Jordan is one of the last bastions of stability in an otherwise volatile region. However, its stability is threatened by a continuing economic crisis. In a survey conducted across all twelve governorates in 2017, only 22 percent of citizens view Jordan's overall economic condition as "good" or "very good" compared to 49 percent two years ago.1 Against this backdrop of economic frustration, Jordan is embarking on a decentralization process at the local level in an attempt to bring decision making closer to the citizen. In 2015, Jordan passed its first Decentralization Law, a continuation of calls from King Abdullah II dating back to 2005 to "enhance our democratic march and to continue the process of political, economic, social and administrative reform" by encouraging local participation in the provision of services and investment priorities.2 This is the latest in a series of small steps taken by the central government intended to improve governance at the local level and secure long-term stability in the kingdom.
Why is Jordan pursuing decentralization? What are its developmental and political implications? What are the vulnerabilities and opportunities associated with it? While exploring these questions, we observed a large amount of political rhetoric. In his earliest speeches on decentralization, King Abdullah II referred to political development as the "gateway to the full participation of all segments of society."3 An article from the Jordanian newspaper Al-Ghad called decentralization "a path to democracy."4 However, over the course of our in-person interviews with key stakeholders and knowledgeable individuals, not a single person referred to Jordanian decentralization as an initiative aimed at bolstering democracy in the kingdom. Our observations of the new local governance bodies as well as a more in-depth study of the rhetoric surrounding decentralization reinforced the notion that these reforms are not democratically motivated. Rather, they are an effort to administratively decentralize in order to improve economic development through more targeted service provision to the rural periphery.
Jordan's centralized makeup and its historical reliance on patronage networks to link rural tribal groups to the central government through service provision and handouts present complications for decentralization. Rural areas are historically underdeveloped, and many individuals and smaller tribes are left out of these patronage networks.5 If and how the Royal Court intends to incorporate these parties into decentralization initiatives was an integral part of our research. Unpacking the objectives of decentralization in Jordan and situating it within a larger framework of authoritarian political calculations will help to shed light on opportunities for success as well as the many obstacles in its way.
In addition, because decentralization efforts are so new, there is a lack of understanding both within the international community and among Jordanians concerning its aims and objectives. The Decentralization Law of 2015 created new popularly elected councils at the governorate level. In theory, these councils are meant to oversee budget allocation, advise on the needs of the governorate, and serve as a check on the executive councils whose members are appointed by the central government.6 However, a lack of adequate information campaigns and vagueness within the law itself have caused widespread confusion over the role of the governorate councils. The first elections for members under the new law took place in August 2017. The fact that less than a year has passed since these reforms took effect presented both opportunities and challenges for our work.
LOCAL GOVERNANCE
Jordan has a two-tier system of administrative governance that is divided into 12 governorates and 100 municipalities. Governorates "have long been the administrative and deconcentrated arm of the central government." They fall under the jurisdiction of the MOI, which "employs the personnel of the governorate and determines and allocates the budget."7 Each is led by a governor appointed by the prime minister, who is essentially "an extension of the central government" and has no accountability to the local constituencies of the governorate.8 Governors are responsible for the execution of national policies at the governorate level.9 Executive councils, a key part of the developmental functions of the new decentralization law, are chaired by the governor and include local representatives from each of the national ministries. Prior to the creation of the governorate councils, the bodies now referred to as the executive councils were the sole bodies at the governorate level. The executive councils draft each governorate's budget according to the ceilings set by the Ministry of Finance, and feedback provided by municipalities and the governorate councils. They also draft strategic and executive plans for development projects and the provision of public services.10
Municipalities are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs (MOMA); their governing administration consists of a mayor, a municipal council and (in the majority of cases) one or more local councils.11 The involvement of municipalities in local planning is restricted to minor projects such as road infrastructure and garbage collection. As per the 2015 revised Municipalities Law, smaller bodies called local councils are now elected and consist of five to seven members. The local councils make proposals to municipal councils to address the needs of businesses such as restaurants and street vendors.12 In a report from the European Commission in 2015, just prior to the adoption of the Municipality Law, the municipal councils were described as "highly dependent on state funding and policy planning and [are] weak in comparison to central government decisions."13
Finally, the governorate councils are now locally elected bodies created by the 2015 Decentralization Law, replacing "consultative councils," which were appointed.14 In contrast, the governorate councils "introduce a democratic component at the highest level of the governorate administration." 85 percent of council seats are elected by popular vote in a number of subgovernorate "districts"" determined by the government, and a maximum of 15 percent of seats are appointed by the Cabinet.15 The law also ensures, via a quota system, that ten percent of each council comprises women.16 The number of seats on each of the 12 governorate councils is proportional to the size of the governorate, ranging from 14 to 41.17 These new councils are designed to inform strategic planning and foster socioeconomic development at the governorate level — giving advice on service provision to the executive councils based on local needs, looking over and approving the budget, and proposing investment and development initiatives. They are seen as consultative bodies with the authority to check the government-appointed executive councils. Legally, the governorate councils have financial and administrative autonomy. Their creation has the potential to introduce "an unprecedented level of popular control and influence" to the process of local governance and budget allocation.18
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND REFORM
Jordan's political economy has largely been defined by rentierism in the form of remittances from the Gulf, the dominance of a strategic coalition between the Royal Court and Transjordanian tribal elites, and a generous public sector that supported these elites with employment despite varying economic conditions. Jordan's tribal elite has relied over the years on its historical relationship and social compact with the Hashemite dynasty to provide them with the wasta (connections) for resources, usually in the form of services for local constituencies. Wasta is a "mediator" between state and citizen and it is key to understanding Jordanian politics.19 However, since the drop in global oil prices in the mid-1980s and the subsequent imposition and embrace of neoliberal economic reform, most Jordanians — especially those who previously benefited from the tribal social contract and wasta with the monarchy — have seen increased economic austerity.20 This trend has been exacerbated by the massive influx of Iraqi and Syrian refugees since 2003 and rising prices due to regional instability and subsidy reforms. Economic development in Jordan has been particularly stunted in governorates with limited economic viability such as Maan, al-Tafileh, and al-Mafraq.21 A lack of opportunity, manifested in increased grievances and, according to some, increased levels of radicalization, has been a main driver of decentralization efforts. This lack of opportunity and the increasingly unstable access to social services exists in a number of poverty pockets in these rural areas.22 The lack of economic viability mattered less before the IMF's Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) that began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as public employment supported most people in rural areas with majority tribal Transjordanian populations. According to Anne Marie Baylouny, "At the advent of structural adjustment, 92 percent of the domestic labor force in Karak worked in the public sector; 99.5 percent in al-Tafileh; 90 percent in Maan — all in the southern region."23 Public employment is still high in these areas, but positions have decreased in recent years as a result of neoliberal reforms put in place by King Abdullah.
