The Woes and Worries of Hizbullah
Levant Update 4
October 2008
By: Antony T. Sullivan
President, Near East Support Services
As noted in previous numbers of the Levant Monitor, Hizbullah is now confronted by many and growing dangers. The greatest of these dangers is the possibility of a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement, which would require Syria to move decisively against Hizbullah. Turkey and France are working hard toward Syrian-Israeli peace, Saudi Arabia is supporting the initiative, and American opposition is fading. In late October 2008, Syrian and Israeli officers were again negotiating in Ankara. Interestingly, the Israelis are asking what Syria's reaction would be in the event of war between Israel and Lebanon (read Hizbullah). The Syrians have replied that Syria will not take part in any war in the region, and has made a strategic and irrevocable decision to pursue peace with Israel. Today, the vise closing around Hizbullah seems to be ever tightening.
As a direct consequence, Hizbullah has been hard at work for months trengthening its position in Lebanon. Today, Hizbullah is perhaps more firmly rooted in Lebanon than ever. Any attempt to crush Hizbullah, by either Syria or Israel, will be a large and bloody task.
During recent months, Hizbullah has been expediting the exit of a number of militant Sunni cells from the Ain al-Hilwa Palestinian refugee camp and has assisted them to relocate in northern Lebanon. A Lebanese army source reports that these militants appear to be planning to launch high profile attacks against the Lebanese army in the heavily Sunni areas of Tripoli and Akkar. During the past several weeks, militants in north Lebanon, reportedly under the command of Abdulghani Jawhar, have in fact attacked the army several times. Hizbullah's objective seems to be to further destabilize Lebanon and simultaneously to consolidate its own mini-state within the country. Moreover, any such attacks by Sunnis will strengthen Hizbullah's argument that Sunnis, not Shiites, are the promoters of violence in Lebanon.
Simultaneously, Hizbullah has been trying to increase its influence over as many Sunni Islamists as possible. To that end, it is currently paying Fathi Yakan, chief of the militant Sunni Islamic Action Front, the sum of $400,000 monthly. Hizbullah aims at total control of the Lebanese Salafi movement because it considers Lebanese Sunnis as the only major remaining obstacle blocking the realization of Iran's strategic goals in Lebanon. It is an old story in Lebanon: what violence may not be able to accomplish, money often can.
Meanwhile, Hizbullah has continued its campaign to emasculate the Lebanese army. That campaign of intimidation and neutralization is part of a larger Iranian policy being used elsewhere (and particularly in Iraq) against the Arab armies of the Middle East. So far, the Hizbullah campaign against the Lebanese army seems to be working. Notably, in January 2008, the army tried to quell a riot in Shiyyah, in the southern suburbs, after its troops came under fire from demonstrators. In the ensuing shooting, seven demonstrators were killed and the entire Shiite leadership demanded government action. A number of army officers were interrogated, several were reprimanded, others were sent to outlying regions of the country, and two senior officers remain in jail. Since then, the army has avoided confrontations with Hizbullah or Shiites. No longer can Lebanese Sunnis, or for that matter any other confessional group in Lebanon, count on intervention from the army to protect them from Hizbullah. No doubt, Hizbullah's future plans include the Lebanese army's fragmentation and absorption.
Immediately after the January confrontation Hizbullah upped the ante by forcing the army to disperse throughout the country. Lebanese troops were already exhausted by the lengthy Nahr al-Barid fighting in 2007 during which it suffered more than 700 casualties. In the late winter and early spring of 2008 Hizbullah provoked a series of skirmishes with Sunnis in Beirut and the Biqaa, and the army itself was attacked near Sidon and outside Tripoli. Despatched to all parts of the country, the army by late spring was fragmented and demoralized.
The army's biggest test came in May of this year when Hizbullah stormed West Beirut and the Druze mountain villages. No resistance whatsoever was mounted by the Lebanese army. When the army did act, it merely made accessible to Hizbullah the routes of entry into Beirut necessary for it to attack the strongholds of its Sunni enemies. Subsequent fighting in Tripoli between Sunnis and Alawites has seen the reduction of the army's role to one similar to that of UNIFIL.
