On The Edge
Levant Update 2
July 2008
By: Antony T. Sullivan
President, Near East Support Services
Events are moving rapidly in the Levant. There is good news and bad news to report. Let's start with the good news.
Under Turkish mediation, Syrian-Israeli peace talks continue to make progress in spite of opposition within and outside the Arab region. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has announced that he will meet publicly with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad in Paris on 13 July. Heads of state do not make such announcements unless they have prior agreements in their pockets. It is not impossible that a peace agreement, or at least a joint memorandum of understanding, might be approved by Israel and Syria not long after the Olmert-al-Asad meeting.
If, despite all obstacles, this scenario were in fact to materialize, geostrategic realities in the Middle East would be dramatically altered.
Most notably, an Israeli-Lebanese peace agreement might well follow, involving a return of Shebaa' Farms to Lebanon and the removal of any "national" reason for Hizbullah to retain its arsenal. Iran would be mightily displeased and might be expected to activate both Hizbullah and Hamas in opposition. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would find themselves more isolated than ever, and almost totally at Israel's mercy. Certainly, an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement would represent the last chapter in the long, tragic history of Arab nationalism.
But the obstacles to consummation of any Israeli-Syrian-Lebanese peace agreements are huge.
One major barrier to a Syrian-Israeli peace treaty is the fact that Iranian intelligence has profoundly penetrated the institutions of state power in Syria. Another is the fact that the minority Alawite regime in Syria knows that it is treading on highly combustible ground in moving toward any peace settlement with Israel. Bashar al-Asad shares the fear of his father Hafez that the Sunni reaction in Syria might be violently negative, and possibly even threaten the position of the Alawite community within the country. And then there are Hizbullah and Hamas, each of which would certainly undertake its own actions to abort any Israeli-Syrian understanding. These are weighty blockages.
But Syria is beginning to act in an independent and statesmanlike fashion. President Asad's recent public announcement that Syria is prepared to recognize the territorial integrity of Lebanon and to exchange ambassadors is one sign of this. Another is his endorsement of French President Nicholas Sarkozy's efforts on behalf of the Mediterranean Union. Indeed, President al-Asad recently braved the explosive anger of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, who in a telephone conversation reportedly called al-Asad a "pygmy" and an individual without principles for his willingness to meet with the Israeli prime minister.
More important, there is now information that Syria may have passed vital nuclear information to Israel, through Turkey, late in the summer of 2007, inviting Israel to destroy Syria's putative nuclear storage facility, the al-Kabor Center, located near its eastern desert city of Deir ez-Zour. The new information indicates that Iran had earlier leaned on Syria to agree to hide important Iranian nuclear components at al-Kabor in order to conceal them from IAEA inspectors. Before 2007, Syria was in no position to say "no." However, Syria is said to have never wanted any part in any such deal and quietly invited Israel to solve its problem for it. If this story has any grounding in fact, it would explain more persuasively than anything proposed to date as to why the Israelis hit al-Kabor, and why Syria never made a peep of protest. It would also suggest that Syria may now indeed be starting to act as a responsible state within the international system.
Furthermore, might any possible Syrian-Israeli cooperation concerning the al-Kabor facility in fact constitute Syria's first down payment on peace with Israel, Imad Mugniyyah's February 2008 assassination in Damascus being the second?
In Levant Update 1, I spoke of a "coming Syrian-Hizbullah confrontation." That confrontation may now be closer than many think. Israel's certain price for any peace settlement will be Syria's emasculation of Hizbullah. Given recent events, that is a price Syria seems increasingly willing to pay.
This leads us to the bad news.
Al-Qaeda continues to sink roots in Lebanon, particularly in Palestinian refugee camps such as Ain al-Hilwa outside of Sidon. In fact, there are now reportedly some 2,000 Sunni jihadists inside Ain al-Hilwa, with other concentrations in the western Beqaa and in far northern Lebanon. In fact, a source inside Hizbullah reports that a series of meetings were recently held in the Safsaf area of Ain al-Hilwa during which orders were conveyed from Al-Qaeda official Radwan Issam al-Din detailing specific terrorist operations to be conducted inside and outside of Lebanon. Now, Al-Qaeda is said to be interested in "accelerating its operations in Lebanon, especially after the surge of Hizbullah in Beirut." This may of course be disinformation by Hizbullah against Sunnis generally, but it does seem to indicate that Hizbullah is genuinely worried about the growth of Sunni jihadism.