Jordan's 2011 uprisings passed without the kinds of major upheavals experienced in Syria, Libya and Egypt. However, the legacy of the protests and the larger context of Jordan's protest movements in 2011-13, which encompassed the Hirak, Islamist and secular protests for reform (notably, not demanding the fall of the regime), was the linkage of participation and democracy with economic development at the local level. Previously, these issues had mostly been addressed by the regime via shifts in its patronage strategy, to keep important tribal actors satisfied.24 According to Sean Yom, "Younger tribal Jordanians utilized politics rather than economics to anchor their concerns about their changing relations with the Hashemite state.... By enshrining popular participation and political openness, rural communities would have a new way to engage the regime and protect their interests on a level playing field with the urban classes of Amman."25 The regime's response to these calls for democracy was a series of what opponents called cosmetic reforms, with an emphasis on participation and accountability.26
Recent economic hardship has also played a role in the drive for decentralization. While Jordanians haven't seen civil strife in the last few years, economic pressures as a result of the influx of Syrian refugees, neoliberal reforms, and a generally sluggish economy have gradually pushed many Jordanians to their breaking point. In another round of economic reforms aimed at addressing the state's crippling debt, the government ended bread subsidies in January 2018. The policy change, which caused a 40 percent price increase for white pita bread and doubled the price for large pita, resulted in the eruption of protests.27 With payouts, subsidies and other financial gifts running out in an increasingly austere fiscal environment, the government is seeking to fill this gap by "empowering citizens" to "take responsibility" at the local level through changes put forth in the 2015 Decentralization Law.28
DECENTRALIZATION
King Abdullah first declared the state's intention to decentralize in a speech in 2005: "In order to enhance our democratic march and to continue the process of political, economic, social and administrative reform,…we have deemed it necessary to reconsider the current administrative divisions of the Kingdom."29 However, Jordan has toyed with the idea of administrative reform at the governorate and municipality levels since the 1990s, as a result of varying internal political and administrative calculations. Plans for decentralization had stalled when, in 2011, Jordanians joined in the Arab Spring protests, demanding more employment opportunities, democracy and anti-corruption reforms. King Abdullah initiated various programs, ostensibly aimed at addressing the concerns voiced by demonstrators. These included the creation of the National Dialogue Committee30 and the Independent Election Commission (IEC). Following a hiatus and a period of upheaval that resulted in thousands of Syrian refugees flooding into Jordan, combined with mounting economic difficulty, the Cabinet took action, working with Parliament to draft the Decentralization and Municipalities Laws in early 2014.
Parliament received the draft law in April 2014 and debated the language of the law for over a year before it was initially passed in August 2015. However, the draft law was later returned to Parliament in October 2015 to address the king's concerns over the lack of clarity regarding the financial and administrative independence of the governorate councils.31 During this process, the draft laws were also publicly debated by civil-society organizations, such as Al-Hayat Center for Civil Society Development and its RASED initiative, which worked to present its recommendations to Parliament during the drafting process. Dr. Musa Shteiwi, the director of the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, argues this process could have benefitted from further community involvement, but that it was more responsive to feedback than previous reform processes.32 With the passage of the Decentralization Law, along with a new Municipalities Law, a Royal Decree and the passage of subsequent bylaws, Jordan approved new legislation establishing elected councils at the governorate level. Joint elections for governorate, municipal and local councils were held in August of 2017.
