The United States and Iran this week renewed attacks amid reports that the two sides were close to a deal freeing up traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and setting conditions for talks on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. A breaking analysis from Middle East Policy, free to read even without a subscription, throws into question whether Tehran will actually relinquish control over the strait, examines potential alternatives for the traffic of energy and other vitally important resources, and lays out the future implications of Iran’s newfound influence over the strategically important waterway.
Middle East Policy has just published several incisive open-access examinations of the war, its causes, and its implications, including how the game of chicken between Iran and Israel spiraled into direct conflict; the benefits and costs of President Donald Trump’s transactional diplomacy; how the Islamic Revolution upended regional security; Iran’s forward defense in Africa; and the effects of the war on Gulf cooperation with the Asia-Pacific. Readers can still access our special issue on the Iran War, our Spring 2026 compilation, and an Early View of our Summer 2026 offering, the 168th in our history.
In his new article for the forthcoming summer issue of Middle East Policy, Gawdat Bahgat argues that the Iran War has fundamentally altered the regional energy order by demonstrating Tehran’s ability to impose selective and sustained control over one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. While Gulf countries, the United States, and global markets seek a return to unrestricted navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, the author shows that neither military force nor alternative export routes are likely to fully eliminate this leverage.
“The potential outcomes of this crisis are not binary, resulting in either the status quo ante of unrestricted transit or Iran’s full control,” Bahgat writes. “Partial restrictions, negotiated passage, and episodes of disruption cannot be ruled out. This would lead to profound shifts in the regional and global orders.”
The piece first reviews how Trump’s war pushed Iran to realize its long-threatened capacity to halt traffic in the narrow artery through which at least 20 percent of liquid petroleum flowed before the US-Israeli regime-change campaign. The Islamic Republic soon pushed to normalize its control:
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy declared that Gulf states would be compelled to sign onto a protocol guaranteeing postwar shipping security. The parliament followed by approving a plan to institute a toll in the strait that would generate an estimated at $70–80 billion annually. In early May, after Trump announced a ceasefire, the Islamic Republic officially established a mechanism to govern the waterway. Under this initiative, all vessels intending to pass through are required to coordinate with Tehran.
While Trump, his secretary of state, and his treasury secretary have declared that it is illegal to charge tolls on an international waterway, Bahgat provides a comparative analysis to show that the issue is not clear-cut. Iran is obliged under customary international law to respect treaties that allow free passage through open waters. However, Turkey is allowed to charge fees in exchange for services to ships crossing the Turkish straits, through which about 5 percent of the world’s seaborne oil flows. And Egypt charges tolls on vessels transiting the Suez Canal. Therefore, Bahgat asserts, “while most Gulf states and the Trump administration strongly reject any change to the [Strait of Hormuz’s] navigation order, appeals to international law are likely to fail.”
Iran’s exercise of sovereignty has severely impacted Gulf economies. Although these states have sought to diversify away from hydrocarbons, they continue to rely on fossil-fuel exports for national income. Therefore, producers are likely to seek new pathways to get oil and gas online. Bahgat examines a number of potential routes and finds that they are not capable of delivering in the short term, and even in the medium term they would require major upgrades.
“The four current alternatives outside the strait are the Iranian port of Jask on the Gulf of Oman, the Iraqi Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline to the Mediterranean Sea, the Saudi Aramco East-West Pipeline to the Red Sea, and the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline to the Gulf of Oman,” Bahgat writes. But after reviewing their capacities and potential for upgrades, he advances three core reasons that they will not soon replace the Strait of Hormuz or, crucially, reduce the newly exercised Iranian influence over global supply:
First, all four pipelines have relatively limited capacity. They have helped to mitigate the global oil crisis but they cannot make up for the entire loss of exports….Second, these routes transport only hydrocarbons and have limited value for the movement of other commodities. The de facto blockade in the Strait of Hormuz has not only limited oil and gas shipments but has also had a severe impact on international trade in food, fertilizers, helium, and many other essential products. Third, the four alternative pipelines have themselves been vulnerable to political instability and security challenges. They do not guarantee the safety, security, and sustainability of oil and gas supplies from the Gulf region.
Although Israel, Turkey, and even Syria have been advanced as future nodes that could prevent Iran from reimposing its stranglehold, Bahgat warns that “there are no guarantees that any of these routes will be built, much less provide the capacity required to replace the volumes jeopardized by Iran’s dominion over the Strait of Hormuz.” In addition, the United States and NATO have no good military options to restore the status quo antebellum, and while European countries have pledged to help reopen the strait, this is conditioned on a negotiated settlement—something Trump seems not to have the patience for.
Thus, Bahgat concludes that the postwar order is unlikely to feature unrestricted navigation or de facto Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. Instead, the emerging system may feature negotiated passage, episodic disruptions, institutionalized fees for security and transit, and Tehran’s recurring leverage over global energy and trade flows. Over the longer term, he argues, the crisis could accelerate shifts in regional alignments, weaken confidence in Washington’s security architecture, and intensify efforts to diversify energy routes while accelerating the shift in the global energy mix toward renewables.
Middle East Policy, Analyzing the Gulf Conflict
AMERICA’S WAR ON IRAN
Signals, Red Lines, and Collision: The Israel-Iran Spiral and US Intervention
Buğra Sari—open access!
Trump’s Transactional Diplomacy: Breakthrough or Breakdown?
Guilain Denoeux | Robert Springborg—open access!
Between Ideology and Strategy: The Iranian Revolution and the Reconfiguration of Middle Eastern Security
Alabbas F. Alsudani—open access!
Iran’s Forward Defense in Sub-Saharan Africa
Ariel Limanya Limbu | Ronen A. Cohen—open access!
CONSEQUENCES IN THE GULF
Crisis in the Strait of Hormuz: What Lies Ahead?
Gawdat Bahgat—free to read!
GCC-Asia Pacific Energy Nexus: Navigating Shifts in Demand and Geopolitics
Umud Shokri—open access!
Outwardly Strong, Internally Brittle: Dissecting the MBS Regime
Mohammed Ayoob