Albert B. Wolf
Dr. Wolf holds a doctorate in political science from the University of California, Irvine.
Does the Arab Street hold authoritarian leaders to account for their failures on the battlefield? Sir John Bagot Glubb, the British head of the Arab Legion, noted several years after Israel's War for Independence that it was the "Street" that pushed Arab statesmen to go to war, rather than any clear strategic rationale:
The Arab statesmen did not intend war... But in the end they entered [Palestine] and ordered their commanders to advance as a result of pressure of public opinion and a desire to appease the "street."...The politicians, the demagogues, the Press and the mob were in charge — not the soldiers. Warnings went unheeded. Doubters were denounced as traitors."1
Many dictators since have used the "Arab Street" as an excuse for why they cannot support a variety of policies, from instituting democratic reforms to recognizing Israel.2 Yet it remains untested whether autocrats pay a political price for pursuing failed foreign policies, such as losing on the battlefield.
Conventional wisdom suggests that in democracies, the people who pay the costs of war can remove their elected leaders from office, compelling them to choose their targets carefully. By contrast, autocratic lack of accountability has been thought to allow dictators to engage in reckless and provocative behavior.3 Others argue that, when autocrats are defeated on the battlefield, they are more likely to be overthrown by regime insiders than by revolutionaries.4
This piece argues that, when autocrats lose, they are vulnerable to being overthrown by mass audiences.5 In order for them (in this case, the Arab Street) to hold dictators to account, three conditions must hold. Critics must be able to identify and coordinate with one another; they must view fighting and losing a war as a sign of failure; and, finally, protests must pose a threat to a dictator's hold onto power.6
A defeat occurs when a state has (1) failed to achieve its publicly stated aims, (2) incurred relative losses vis-à-vis its enemy, or (3) suffered absolute losses that make it worse off than before the war.7 I treat the Arab Street as a hands-tying device for Arab leaders, a proxy for public opinion made visible through anti-regime protests.8 These would involve five or more people publicly criticizing the government, coupled with violence, personal injuries or property damage.9
I will focus on the fate of Arab leaders who fought and lost to Israel during the Six-Day War of 1967. Contrary to the received wisdom, mass protests were inspired by major defeats on the battlefield, which in turn led to the imposition of political sanctions up to and including the removal of dictators from office.
LOSSES AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Mass audiences such as the Arab Street hold dictators accountable for their military losses if three variables are in place. First, critics of the regime must have the ability to coordinate anti-regime protests among the general public.10 Battlefield defeats serve as a focal point that allows protesters to identify one another. Second, domestic audiences must view fighting and losing a war as a sign of a leader's incompetence.11 For many, losses signal a leader's poor judgment and inability to a deliver on foreign policy goods in the future. Third, protests must pose a threat to a dictator's hold on power.
The Coordination Problem
The primary domestic threat to dictators comes from their militaries and security apparatuses.12 The removal of an ineffective dictator is a public good that few citizens want to pay for with their jobs and lives.13 Major military defeats make it easier for mass publics to take down dictators by allowing members of the opposition to identify one another and by weakening the security apparatuses keeping the regime in power.