DECENTRALIZATION AS DEVELOPMENT
Decentralization in Jordan can be characterized primarily as an administrative initiative responding to calls from the Transjordanian base for economic development. While the Palace's goal is the creation of increased development opportunities in the rural periphery through more targeted service provision, regime stability and security as a whole remains the primary motivating factor. Economic development and regime stability are often seen as mutually exclusive. However, this can preclude real opportunities for improved service delivery and economic improvements that are beneficial to both the regime and the populace. Jordan's hyper-centralized governance structure has disproportionately benefited Amman, particularly West Amman, but a desire to develop the areas outside the capital has been a key driver of decentralization efforts. Economic development, particularly in the various governorates outside of Amman, is a stated goal of Jordan's Vision 2025.33 The creation of the governorate councils as a new, nominally representative body demonstrates the Palace's intent to bring economic development to the most impoverished rural areas. This commitment was generally unquestioned in all of our interviews, but past initiatives to encourage development at the governorate level, such as Local Development Units, have failed due to a lack of political will, elite capture (wherein public resources and services are monopolized by elite-level individuals and groups) and resources.34 The governorate councils and the new Decentralization Law in general face similar obstacles.
Jordanian decentralization can be placed in the context of constituency clientelism,35 rather than as a radical political reform. While local media coverage and interviews downplayed the role of the tribal coalitions, they firmly stated that decentralization was an effort to develop areas outside the capital. While it is difficult to assess the effect that the government's awareness-raising campaigns had on voter turnout, statistics show that it was high in areas with a high concentration of rural (usually tribal-affiliated) voters such as Jerash (91 percent), Ajloun (62 percent), Mafraq (59 percent), Maan (54 percent) and al-Tafileh (54 percent).36 In urban areas with large Palestinian populations, such as Amman, Zarqa and Irbid, low turnout mirrored past parliamentary elections. Whether governorate councils can truly help to strengthen developmental decision making at the governorate level or not, voters in rural areas saw these elections as an opportunity to raise their voices for more responsive governance and better service provision.
The role of King Abdullah's inner circle of technocratic advisors and businessmen in the decentralization process also shows an emphasis on developmental objectives.37 In general, this group advocates for growth and local development through neoliberal reforms such as public private partnerships and smaller government. As a result, these advisers have supported and helped develop Jordan's decentralization initiative as a means of moving decision making closer to the citizen. This policy prescription rests on the assumption that moving decision making to the local level will allow for better identification of local needs. With this goal in mind, the development of rural areas is seen as a way to shore up regime security by attempting to institute developmental reforms based on widely accepted theories about the benefits of popular participation in local development, while targeting a specific population to benefit from these reforms. According to Ahmad Ajarmeh, the former head of the International Cooperation Unit at the Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs, decentralization is "not a political process; it's a development project."38 According to USAID, Jordan's decentralization experiment is about equitable development and popular participation in local decision making.39 Officials at NDI pointed out that many development organizations were brought in to assist the government with decentralization efforts, highlighting the developmental nature of the initiatives.40 We compiled over 100 Arabic language news articles about decentralization from three prominent Jordanian newspapers — Al-Ra'i, Ad-Dustour and Al Ghad — and in over half of them, government officials and civil-society representatives strongly noted the potential of decentralization as a boon to local economic development. In accordance with this, many of our interview subjects emphasized the lack of political aims or the political empowerment of subnational bodies in this process.
The "stabilization" intended to be brought about by decentralization consists of two components — implementation and elections. Implementation includes the formation of the governorate council and its interaction with the central government, Parliament, the executive council, municipal councils and local councils. The ultimate goal of this development-oriented decentralization project is to allow the governorate councils to better identify local needs in order to provide more targeted services and invest in capital projects that will serve the community. While the reforms are intended to placate the population with potential growth via popular participation, the weaknesses of the governorate councils, the vague language of the Decentralization Law, and pushback from Parliament and government ministries such as the MOI demonstrate that decentralization is not primarily a political initiative. Regarding the weaknesses of the governorate councils themselves; legislative power, financial independence, detailed bylaws, and well-delineated roles and responsibilities that lay out the mechanisms available to these bodies are missing. One of the primary criteria for political decentralization is the transfer of legislative power to local councils, which the governorate councils, despite being popularly elected, do not have. Currently, they only have the power to "see and approve."41 When we asked for peoples' opinions on whether governorate councils would ever be granted legislative power, the answer was overwhelmingly "no." Amer bani Amer, the founder and director of the Al Hayat Center, clarified, "No legislative powers will be granted to the governorate councils, because this is not a political project."42 He further specified that more participation by citizens is a secondary goal; the primary goal is moving the decisions of the ministries from Amman to the governorates in order to enhance development outcomes.
