member of a group may become violent while others do not, hence making the individual rather than the group the victim of such a process. This article centers on what has been labeled the “dilemma” of the Islamists: how to provide security while respecting basic civil liberties and, more important, how this weighing of principles and the subsequent strategies employed affect recruitment by radical organizations. The focus is on general policy implications rather than the effect on speciﬁ c organizations. Hence, the effect of domestic and international policies — democracy-promotion efforts, the prosecution of (perceived)Islamists and the tolerated level of freedom of expression — on the structure, methods and membership base of radical Islamist groupings will not be studied in detail.
Finally, it is important to underline the scope and depth of the research presented here. While quite a number of the conclusions reached in this article may be valid for a number of Arab and Islamic countries, the ﬁndings are based on ﬁeldwork carried out in Morocco from 2002 until 2008, and during research trips to France, Spain, Germany and the United States. With regard to the case selection, the reasoning behind the focus on the radicalization of Islamists in Morocco rather than in the entire Maghreb is the direct implication of Moroccan nationals in terrorist incidents at home (for example, the Casablanca bombings of May 16, 2003), abroad (e.g., the Madrid bombings of March 11, 2004), and as accessories in the terrorist attacks of September 11 (e.g., Mounir el-Motassadeq in Germany). Moreover, Morocco also lends itself very well to this kind of research in comparison to Algeria and Tunisia, as freedom of speech and information is markedly better there, making it a lot less difﬁcult and dangerous to access data.
"Good" and "Bad" Islamists
For a number of decades there has been a tendency in the West — particularly in the United States — to classify regimes across the globe as either “good” or “bad,” that is, “friends” or “foes.”3 In recent years, this policy has been extended to Islamist groupings; there are now so-called good and bad Islamists. In the current post-9/11 political climate and following the commencement of the War on Terror, the United States, in particular, but also the EU, has intensiﬁed its dialogue with Islamist groupings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Democracy-promotion programs have been one of the key vehicles behind such dialogue. This is partly because of the realization that Islamist involvement in democracy promotion programs is paramount for their success, as the Islamists are generally viewed as the main target. But it is also due to the fact that democracy-promotion initiatives are received with huge scepticism not only from the political leadership, but also from large segments of the so-called “Arab street.” It is a problem Islamist involvement may help alleviate.4
In the case of Morocco, democracy-promotion efforts and similar initiatives are largely directed at the Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD), the country’s largest Islamist party.5 The PJD is also generally seen as the most moderate Islamist party in Morocco, although this status is disputed by some academics due to the party’s structure. The PJD came into being in 1998 when its predecessor, the Mouvement Populaire Démocratique et Constitutionnel (MPDC), changed its name following the incorporation of the radical Mouvement Unicité et Réforme (MUR) in 1996. Today the MUR, which is the bone of contention, is best described as a rather independent and very powerful wing of the PJD. This is largely due to the fact that, although a great many MUR members eventually moderated their outlook following the merger, a considerable segment remain loyal to the pre-1996 principles, particularly on religious issues and the status of the monarchy. Because the PJD has allowed the MUR to continue to occupy such an inﬂuential position within the party, despite its radical credentials, some academics claim that the PJD is a radical construction itself — nothing but a wolf in sheep’s clothing.6
It is worth noting that the Islamist alternative to the PJD, the Parti de la Renaissance et de la Vertu (PRV), was formed as the result of a split from the PJD in December 2005 by a group of politicians under the leadership of Mohamed Khalidi, though the party was not legalized until January 2006.7 The dissociation from the MUR may make some observers conclude that it is the more moderate of the two Islamist parties currently on the scene.8 However, based on the behavior in parliament by the PRV, this article adopts the opposing position. While the PJD has been much less concerned with religious issues, the PRV has brought forward a number of radical proposals, including the introduction of reserved seats for members of the ‘ulama in parliament, a proposal which the PJD opposed.9
"Friends" and "Foes"
The division of Morocco’s Islamist groupings into friends and foes not only takes place at the international level. With regard to participation in the country’s political institutions, the PJD exercises a virtual monopoly. It won no less than 47 seats in the lower-house elections of September 7, 2007, a great many more than the one seat won by the PRV, the only other Islamist party to successfully contest the elections.10 The PJD’s rather strong electoral performance in September 2007 was due to its popularity, but its status as a friendly Islamist party in the eyes of the Moroccan authorities was not without signiﬁcance.11 It has long been clear that the PJD has close links with the monarchy. In fact, the party has often been accused, rightly or wrongly, of being a makhzen party, that is, a party set up either directly or indirectly by the monarchy in an effort to counterbalance other political forces.12 Having proven itself as an Islamist party that could be both controlled and trusted over the course of the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the PJD has reached a position within Moroccan political life where it is viewed by the makhzen as not only a good Islamist party, but the best of those currently on the scene.