Under dictatorships, the masses have potent incentives to engage in "preference falsification," openly expressing approval of the regime though they actually dislike or despise it.14 This makes it difficult for members of the opposition to identify one another. Major military defeats rally the opposition against the regime, crowding out all other domestic political phenomena competing for public attention. 15
Military defeats lower the costs of protest by weakening the state's security apparatus. Dictatorial politics often take place in the shadow of violence; there are no regular procedures for removing leaders from office.16 However, reliance on repression carries a cost in the aftermath of a military defeat. Theda Skocpol points out that defeats are particularly dangerous for autocratic leaders, as losses weaken the organs of coercion.17
Evaluation of Autocratic Leaders
Even in the wake of a loss, members of the public still have to calculate whether they would be better off under a new set of leaders than under the incumbent. Although decision makers and members of the public may differ over the costs and benefits of fighting, they tend to agree that losing is "one of the cardinal sins of international politics."18
First, losing reflects poorly on a leader's judgment and reliability. Different voting rules suggest varying levels of cost sensitivity when it comes to war, but only a pacifist punishes a leader who fights and wins.19 Second, losers are unlikely to be able to deliver on foreign-policy promises in the future.20 In the wake of a humiliating defeat, critics of the regime point out inconsistencies between the government's words and promises, on the one hand, and the policies that failed to deliver, on the other.21 A loss damages not only a leader's individual ability to make credible commitments, but the reputation of the nation as a whole. Replacing the incumbent puts the state on the road to recovering its lost reputation.22
Protests Threaten a Leader
Dictators go out of their way to neutralize the revolutionary threat posed by mass publics.23 Anti-regime protests can undermine public order, making it difficult for elites to bargain with one another.24 At least three mechanisms translate protests into political costs: protests that are tipping points; protests that reveal splits among elite veto players; and protests that bring about revolution, anarchy or civil war.
Initial protests led by "early risers" can serve as tipping points signaling the beginning of the breakdown of a regime.25 Once protests begin, the costs of collective action become lower for other disgruntled individuals, signaling that it is now acceptable to publicly oppose the regime.26
Second, protests can raise the likelihood of a coup by exposing splits among elites. Such divisions are one of the leading sources of autocrats' turnover in office.27 Sensing that it will be scapegoated, the military may initiate a putsch in order for senior officers to maintain their access to rents and patronage.28 To prevent this, dictators may be compelled to make concessions or alter the substance of ongoing policies.29 They may also incur personnel costs, replacing high-ranking members of the regime with new individuals.
Third, protests can bring down a regime by instigating a revolution or fostering a breakdown in domestic order. Conservative beneficiaries of the status quo may choose to countermobilize in response. This dynamic may spiral out of control, reducing the state to a set of competing interest groups jockeying for advantage.30 The Alawites who constitute the National Defense Forces (NDF) and the ad hoc Shabiha militias in Syria are one example of conservative beneficiaries who countermobilized in reaction to the Sunni opposition seeking to topple Bashar al-Assad's rule.31
THE SIX-DAY WAR
The long-term causes of the June 1967 war were the competition over water resources among Israel, Syria and Jordan from 1964 to 1967. Other causes included recurrent conflicts within the demilitarized zones (DMZs) between Israel and Syria, and Nasser's competition with other Arab dictators for leadership of the Arab world.
Among the shorter-term causes were the new Syrian Baath regime's sending Egypt, via the Soviet Union, a false report indicating that Israel had mobilized its armed forces along the Israeli-Syrian border. Syria intended to compel Egypt to mobilize its own soldiers to deter an Israeli invasion. This mobilization, along with the expulsion of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and the closing of the Red Sea Straits of Tiran, had the opposite effect. Pressure mounted upon the incumbent government of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to strike first. On June 6, 1967, Eshkol's government attacked the largely unguarded Egyptian air force to devastating effect before taking the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank and the Golan Heights.32