The current lack of clarity surrounding the governorate councils, the roles of their members, and their relationships to executive councils limits the relevance of the councils and has caused widespread confusion among Jordanians over their roles and jurisdiction.43 Bani Amer pointed to vague language in Article 8 of the law, which outlines the duties of the governorate councils vis à vis the executive councils.44 Regarding the duties of the governorate councils, Section 7 of Article 8 reads: "Discuss reports on the implementation of projects, plans and programs that are being carried out by the government departments in the governorate, without contradicting the work of the competent government monitoring agencies, and follow up and assess work progress in the development projects." Working definitions of mechanisms for these "discussions," "follow-up" and "assess[ment]," not to mention detailed by-laws, are nonexistent. Fares Braizat, a leading political analyst in Jordan, expressed concern about Section 3 of Article 8, which states that among the governorate's duties is the ability to "look into the means of implementing the annual budgets of all the governorate's municipalities."45 The question of what the phrase "look into" legally allows council members to do in their interactions with the executive councils of each governorate is unclear, and may set the stage for conflict between the central government and local elected leaders.46
Some see this vague language as not only a limiting factor to the success of the law, but as an intentional move by Parliament and the central government ministries to ensure that the governorate councils do not take away their power and control over local patronage networks.47 One of the expressed aims of the Decentralization Law is the removal of informal service provision from the responsibilities of parliamentarians.48 Jordan's members of parliament (MPs) "are elected by promising services they can deliver to their constituents."49 Former Jordanian MP Jamil al-Nimri estimated that 80 percent of MPs' time is spent operating in networks of wasta to provide services to constituents with connections to the parliamentarian.50 The royal court, at least rhetorically, has sought to limit the social frictions that the selective provision of social services creates.51 In 2015, former minister of Municipal Affairs Hazem Qashua said he saw the new law as working to lessen "pressure" on the legislature; "transforming" them from deputies of "services" to deputies of "the nation."52 Debates surrounding Parliament's efficacy as a legislative body were widely covered in the Jordanian press during 2014 and 2015. Some critics even discussed the total dissolution of Parliament. Others suggested cutting down the number of Parliamentary seats from 150 to 130, an idea that came to fruition with the 2015 amendment to the Election Law.53 This discussion has been revived recently with some, including King Abdullah, suggesting a second decrease in Parliamentary seats from 130 to 80 after the creation of the new governorate councils.54 Parliamentarians, therefore, have a vested interest in keeping any attempted reforms vague. Indeed, Bani Amer reported that MPs strongly opposed the possibility of legislative or financial autonomy during the drafting of the law.55
Other obstacles to robust legislation and implementation of the Decentralization Law's mandate are the MOI, whose mukhabarat networks operate between MPs, municipalities and local power brokers, and its relationship with the other ministries implementing these reforms (Ministry of Municipal Affairs, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, and the Ministry of Parliamentary and Political Affairs). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the MOI is loath to give up any power, specifically that of the governors to fully control governorate finances.56 While it remains to be seen whether governorate councils will truly be able to exercise veto power on budgets handed down by the governor-headed executive councils, it is clear that this development would weaken the MOI's hold on local patronage networks. At the very least, it would cause them to adapt to a newly formed network containing new actors with differing interests.
Another criticism, voiced strongly by local council members, was that budgets are not sufficient to meet local development needs.57 The king, under the auspices of the Constitutional Court, intervened during the drafting process in 2015 and passed down a ruling stating that "any units or councils established under a law should be administratively and financial independent from the central government."58 While financial independence has been promised by the central government, and governorate councils are increasingly pushing for amendments that provide them with their own budgets,59 for now, governorate councils are relegated to approving or rejecting the budget of the executive council for each governorate.
POLITICAL RHETORIC
The second aspect of the Palace's "stabilization" initiative focused on elections, with the government emphasizing its commitment to democratic decision making through a series of awareness-raising sessions, workshops and media coverage. This emphasis is reflected in the political rhetoric around the Decentralization Law, which highlighted aspects of political development such as local elections, youth and women's empowerment, civic and democracy education, and shifting decision making from the center to the periphery.60 In King Abdullah II's 2005 decentralization speech, he discussed how it is "essential to expand the base of public participation" in the reform process: "As political development is the gateway to the full participation of all segments of the grassroots and civil-society institutions in the various aspects of the development process, I assert here that political development should start at the grassroots level, then move up to decision-making centres, and not vice-versa."61 This focus functions as both another facet of the political rhetoric surrounding decentralization reform, as well as a genuine widespread effort to mobilize citizen engagement at the local level. The various ministries involved in the decentralization process — the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, and the Independent Election Commission — as well as international donor agencies, particularly the European Union, various European agencies and USAID, were heavily involved in supporting these campaigns.62 The newly-formed IEC was also a key player in the run-up to governorate council elections.
The central government's dissemination of political rhetoric functions in several ways. First, it works as a signaling tool to the international community that Jordan's reforms are democratic-leaning in nature, and therefore worthy of being supported by outside funding. It also reflects King Abdullah II's collaboration with a Western-educated technocratic elite who advocate for neoliberal policies. Finally, it follows the trend that emerged in the 1990s that entwines economic development with democratic "good" governance.63 However, this ultimately serves to add a political layer to what is, in reality, administrative decentralization the goal of which is to spur economic development through more targeted service provision at the local level.
Jordan's lack of natural resources, its proximity to regional conflicts, and its large refugee population make it historically reliant on international aid. The heavy layer of political discourse surrounding the decentralization project aligns it with the international push for democratization as a means to improve governance and stem conflict at its roots. Elections signal to the international community that Jordan is undergoing real reform that is worth funding. In addition, the 2017 local elections provided the government with a good opportunity to tout its political reformist credentials. Steven Heydemann, as part of his discussion of "authoritarian upgrading", refers to how, in recent years, the Arab world has seen growing levels of "political competition, increased attention from regimes to issues of electoral reform, and a widespread sense of progress in the liberalization, if not the democratization, of electoral arenas."64 However, there is less to these changes than meets the eye. According to Heydemann, "electoral reforms in Arab countries have less to do with democratization than with making elections safe for authoritarianism."