As is common knowledge in Morocco, political success is strongly correlated with endorsement by the makhzen, even in a day and age when election results are no longer heavily manipulated before being released to the pubic.13 Rather, in present day Morocco, makhzen endorsement plays a key role in the aftermath of the elections, as the power to appoint the cabinet resides with the king.14
In addition to the endorsement by the makhzen, the PJD has been aided by the Moroccan authorities’ reluctance to legalize other potential Islamist parties, especially those of a more signiﬁcant size, such as Al-Adl wal-Ihsan, which, despite varying estimates, is presumed to be Morocco’s largest Islamist movement, with a popularity alleged to surpass that of all of the legal parties.15 At the time of the lower-house elections of September 7, 2007, only three Islamist parties had received legal recognition (the PJD, the PRV and the now illegal Al-Badil al-Hadari).16 Of these three, only the PJD, as indicated by the party’s performance in these elections, was of a considerable size in terms of estimated support base. In fact, although it is still early, there appears to be a pattern emerging with regard to the legal recognition of Islamist political parties. When the MPDC, the PJD’s predecessor, ﬁrst emerged in 1965, the party commanded a rather modest following, winning a meagre 1.8 percent of the votes in the 1997 elections, the ﬁrst the party contested.17 After the MPDC’s incorporation of the MUR in 1996 and the umbrella’s subsequent change of name to the PJD in 1998, the party agreed to limit its presence in the political landscape by restricting the number of candidates it ﬁelded in the lower-house elections of September 2002, resulting in the party’s contesting only 60 percent of the electoral districts.18 In short, the PJD was kept on the small side in order for it to remain relatively easy for the monarchy to manage. Further supporting this thesis that only smaller Islamist parties are successful in gaining legal recognition were the legalization of the PRV in 2006 and Al-Badil al-Hadari in 2005. As discussed above, both of these parties had rather insigniﬁcant support bases, at least in terms of numbers of voters. This was clearly demonstrated in the lower-house elections of September 2007, where Al-Badil al-Hadari failed to get even a single member elected and the PRV only managed to secure one seat, despite ﬁelding candidates in 60 percent of the electoral districts.19
Sceptics may argue that the fact that there are currently no serious rivals to the PJD among the Moroccan Islamist parties has very little to do with the monarchy’s apparent reluctance to legalize Islamist political parties of size. In theory, this is true as smaller Islamist parties could potentially grow stronger over time, as the MPDC/PJD has done, or even merge once they have become more established, as was the case wtih the MPDC/MUR in 1996. In practice, however, the opportutnies for smaller Islamist parties-- or any smaller political parteis, for that matter--to slowly mature adn expand are simply not present. Relatively new legistlation, mainly in the form of the law on political parties, promulgated in February 2006, but also the election code of 2007 and the 2007 version of the code governing the House of Representatives, signiﬁcantly limit the possibility for smaller parties to persist for longer than just a single term.
With regard to the law on political parties, Section IV is the crux of the matter, as it outlines the rules of party funding. In essence, the law on political parties makes them heavily dependent on state funding, as most other forms of funding are very restricted apart from membership dues (see Articles 28, 30 and 32). Given the loose connection between voters and parties in Morocco, however, most parties cannot afford to rely on new people joining or members actually paying their fees. Articles 29 and 35 lay out the rules for state funding, which is limited to the political parties that manage to secure enough votes to satisfy the 5 percent district threshold in the latest elections to the lower house. That said, it is important to note that the sum of this system is nothing but a vicious circle, making it virtually impossible for them to survive for more than a single term.