The appointment in mid summer of lieutenant general John Qahwaji as Lebanese army commander may have largely completed Hizbullah's neutralization of the Lebanese army. A former subordinate to and admirer of Michel Aoun, Qahwaji's appointment coincided with the shooting down of an army Gazelle helicopter over the heart of Hizbullah territory. Destruction of the helicopter was a clear message that Hizbullah would no longer tolerate the presence of any non-Hizbullah fighting force in its de facto mini-state in the Biqaa, South Beirut, and South Lebanon. General Qahwaji is unlikely to order the Lebanese army to move against Hizbullah. In the autumn of 2008, Hizbullah appears at a minimum to now have the upper hand in its struggle with the Lebanese army.
For months, there has been talk in Lebanon about incorporation of Hizbullah within the Lebanese army. Probably more likely, over time, is the disintegration of the army and its absorption into Hizbullah. One astute Lebanese observer reports: "Hizbullah is a devout instrument of Iran's foreign policy strategy. The answers to Lebanon's woes can only be found between Teheran and Qom." And any such answers will require a new Iranian-American relationship. In any event, Iran is most unlikely to ever come down on the side of any national Lebanese army serving the interests of a truly independent Lebanese state.
While Hizbullah's campaign against the Lebanese army proceeds, Hizbullah is also preparing for the 2009 parliamentary elections. Hizbullah intends to emerge from those elections with a parliamentary majority, combining its own deputies with those of its political allies (Michel Aoun's Christians and the Syrian Nationalist and Socialist Party), plus the Amal movement led by Nabih Birri. The key to Hizbullah success depends on defeating the Future Trend of Sa'ad al-Hariri. In September 2008, a well-informed Lebanese journalist stated: "If the elections were held today, Sa'ad al-Hariri would not prevail within the Sunni community. Hizbullah is working to finish him off politically."
Hizbullah is now concentrating its political efforts in northern Lebanon, where the al-Hariri clan won all 28 parliamentary seats in 2005. Hizbullah has attracted supported from a portion of the Alawites in Jabal Muhsin. Hizbullah in fact seems to be counting on coopting significant numbers of Alawites in the Tripoli and Akkar areas. Otherwise, Hizbullah's outreach to the Maronite community, which fears Sunni radicalism more than Shiite militancy, is intended to augment its supporters as the 2009 elections approach.
Furthermore, Hizbullah recently initiated a charm offensive to make sure that push does not come to shove. Perhaps the most important of Hizbullah's recent demarches has been its courting of Lebanese Maronite Patriarch Mar Nasrallah Butrus Sfeir.
Sfeir has been demanding repatriation from Israel of scores of Lebanese Christians who collaborated with Israel during its occupation of South Lebanon. The collaborators who were members of the South Lebanese Army (SLA) and their dependents total approximately 3,000 individuals.
Hizbullah is now reported to have accepted the principle of repatriation and has informed Lebanese army intelligence to prepare to receive the returnees via the Naqura border crossing with Israel. The understanding between Hizbullah and the Lebanese army is that the returnees will be subjected to symbolic interrogation and then surrendered to a military tribunal which will return very mild sentences before permitting them to once again lead a normal life in Lebanon. This outcome constitutes a political victory for Maronite leader Michel Aoun, who has been a political ally of Hizbullah since February 2006 and played a key role in consummating the agreement. Clearly, Hizbullah is attempting to convince Maronite Christians that it pays to be on good terms with them.
Entrenchment of Hizbullah in Lebanon is also proceeding through acceleration of a variety of profit-making enterprises in both Shiite and non-Shiite areas. Examples of such enterprises include food cooperatives, medical facilities, and clothing stores. Hizbullah is evidently attempting to make sure that its sources of funding do not dry up if Syria and/or Iran conclude a deal with the United States. A source within Hizbullah states that there are some in the party who actually believe that if Iran exits the confrontation with the West, "it would be the duty of Hizbullah to place it back on the right track."