UNDP also stressed that, to date, the thought around the Decentralization Law has been mostly about elections, not about implementation.65 USAID agreed that the law is "three-quarters about elections and one-quarter about structure"; the law itself does not clarify how any concrete change will take place.66 Officials from the National Democratic Institute also pointed out that there have been no reforms on individual liberties or democratic rules thus far, despite the overt focus on elections.67 The inclusion of a 10 percent quota for women was lauded as a significant achievement for the creation of the governorate councils.68 However, Dr. Musa Shteiwi was more critical of the democratizing impetus behind this: "democracy in Jordan is a numbers game. [The government] can promote how many women are in the council, but if they're not elected then it's not democracy. If no one participates, it's not democracy."69
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
It is clear that while the formation of governorate councils seems to, at least in its current iteration, fall short of the developmental and democratic panacea it has been touted as, the renewed promise of accountable local governance may push open still-closed doors to more effective decision making at the local level. Inefficient funding, the lack of effective cross-level mechanisms, and the likelihood of clientelism present a number of possibilities for failure. However, the technocratic elite that surrounds the king is oriented towards efficient neoliberal development and will likely push for effective reforms that empower the local councils. This sentiment was expressed by a number of critics of the current iteration of the law from a variety of backgrounds, including officers of the current government,70 officials from international aid agencies71,72 and others. As such, opportunities for neoliberal development, focused on jobs and public private partnerships, in cooperation with local NGOs and international organizations, will likely be pursued by governorate councils. However, given the current macroeconomic woes Jordan faces, it seems unlikely that local development through popular accountability, even if successful at reflecting the will of local residents in rural areas, can fully address the issues that most acutely affect all Jordanians, including Palestinians in urban areas.
Many of the articles we read and interviewees we spoke with advocated for amendments to the Decentralization Law. Governorate members from various councils have grouped together to discuss specific amendments to the law.73 Our meetings with the Social Democratic Party and the governorate council in Jerash stressed the need for amendments to the law as well. Musa Maaytah, the minister of Political and Parliamentary Affairs has responded by calling for amendments to the law that would expand the powers of the governorate councils to allow for better service provision to local communities. He emphasized that "the widespread disappointment [over the law] may give policymakers an opportunity to review and adjust before the issues become difficult to address."74 Amer bani Amer stated that the government is trying to come up with a new draft of the law in the next two years. Governorate councils do not currently have the power to legislate, nor are they fiscally independent from the central government. From a purely developmental standpoint, however, the governorate council can still identify local needs and communicate these to the executive council without the power to amend, legislate or question the executive council about overarching policy prescriptions.75
Another topic of discussion is whether the government intends to utilize decentralization to open up new channels of patronage at the local level for individuals and groups that are currently excluded from existing networks in its attempt to "stabilize."76 The governorate councils would then function as what Janine Clark calls "imitative institutions," which act like democratically elected bodies but function as vehicles for patronage. This idea was supported in a number of interviews and news articles where governorate council members called for the same kind of perks that Parliamentary Members currently have — cars, immunities, offices and secretaries.77 While some believe that these local representatives cannot truly represent the people without having the means to respond to requests,78 and that having these items would give governorate council members legitimacy that they currently lack79 , others view these requests as signals that governorate council members expect to be folded into existing patronage systems, risking the creation of another level of elite capture.80 From this perspective, governorate council members should not have these amenities because they are meant to act as civil servants rather than as "local parliaments."81 Extension of patronage may indeed be part of the intent of decentralization reforms, regardless of the rhetoric surrounding the law. However, providing salaries, holding elections, and maintaining positions at the governorate level is a large investment for a country struggling to stay afloat financially, even with help from the international community. It could also add another bureaucratic body in an already saturated hierarchy of bureaucracy. Rather than devolving the service burden from Parliament, the creation of governorate councils could obfuscate how services are disseminated.
However, even if the intention behind decentralization is to bring more people and smaller tribes into the political patronage networks, this does not inherently preclude more targeted and widespread service provision. There is a fine line between Jordan's tribalist clientelism and political representation; both, in theory, reflect the interests of wide swaths of the population. Recent political decentralization efforts in Jordan cannot be removed from the context of an authoritarian state; political decentralization cannot lead to sweeping democratic reforms. Instead, political decentralization in Jordan could result in increased citizen participation and government responsiveness to citizens' demands, particularly in the rural periphery. New elected bodies created at the local level, such as the governorate councils, open a new space for potential political engagement and contestation, especially among youth, who are looking for channels to engage outside of traditional clientelist networks. In theory, governorate councils set a precedent for checks on the executive, something that has technically been the domain of Parliament since its inception. Local demands for accountability can give local actors and activists more pinpointed targets for their discontent. If seen as a real site for political contention and not "an empty container,"82 decentralization can be a vehicle for a more engaged style of governance. This will need to involve a more coordinated and widespread education campaign to inform voters about the role and jurisdiction of the new councils.