It is important to note that the legislation rendering it effectively impossible for smaller political parties to prosper was not adopted with the intention of targeting only Islamist parties. In fact, while most of the larger parties have beneﬁted at the expense of the smaller ones, the PJD has perhaps beneﬁted the most. Whereas the other larger political parties ﬁnd that they continue to face considerable competition within their camps, the Islamist alternatives to the PJD are simply nonexistent. The PRV is far too small to survive, and the same would have been true for Al-Badil al-Hadari, had the party not already been banned, or Hizb al-Oumma, had it received the elusive legalization as a political party following its application in 2007, some nine years after its formation.20 In short, the PJD has come to embody the friendly Islamists; it holds a virtual monopoly.21
In a political climate where endorsement by the makhzen is vital and the monarchy is known for setting up new political parties when tiring of the existing ones, the PJD’s desire to maintain its position as the most friendly Islamist party and not fall out of favor with the monarchy is not only understandable, but also beyond doubt. Time and again, the PJD has voted against or publicly denounced initiatives that one would assume the party would have favored due to its Islamist credentials. To give one example, the PJD supported the adoption of the new law on political parties, despite the fact that it prohibited the creation of religious political parties.22 A further illustration is the very recent debate on the role of the ‘ulama in Moroccan politics. The PJD declared that the party did not support the establishment of a so-called ‘ulama quota in parliament similar to that for women as the PJD was of the opinion that religious scholars should remain politically neutral.23
Although such moves undoubtedly strengthen the makhzen’s view of the PJD as the bulwark against more extreme Islamist forces in the country, the risk for the PJD is that, come the next lower-house elections, the voters are going to object. As it is not possible, of course, for the PJD’s electorate to leave the party for another credible Islamist alternative, it is likely that its voters will follow the traditional Moroccan pattern and simply exit the political system when dissatisﬁed. After all, this lack of credible alternatives, in general, is why voter turnout has continued to decline despite clear signs of democratization over the past decade.24
More worryingly, at least from a security perspective, is the possibility that, while the makhzen may view the PJD as a means to counter the more radical Islamist forces in Morocco, the general population may disagree, and not only at election time. There are already signs that the tide is beginning to turn and that the goodwill won by the regime when the PJD was allowed to contest the elections in 2002 is slipping away. It now appears as if only Islamist parties that are viewed as so friendly that they might as well have been makhzen parties will be allowed to remain in the picture. The Moroccan population may be largely illiterate, poor and depoliticized, but it is not stupid. The more the PJD resembles the other Moroccan political parties, and conforms to the norms of the political system which a great many Moroccans rather aptly describe as “cinéma,” the more voters are going to abandon the party in favour of other alternatives.25 With the lack of legalization of alternative Islamist parties of a signiﬁcant size, the most credible alternative to the PJD is found in more radical and, therefore illegal, Islamist groupings outside the political system such as Al-Adl wal-Ihsan, generally viewed as peaceful, and the GICM (Islamic Group for Combat in Morocco), suspected of various terrorist activities in Morocco and abroad.
Islamists Outside the Political Arena
Whether a person decides to exit the political system in favor of non-involvement, civil-society engagement, or membership in a clandestine political party, of course depends on the extent of his or her dissatisfaction. In Morocco, where civil-society organizations are numerous, there is plenty of choice for someone dissatisﬁed with the political system. If one has an Islamic leaning, there are a number of peaceful Islamic organizations, such as Jama’a at-Tabligh of the Annour Mosque in Casablanca and the Salaﬁ networks in the Souss.26 A membership boost for such organizations may sound alarm bells for some, as peaceful Islamic movements may one day become Islamist movements and perhaps also violent. However, the increased popularity of Jama’a at-Tabligh, for instance, is much less of a worry than the ﬂocking of dissatisﬁed Moroccans to illegal Islamist organizations such as the GICM, Al-Adl wal-Ihsan, Al-Badil al-Hadari, and the Hizb al-Oumma, some of which are known to be violent.