The leaders of the three main Arab participants in the war — Egypt, Jordan and Syria — suffered political punishments because of their poor performance. Nasser's Egypt was rocked by mass protests, forcing him to pay some limited policy costs. King Hussein's Jordan was forced to contend with the machinations of Palestinian guerrillas; this led to the breakdown of law and order for a time. Syria's protests led to an elite power struggle between the civilian Baathist Salah Jadid and Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad. Jadid was eventually overthrown in 1970.33
Gamal Abdel Nasser
Within the first few hours of Israel's preemptive airstrikes on June 5, most of the Egyptian air force had been destroyed. Marshal Abdel-Hakim Amer, the military chief, ordered an immediate withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, allowing Israel to conquer the territory and its oil supplies in three days. Within five days of fighting, Nasser's army had suffered over 10,000 casualties.34
For many historians, 1967 marked a blow to Nasser's presidency from which he never recovered. Not only was his reputation damaged throughout the Arab world; he was forced to call upon the Soviet Union for assistance in rebuilding Egypt's decimated armed forces.35 Dubbing the Six-Day War the naksa (setback), Nasser offered his resignation on the fifth day of the war, June 9, 1967, initially accepting full responsibility for the defeat shortly after having learned that Israel had crossed the Suez Canal. Instead of naming Amer as his successor, he transferred presidential powers to his vice-president, Zakaria Mohieddin. However, an outpouring of public support emerged throughout Egypt and the whole Arab world, urging Nasser to reconsider his decision.36 Some western observers in Cairo at the time, such as the Canadian ambassador, R.M. Tesh, questioned whether Nasser's resignation was actually a ploy to rally the public behind his regime. Tesh suspected that the protests had been organized by the ruling political party. Ploy or not, Nasser rescinded his resignation on the last day of the war, June 10. However, he still accepted the resignations of Amer, Defense Minister Shams Badran, and several senior members of the general staff.37
Amer had been one of Nasser's oldest and closest confidants as well as his most likely challenger, although there is little in the way of evidence that Amer himself ever contemplated challenging Nasser for the presidency before the Six-Day War.38 However, the armed forces were Amer's power base, the source of his patronage network. This led many of Nasser's closest aides to question how Amer's supporters would respond if their source of rents suddenly dried up. Prior to his abysmal performance during the Six-Day War, Amer had not been held responsible for the Egyptian military's poor showing during the Suez Crisis or the intervention in Yemen. Nasser preferred stability to provoking a confrontation with Amer, who, in turn, was able to continue to build up his patronage network in the military through the failed intervention in Yemen and up to June 1967.39
Nasser began an overhaul of the armed forces' command structure. He sacked 50 senior commanders, appointed new commanders of the air force and navy as well as a chief of staff and, finally, on June 19, 1967, named himself prime minister.40 Shortly after having been sacked as field marshal, Amer went into self-imposed exile. He began contacting officers who feared that they, too, were about to be scapegoated by Nasser for the outcome of the war. Knowing Nasser would be out of the country for the Arab League summit in Khartoum, Amer and his disgruntled acolytes decided to initiate a coup on September 1, 1967. Nasser caught wind of the plot and on August 27 sent a military battalion to arrest Amer at his home in Giza. This signaled the beginning of a major purge. Over 1,000 people were arrested, including Amer, former Defense Minister Shams Badran, nearly 300 senior generals and several members of Amer's family. Although the circumstances remain a matter of debate, Amer died during the interrogation that followed his arrest. Some historians suggest that he was given the option of committing suicide by poison; others contend he was executed by military police.41 Shortly after Amer's death, the state-sanctioned press, beginning with Al-Ahram, began deflecting the blame for the defeat in the Six-Day War away from Nasser himself by scapegoating the military for its inflexibility and for being caught off guard by Israel's air attack.42
Throughout the Arab Cold War, Nasser had used popular anger over what he depicted as weakness in the struggle with Israel to gain an advantage over rivals in the region.43 Nasser now realized he was threatened by the very forces of which he had once been considered the undisputed leader. It was imperative not only to ward off potential threats from within the regime, but to secure the regime against a revolution from the public.44 Beginning in late July 1967, Nasser attempted to buy the public's quiescence by a repeat performance of his resignation speech, acknowledging the public's disapproval of the war's outcome, accepting (limited) personal responsibility and scapegoating the military.45 The strategy largely worked until late February 1968.46