Recent signs of increased civic engagement around issues-based politics among youth show potential for further political engagement. In the face of widespread voter apathy, the IEC is implementing a nationwide civic-education campaign, starting "from kindergarten through college"83 in order to foster a culture of engaged, educated and informed citizens. Tim Shorter, who worked with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to create and help implement the IEC, lauded the institution's success with youth engagement. Even if young potential voters were skeptical about elections and the new law, there was consistently high turnout during the IEC's community programming in the run-up to the decentralization elections. "Youth want to care and be involved," he said.84
However, if better developmental outcomes are not achieved, this could exacerbate frustrations among Jordanians. Indeed, that massive protests that occurred in the summer of 2018, which led to the sacking of Prime Minister Hani Mulki and his cabinet, were a clear sign of growing unrest. The new Prime Minister, Omar Razzaz, has stressed the importance of the reforms and vowed to strengthen the role of the councils.85 While it seems that policy makers in the Royal Court are well-intentioned in their pursuit of local growth, a number of mitigating factors still exist. Given the low amounts of funding provided to governorates for the yearly budget and limits on the revenue-raising abilities of subnational bodies, even the best public servants are not going to be able to make significant investments in their communities. If seen as just another site of elite capture, clientelism and wasta, decentralization may seem like just one more example of failed governance and corruption to rural Jordanians. This could work in the government's favor if dissatisfaction is now aimed at these local bodies, but given their new status and the lack of information surrounding them, anger is more likely to be projected towards Amman. The government is aware of this and therefore incentivized to ensure more positive development outcomes, in the name of stability. Whether the inertia of 100 years of tribalism can be overcome in a way that includes citizens in the development process remains to be seen.
A robust system that allows for checks on executive power from the subnational level will rely on the interaction of a number of institutions, nominally directed by the Royal Court and the king, who are also pursuing their own institutional interests. Future research should avoid simplistic notions of the flow of power from the Royal Court down to the local level and look critically at the interplay of institutional interests, particularly between the Royal Court, MOI, MOPPA, MOMA, and Parliament. While the Royal Court always has the upper hand and can direct the ministries to do its bidding, these institutions do have agency, particularly when it comes to information flows about the costs and benefits of administrative processes. Coordination among the ministries on decentralization, directed by MOPIC and UNDP, is already beginning. These types of coordination and dialogue can reduce gaps in understanding and strategy, and allow for the strengthening of coordination on what is a complicated and potentially destabilizing process in a highly centralized state.
CONCLUSION
While the implementation of decentralization has been hurried and confusing to many, it is an ongoing process. Decentralization should not be thought of merely as a cynical response by an authoritarian regime, but rather an attempt to make gradual change in a limiting environment. King Abdullah has expressed frustration, mostly to Western audiences, about the factors limiting inclusive governance and better economic performance in Jordan: clientelism, tribalism and a fear of the unknown.86 At the same time, the Royal Court and the government are deeply implicated in the perpetuation of these structures. Wasta still rules, and this benefits an elite that do not want to see Islamists, Palestinians or a vast chunk of marginalized Jordanians threaten their power. The longer these structures are in place, the more limited the fruits of decentralization will be to the population. Ultimately, Jordan has taken a significant step towards more inclusive governance by attempting to increase opportunities for local-level decision making in the context of privileged constituencies. Centralized decentralization may seem like an oxymoron, but in the absence of true democratic reform, the introduction of robust local decision- making as well as new political spaces and institutions that could benefit some of Jordan's most marginalized groups, may well present a new model for local governance in the region.
1 Ramsey Day. "Jordan's decentralisation and economic stability are linked," The Jordan Times, July15, 2017, https://bit.ly/2uniIZR.
2 King Abdullah speech, 2005, https://bit.ly/2K0zant.
3 Ibid.
4 Jihad Al-Mansi, "40 + 40," Al-Ghad, 14 February 2018, https://bit.ly/2H0ThRI.
5 Janine A. Clark, Local Politics in Jordan and Morocco: Strategies of Centralization and Decentralization. (2018) Columbia University Press.
6 A. Ranko, et al. The Municipal and Governorate Council Elections of 2017: Decentralization Efforts in Jordan. (2017) Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2017, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_49922-1522-1-30.pdf?170914085356.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Jordan-Fact Sheet; Vertical Division of Power: European Commission, 2015. https://bit.ly/2wx5wUe.
14 Interview with Waheed Qarmosh, Vice President and Organizer for the Jordanian Social Democratic Party (Hizb al-Dimocrati al-Ijtima'iyya) in Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
15 Ibid.
16 "Proposed by-law increases seats, women's quota at governorate councils." Jordan Times, Feb. 18, 2017. https://bit.ly/2kVG9Bt.
17 Independent Election Commission, "Governorate Councils Electoral District By-Law No. 135/ 2016 1
Issued According to Article (6) of the Decentralisation Law No. 49/2015," IEC.jo, 2016. https://bit.ly/2jOZN35.
18 Ibid.
19 E. Lust, "Competitive clientelism in the Middle East." (2009) Journal of Democracy 20.3: 122-135.
20 S. L. Yom, "The Dilemmas of American Democracy Promotion in the Arab World." (2008) Yale Journal of Int'l Affairs 3: 131-145.
21 P. L. Doan, "Changing administrative regions in Jordan: Regional development strategy or distraction?" (1991) Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie 82.3: 177-184.
22 The World Bank, (2016) "Report No. 103433-JO: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan - Promoting Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity, Systematic Country Diagnostic," The World Bank Group - Middle East and North Africa Region. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/368161467992043090/pdf/103433….
23 A.M. Baylouny, "Militarizing welfare: neo-liberalism and Jordanian policy." (2008) The Middle East Journal 62.2: 277-303.
24 Janine A. Clark, "The Dismal Failure of Efforts to Empower People in the Arab World." (2018) The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/the-dismal-failure-of-efforts-to-empower-pe….
25 S. L. Yom, "Tribal Politics in Contemporary Jordan: The Case of the Hirak Movement." (2014) The Middle East Journal, vol. 68, no. 2: 229-247.