Furthermore, a Hizbullah source reports that Hizbullah is continuing to purchase or rent buildings and apartments in West Beirut. This is especially true in such fashionable areas as Raouche, Hamra and Qantari. Some of these facilities serve as safe houses, intelligence centers, and troop mobilization facilities. Apparently, Hizbullah intends to house its cadres in these buildings in case of another round of fighting with Israel.
Two reliable Hizbullah sources report that Hizbullah now has a new commander to replace the assassinated Imad Mughniyyah. This assassination was most likely a Syrian operation sparked by Mughniyyah's campaign to convert Alawite army officers to Twelver Shiism. The new Hizbullah chief is Talal Hamiyyeh, formerly Mughniyyah's deputy. Hamiyyeh is unlikely to make the same mistake of proselytization that Mughniyyah made. Hamiyyeh is described as a "most feared man" who is "lethally efficient." He is 47 years old and has vast experience in external operations, especially in connection with Hizbullah's special operations unit. Consequently, Hizbullah is unlikely to experience any degradation of its leadership capability when and if it is next tested militarily.
Perhaps most dramatically during the summer of 2008, Hizbullah occupied the summit of Mt. Sannine, overlooking Beirut. Hizbullah easily took over the "French Cabin," an army base originally constructed by France in the early 1930's, on the strategic 7,800-foot mountain ridge. Syria had occupied the Cabin until it abandoned it in April 2005 two months after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. After Syria's departure, the Lebanese army, interestingly, made no move to occupy the Cabin. Hizbullah apparently simply walked in. One should note that Mt. Sannine is located in the Matn, an area dominated by Michel Aoun.
With Iranian assistance, Hizbullah has proceeded to install an anti-aircraft missile system (modified stingers) on the heights of Mt. Sannine. Hizbullah now claims to possess the ability to shoot down Israeli planes, which have at least tripled their overflights of Lebanon since last May.
Hizbullah's occupation of the French Cabin has been a strategic coup. From the Cabin, Hizbullah can bring two-thirds of Lebanon under surveillance, including Beirut, the Mediterranean Sea, the Kisirwan, Matn, Biqaa, and parts of Syria. Potentially, thousands of Hizbullah troops may now be positioned along the top of Mt. Sannine. The mountain is an ideal location for the emplacement of artillery and missile sites. It is also an excellent repair from which to launch commando raids should Israel land helicopter-born commandos in the Biqaa. From atop Sannine, Hizbullah can easily dominate the Biqaa, long the Hizbullah heartland, from al-Hirmil to Baalbek to Chtaura. However, in the case of a new and all-out Israeli invasion of Lebanon, one can expect Israeli paratroopers to rather easily sweep Hizbullah aside and seize the Cabin as well as the rest of Mt. Sannine.
Perhaps the most important consequence of the takeover of Mt. Sannine is that Hizbullah may now be in a position to locate and disable the monitoring and jamming devices that Israel has planted almost everywhere on the mountain. These devices have seriously disrupted Hizbullah's communications system, including its landline networks, making them extremely vulnerable to Israeli penetration. Hizbullah field operatives and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officers have been holding regular meetings at the Iranian Embassy in Beirut in order to find a way for Hizbullah to regain control of its communications. Indeed, reestablishment of communication security may have been the original and primary reason for the Hizbullah takeover of Mt. Sannine.
Hizbullah regards the independence and security of its landline and other communication assets as perhaps its most important strategic advantage. As explained in Levant Monitor no. 1 ("A New Lebanon?: A Brief Geostrategic Overview," June, 2008) , the Lebanese government's attempt to tax its communications may have been the most important reason for Hizbullah's takeover of West Beirut this past May. More recently, Israel's threat to Hizbullah communication security appears to have been the catalyst for its takeover of Mt. Sannine.