In Ain al-Hilwa, a sort of "Jihadist International" has been established. Pakistanis, Somalis and Chechens are well represented. Also present are the Tal Kalakh group (Syrians), the al-Anbar and al-Mosul group (Iraqi), the Upper Egyptian group, the Revolutionary Council group (Palestinian), the Tal al-Bireh group (Palestinian), and a Libyan group. There are also mixed Palestinian and Tunisian military training groups. A Palestinian Authority source in Ramallah reports that Usbat al-Ansar, Jund al-Sham, and the remnants of Fateh al-Islam are now planning an "ultra-radical" takeover of the camp. A catalyst for much of this activity is Fathi al-Agha (code-named Abu Khalid al Jazaairi), an explosives expert who has been operating in Ain al-Hilwa since 1996. Apparently, the camp has become roughly equivalent to what al-Anbar province in Iraq was during the first few years after the toppling of Saddam Hussein.
Other Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups are concentrated in Majdal Anjar (especially), and also in Kamid al-Lawz, Marj, and Lala in the Beqaa, and in Akkar and the almost impregnable Diniyye mountains in north Lebanon. Minya, Birqayil, and Azaqeer are key militant centers in the north.
As a matter of longstanding policy, the Lebanese army has not entered either Palestinian refugee camps or mosques. Even if the army has evidence that a specific mosque is being used by a jihadist group to store war material, it has maintained a hands-off attitude. Both mosques and refugee camps have become major nodes of jihadist organization in Lebanon. There can be no doubt that Sunni militancy in Lebanon is metastasizing, and that the new Lebanese jihadism has become a very tough nut for the Lebanese army to crack.
However, there is now also evidence that the hands-off attitude of the Lebanese army may be starting to change.
Recently, Lebanese soldiers killed two suicide bombers, one in south Lebanon and the other in the north. One attacker was shot down at an army checkpoint outside of Ain al-Hilwa, and another at a military base in Abdeh, near Tripoli. More interesting, an agreement is now said to have been reached between the Lebanese army and Palestinian Fateh to move jointly to "pacify and deradicalize" Ain al-Hilwa. The Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, which has ordered Fateh to proceed on this, clearly fears that events may be spinning out of control and that a repeat of the disaster that befell the Palestinians in Lebanon during the 1970s and 1980s may be repeated unless corrective action is taken.
Signs of this new approach are surfacing. Recently, the Lebanese army entered Ain al-Hilwa in conjunction with Fateh and "forcibly" removed six individuals, who were taken to Brummana and jailed in Rumie prison. Forty other jihadists were also seized, and are now detained by pro-Hariri forces elsewhere in Lebanon. Of course, given the number of Jihadists in Ain al-Hilwa, action taken to date is only a drop in the bucket.
For its part, Saudi Arabia has recently sent into Lebanon many Sunni militants whom it controls, in order to infiltrate the most extreme Al-Qaeda oriented groups in Lebanon. For example, in late May, 46 Saudi operatives arrived by ship in Dbaye, a port just a few miles north of Beirut. Dressed as sailors, the Saudi militants disembarked in pairs over a period of five hours in order to avoid attention. These Saudi operatives are former Al-Qaeda militants, most of whom were arrested in Saudi Arabia or by coalition forces in Iraq and subsequently "rehabilitated" by Saudi authorities. Now they are controlled by the Saudi National Security Council, headed by prince Bandar bin Sultan. Interestingly, the port of Dbaye is in the hands of the Lebanese Forces of Samir Geagea. More interesting still, those Lebanese Forces are reported to have provided the Saudi militants with maps, weapons, communications gear and forged identification papers, and facilitated their dispersal throughout Lebanon.