26 C.R. Ryan, "Jordanian foreign policy and the Arab Spring." (2014) Middle East Policy 21.1: 144-153.
27 Suleiman Al-Khalidi, "Jordan Ends Bread Subsidy, Doubling some Prices, to Help State Finances." Reuters, Jan. 26, 2018, https://reut.rs/2Ke7Q4x.
28 "al-malik: len yuqūm aḥed bi-musāʿadatnā inna lem nusāʿid infasinā awalan." Ad-Dustour, Sept 14, 2017. https://bit.ly/2Iofk82.
29 "Address by His Majesty King Abdullah II to the Nation Announcing the Decentralisation Plan." https://bit.ly/2K0zant.
30 Courtney Freer and Shadi Hamid, "How Stable is Jordan? King Abdullah's Half-Hearted Reforms and the Challenge of the Arab Spring," Brookings Institution, Nov. 1, 2011, https://brook.gs/2IeZSI2.
31 "Royal Decree ratifies decentralisation law." Jordan Times (Amman, Jordan), Dec. 17, 2015. https://bit.ly/1mpdmVZ.
32 RASED, Statement on the Recent Development on Decentralization Legislation in Jordan. Al-Hayat Center for Civil Society Development, 2014.
33 "Jordan 2025: A National Vision and Strategy," (2015) http://inform.gov.jo/en-us/By-Date/Report-Details/ArticleId/247/Jordan-….
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Nefeen Abdel Hadi, "Amman… hal taḥtaj li man "yestifazha" lil mushārika bil intikhabāt?", Ad-Dustour, August 26, 2017.
37 Ibid.
38 Interview with Ahmed Ajarmeh, (former) Head of International Cooperation Unit, Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs (MoPPA), Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
39 Interview with Monica Wisner, Foreign Service Offier (FSO) and Sean Osner, Director for Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
40 Interview with John Maisner, Program Manager - Youth Political Participation and Jonas Cekuolis - Deputy Chief of Party - National Democratic Institute (NDI) Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
41 Ibid.
42 Interview with Amer Bani Amer, Founder & Director of Al-Hayat Center for Civil Society Development, Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
43 Various Arabic media articles from Ad-Dustour, al-Ghad, and al-Rai.
44 Interview with Amer Bani Amer, Founder & Director of Al-Hayat Center for Civil Society Development, Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
45 Law on Decentralization, Law No. 49 of 2015, Independent Election Commission, Jordan. Dec. 31, 2015. https://bit.ly/2kWCM1E (Translation); https://bit.ly/2o5f6Y4 (Arabic).
46 Interview with Fares Braizat, Co-founder and Chairman of NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions, Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
47 Interview with Amer Bani Amer, Founder & Director of Al-Hayat Center for Civil Society Development, Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
48 "Drāst: Qānūn Al-antikhāb Al-jadīd Lm Yuḥsin Tarkībat Majilis Al-nuwāb Wādāʾh," Al-Ghad, Jan 29, 2018. http://bit.ly/2ocaZbK.
49 Ibid.
50 Interview with Jamil al-Nimri, General Secretary of the Jordanian Social Democratic Party, former member of Parliament, columnist for Al-Ghad, Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
51 Dana Al Emam, "Royal Discussion Paper offers 'timely critique' — analyst," Jordan Times, Oct. 26, 2016. https://bit.ly/2IBFqVf.
52 Ezzeddin an-Naṭur, "al-lāmarkaziyya – māhiyatha w aliyat 'milha," AmmanNet, Mar. 11, 2015, https://bit.ly/2t8RMIG.
53 Curtis R. Ryan, "Deja Vu for Jordanian Election Reforms," The Washington Post, https://wapo.st/2IAml5w.
54 Jihad Al-Mansi, "40+40 / Jihād Al-mansī," Al-Ghad, Feb 14, 2018. https://bit.ly/2H0ThRI.
55 Interview with Amer Bani Amer, Founder & Director of Al-Hayat Center for Civil Society Development, Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
56 Interview with Richard Chambers, Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) at United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
57 Meeting with the Jerash Governorate Council in Jerash, Jordan, March 2018; In attendance: Dr. Ali Mhassneh, Fatima Al-Arareh, Dalal Qardan, Ahmed Yahya Ahmed Beni Ahmed, Dr. Yousef Zraigat, Ahmad Marazig, Muhammed Ali al-Jazazeen, Hind Al-Shorouqi, Ahmed al-Aʿtoum, Salim Ali Muhammed Hamdan, Hamza al-Nuasireh, Ahmed Mustafa, Raed al-Aʿtoum, Mahmoud Daraghmeh, Ahmed beni Abdeh, Hatmal Ahmed Ali al-Zaboun, Aqleh Abdullah Musaleheh, Muhamed Saleh al-Barmawi, Muhamed al-Ghadayreh, Muhammed al-Afeef.
58 "King rejects decentralization bill for 'unconstitutionality,'" Jordan Times, Oct. 19, 2015, https://bit.ly/1GmaxxM.