On February 20, the tribunal tasked with punishing the air force officers who were held responsible for negligence during the war meted out their sentences: not more than 15 years. Nasser's strategy of scapegoating the military resulted in popular blowback; many Egyptians believed these sentences were inappropriately harsh.47 The first riots against the regime broke out on February 21, 1968, partly by accident. Protests had initially been organized by the ruling Arab Socialist Union (ASU) to take place in the city of Helwan among industrial workers. However, the city police had never been informed and stepped in to thwart the protests. Police efforts at repression had a cascade effect, leading to the outbreak of student protests against the regime in Cairo. Many of the students began to point to the gap between what the regime had promised in several areas — including the struggle with Israel — and what it had actually achieved. These were the most violent protests Egypt had seen since the overthrow of King Farouk in 1952.48
In addition to domestic political pressure, Egypt had to continue to pay off nearly $2 billion in foreign debt. This task was made even more difficult by declining revenues from the Sinai oil fields, Suez Canal shipping and tourism. Nasser was only able to replenish the state's coffers through subsidies from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya on condition that Egypt continue its rivalry with Israel.49 Contrary to the expectations of rationalist theory, Nasser was experiencing both domestic and international pressure to maintain an aggressive stance against Israel despite having recently suffered a humiliating loss — making cooperation more costly than conflict.50
The ongoing civil unrest compelled Nasser to unveil the "March 30 Program." Selling it as a broad-scale blueprint for reform, Nasser's presentation began by blaming Amer and the military — whom he referred to as "reactionary culprits" — for having been responsible for Egypt's defeat. The new program promised the further democratization of the ASU and additional personal freedoms, including the curbing of the secret police. This was approved in a national referendum on May 2. After subsequent elections that July to the ASU Congress and the National Assembly went off with little excitement, a new round of student protests broke out in Alexandria, Mansoura and Assiut. Protesters railed against the lack of military progress in reversing the naksa. Unlike previous protests, though, these included participants across the political spectrum, from members of the Muslim Brotherhood on the right to students on the secular left.51
Despite the protests, fissures did not emerge among the elite ranks of the regime itself because of Nasser's purges. In contrast to the protests and riots that characterized 1968, 1969 proved to be fairly quiet. Nasser had managed to abandon many of the promises enshrined in the March 30 Program while continuing to consolidate his hold on power. As his health began to deteriorate in what would prove to be the last year of his life, Nasser retained the presidency and served as prime minister and head of both the National Congress and the Supreme Executive Committee of the ASU.52
It is important to note that Nasser faced greater criticism from his regional counterparts for cooperating with Israel than continuing to fight, as shown by Arab states' responses to the ceasefire that ended the War of Attrition. Lasting from 1969 to 1970, this war consisted of a series of tit-for-tat military strikes between Egypt and Israel along the Suez Canal. Nasser's aims were to gain territory close to Suez and to compel Israel to cease its air raids into Egypt.53 The United States intervened out of concern that the conflict would escalate into a confrontation with the Soviet Union; Secretary of State William P. Rogers brokered a ceasefire in August 1970 (a month before Nasser's death). Though Nasser did not face criticism for his conduct of the war itself, elements of the PLO as well as the governments of Iraq and Syria condemned the agreement as "defeatist" and accused him of "capitulation."54 Despite everything, Nasser managed to die while still in office.
The loss of the Golan Heights placed Syria at a military disadvantage vis-à-vis Israel while removing its access to the three main tributaries of the Jordan River. This setback, coupled with domestic instability, exacerbated the rivalries in the upper echelons of the regime. The de facto leader of the regime, Salah Jadid, was overthrown, and its nominal (but largely powerless) leader, Hashim al-Atasi, was removed by the defense minister, Hafez al-Assad.55
Prior to the outbreak of the Six-Day War, Syria had been governed by an ideologically radical Baathist regime that came to power in a coup in 1966. It viewed its role in the Arab world as analogous to that of China in the Communist world: radical-in-chief, ever-ready to criticize any attempt to reach accommodation with Israel.56 After June 1967, the more radical-leaning trend, led by Salah Jadid, sought to continue what had been dubbed the "Arab Cold War" between radical and conservative Western-leaning regimes.57 For Jadid and his partisans, Syria was the "beating heart of Arab nationalism." Other regimes were either "defeatist" or "reactionary," and he called for their overthrow. The rivalry with Israel was to be treated as a "popular war of liberation," to be carried out by Palestinian guerrilla groups sponsored by Syria.58 By contrast, Assad advocated a more pragmatic approach to confronting Israel that would include the more conservative Arab monarchies.59