A number of domestic and international factors are contributing signiﬁcantly to the growing membership in radical Islamist organizations, which have been declared illegal by the Moroccan authorities, either due to alleged links to terrorist activities (such as the GICM, Al-Badil al-Hadari, and the Hizb al-Oumma) or because they are viewed as a threat to the monarchy and, therefore, anti-systemic (the most prominent being Al-Adl wal-Ihsan, which has publicly declared its aspiration to turn Morocco into a caliphate). Beginning with the domestic factors, the main problem is what appears to be the “special” treatment of actual or alleged radical Islamists, who are deﬁned as constituting a threat to the monarchy or to the national security of Morocco.27
Domestic Radicalizing Factors
In this article, the phrase “special treatment” is used to refer to a number of different issues such as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, unfair trials, arbitrary arrest and detention, and the particularly harsh treatment of radical Islamist prisoners in Moroccan jails. It is important to note that while freedom of expression by MENA standards is rather good in Morocco, reports indicate that it is restricted and that respect for this basic civil liberty is actually declining.28 The restrictive climate is not only the result of a highly constraining press code, but also the adoption of the Anti-Terrorist Laws of May 2003, which have made it easier for the authorities to crack down on illegal Islamist organizations and their sympathizers. The two most famous examples of the violation of the freedom of expression of radical Islamists are the long-running ban on Rissalat al-Foutuwa, the newspaper published by Al-Adl wal-Ihsan, and the seemingly everlasting prosecution of Nadia Yassine, the movement’s unofﬁcial spokesperson. She is on trial for having publicly declared that she thought it in the best interest of Morocco to abolish the monarchy and introduce an Islamic republic.29
That the Moroccan radical Islamists also have a difﬁcult time exercising freedom of association should be evident. As discussed earlier, radical Islamist groupings ﬁnd it particularly difﬁcult to obtain legalization as political parties. Moreover, for the few who have succeeded in gaining this elusive ofﬁcial recognition — the PJD, the PRV and Al-Badil al-Hadari — one, Al-Badil al-Hadari, has had its license withdrawn, and a potential fourth party, the Hizb al-Oumma, which many people thought would obtain legalization, was banned amid speculation that it was involved in terrorist activities.30
As to freedom of assembly, while signiﬁcant constraints exist for all groups in Moroccan society, they appear to be particularly restrictive for the radical Isla-mists. While the crack-down on demonstrations in front of the parliament building in Rabat, for example, appears to be rather arbitrary, with unemployed graduates and the like being allowed to demonstrate one week but arrested the following week, such randomness seems much less pronounced for demonstrating radical Islamists. More often than not, they ﬁnd themselves on the way to detention following public demonstrations.31 In addition to this tendency to punish participants in demonstrations organized by illegal radical Islamist organizations, particularly Al-Adl wal-Ihsan, the authorities also appear to have an inclination to crack down much more frequently on so-called “unauthorized public meetings” when organized by radical Islamists. An excellent illustration of this was the arrest of some 300-400 members of Al-Adl wal-Ihsan in spring 2006.32 Since then, more arrests have followed on a regular basis, the latest in the Nador area over the weekend of March 7-9,2008.33
Finally, and most important, there is the issue of arbitrary arrest and detention, unfair trials, and treatment of radical Isla-mist prisoners in Moroccan jails. According to numerous media reports and documentation by various human-rights organizations, both Moroccan and international, arbitrary arrests and detentions of radical Islamists take place on a large scale.34 According to some reports, the situation recalls the années de plomb, when scores of regime critics and innocent citizens disappeared.35 Unlike a substantial number of the cases of arbitrary arrest and detention during the années de plomb, however, the present-day radical Islamist victims of this policy tend not to disappear, but live to tell about their ordeal. In recent years, the Moroccan media has been awash with stories of the abuse of radical Islamists in the country’s prisons, including tales of rape, suspension and electroshock.36
While violation of the freedom of speech of illegal radical Islamist organizations such as Al-Adl wal-Ihsan may come across as rather unimportant in the greater scheme of things, as may the violation of the radical Islamists’ freedom of association and assembly, taken together they add up signiﬁcantly in the opinion of a great number of Moroccans. To many ordinary citizens, religious and secular alike, there appear to be two standards of human rights in Morocco, one for the radical Islamists and one for everyone else. This impression is further strengthened by the numerous reports of radical Islamists being arrested at night by the secret police, being remanded into custody without a trial, not given access to a lawyer, the lawyers being denied access to evidence on their clients, the sentences on the basis of little or no substantive evidence, and military tribunals being used in Islamist trials.37
The sense of injustice towards the country’s radical Islamists, coupled with the dissatisfaction with the political system and party politics in particular, has made it easier for radical Islamist organizations to recruit new members. In fact, it appears as if the makhzen’s efforts to control the radical Isla-mist groupings, whether violent or peaceful, have backﬁred massively. The makhzen successfully applied these methods in previous decades against the left wing, which is now largely insigniﬁcant as an opposition force. The fact that the cooptation and repression of the radical Islamists has not yielded similar results must have come as a great surprise, if not a shock. Hence, it seems fair to conclude that the time has come for the makhzen to go back to the drawing board and reconsider the way forward.
International Radicalizing Factors
That radical Islamist organizations are becoming increasingly popular in Morocco is undoubtedly disturbing. However, the fact that the makhzen is going to have to reconsider its current policy towards the country’s radical Islamists opens up the possibility of improvement. There is at least the hope that the makhzen might come to the realization that further democratization — respect for basic civil liberties coupled with political pluralism, and not just in the numerical sense — is the best option available. At a time when international pressure by the United States and the EU member states for further democratization in the MENA region is at best selective and generally ineffective, domestic incentives for democratization, even if coming from above, are absolutely paramount if the (violent) radicalization of Islamists is to be countered and the region is to move forward politically.