These Saudis have been divided into cells of two or three individuals each. Some cells have gone to Tripoli to protect Shaikh al-Shahhal, founder of the Salafi fundamentalist movement in Lebanon, and others to Quraytem Palace, where Saad Hariri occasionally resides. Others have been sent to the Sabra Palestinian refugee camp, which adjoins Beirut's Shiite southern suburbs, and still others to the town of Anjar in the central Beqaa. All of this suggests that, despite their long history of enmity, Saudi Arabia and Syria are now coming together to settle scores with Hizbullah and, perhaps beyond that, with Iran. Saudi Arabian, Jordanian, and numerous Israeli intelligence agents are all working jointly inside Lebanon against both Sunni and Shiite extremists. In fact, there seems to be a triumvirate taking shape composed of Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Christian anti-Hizbullah elements, seconded by the United States, which are all maneuvering into place to confront both Al-Qaeda and Hizbullah. This is a time of enormous change in the Middle East, and the outlines of a possible new order can already be dimly perceived.
Are American, Syrian and Saudi national interests beginning to converge? Might an Arab-American Entente Cordiale soon replace the Axis of Evil?
Certainly, neither Hizbullah nor Iran will go quietly. Few know that Iranian general Qassem Suleimani, head of the al-Quds brigade, personally took charge of Hizbullah's May coup from a basement in Iran's Beirut embassy. General Suleimani has been one of Iran's key operatives in Iraq, where he played a decisive role in putting an end to the military operations of the Sadr movement. Indeed, some believe that Suleimani is still the most influential figure in Iraq and may soon become the most powerful person in Lebanon. In any forthcoming confrontation with Hizbullah and Iran, General Suleimani will surely be a formidable opponent.
Contrary to popular impression, Hizbullah is hardly an invincible force in Beirut or anywhere else in Lebanon. Its "victory" over Israel in 2006 gave it a reputation for military prowess that the events of May exploded. Hizbullah did not defeat the Lebanese army on the streets of Beirut in May; the army largely declined combat and withdrew from the city. But in the mountains above Beirut, Hizbullah in fact suffered a resounding defeat.
Hizbullah proved no match for Druze and Lebanese Forces militiamen in man-to-man combat. In the Shuf, Hizbullah performed poorly and was soundly defeated. Hizbullah was routed everywhere, most notably between Aley and Tumat Neeha. Hundreds of Samir Geagea's battle-hardened Lebanese Forces shattered Hizbullah. One Lebanese authority states: "Hizbullah may excel in laying landmines and planting IEDs. Its operatives may be disciplined and well-organized, and know how to ambush Israelis and destroy their anti-tank missiles. But when it comes to conventional engagements, Hizbullah, despite its firepower, can be easily defeated by a determined foe." That assertion will likely soon be tested.
Hizbullah was not the only big loser in the mountains during May. Another was Walid Junblatt. An Arab Sunni observer reports that "Junblatt has finally run out of luck. His Druze adversaries (the Syrian Nationalists, the Arslanis, and Wiam Wahhab's militiamen) soundly defeated him in Shweifat and Aley, where he lost many men. The Syrians have now succeeded in making Junblatt politically irrelevant." This observer adds, "A security officer who is protecting Walid Junblatt's residence in Beirut said recently that he overheard a conversation between Junblatt and Nabih Berri in which Junblatt said, 'OK, we lost and you won. I will stay silent from now on.'"
The question remains, Will there be another Israeli-Hizbullah war this year? The current odds are something like 50-50. If there is to be another war, it will most likely occur between early September and mid October. Hizbullah clearly anticipates renewed combat and continues to reinforce its missile arsenal in south Lebanon and to enlarge its tunnel network there. As far as Israel is concerned, Hizbullah is said to be planning for "a genuine underground war."
The larger question, however, is the outlook for Sunni-Shiite relations within Lebanon. And that outlook is bleak. The tension is unprecedented. A showdown looms between what one observer calls "two doomsday movements," Al-Qaeda and Hizbullah. No exit for either party seems readily available.
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