For the past several months, Hizbullah has pushed vigorously ahead with construction of new landlines north of the Litani River. Sujud Mountain, a strategic Hizbullah stronghold, has now been linked with the villages of Jbaa', Kfar Fila, Kfar Milki, Kfar Hatta and Qrayye. Within Beirut itself, Hizbullah by October 2008 had largely completed the linking by landline of the Shiite southern suburbs with West Beirut. To this end, an Amal representative reports, Hizbullah has been digging for months between the Ghubayri neighborhood, the Shatila roundabout, and Jamal Abdulnasser street by Hurj Beirut. Hizbullah comprehends only too well, of course, that all these efforts will be for naught if its system remains vulnerable to Israeli or other penetration.
Hizbullah has numerous agents in Syria, most of whom are Iraqi nationals. On average, Iraqi agents in Syria recruited by Iran/Hizbullah receive monthly compensation of 10,000 Syrian pounds (approximately $200). They function as intelligence agents in place and supply a regular stream of data to South Beirut. Hizbullah now has a data bank of potential Syrian targets, including the residences of all government officials, ranking civil servants, and army officers above the rank of captain. Were Damascus to move against Hizbullah, significant blowback may be expected within Syria itself.
Meanwhile, a Hizbullah source reports that the party has launched a major recruitment campaign to strengthen its non-military base. Its new recruits will serve as a civil defense and intelligence corps, and are receiving special training in computer science and logistics. Currently, Hizbullah is paying each new recruit between $200 and $400, depending on educational level.
Otherwise, Hizbullah is attempting to expand and consolidate its presence abroad. Even if Hizbullah were somehow to be crushed in Lebanon, its foreign footholds would remain formidable.
Now, Iran is attempting to use Hamas to foster a Hizbullah foothold in Jordan. The Iranians apparently believe that Hamas, which is well rooted in Jordan, may be able to assist Hizbullah to begin to put down roots there. Hizbullah sources report that the party has started to recruit Palestinian Sunnis to operate under its aegis. For reasons both military and political, Hizbullah can no longer launch attacks on Israel from Lebanon. Iran is now reported to be searching for a "new pad to launch attacks against Israelis." It may also wish to demonstrate that Hizbullah has a presence in the Arab world outside of Lebanon, and a capability to launch attacks throughout the world. Nevertheless, how Iran can realistically hope to establish Hizbullah in Jordan, given the strength of the Hashemite monarchy and the competence of its army, is far from clear. The PLO tried to do something similar 40 years ago, with results disastrous to itself.
Elsewhere on the international front, Hizbullah has been sending military trainers to the Sudan in order to train elements of the popular resistance militias, which President Umar Hassan al-Bashir recently established to cope with wha he termed an "American campaign" against his regime. In August 2008, a Hizbullah delegation headed by parliamentary deputy Hussein Haj Hassan made an unpublicized visit to Sudan to express its solidarity with the beleaguered regime in Khartoum.
More broadly, Lebanese military intelligence states that there is heavy Hizbullah traffic from Beirut airport to West Africa, where large, predominantly Shiite Lebanese expatriates reside. Ibrahim Aqil, Hizbullah's Head of Foreign Operations, is supervising this operation. Lebanese authorities are concerned that Hizbullah may be planning a major strike against Israel interests in West Africa. The objective of such an attack, Lebanese government sources believe, may be to provoke another Israeli invasion of Lebanon in order to cause the collapse of the Lebanese government and thereby provide Hizbullah with a golden opportunity to declare its own independent state in the Biqaa and south Lebanon.
Hizbullah is also active in South America. Now, it appears that the Venezuelan island of Margarita may be its most important base. Tariq al-Aysami, the Venezuelan Deputy Minister of the Interior, is of Lebanese origin and has been active in recruiting Venezuelans of Arab origin on behalf of Hizbullah, sending them to the Biqaa for military training and then arranging for them to return toVenezuela. Some of these operatives will apparently be infiltrated into the United States as college students or businessmen. Ghazi Nasreddine, a Venezuelan diplomat of Lebanese Shiite background who works in the Venezuelan diplomatic compound in Beirut, is known to be bringing money into Lebanon for Hizbullah from Arab donors in Venezuela.
After a new American President takes office, Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations are likely to become public. At that stage, events in the Levant may get especially interesting.
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