Ironically, current Western democracy-promotion strategies towards the MENA countries have contributed to the growth of radical Islamist movements, mainly due to the existence of the “friend and foe” paradigm mentioned earlier. In an effort not to upset the few friendly states remaining in the MENA region, U.S. and EU democracy-promotion strategies tend to be of the “softly, softly” kind, whereas states deﬁned as foes are targeted much more aggressively.38 Unfortunately, this policy has led to a situation where democratization processes in the region are stalling. The pressure for democratization is virtually non-existent with regards to the friendly states, and the demands are completely ignored by the foes. More important, however, the general population in MENA has picked up on these double standards, resulting in widespread resentment towards Western democracy promoters.39
Within Morocco, which is generally viewed as a friendly state, the resentment is to some extent directed against U.S. democracy promoters. This is due to the unprecedented level of anti-American sentiment already rife in the region. The main targets, however, are the former colonial powers, who are accused of being mostly interested in trade and keeping immigration at bay, rather than caring about the general population, which they are letting down by turning a blind eye to the human-rights abuses committed by the regime, largely in the name of the War on Terror. There is some evidence to suggest that both France and Spain have failed to put pressure on Morocco to initiate further political reforms.40 Observers argue that, at least in the case of France, this is due to a primary policy concern with domestic security rather than the global spread of democracy.41 There is reason to believe, however, that equally important factors are stemming the ﬂow of immigrants to France and reducing poverty, one of the main factors behind radical Islamist recruitment. Finally, there is a desire to guarantee that the political leadership in Morocco remains stable and that there is not an Islamic revolution or the peaceful takeover of power by the country’s radical Islamists, particularly Al-Adl wal-Ihsan.42
In theory, the fact that democratization in MENA has slowed, if not come to a halt, is not a paramount problem. The region has been overwhelmingly authoritarian for such a long time; what do a few more decades matter? Is it really so important that the War on Terror has seemingly led not just the general population, but also Islamist movements and parties, to radicalize further, pushing, in the words of Dalacoura, “the Arab world since 2001 towards more, not less, authoritarianism”?43 In practice, the answer to these questions must be, yes, it does matter that MENA is largely authoritarian and that the region is not democratizing. If this is true, as it appears to be, that the lack of democratic regimes in MENA and the virtual absence of genuine democratization processes are proving to be of paramount importance to radical Islamist recruitment, then democratization in the region should, accordingly, be a main concern of the West. The question is, however, how one goes about promoting democracy in MENA without jeopardizing domestic, regional and global security concerns. What is the optimal trade-off between security interests and the desire to promote liberty, and does such an equilibrium exist?
Conclusion and Perspectives
I have argued that there is currently a rise in support for radical Islamist organizations, not only in Morocco, but across the MENA region. In the case of Morocco, dissatisﬁed citizens are responding to a number of domestic and international factors that are often interrelated.
On the domestic front, a great number of Moroccans are frustrated with the lack of political parties that are not somehow in the pocket of the makhzen, and they are dissatisﬁed with the available choices when it comes to the range of Islamist political parties. This reality has led some Moroccans to exit the political system as they have found it virtually impossible to voice their dissatisfaction from within. While the exit from the political system by a signiﬁcant proportion of the electorate is always problematic, it is even more so when a large number of people choose to join radical Islamist organizations that are outside the political arena due to their illegal status — that is, when the disaffected citizens opt for those who have crudely been labelled “foes” or even the “bad Isla-mists” in this article.
A further domestic factor contributing to the growth in the number of radical Islamists in Morocco is the so-called “special” treatment of radical Islamists in the country. Over the past decade, and particularly since September 11 and the 2003 Casablanca bombings, two standards of human rights have appeared to emerge: one for the radical Islamists and another for everyone else. Although some citizens, of course, ﬁnd comfort in this heightened alert, not only in Morocco but across the globe, a great many Moroccans ﬁnd the repeated violation of the freedom of speech, assembly and association of the country’s radical Islamists highly unwarranted and extremely unjust. Further adding to this sense of injustice is the fact that arbitrary arrests and detentions of radical Islamists take place on a large scale. Radical Islamists often have unfair trials, and are ill-treated while in prison, something that is becoming increasingly apparent as more and more Islamists begin to tell their stories of torture and abuse, not only to their families, but now also to human-rights organizations and the media.
Internationally, the main factor assisting the recruitment of radical Islamist organizations in Morocco has been the virtual lack of pressure for further democratization. With Moroccans already exiting the political system due to dissatisfaction with the country’s political system and the general treatment of radical Islamists, the absence of strong international pressure on the regime to democratize has led many Moroccans to believe that the West is turning a blind eye to the situation, thereby making the former colonial powers France and Spain, but also the United States, accomplices of the regime.