After the war, the Baathist regime in Syria attempted to secure its hold on power by scapegoating outside powers, searching for insiders it could deem "traitors" and maintaining a degree of economic stability. After breaking relations with the United States and Britain, the regime executed two men involved in the failed coup of September 1966. Support from the Soviet and Arab worlds helped secure the regime, with Abu Dhabi pledging $2 million to the military, East Germany signing a deal to purchase irrigation equipment, and Iraq signing a customs agreement to lower tariff barriers.60 Syria received additional aid from Kuwait in November.61 The Soviets agreed to replace the military equipment lost during the war, while the transit fees charged to the Arabian American Oil Company helped to cover Syria's long-running trade deficit.62 Finally, despite longstanding mismanagement of the state's agricultural sector, the regime announced a new initiative to raise the production of cotton by 100,000 tons.63
According to a contemporary article, the immediate outcome of the war "apparently aggravated internal instability."64 Throughout the rest of 1967 and the first half of 1968, Syria was only able to retain a degree of calm because of economic subsidies from the Soviets and other Arab states.65 However, this was interrupted on July 11, when it was reported that a strike had taken place at the state-owned oil agency at al-Sukhnah.66
Domestic turbulence reinforced competition within the upper echelons of the Baath party. On May 22, 1968, three Arab-nationalist opposition parties — the Arab Nationalist Movement, the Syrian Arab Socialist Union and the Arab Socialist Party — banded together to protest the regime's handling of the war. They contended that the government had not only given Israel an excuse to attack but had "surrendered" the Golan Heights, while the foreign minister accused Lebanon of harboring Syrian plotters of a coup against the Baath government.67
The Baath issued a decree announcing the formation of a special high court "to try conspirators against the state and saboteurs against the revolution."68 One witness claimed that former Jordanian Premier Wasfi al-Tal had paid former Syrian Prime Minister Salah al-Din al-Bitar $14,000 to finance a conspiracy against the Baath government.69 When the trial concluded, 77 of the defendants were found guilty, and 18 were condemned to death.70
Starting in February 1968, Assad decided on a course of action that would sever the control of the civilian half of the Baath party over the military.71 He replaced army chief of staff Ahmad al-Suwaydani with his childhood friend, Mustafa Tlas.72 By scapegoating Jadid's allies in the armed forces for Syria's defeat, Assad was able to remove Jadid's influence from the military. After sacking al-Suwaydani, Assad removed Ahmad al-Mir, a supporter of Jadid who had been the commander on the Golan. In October of 1968, Assad was elected head of a new regional command of the Baath Party; Jadid reportedly gave the Communists half of the seats in the new cabinet.73
In early 1969, the Baath Party announced that political constraints would be relaxed and a new constitution would be drawn up; the election of a people's assembly would follow.74 By April, a new constitution had been implemented, and the Baath created an execution authority, the Politburo, of which Assad was a member.75 By May 29, reports began to emerge that Jadid had been forced to resign as the assistant secretary-general of the Baath Party.76 Shortly after Syrian forces entered the Jordanian civil war on the side of the Palestinians, Assad ordered the arrest of Jadid and al-Atasi, the front man who was serving as president.77 The coup was almost entirely bloodless, taking only three days to complete.78
In his memoirs, King Hussein wrote of the Six-Day War, "I have to admit that once June was over, it took me a long time to understand, digest and face up to what had happened. It was like a dream or, worse yet, a nightmare."79 Jordan had lost the West Bank, which included the Old City of Jerusalem. The Hashemites had used their custodianship of some of Islam's holiest places to legitimate their rule. Even before June 1967, the Hashemites had faced challenges from Arab nationalists, who saw the monarchy as a puppet of the British.80 The loss of the Old City had the potential to exacerbate King Hussein's problems with the Arab Street.81
The loss of the holy sites was a heavy blow, but the West Bank also was responsible for as much as 40 percent of Jordan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It contained half of the kingdom's inhabited land and industrial capacity and one fourth of its farmable land. In addition, Jordan was forced to absorb between 175,000-250,000 Palestinian refugees. The Arab Legion lost 700 soldiers (with an additional 6,000 missing or injured) and its entire air force, while seven out of 11 of its army brigades were rendered useless.82