59 Meeting with the Jerash Governorate Council in Jerash, Jordan, March 2018; In attendance: Dr. Ali Mhassneh, Fatima Al-Arareh, Dalal Qardan, Ahmed Yahya Ahmed Beni Ahmed, Dr. Yousef Zraigat, Ahmad Marazig, Muhammed Ali al-Jazazeen, Hind Al-Shorouqi, Ahmed al-Aʿtoum, Salim Ali Muhammed Hamdan, Hamza al-Nuasireh, Ahmed Mustafa, Raed al-Aʿtoum, Mahmoud Daraghmeh, Ahmed beni Abdeh, Hatmal Ahmed Ali al-Zaboun, Aqleh Abdullah Musaleheh, Muhamed Saleh al-Barmawi, Muhamed al-Ghadayreh, Muhammed al-Afeef.
60 Various Arabic media articles from Ad-Dustour, al-Ghad, and al-Rai.
61 Ahmed Al-Tamimi, "Fāʿliāt Shʿbīt: Ghiāb Al-mashārīʿ Al-astithmārīt Bimūāzanat Irbd Yazīd Min Al-faqr," Al-Ghad, Nov. 25, 2017. https://bit.ly/2IhvY5j.
62 Various Arabic media articles from Ad-Dustour, al-Ghad, and al-Rai.
63 J.M. Kauzya, "Political Decentralization in Africa: Experiences of Uganda, Rwanda and South Africa," (2007) in eds. Cheema and Rondinelli, Decentralizing governance: emerging concepts and practices. Brookings Institution Press: 75-91.
64 S. Heydemann, "Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World," (2007) The Brookings Institution, vol. 13.
65 Ibid.
66 Interview with Monica Wisner, Foreign Service Officer (FSO) and Sean Osner, Director for Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
67 Interview with John Maisner, Program Manager - Youth Political Participation and Jonas Cekuolis - Deputy Chief of Party - National Democratic Institute (NDI) Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
68 Interview with Amer Bani Amer, Founder & Director of Al-Hayat Center for Civil Society Development, Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
69 Interview with Musa Shteiwi, Director of the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan in Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
70 Interview with Ahmed Ajarmeh, (former) Head of International Cooperation Unit, Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs (MoPPA), Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
71 Interview with Richard Chambers, Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) at United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
72 Interview with Monica Wisner, Foreign Service Officer (FSO) and Sean Osner, Director for Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
73 Meeting with the Jerash Governorate Council in Jerash, Jordan, March 2018; In attendance: Dr. Ali Mhassneh, Fatima Al-Arareh, Dalal Qardan, Ahmed Yahya Ahmed Beni Ahmed, Dr. Yousef Zraigat, Ahmad Marazig, Muhammed Ali al-Jazazeen, Hind Al-Shorouqi, Ahmed al-Aʿtoum, Salim Ali Muhammed Hamdan, Hamza al-Nuasireh, Ahmed Mustafa, Raed al-Aʿtoum, Mahmoud Daraghmeh, Ahmed beni Abdeh, Hatmal Ahmed Ali al-Zaboun, Aqleh Abdullah Musaleheh, Muhamed Saleh al-Barmawi, Muhamed al-Ghadayreh, Muhammed al-Afeef.
74 "Al-mʿāiṭt: Tawajah Ḥukūmī Litawfir Maqarrāt Limajālis Al-muḥāfaẓāt," Al-Ghad, Feb. 22, 2018. http://bit.ly/2CLMYh7.
75 "New Municipalities Law Aimed at Entrenching Decentralisation." (2014) Jordan Times, Amman, Jordan. http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/new-municipalities-law-aimed-entr….
76 Interview with Richard Chambers, Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) at United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Amman, March 2018.
77 “Āl-maʿāyṭah: Āl-ḥiṣāna āleti yuṭālib bihā baʿḍa āʿaḍāʾ majālis ālmuḥāfaẓāt lā tansejim mʿa āl-dustour,” Ad-Dustour, Oct. 23, 2017. https://bit.ly/2K6VCdR.
78 Meeting with the Jerash Governorate Council in Jerash, Jordan, March 2018; In attendance: Dr. Ali Mhassneh, Fatima Al-Arareh, Dalal Qardan, Ahmed Yahya Ahmed Beni Ahmed, Dr. Yousef Zraigat, Ahmad Marazig, Muhammed Ali al-Jazazeen, Hind Al-Shorouqi, Ahmed al-Aʿtoum, Salim Ali Muhammed Hamdan, Hamza al-Nuasireh, Ahmed Mustafa, Raed al-Aʿtoum, Mahmoud Daraghmeh, Ahmed beni Abdeh, Hatmal Ahmed Ali al-Zaboun, Aqleh Abdullah Musaleheh, Muhamed Saleh al-Barmawi, Muhamed al-Ghadayreh, Muhammed al-Afeef.
79 Interview with Amer Bani Amer, Founder & Director of Al-Hayat Center for Civil Society Development, Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
80 Interview with Fares Braizat, Co-founder and Chairman of NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions, Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
81 Interview with Jamil al-Nimri, General Secretary of the Jordanian Social Democratic Party, former member of Parliament, columnist for Al-Ghad, Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Interview with Ahmed Ajarmeh, (former) Head of International Cooperation Unit, Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs (MoPPA), Amman, Jordan, March 2018.
85 "Razzaz vows to boost decentralisation councils' role," The Jordan Times, 31 July 2018, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/razzaz-vows-boost-decentralisatio…
86 J. Goldberg, "The Modern King in the Arab Spring," (2013) Atlantic.com.
Middle East Policy is fully accessible through the Wiley Online Library
Click below to subscribe to the online or print edition of Middle East Policy and gain access to all journal content.