As a consequence of the response by many Moroccans to these domestic and international policy decisions, Moroccan authorities and Western leaders now ﬁnd themselves with a so-called “Islamist dilemma” on their hands. How do the political leadership of Morocco and countries such as France, Spain and the United States provide security in the context of the War on Terror, while at the same time respecting and protecting basic civil liberties, the violation of which appears to be a very important vehicle for the recruitment of new members of various radical Islamist organizations, including the violent ones, such as GICM and the Takfir wal-Hijra?
2 Please note that the term “Islamist” covers those organizations and individuals who have a religious and political agenda, whereas the term “Islamic” refers to those with a religious but apolitical outlook.
3 The most famous of the foes are undoubtedly Iran, Iraq and North Korea, which were referred to as “the axis of evil” in a speech by George W. Bush in January 2002. To those three, John R. Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, added Cuba, Libya and Syria in May 2002, when giving a speech entitled “Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction,” U.S. Department of State, May 6, 2002. Among the so-called friendly Middle Eastern regimes are those of Afghanistan, Egypt, Morocco and the Gulf States.
4 T. Carothers, “Responding to the Democracy Promotion Backlash,” Senate Foreign Relations Hearing, June 8, 2006, available online at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18416 &prog=zgp&proj=zdrl,zme. T. Carothers and B. Lacina, “Quick Transformation to Democratic Middle East a Fantasy,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, March 16, 2003; L. Diamond, “The Middle East: Between Democracy and Stability,” speech given at the Weinberg Founders Conference at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 17, 2004 (Summary available online at http://www.hoover.org/ publications/digest/3001351.html.)
5 J. Sharp, “U.S. Democracy Promotion Policy in the Middle East: The Islamist Dilemma,” CRS Report for Congress, 2006, p. 14. Available online at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33486.pdf.
6 M. Tozy, Monarchie et Islam Politique au Maroc. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1999, pp. 227-57; M. Zeghal, 2005 Les Islamistes Marocains: le déﬁ à la monarchie. Paris: La Découverte, 2005, pp. 215-17.
7 D. Bennani, “Outita II: Le Abu Ghraib marocain,” TelQuel, July 28, 2005, no. 168; M. Rhandi, “Ramid: ‘Le PJD, la dernière carte du Makhzen,” Le Journal, September 6, 2005; M. Rhandi, “Ramid: ‘Le PJD a perdu son âme’,” Le Journal,; D. Ksikes, “Exclusif. Étude. Le PJD à la loupe,” TelQuel, no. 224, 2006.
8 L. Belamine, “Blocage ou casting électoral?,” La Gazette du Maroc, January 9, 2006; M. Hamraoui, “Un nouveau parti à référentiel islamiste est né,” Le Reporter, January 2, 2006.
9 N. El-Hamraoui, “Lamlili, Politique. Le patchwork islamiste,” TelQuel, no. 299, 2006.
10 B. Mokhliss, “Religion et politique: Un quota pour les oulémas au parlement?” Le Reporter, March 10, 2008; I. Binoual, “Islamist party’s call for ulema quota in Moroccan Parliament sparks debate,” Magharebia, March 12, 2008.
11 L. Storm, “The parliamentary election in Morocco,” Electoral Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2, September 2007, p. 363.
12 M. Chaoui, “Un nouveau sondage de l’IRI: le PJD porté par les indécis,” L’Economiste, September 14, 2006; R. Khalaf, “Morocco Sees the Rise of ‘Acceptable’ Islamist Party,” Financial Times, May 23, 2006; W. Kristianasen, “Can Morocco’s Islamists Check al-Qaida ?” Le Monde Diplomatique, August 2007.
13 Bennani, Rhandi, Ksikes, see note 7, above.
14 Democracy Reporting International, Evaluation qualitative de l’élection à la Chambre des Représentants. Berlin : Democracy Reporting International, September 7, 2007.