King Hussein did not face a political threat in the form of a palace or military coup. The influx of Palestinian refugees that resulted from the Israeli occupation of the West Bank led to the PLO's use of Jordan as a staging ground for raids against Israel.83 This challenged the Hashemite monarchy's ability to rule, resulting in a civil war. Many of the Palestinian guerrillas received support from Syria, while King Hussein obtained backing from the United States, Egypt and his erstwhile adversary Israel, allowing him to retain office.84
Although none of these groups initially sought to take over Jordan, their presence became viewed as an unacceptable infringement of the monarchy's sovereignty.85 The raids they conducted raised the likelihood of retaliation from Israel. The guerrilla groups' lack of respect for Jordanian laws resulted in a total breakdown in domestic order.86
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) consisted of multiple factions. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) were the most hawkish, while Yasser Arafat's Fatah initially sought to avoid a conflict with Jordan.87 By September 1970, the fedayeen established their own government in Irbid, prompting King Hussein to crack down on the PLO. Hussein was worried about Syria's involvement in the Jordanian civil war. Nasser repaid the king's loyalty during the Six-Day War by criticizing Syria for supporting the PLO. The Egyptian president went on to argue that guerrilla tactics against Israel were unlikely to result in the liberation of Palestine, and that disunity among the Arab states was likely to prolong the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The United States and Israel also supported Amman, for fear the Hashemites would be replaced by a pro-Moscow regime.88
By the end of September 1970, 3,000 Palestinian fighters and civilians had been killed; those who survived were expelled to Lebanon. Nasser brokered an agreement between King Hussein and the PLO whereby the latter could keep their bases in exchange for obeying Jordanian law. The agreement quickly fell apart. In October 1970, Wasfi al-Tal, prime minister of Jordan for the third time, made the elimination of the PLO his main priority, embarking upon a series of "mopping-up operations."89
Critics may contend that my findings exaggerate the causal importance of mass constraints by focusing solely upon states in the Middle East. However, two major social revolutions — the Russian Revolution and the Chinese Revolution of 1911 — were the outgrowth of military defeats.90 Mass protests were sparked by the defeat of the army of Nicholas II by Wilhelmine Germany. These protests ultimately resulted in the overthrow of the Russian monarchy, which in turn brought about the Kerensky government.91 Similarly, the Chinese Revolution of 1911 came after the Qing Dynasty was repeatedly defeated by Meiji Japan.92
Second, authoritarian leaders are traditionally depicted as ruling over closed societies with little or no access to a free press, limiting the public's ability to hold dictators to account.93 However, from the radio "wars" during the Arab Cold War to the rise of Al Jazeera and social media, mass publics have managed to outmaneuver state censorship in the Arab world on several occasions.94
A third concern surrounds the degree of variation in the punishments each leader suffered. Here, external support appears to have played a key role. Nasser and King Hussein were able to retain a degree of support from one-time allies (and in King Hussein's case, quiet support from Israel). This may have mitigated the punishments they suffered. Salah Jadid, by contrast, found himself isolated both at home and abroad.
These findings undermine the claim that autocrats are unaccountable to their publics on matters of foreign policy. Despite the collective-action problem that non-elites face when forcing dictators out of power, foreign-policy failures can serve as a focal point to rally the public together to overturn the domestic status quo. If autocrats also pay attention to the domestic consequences of losing wars, they may also be more selective when choosing their foreign policy initiatives than previously thought.
1 Benny Morris, 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War (Yale University Press, 2008), ch. 2.
2 Marc Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan's Identity (Columbia University Press, 1999), 50.
3 See Kenneth A. Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton University Press, 2002); Schultz and Barry Weingast, "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition," International Organization 57, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 3–42; Branislav Slantchev, "Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs," International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 2 (June 2006): 445-477; and Emily Beaulieu, Gary W. Cox, and Sebastian Saiegh, "Sovereign Debt and Regime Type: Reconsidering the Democratic Advantage," International Organization 66, no. 4 (Fall 2012): 709-738.