15 Dahir no. 1-96-157 du 23 joumada I 1417, October 7, 1996. (portant promulgation du texte de la Constitution révisée).
16 F. Cavatorta, “Neither Participation Nor Revolution: The Strategy of the Moroccan,” Jamiat al-Adl walIhsan, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 12 No. 3, p. 396; J. Entelis, “Un courant populaire mis à l’écart,”Le Monde Diplomatique, September, 2002, p. 20; M. Ottaway and M. Riley, “Morocco: From Top-down Reform to Democratic Transition?” Carnegie Paper 71, 2006, p. 16. Please note that Al-Adl wal-Ihsan’s application for legal recognition as a political party was refused by the authorities in 1981. The movement has not reapplied, and Sheikh Yassine has often stated that the movement does not wish to be part of the party landscape. Had Al-Adl wal-Ihsan had the opportunity to contest the 2007 elections, it would have boycotted these as the movement does not recognize the regime as legitimate (A. Campiotti, “Le Maroc, entre le roi et l’islam pluriel,” Le Temps, September 5, 2007).
17 Al-Badil al-Hadari was formed in 2002, but as is often the case in Morocco, obtaining legal recognition of the party proved to be a lengthy process, and it was not successful in its application until 2005. See A. El-Hassaouni, “Al Badil Al Hadari entre en scène,” Aujourd’hui Le Maroc, June 10, 2005. Only some three years after its legalization, on February 20, 2008, Al-Badil al-Hadari was banned following the arrest of its leader, Mustapha Moatassim, on terrorism charges on February 19, 2008. It is worth noting that members of the political leadership of Hizb al-Oumma, which was in the process of applying for legalization as a political party, were arrested in the February crackdown. Both groups were accused of having established links to the GICM and the Groupe Salaﬁste de la Predication et le Combat (GSPC) in Algeria. Y. Aqdim and Iraqi, F., “Enquête. Politique et Terrorisme. Les liaisons dangereuses,” Tel,Quel, 2008, no. 312.
18 L. Storm, Democratization in Morocco: The Political Elite and Struggles for Power in the Post-Independence State (Routledge, 2007, p. 41); p. 29, B.L. García, Marruecos Político: Cuarenta anos de procesos electorales (1960-2000)., Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, pp. 57-66.
19 P. Vermeren, Maghreb – la démocratie impossible? (Paris : Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2004), p. 298; Storm, Democratization in Morrocco, p. 81; J. Ketterer, “From One Chamber to Two : The Case of Morocco,” Journal of Legislative Studies, 2001,Vol. 7 No. 1, p. 156.
20 A. Kharroubi, “Mohamed Khalidi, SG du PRV: ‘Tout dépendra de la notoriété et la crédibilité du candidat’,” Aujoud’hui Le Maroc, August 31, 2007. Keeping in mind that the PJD had limited the number of electoral districts it contested back in 2002, it is important to note that this was not the case with the PRV. No deal was made with the makhzen; the party simply chose to spend its resources in a more concentrated manner, something which is far from unusual in Morocco, where most of the political parties don’t cover the entire territory of the country.
21 M. El-Atouabi, “Politique. Un parti islamiste de plus,” TelQuel, no. 277, 2007.
22 Kristianasen, “Can Morrocco’s Islamists…” It is worth noting that when a potential Islamist party aplies for legalization, the makhzen undoubtedly takes into account both the size of the potential new party and the extent to which it is radicalized. In the case of Al-Adl wal-Ihsan, the size of the party’s support base no doubt played the most important role when it was denied legalization. In fact, in contrast to Al-Badil al-Hadari, which the authorities have allegedly linked directly to terrorist activities, the makhzen has never been able to ﬁnd anything substantial on the main personalities within Al-Adl wal-Ihsan. This supports the thesis that the organization is in fact not a violent Islamist organization but simply a radical Islamist organization that threatens the makhzen due to its declared ultimate goal of regime change.
23 “Congrès extraordinaire du Parti de la Justice et du Développement: Appel à la transparence,” Maroc Hebdo International, July 28, 2006.
24 Binoual, “Islamist Parties Call in Ulema Quota”; Mokhliss, “Religion et Politique.” Some analysts have pointed to the PJD’s behavior in connection with the Ksar el-Kebir affair as a sign that there are cracks in the party’s façade. However, the PJD was far from the only political party speaking out against homosexuality and asking for a public enquiry (“Liberals, Islamists clash over Morocco ‘Gay wedding’,” Reuters, March12, 2008).N.H. Alaoui, “Le parti islamique marocain bat une campagne très morale,” Liberation, February 28, 2008).
25 L. Storm, “Testing Morocco. The Parliamentary Elections of September 2007,” Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2008, pp. 43-44.
26 Interviews with Nadia Lamlili, journalist at TelQuel; Omar Bendourou, professor of law, Université Mohammed V, Souissi; Mouna Cherkaoui, professor of economics at the Université Mohammed V, Agdal; and Mustapha el-Khalﬁ, editor of At-Tajdid, the MUR’s newspaper. The interviews were conducted in Morocco during early 2008.
27 International Crisis Group, “Middle East and North Africa Brieﬁng,” April 20, 2004, p. 6; A. El-Azizi, “Alerte Générale!” TelQuel, no. 201, 2005, pp. 22-29.
28 For the sake of the ﬂow of the text, the term “radical Islamists” also refers to alleged radical Islamists.
29 “Morocco and Western Sahara,” Amnesty International Report 2008: State of the World’s Human Rights Available at Http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/regions/middle-east-and-north-africa/morocco-and-westernsahara. See also M. Zaki, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World: Annual Report 2007. Cairo: Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies, p. 118.
30 N. Belghazi, “Affaire Nadia Yassine & Abdelaziz Koukas: liberté d’expression ou diffamation?” L’Economiste, June 28, 2005; M. Abdelhadi, “Accused Morocco Islamist Speaks Out,” BBC News, September 30, 2005; N. Lamlili, “Nadia Yassine : au nom de la liberté d’expression!” L’Economiste, September 8, 2005; C. Whitlock, “Feud with King Tests Freedoms in Morocco,” The Washington Post, February12, 2006; Amnesty International, 2008
31 El-Atouabi, “Un Parti Islamiste de Plus.”
32 Storm, Democratization in Morocco, pp. 99-113. This reality was further conﬁrmed in interviews (in Morocco, 2005-08) with Mohamed el-Boukili of the Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH); Khadija Ryadi of the AMDH; Nadia Lamlili, journalist at TelQuel; Omar Bendourou, professor of law, Université Mohammed V, Souissi; Mouna Cherkaoui, professor of economics at the Université Mohammed V, Agdal; and Mustapha el-Khalﬁ, editor of At-Tajdid, the MUR’s newspaper.
33 Zaki, Civil Society and Democracy, p. 116.
34 T. Pfeiffer, “Morocco Arrests 44 Members of Islamist Opposition,” Reuters, March 10, 2008;Amnesty International, Morocco and Western Sahara.
35 Amnesty International, Morocco/Western Sahara: Brieﬁ ng to the Committee against Torture, 2003, p. 5; Association Marocaine des Droits Humains, Rapport parallèle au rapport gouvernemental concernant la mise en œuvre de Pacte International relatif aux droits civils et politiques (Rabat: Association Marocaine des Droits Humains, 2004); Storm, Democratization in Morocco, pp. 108-09.
36 Interviews with Mohamed el-Boukili and Khadija Ryadi of the AMDH, 2005 and 2008.
37 Storm, Democratization in Morocco, p. 108; A. Amar, H. Houdaïfa, and M. Rhandi, “La revolte salaﬁste,” Le Journal, May 14-20, 2005; Bennani, “Outita II.” Interviews with el-Boukili and Ryadi of the AMDH.
38 Amnesty International, Morocco/Western Sahara, p. 5; Association Marocaine des Droits Humains, Rapport parallèle au rapport gouvernemental concernant la mise en œuvre de Pacte Internationale relatif ax droits civils et politiques (Rabat, 2004). Zaki, Civil Society and Democratization, p. 115.
39 Sharp, “U.S. Democracy Promotion,” pp. 14-16; K. Dalacoura, 2005 “U.S. Democracy Promotion in the Arab Middle East since 11 September 2001: A Critique,” International Affairs, Vol. 81, Vol. 5, pp. 968-72; T. Carothers, U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007, pp. 5, 8.
40 S. Heydemann, Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World (Brookings Institution, 2008), p. 1.
41 R. Gillespie, “Spain and the Western Mediterranean,” Working Paper 37/01, ESRC programme, University of Sussex, 2001, p. 19, 25; K. Fülscher, “Democracy Promotion during Zapatero’s Government 2004-2008,” Democracy Backgrounder, Madrid: Fundacíon para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, 2008, p. 10.
42 F. Cavatorta, “The International Context of Morocco’s Stalled Democratization,” Democratization, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2005, p. 559; Gillespie, “Spain and the Western Mediterranean,” pp. 19-20.
43 Cavatorta, “Neither Participation nor Revolution,” p. 559. These French policy concerns are largely shared by the U.S., particularly with regard to the latter issue (see Carothers and Sharp above, as well as F. Zakaria, “Islam, Democracy, and Constitutional Liberalism,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 1, 2004, p. 2).
44 See also M. Holt, “Islam, Memory, Identity,” CSD Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2005, pp. 3-5; and G. Fuller, “Islamists and Democracy,” in T. Carothers and M. Ottaway, eds., Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp. 37-55.