4 Jessica L. Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," International Organization 62, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 35-64.
5 See Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (Cambridge University Press, 2006); Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements in Contentious Politics, 3rd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Jessica Chen Weiss, "Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China," International Organization 67, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 1-35.
6 See Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs"; Weeks, Dictators at War and Peace (Cornell University Press, 2014); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (Harper and Row, 1957); and Morris Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (Yale University Press, 1981).
7 Dominic D.P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics (Harvard University Press, 2006), 25.
8 Marc Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan's Identity (Columbia University Press, 1999), 50; and Marc Lynch, "Beyond the Arab Street: Iraq and the Arab Public Sphere," Politics and Society 31, no. 1 (March 2003): 56.
9 Doug McAdam and Yang Su, "The War at Home: Antiwar Protests and Congressional Voting, 1965 to 1973," American Sociological Review 67, no. 5 (October 2002): 702; and Weiss, "Authoritarian Signaling," 6-7.
10 See Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs."
11 See Weeks, Dictators at Peace and War.
12 Barbara Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics (University of Michigan Press, 2003), 53-88.
13 Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-12.
14 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification (Harvard University Press, 1997), 21.
15 Jessica Weeks, "Leaders, Accountability, and Foreign Policy in Non-Democracies," Ph.D. Dissertation (Stanford University, 2009), 110.
16 Alexandre Debs and H.E. Goemans, "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War," American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (August 2010): 435; and Giacomo Chiozza and H.E.Goemans, Leaders and International Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 44.
17 See Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge University Press, 1978), ch. 1; and Debs and Goemans, "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War," 435.
18 Weeks, Dictators at War and Peace, 13.
19 Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifle, Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts (Princeton University Press, 2009), 237; and Leslie Johns, "Knowing the Unknown: Executive Evaluation and International Crisis Outcomes," Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 2 (April 2006): 230.
20 James D. Fearon, "Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance," in Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, eds. Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 55-97.
21 Kevin J. O'Brien, "Rightful Resistance," World Politics 49, no. 1 (October 1996): 33.
22 Alastair Smith and Alexandra Guisinger, "Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises." Journal of Crisis Resolution 46, no. 2 (April 2002): 175-200; and Jason M.K. Lyall, "Pocket Protests: Rhetorical Coercion and the Micropolitics of Collective Action in Semiauthoritarian Regimes," World Politics 58, no. 3 (July 2006): 378-412.
23 Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico (Cambridge University Press, 2006), ch. 1.
24 McAdam and Su, "The War at Home," 702-703.
25 See Thomas Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (W.W. Norton, 1978).
26 Timur Kuran, "Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution," Public Choice 61, no. 1 (April 1989): 41-47; Timur Kuran, "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution in 1989," World Politics 44, no. 1 (October 1991): 7-48; and Susanne Lohmann, "Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-1991," World Politics 47, no. 1 (October 1994): 42-101.
27 Beatriz Magaloni and Ruth Kricheli, "Political Order and One-Party Rule," Annual Reviews in Political Science 13 (2010): 123-143.
28 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 169.
29 See Jack L. Snyder and Erica Borghard, "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound," American Political Science Review 105, no. 3 (August 2011): 437-456.
30 Jessica Chen Weiss, "Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China," International Organization 67, no. 1 (January 2013): 1-35.
31 Sam Dagher, "Syria's Alawite Force Turned Tide for Assad: National Defense Force Helped Regain Territory from Rebels," Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2013.
32 Michael Brecher and Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (Oxford University Press, 1974), chs. 1-2; and Trever N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (Harper and Row, 1978), ch. 1.
33 John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton University Press ,1983), chs. 1-5.
34 See Laura James, "Egypt: Dangerous Illusions," in The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences, eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Avi Shlaim (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
35 Jason Brownlee, Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the U.S.-Egyptian Alliance (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 19.
36 Abdel Magid Farid, Nasser: The Final Years (Garnet and Ithaca Press, 1996), 1-18.
37 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Oxford University Press, 2002), 286-289.
38 Shaheen Ayubi, Nasser and Sadat: Decision-Making and Foreign Policy, 1970-1972 (University Press of America, 1994), 20-25.
39 Robert Stephens, Nasser: A Political Biography (Simon and Schuster. 1971), 515; and Jesse Ferris, Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power (Princeton University Press, 2013), 42-45.
40 "Chronology," Middle East Journal 21, no. 4 (Autumn 1967).
41 Oren 2002, 320; Ferris 2012, 37.
42 "Chronology," Middle East Journal 22, no. 1 (Winter 1968): 71.
43 See Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (Public Affairs, 2012), chs. 1-2.
44 Raymond William Baker, Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat (Harvard University Press, 1978), ch. 5.
45 Yoram Meital, Egypt's Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967-1977 (University Press of Florida, 1997), chs. 2-3.
46 Stephens, 533.
47 Brownlee, 18.
48 Steven A. Cook, The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square (Oxford University Press, 2011), 101-103.
49 See James, 2012.
50 Branislav Slantchev, "Borrowed Power: Debt Finance and the Resort to Arms," American Political Science Review 106, no. 4 (Autumn 2012): 787-809.
51 Stephens, 535-537.
52 Anthony Nutting, Nasser (Constable and Robinson, 1972), ch. 3.
53 See Brownlee.
54 Barnett, 1998, 175.
55 Fred Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War: Thirty Years of Confrontation (Cornell University Press, 1996), chs. 1-3.
56 Moshe Ma'oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus – A Political Biography (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988), 39.
57 Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970 (Oxford University Press, 1971), 150-151.
58 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (Clarendon Press, 1997), 117, 125, 127.
59 Ma'oz 1988, 37; Raymond Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria: Army, Party, and Peasant (Westview Press 1990), 137.
60 "Chronology," Middle East Journal 22, no. 4 (Autumn 1967): 4521-522.
61 "Chronology," Middle East Journal 22, no. 2 (Spring 1968): 188.
62 E. Kanovsky, "The Economic Aftermath of the Six Day War: UAR, Jordan and Syria," Middle East Journal 22, no. 3 (Summer 1967): 281.
63 "Chronology," Middle East Journal 22, no. 2 (Spring 1968): 283.
64 Kanovsky, 278.
65 Ibid., 278, 279.
66 "Chronology," Middle East Journal, 1967: 521.
67 "Chronology," Middle East Journal 22, no. 4 (Autumn 1967): 490-491.
69 "Chronology," Middle East Journal 23, no. 1 (Winter 1969): 63-80.
70 "Chronology," Middle East Journal 23, no. 4 (Autumn 1969): 205.
71 Tabitha Petran, Syria (Praeger, 1972), 82-83.
72 "Chronology," Middle East Journal 22, no. 2 (Spring 1968): 173-191.
73 "Chronology," Middle East Journal 23 no. 1 (Winter 1968): 77; and Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (University of California Press, 1988), 143-150.
74 "Chronology," Middle East Journal 23, no. 3 (Summer 1969): 378.
75 Ibid., 379.
76 "Chronology," Middle East Journal 22, no. 4 (Autumn 1969): 524.
77 "Chronology," Middle East Journal 25, no. 1 (Winter 1971): 76.
78 Seale, 163-165.
79 Oren, 320.
80 Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 1955-1967 (Oxford University Press, 1991), 21-31.
81 Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace (Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), 251.
82 Ibid., 252-254.
83 Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (Columbia University Press, 1998), 174-182.
84 See Seale 1988; Sayigh 1997; Shlaim 2007.
85 Kerr, 133-145.
86 Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal, The Palestinian People: A History (Harvard University Press, 2003), 255-257.
87 Sayigh 1997, 150-151, 262-268; and Migdal and Kimmerling 2003: 258-261.
88 Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton University Press, 2003), 259-260.
89 Ibid., 260.
90 Skocpol, 81-98.
91 Sean McMeekin, The Russian Origins of the First World War (Belknap Press, 2011), 314-345.
92 John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History (Belknap Press, 2006), 206-217.
93 Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (Autumn 1986): 1151-1169.
94 Lynch 2003, 58.